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In the

SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF IDAHO

In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF MICHAELS. CORNELL
AND ARLIE M. CORNELL.

Petitioner-Appellant,

Appealed from the District Court of the Second
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and
for Clearwater County
Honorable MICHAEL J. GRIFFIN, District Judge

Samuel T. Creason
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant
Karin Seubert
Attorney for Respondent-Respondent
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Date: 1/26/2015

Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County

Time: 09:04 AM

ROA Report

Page 1 of 10

User: BARBIE

Case: CV-2012-0000277 Current Judge: Michael J Griffin
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, etal.

In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, Arlie M. Cornell
Date

Code

User

7/11/2012

NCOC

BARBIE

New Case Filed - Other Claims

BARBIE

Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not Randall W. Robinson
listed in categories B-H, or the other A listings
below Paid by: Aherin, Rice & Anegon Receipt
number: 0002377 Dated: 7/26/2012 Amount:
$96.00 (Cashiers Check) For: Cronell, John
Henry (other party)

PETN

BARBIE

Petition For Supervised Administration And
Removal Of Trustee

Randall W. Robinson

NOHG

BARBIE

Notice Of Hearing

Randall W. Robinson

HRSC

BARBIE

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
08/21/2012 03:30 PM) Petition for Supervised
Administration and Removal of Trustee

Randall W. Robinson

APER

BARBIE

Other party: Cronell, John Henry Appearance
Darrel W. Aherin

Randall W. Robinson

NOAP

TEMP

Notice Of Appearance

Randall W. Robinson

APER

TEMP

Other party: Johnson, Toni C. Appearance Karin
Seubert

Randall W. Robinson

TEMP

Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Seubert,
Karin (attorney for Johnson, Toni C.) Receipt
number: 0002622 Dated: 8/16/2012 Amount:
$66.00 (Cashiers Check) For: Johnson, Toni C.
(other party)

Randall W. Robinson

MOTN

TEMP

Motion to Continue _and to Set Scheduling
Conference

Randall W. Robinson

8/17/2012

OBJC

JALLAIN

Objection to Motion to Continue and to set
Scheduling Conference

Randall W. Robinson

8/21/2012

HRHD

CHRISTY

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Randall W. Robinson
on 08/21/2012 03:30 PM: Hearing Held Petition
for Supervised Administration and Removal of
Trustee

CMIN

CHRISTY

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Randall W. Robinson
on 08/21/2012 03:30 PM: Court Minutes Petition
for Supervised Administration and Removal of
Trustee

HRSC

CHRISTY

Hearing Scheduled (Status 10/01/2012 10:00
AM) and Scheduling Conference. All parties
must be present for hearing.

8/22/2012

ORDR

BARBIE

Order Continuing Hearing and Setting Scheduling Randall W. Robinson
Conference

8/23/2012

AFFD

KBR OWNING

Affidavit of Service

Randall W. Robinson

9/17/2012

AFFD

BARBIE

Affidavit of Karin Seubert

Randall W. Robinson

MTDM

BARBIE

Motion To Dismiss

Randall W. Robinson

NOHG

BARBIE

Notice Of Hearing

Randall W. Robinson

8/16/2012

Judge
Randall W. Robinson

Randall W. Robinson
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User: BARBIE

Case: CV-2012-0000277 Current Judge: Michael J Griffin
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, etal.

In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, Arlie M. Cornell
Date

Code

User

9/27/2012

MOTN

KCONNOR

Motion to Vacate Respondent's Notice of Hearing Randall W. Robinson
on Motion to Dismiss

MOTN

KCONNOR

Motion to Strike Affidavit of Karen Seubert

Randall W. Robinson

10/1/2012

CONT

KBROWNING

Hearing result for Status scheduled on
10/01/2012 10:00 AM: Hearing Continued and
Scheduling Conference. All parties must be
present for hearing. (OFF THE RECORD)

Randall W. Robinson

10/3/2012

HRSC

KBROWNING

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
11/27/2012 01:00 PM)

Randall W. Robinson

KBROWNING

Notice Of Hearing

Randall W. Robinson

Judge

10/11/2012

NODT

JALLAIN

Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Toni
Johnson

Randall W. Robinson

10/12/2012

MOTN

JALLAIN

Motion to Shorten Time

Randall W. Robinson

MOTN

JALLAIN

Motion for Protective Order

Randall W. Robinson

TPMO

JALLAIN

Telephonic Motion Hearing - held 10/17/2012

Randall W. Robinson

CMIN

JALLAIN

Court Minutes

Randall W. Robinson

ORDR

JALLAIN

Order of Protection from Discovery

Randall W. Robinson

RSPN

JALLAIN

Response to Motion for Protective Order

Randall W. Robinson

AFFD

JALLAIN

Affidavit of Darrel W. Aherin

Randall W. Robinson

11/1/2012

MEMO

BARBIE

Memorandum Of Law

Randall W. Robinson

11/15/2012

RSPN

JALLAIN

Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss

Randall W. Robinson

AFFD

JALLAIN

Affidavit of Margaret M Watkins

Randall W. Robinson

AFFD

JALLAIN

Affidavit of Darrel W Aherin

Randall W. Robinson

11/20/2012

BREF

BARBIE

Respondent's Reply Brief in Support of Motion to
Dismiss

Randall W. Robinson

11/27/2012

APER

KBR OWNING

Other party: Cornell, Kareen Appearance
Theodore 0. Creason

Randall W. Robinson

CONT

KBROWNING

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled
on 11/27/2012 01 :00 PM: Continued

Randall W. Robinson

HRSC

KBROWNING

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
01/08/2013 01:00 PM)

Randall W. Robinson

10/17/2012

10/18/2012

KBROWNING

1/8/2013

1/11/2013

Notice Of Hearing

Randall W. Robinson

CMIN

BARBIE

Court Minutes

Michael J Griffin

HRHD

CBAKER

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled
on 01/08/2013 01 :00 PM: Hearing Held

Randall W. Robinson

CMIN

CBAKER

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled
on 01/08/2013 01 :00 PM: Court Minutes

Randall W. Robinson

HRSC

JALLAIN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss Hearing
02/06/2013 02:00 PM)

Randall W. Robinson

JALLAIN

Notice Of Hearing - Briefing schedule: T. 0.
Creason must submit Brief by 01/23/2013; Reply
Briefs due by 02/01/2013

Randall W. Robinson
3

Date: 1/26/2015

Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County

Time: 09:04 AM

ROA Report

Page 3 of 10

User: BARBIE

Case: CV-2012-0000277 Current Judge: Michael J Griffin
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, etal.

In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, Arlie M. Cornell
Date

Code

User

1/18/2013

MEMO

CHRISTY

Memorandum RE: Repsondent's Motion to
Dismiss

Randall W. Robinson

2/4/2013

MOTN

BARBIE

Motion To Mediate

Randall W. Robinson

BREF

JALLAIN

Respondent's Brief in Reply to Brief of Surviving
Spouse

Randall W. Robinson

HRHD

JALLAIN

Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled
on 02/06/2013 02:00 PM: Hearing Held

Randall W. Robinson

CMIN

BARBIE

Court Minutes

Michael J Griffin

NOTC

JALLAIN

Notice of Service

Randall W. Robinson

NODT

JALLAIN

Notice Of Taking Deposition of Toni C Johnson

Randall W. Robinson

MOTN

JALLAIN

Motion for Substitution of Party (IRCP 25(a)(1)

Randall W. Robinson

NOTH

JALLAIN

Notice Of Hearing for 02/26/2013 at 11 :00 AM

Randall W. Robinson

HRSC

JALLAIN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/26/2013 11 :00
AM)

Randall W. Robinson

MEMO

JALLAIN

Memorandum Opinion

Randall W. Robinson

2/6/2013

2/13/2013

2/15/2013

Judge

JDMT

JALLAIN

Judgment for Dismissal

Randall W. Robinson

2/22/2013

NOHG

BARBIE

Notice Of Hearing

Michael J Griffin

2/26/2013

HRHD

JALLAIN

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
02/26/201311:00 AM: Hearing Held

Randall W. Robinson

CMIN

JALLAIN

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
02/26/2013 11 :00 AM: Court Minutes

Randall W. Robinson

MOTN

JALLAIN

Motion for Consolidation (IRCP 42(a))

Randall W. Robinson

PETN

JALLAIN

Petitiom by Kareen Cornell as Personal
Representative of the Estate of John Henry
Cornell & as Surviving Spouse of John Henry
Cornell, Deceased Beneficiary of the Revocable
Family Trust of Michael S Cornell & Arlie M
Cornell for Supervised Administration & Court
Ordered Distribution

Randall W. Robinson

MEMO

JALLAIN

Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees

Randall W. Robinson

AFFD

JALLAIN

Affidavit in Support of Memorandum of Costs and Randall W. Robinson
Attorney Fees

MOTN

JALLAIN

Motion to Dismiss

Randall W. Robinson

MOTN

JALLAIN

Motion for Protective Order

Randall W. Robinson

NOTC

JALLAIN

Notice of Hearing

Randall W. Robinson

HRSC

JALLAIN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion For Protective Order Randall W. Robinson
03/13/2013 03:00 PM)

3/11/2013

OBJE

JALLAIN

Objection to Hearing

Randall W. Robinson

3/13/2013

HRHD

CBAKER

Hearing result for Motion For Protective Order
scheduled on 03/13/2013 03:00 PM: Hearing
Held

Randall W. Robinson

3/1/2013

3/4/2013
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Case: CV-2012-0000277 Current Judge: Michael J Griffin
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, eta!.

In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, Arlie M. Cornell
Date

Code

User

3/13/2013

CMIN

CBAKER

Hearing result for Motion For Protective Order
scheduled on 03/13/2013 03:00 PM: Court
Minutes

Randall W. Robinson

3/14/2013

MOTN

JALLAIN

Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees
Claimed by Toni C Johnson against the Trust

Randall W. Robinson

3/15/2013

MOTN

CBAKER

Motion To Disallow Costs And Attorney Fees
(I.C.R.P. 54(d)(6))

Randall W. Robinson

MEMO

CBAKER

Memorandum In Support

Randall W. Robinson

NOTC

CBAKER

Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion To Disallow Costs
And Attorney Fees (I.R.C.P 54(d)(6))

Randall W. Robinson

HRSC

CBAKER

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/10/2013 09:00
AM) Motion To Disallow Costs And Attorney
Fees

Randall W. Robinson

NOTC

CBAKER

Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Of Toni C. Randall W. Robinson
Johnson

JALLAIN

Filing: L2 -Appeal, Magistrate Division to District
Court Paid by: Aherin, Darrel W. (attorney for
Cronell, John Henry) Receipt number: 0001115
Dated: 4/2/2013 Amount: $61.00 (Cashiers
Check) For: Cornell, Michael S. (subject)

Randall W. Robinson

3/20/2013
3/26/2013

Judge

NOTA

JALLAIN

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Randall W. Robinson

4/2/2013

CCOA

JALLAIN

Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal

Randall W. Robinson

4/4/2013

ORDR

CHRISTY

Order for Briefing

Randall W. Robinson

4/9/2013

STIP

BARBIE

Stipulation Rescheduling Hearing

Randall W. Robinson

4/10/2013

CONT

JALLAIN

Continued Hearing result for Motion scheduled
on 04/10/2013 09:00 AM: Hearing Continued
Motion To Disallow Costs And Attorney Fees

Randall W. Robinson

4/16/2013

NSRV

JALLAIN

Notice Of Service

Randall W. Robinson

5/7/2013

NOTH

JALLAIN

Amended Notice Of Hearing for 06/04/2013 at
4:00 PM

Randall W. Robinson

MEMO

JALLAIN

Memorandum of Law in Support of Second
Motion to Dismiss

Randall W. Robinson

HRSC

JALLAIN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss
06/04/2013 04:00 PM)

Randall W. Robinson

5/13/2013

BRIE

JALLAIN

Brief in Support of Appeal

Randall W. Robinson

5/15/2013

MOTN

JALLAIN

Motion for Order Shortening Time for Hearing Telephonic Conference for 05/17/2013 at 2:30

Randall W. Robinson

PM

5/17/2013

MOTN

JALLAIN

Motion to Stay Proceedings

Randall W. Robinson

HRSC

JALLAIN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Stay 05/17/2013
02:30 PM) Telephonic Conference

Randall W. Robinson

OBJC

JALLAIN

Objection to Motion to Stay Proceedings

Randall W. Robinson

MOTN

JALLAIN

Motion to Augment Record

Randall W. Robinson
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User: BARBIE

Case: CV-2012-0000 277 Current Judge: Michael J Griffin
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, etal.

In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, Arlie M. Cornell
Date

Code

User

5/17/2013

HRHD

JALLAIN

Hearing Held (Motion to Stay 05/17/2013 2:30
PM) Telephonic Conference

Randall W. Robinson

CMIN

JALLAIN

Court Minutes

Randall W. Robinson

NOTH

KCONNOR

Notice Of Hearing

Randall W. Robinson

5/20/2013

ORDR

JALLAIN

Order - Denying Karreen Cornell's Motion to Stay Randall W. Robinson
the Proceedings

5/22/2013

AFFD

JALLAIN

Affidavit of Theodore O Creason Certifying a
Randall W. Robinson
Portion of the Desposition of Toni C Johnson and
Exhibits of April 22, 2013

MEMO

JALLAIN

Memorandum in Oppostion Re: Motion to
Dismiss

Randall W. Robinson

5/23/2013

HRSC

KCONNOR

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/04/2013 03:00
PM)

Randall W. Robinson

5/28/2013

REPL

KCONNOR

Respondent's Reply Brief Re: Motion to Dismiss

Randall W. Robinson

6/3/2013

MOTN

JALLAIN

The Estate of John Cornell's Motion to Disqualify
the Law Firm of Jones, Brower & Callery, PLLC

Randall W. Robinson

MEMO

JALLAIN

Memorandum in Support of the Estate of John
Cornell's Motion to Disqualify the Law Firm of
Jones, Brower & Callery, PLLC

Randall W. Robinson

HRHD

CHRISTY

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
06/04/2013 03:00 PM: Hearing Held Motion to
Augment Record

Michael J Griffin

DCHH

CHRISTY

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Michael J Griffin
06/04/2013 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel<
Court Reporter: Keith Evans
Number of Transcript Pages for hearing
estimated:
LESS THAN 100 Motion to Augment Record

CMIN

CHRISTY

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
06/04/2013 03:00 PM: Court Minutes Motion to
Augment Record

Michael J Griffin

ORDR

CHRISTY

Order Augmenting Record

Randall W. Robinson

HRHD

JALLAIN

Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled
on 06/04/2013 04:00 PM: Hearing Held

Randall W. Robinson

CMIN

JALLAIN

Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled
on 06/04/2013 04:00 PM: Court Minutes

Randall W. Robinson

BREF

BARBIE

Brief of Estate of John H. Cornell

Randall W. Robinson

BREF

BARBIE

Brief In Opposition to Appeal

Randall W. Robinson

6/11/2013

ORDR

CHRISTY

Second Order Augmenting Record

Randall W. Robinson·

6/21/2013

MEMO

JALLAIN

Memorandum Opinion Re: Kareen Cornell

Randall W. Robinson

JDMT

JALLAIN

Judgment for Dismissal

Randall W. Robinson

SCAN

BARBIE

Scanned:

Randall W. Robinson

SCAN

BARBIE

Scanned:

Randall W. Robinson

REPL

CHRISTY

Appellant Rely Brief

Randall W. Robinson

6/4/2013

6/10/2013

7/1/2013

Judge
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User: BARBIE

Case: CV-2012-0000277 Current Judge: Michael J Griffin
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, etal.

In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, Arlie M. Cornell
Date

Code

7/2/2013

User

Judge

BARBIE

Filing: L2 -Appeal, Magistrate Division to District Randall W. Robinson
Court Paid by: Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl
Receipt number: 0002068 Dated: 7/2/2013
Amount: $61.00 (Cashiers Check) For: Cornell,
Kareen (other party)

NOTA

BARBIE

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Randall W. Robinson

APDC

BARBIE

Appeal Filed In District Court

Randall W. Robinson

7/3/2013

CCOA

BARBIE

Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal

Randall W. Robinson

7/5/2013

AFFD

BARBIE

Affidavit In Support Of Memorandum Of Costs
And Attorney Fees·

Randall W. Robinson

MEMO

BARBIE

Memorandum Of Costs And Attorney Fees

Randall W. Robinson

MOTN

CBAKER

Motion To Disallow Costs And Attorney Fees

Randall W. Robinson

MEMO

CBAKER

Memorandum In Support RE: Motion To Disallow Randall W. Robinson
Costs And Attorney Fees

MOTN

BARBIE

Motion to Mediate

Randall W. Robinson

NOHG

BARBIE

Notice Of Telephonic Hearing

Randall W. Robinson

HRSC

BARBIE

Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Motion Hearing
07/30/2013 01:45 PM)

Randall W. Robinson

7/12/2013

ORDR

CHRISTY

Order for Transcript on Appeal

Randall W. Robinson

7/15/2013

MOTN

JALLAIN

Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees
Claimed by Toni C Johnson against the Trust

Randall W. Robinson

7/17/2013

BNDC

BARBIE

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 2311 Dated
7/17/2013 for 200.00)

Randall W. Robinson

7/25/2013

HRSC

BARBIE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/03/2013 10:00
AM)

Randall W. Robinson

7/9/2013

7/10/2013

BARBIE
7/30/2013

8/2/2013

Notice Of Hearing

Randall W. Robinson

HRHD

CHRISTY

Hearing result for Telephonic Motion Hearing
scheduled on 07/30/2013 01:45 PM: Hearing
Held Set Up Meet Me

Michael J Griffin

DCHH

CHRISTY

Hearing result for Telephonic Motion Hearing
scheduled on 07/30/2013 01:45 PM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Keith Evans
Number of Transcript Pages for hearing
estimated:
LESS THAN 100 Set Up Meet Me

Michael J Griffin

CMIN

CHRISTY

Hearing result for Telephonic Motion Hearing
scheduled on 07/30/2013 01:45 PM: Court
Minutes Set Up Meet Me

Michael J Griffin

BNDV

CHRISTY

Bond Converted (Transaction number 254 dated
8/2/2013 amount 130.00)

Randall W. Robinson

BNDV

CHRISTY

Bond Converted (Transaction number 255 dated
8/2/2013 amount 70.00)

Randall W. Robinson

TRAN

KCONNOR

Transcript of a Motion to Dismiss

Randall W. Robinson
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User: BARBIE

Case: CV-2012-0000277 Current Judge: Michael J Griffin
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, etal.

In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, Arlie M. Cornell
Date

Code

User

8/13/2013

NOTH

JALLAIN

Notice Of Hearing Re: Motion to Disallow Costs
and Attorney Fees

9/3/2013

HRHD

JALLAIN

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Randall W. Robinson
09/03/2013 10:00 AM: Hearing Held Mr. Aherin
to appear by Telephone

CMIN

BARBIE

Court Minutes

Michael J Griffin

MEMO

JALLAIN

Memorandum Opinion Re: Attorney Fees and
Costs

Randall W. Robinson

ORDR

JALLAIN

Order Re: Attorney Fees and Costs filed on July
5, 2013 are hereby DENIED.

Randall W. Robinson

9/13/2013

MOTN

JALLAIN

Motion to Augment Record

Randall W. Robinson

9/26/2013

MOTN

CHRISTY

Motion to Augment Record

Randall W. Robinson

NOTC

CHRISTY

Notice of Hearing RE: Motion to Augment Record Randall W. Robinson

HRSC

CHRISTY

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/05/2013 10:30
AM) to Augment Record

Randall W. Robinson

10/7/2013

NOTC

JALLAIN

Notice of NO Objection

Randall W. Robinson

10/18/2013

BRIE

JALLAIN

Appellant's Brief

Randall W. Robinson

10/29/2013

ORDR

BARBIE

Order Granting Motion To Augment Record

Randall W. Robinson

ORDR

BARBIE

Order RE: Augment Record

Michael J Griffin

11/1/2013

STIP

CHRISTY

Stipulation to Augment

Michael J Griffin

11/4/2013

HRVC

CHRISTY

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
11/05/2013 10:30 AM: Hearing Vacated to
Augment Record

Michael J Griffin

11/20/2013

BREF

JALLAIN

Respondent's Brief

Michael J Griffin

12/4/2013

BRIE

JALLAIN

Appellant's Reply Brief

Michael J Griffin

12/11/2013

NOHG

BARBIE

N9tice Of Hearing RE: Appeal

Michael J Griffin

HRSC

BARBIE

Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal
02/18/2014 08:30 AM)

Michael J Griffin

HRHD

CHRISTY

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal
scheduled on 02/18/2014 08:30 AM: Hearing
Held

Michael J Griffin

DCHH

CHRISTY

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal
scheduled on 02/18/2014 08:30 AM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Keith Evans
Number of Transcript Pages for hearing
estimated:
LESS THAN 100

Michael J Griffin

CMIN

CHRISTY

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal
scheduled on 02/18/2014 08:30 AM: Court
Minutes

Michael J Griffin

ORDR

JJENSEN

Order Remanding Case

Michael J Griffin

ORDR

JJENSEN

Order Re: Appeal

Michael J Griffin

CHJG

JDUGGER

Change Assigned Judge

Randall W. Robinson

9/6/2013

2/18/2014

4/8/2014

Judge
Randall W. Robinson
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Case: CV-2012-0000277 Current Judge: Michael J Griffin
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, etal.

In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, Arlie M. Cornell
Date

Code

User

5/13/2014

MOTN

JDUGGER

Motion To Remove Trustee

Randall W. Robinson

MEMO

JDUGGER

Memorandum In Support
RE: Motion To Remove Trustee

Randall W. Robinson

NOHG

JDUGGER

Notice Of Hearing
RE: Motion To Remove Trustee

Randall W. Robinson

HRSC

JDUGGER

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 05/27/2014
03:00 PM) Motion To Remove Trustee

Randall W. Robinson

APPL

JDUGGER

Application For Appointment Of Trustee

Randall W. Robinson

ACCP

JDUGGER

Acceptance Of Appointment

Randall W. Robinson

NOHG

JDUGGER

Notice Of Hearing
RE:Application For Appointment Of Trustee

Randall W. Robinson

HRSC

JDUGGER

Hearing Scheduled (Application for Appointment Randall W. Robinson
of Trustee 05/27/2014 03:00 PM)

5/23/2014

OBJC

KCONNOR

Objection to Motion to Remove Trustee &
Application for Apointment of Trustee

Randall W. Robinson

5/27/2014

HRHD

LMCMILLAN

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
05/27/2014 03:00 PM: Hearing Held Motion To
Remove Trustee

Randall W. Robinson

HRHD

LMCMILLAN

Hearing result for Application for Appointment of
Trustee scheduled on 05/27/2014 03:00 PM:
Hearing Held

Randall W. Robinson

CMIN

LMCMILLAN

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Randall W. Robinson
05/27/2014 03:00 PM: Court Minutes Motion To
Remove Trustee

6/16/2014

6/20/2014

7/7/2014

MEMO

. BARBIE

SCAN

Judge

Memorandum Opinion RE: Remand Order

Randall W. Robinson

BARBIE

Scanned: 06/18/2014

Randall W. Robinson

JDMT

BARBIE

Final Judgment RE: Remand Order

Randall W. Robinson

CDIS

BARBIE

Civil Disposition entered for: Cornell, Kareen,
Randall W. Robinson
Other Party; Cronell, John Henry, Other Party;
Johnson, Toni C., Other Party; Cornell, Arlie M.,
Subject; Cornell, Michael S., Subject. Filing date:
6/16/2014

SCAN

BARBIE

Scanned: 06/18/2014

Randall W. Robinson

MOTN

CHRISTY

Motion to Correct Clerical Mistakes

Randall W. Robinson

NOTC

CHRISTY

Notice of Hearing

Randall W. Robinson

HRSC

CHRISTY

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Correct Clerical
Mistakes 07/07/2014 02:15 PM)

Randall W. Robinson

HRHD

LMCMILLAN

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
07/07/2014 02:15 PM: Hearing Held to Correct
Clerical Mistakes

Randall W. Robinson

CMIN

LMCMILLAN

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Randall W. Robinson
07/07/2014 02:15 PM: Court Minutes to Correct
Clerical Mistakes

ORDR

LMCMILLAN

Order Clarifying Citations

Randall W. Robinson
9

Date: 1/26/2015

Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County

Time: 09:04 AM

ROA Report

Page 9 of 10

User: BARBIE

Case: CV-2012-0000277 Current Judge: Michael J Griffin
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, etal.

In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, Arlie M. Cornell
Date

Code

User

7/10/2014

NOTA

KCONNOR
KCONNOR

Judge
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Randall W. Robinson

Filing: L2 -Appeal, Magistrate Division to District
Court Paid by: Creason, Theodore 0. (attorney
for Cornell, Kareen) Receipt number: 0002085
Dated: 7/10/2014 Amount: $81.00 (Cashiers
Check) For: Cornell, Kareen (other party)

Randall W. Robinson

Michael J Griffin

BREF

KCONNOR

Appellant's Brief

7/14/2014

MISC

BARBIE

Clerk's Transmittal of Court File and Certificate of Michael J Griffin
Appeal to District Court

7/22/2014

SCHE

BARBIE

Scheduling Order

Michael J Griffin

HRSC

BARBIE

Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal
09/09/2014 10:00 AM)

Michael J Griffin

8/5/2014

BREF

BARBIE

Respondent's Brief

Randall W. Robinson

8/7/2014

CONT

BARBIE

Continued (Oral Argument on Appeal
09/23/2014 10:30 AM)

Randall W. Robinson

8/12/2014

BREF

BARBIE

Appellant's Reply Brief

Randall W. Robinson

8/21/2014

BARBIE

Notice Of Hearing

Randall W. Robinson

9/11/2014

ORDR

CHRISTY

Order Staying Appeal

Michael J Griffin

9/22/2014

JDMT

BARBIE

Judgment

Michael J Griffin

SCAN

BARBIE

Scanned: 12-30-2014

Michael J Griffin

HRHD

CHRISTY

Hearing Held: Scheduling Conference (OFF THE Michael J Griffin
RECORD)

CONT

CHRISTY

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal
scheduled on 09/23/2014 10:30 AM: Hearing
Continued to 10/15/2014@ 11:30 a.m.

HRSC

CHRISTY

Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument-on Appeal
Michael J Griffin
10/15/2014 11 :30 AM) Hearing will be conducted
in Nez Perce County

HRHD

CHRISTY

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal
scheduled on 10/15/2014 11 :30 AM: Hearing
Held Hearing will be conducted in Nez Perce
County

Michael J Griffin

DCHH

CHRISTY

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal
scheduled on 10/15/2014 11 :30 AM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Keith Evans
Number of Transcript Pages for hearing
estimated:
LESS THAN 100 Hearing will be conducted in
Nez Perce County

Michael J Griffin

CMIN

CHRISTY

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal
scheduled on 10/15/201411:30AM: Court
Minutes Hearing will be conducted in Nez Perce
County (Nez Perce County clerk will email
minutes from hearing.)

Michael J Griffin

MEMO

CHRISTY

Memorandum Opinion

Michael J Griffin

9/23/2014

10/15/2014

10/24/2014

Michael J Griffin
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Date: 1/26/2015

Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County

Time: 09:04 AM

ROA Report

Page 10 of 10

User: BARBIE

Case: CV-2012-0000277 Current Judge: Michael J Griffin
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, eta!.

In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, Arlie M. Cornell
Date

Code

User

10/24/2014

SCAN

CHRISTY

Scanned: 11-7-2014

ORDR

BARBIE

Order Re: Appeal - Magistrate's Order of June 16, Michael J Griffin
2014 Affirmed

SCAN

BARBIE

Scanned: 11-7-2014

BARBIE

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Michael J Griffin
Supreme Court Paid by: Creason, Theodore 0.
(attorney for Cornell, Kareen) Receipt number:
0003458 Dated: 12/3/2014 Amount: $129.00
(Cashiers Check) For: Crone!!, John Henry (other
party)

NOTA

BARBIE

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Michael J Griffin

APSC

BARBIE

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Michael J Griffin

BNDC

BARBIE

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 3459 Dated
12/3/2014 for 434.90)

Michael J Griffin

CCOA

BARBIE

Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal

Michael J Griffin

12/2/2014

12/3/2014

Judge
Michael J Griffin

Michael J Griffin
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AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON
Darrel W. Aherin
1212 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698
(208) 746-3646
ISB# 1534

I\C .

CA)\'A·?..1J.7_.

DY _ _t?oQ
_,.,.......__
_

C:: .:,--:·:

Attorneys for John Hemy Cornell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL,

PETITION FOR SUPERVISED
ADMINISTRATION AND REMOVAL OF
TRUSTEE

Petitioner, John Henry Cornell, states and represents to the Court that:
1.

Petitioner's interest in this matter is that of a beneficiary under The Revocable

Family Trust of Michael S. and Arlie M. Cornell.
2.

Arlie M. Cornell died on November 9, 2008 and Michael S. Comeii died on

December 15, 2009.
3.

Under the terms of The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie

M. Cornell, dated November 1, 1996, hereinafter "The Trust," Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M.
Cornell, or the survivor between them, were Co-Trustees. The Trust further provided that upon
the death or incapacity of the last survivor of the initial trustees, Toni C . Johnson and John H.
Cornell would act as successor trustees. Toni C. Johnson is 50 years old and John H. Cornell is
47 years old.
PETITION FOR SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION
AND REMOVAL OF TRUSTEE -- 1
N:\Comell, John\Pleadings\Petition Supervised Admin & Removal.docx

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
Lewiston, Idaho
12

4.

After the death of Arlie M. Cornell, Michael S. Cornell modified The Trust to

appoint Toni C. Johnson as successor trustee upon his death or incapacity, and John H. Cornell
as trustee in the event Toni C. Johnson could not act.
5.

Section 1.06 of The Trust provides that amendments to The Trust could be made

"during the joint lives of the Trustors" (emphasis added).
6.

Toni C. Johnson has been serving as sole successor trustee since the death of

Michael S. Cornell.
7.

No inventory of the assets in The Trust at the time of the death of Michael S.

Cornell has been provided.
8.

The Trust, Section 4.03 provides as follows:

On the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trust shall terminate and the Trustee
shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and principal
remaining in the Trust into two (2) equal shares and distribute them to the
following beneficiaries: TONI C. JOHNSON AND JOHN H. CORNELL.
9.

The main asset of The Trust is house and real property. Toni C. Johnson has been

residing in the house since Michael S. Cornell's death. The property remains in the name of The
Trust and has not been distributed to the two beneficiaries. Toni C. Johnson has paid no rent
during her tenancy of the premises.
10.

Toni C. Johnson has mismanaged The Trust in that she has used a substantial

amount of the monies available to pay both expenses of maintaining the real property, where she
has resided for two and one half years, and to pay her personal expenses. No money has been
distributed to John Henry Cornell.
11.

Toni C. Johnson has breached her fiduciary duty to settle and distribute The Trust

in accordance with the terms of The Trust.
12.

The best interest of The Trust would be served by removal of Toni C. Johnson as

Trustee. Margaret Watkins, the sister of Arlie M. Cornell, is qualified to succeed Toni C.
Johnson as trustee. Margaret Watkins has offered to serve as Trustee to preserve the assets of the
Trust and save The Trust money.
13.

The Trust should be subject to supervised administration because supervised

administration is necessary for the protection of the beneficiaries in the estate.

PETITION FOR SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION
AND REMOVAL OF TRUSTEE -- 2
N:\Comell, John\Pleadings\Petition Supervised Admin & Removal.docx

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
Lewiston, Idaho
13

14.

That John Henry Cornell has incurred legal fees and costs as a result of the

wrongful conduct of Toni C. Johnson as trustee and should be compensated for those expenses.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests that:
1.

The Court fix a time and place for hearing.

2.

Toni C. Johnson be removed as trustee for cause.

3.

Margaret Watkins be appointed as successor trustee, to act without bond.

4.

The Court order the delivery of the assets and records of The Trust to Margaret

Watkins.
5.

The Court order that The Trust be subject to supervised administration.

6.

The Court order legal fees and costs incurred personally by Petitioner caused by

the wrongful actions of Toni C. Johnson be paid by Toni C. Johnson, personally, or from Toni C.
Johnson's share of The Trust.
7.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

DATED this

q~

day of~

, 2012.
AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON

By

/j~t,J -~

Darrel W. Aherin
Attorney for Petitioner

PETITION FOR SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION
AND REMOVAL OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE -- 3
N:\Comell , John\Pleadings\Petition Supervised Admin & Removal.docx

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
Lewiston, Idaho
14

VERIFICATION

JOHN HENRY CORNELL, being first duly sworn, upon oath, deposes and says:
That he is the Petitioner in the above-entitled matter, that he has read the foregoing
Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee, well knows the contents thereof,
and verily believes that the facts therein stated are true.

) ss.
)

AlfUJ

LA ~

I,
L
Uc
' a notary public, do hereby certify that on this
_ _ day of June9o12, personally appeared before me JOHN HENRY CORNELL, who, being
by me first duly sworn, declared that he is the Petitioner in the foregoing document and that the
statements therein contained are true.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal on
the day and year first above written.

AMYL. LAWE
Notary Public State of Nevada

No. 07-1423-1
My Appt. Exp. December 7, 20·14

PETITION FOR SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION
AND REMOVAL OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATNE -- 4
N:\Comell, John\Pleadings\Petition Supervised Admin & Removal.docx

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
Lewiston, Idaho
15

CARR.IE 8:-ci
CLERK - DISTRICT CCL!F:T
CLE/~RW/,T~R ccu::TY
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CASE tW.

AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON
Darrel W. Aherin
1212 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698
(208) 746-3646
ISB# 1534

BY

2_·:}..ll

(.J./

1uO

DEPUTY

Attorneys for Petitioner,
John Henry Cornell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL,

TO:

NO.

~l/lO)l,l.11

NOTICE OF HEARING

TONIC. JOHNSON:
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTE that on Tuesday, August 21, 2012, at the hour of

3:30 p.m. (Pacific), or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, at the courtroom of the above
entitled court, in Orofino, County of Clearwater, Idaho, the court will call on for hearing the
petitioner, John Henry Cornell's, Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of
Trustee.
DATED this 10th day of July, 2012.
AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON

zJ. ~
Byfu
.
Darrel W. Aherin
Attorney for Petitioner

NOTICE OF HEARING -- 1
N:\Comell , John\Pleadings\Notice ofHearing.docx

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
Lewiston, Idaho

16

Karin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813

:.J

r--

I '--

I

·

/~. AUG16 2~

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M .
CORNELL.

______ ______ __

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

Karin Seubert of the Law Firm of Jones, Brower & Callery, P .L.L.C. , hereby enters an
appearance as attorney of record for the respondent, TONI C. JOHNSON in the above entitled
matter.
DATED this

I~

day of August, 2012.
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

Karin Seubert
Attorney for Respondent

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

-117

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF
day of August,
APPEARANCE was, this
2012,

1.r-

~ hand-delivered by providing a
copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;
mailed, postage pre-paid,
by first class mail; or
transmitted via facsimile
to:
Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice and Anegon
1212 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501

By

~
~
Karin Seubert

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

-218

. ___ Cl/ t 1- ~ J 1-=r .
Karin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

MOTION TO CONTINUE AND
TO SET SCHEDULING CONFERENCE

Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attorney ofrecord, Karin Seubert of Jones,
Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l), hereby moves this Court to continue
the hearing on petitioner's Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee currently
scheduled for August 21 , 2012 at 3:30 p.m. until such time as is determined at a scheduling
conference to be set at the earliest date convenient to the court and counsel.
This Motion to Continue is made for the reason that Respondent' s counsel has only recently
been retained and the current hearing setting does not allow sufficient time for said counsel to
prepare for said hearing in order to protect Respondent's interests.

MOTION TO CONTINUE AND TO SET
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE

-119

DATED this

/

S-

day of August, 2012.
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

Karin Seubert
Attorney for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO
CONTINUE AND TO SET SCHEDULING
CONFERENCE was, this__j£ day of August,
2012,
/

hand-delivered by providing a
copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;
mailed, postage pre-paid,
by first class mail; or
transmitted via facsimile

to:
Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice and Anegon
1212 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501

By

r~~M~
Karin Seubert

MOTION TO CONTINUE AND TO SET
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE

-220

RUG-·17-2012 12:09 From:RHERIN RICE RNEGON

2087463650

AHERIN, RlCE & ANEGON

Darrel W. Aherin
1212 Idaho Street

P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston! ID 83501-0698
(208) 746-3646
ISB# 1534
Attorney for John Henry Cornell

TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRlCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OP CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:

NO. CV 2012-00277

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF

OBJECTION TO MOTION TO CONTINUE
AND TO SET SCHEDULING
CONFERENCE

MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.

CORNELL,

COMES NOW the attorney for John H. Cornell, Darrel W. Aherin of Ahcrin, Rice &
Anegon, and responds to the Motion to Continue filed by Toni C. Johnson.
The status of the trust property may be compromised by delay in getting the issue before
the Court John H. Cornell objects to a continuation of his petition and requests the opportunity
to provide the Court with the back ground so the Court can assist the parties in getting this matter
re!-lolved.

OBJECTION TO CONTINUE AND TO SET SCHEDULING
CONFERENCE -- I
N:\Comell, John\Pkadings\Objccti on to Motion to Continue and to Set Scheduling

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
Lewiston, Idaho

21

AUG-17-2012 12:09 From:AHERIN RlCE ANEGON

DATED this

2087463650

To:lc:084769315

/ (p ~ay of August, 2012.

::E&JJ~L
Darrel W. Aherin
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

I, DARREL W. AHERJN, hereby certify that on the //:,
day of August, 2012, I
caused to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed
to the following:
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC.,
Attorney at Law
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501

0 U.S. Mail
D _)land Delivery
r.g,/" Facsimil~

OBJECTION TO CONTINUE AND TO SET SCHEDULING
CONFERENCE -- 2
N:\Comell, John\Pleadings\Objection to Motion to Continue and to Set Scheduling

Aherln, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at law
Lewiston, Idaho
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Karin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

ORDER CONTINUING HEARING AND
SETTING SCHEDULING
CONFERENCE

The Court having reviewed Respondent's Motion to Continue Hearing and to Set

Scheduling Conference and good cause shown, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing on
petitioner's Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee currently set for August
21, 2012 at 3:30 p.m. is hereby vacated and a telephonic scheduling conference is hereby set for the
..
0 vCD ber
~1S'~- day of~
t, 2012 at the hour o± lo·~po_ a.m ~ . Counsel for respondent shall initiate
the telephone call.
DATED this l/(5 ( day of August, 2012.

JUDGE RANDALL ROBINSON
ORDER CONTINUING HEARING &
SETTING SCHEDULING CONFERENCE

-123

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER
CONTINUING HEARING AND SETT]J1G
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE was, thi~
day
of August, 2012,

_X_

hand-delivered by providing a
copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;
mailed, postage pre-paid,
by first class mail; or
transmitted via facsimile

-to:
Darrel W . Aherin
Aherin, Rice and Anegon
1212 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C.
1304 Idaho St.
P.O. Box 854

By ~

ORDER CONTINUING HEARING &
SETTING SCHEDULING CONFERENCE

-224

AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON
Darrel W. Aherin
1212 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698
(208) 746-3646
ISB# 1534
Attorneys for Petitioner,
John Hemy Cornell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWAT ER
In the Matter of:
NO. 2012-277
THE REVOCABL E FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL,

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE -- I
N :\Cornell, John\Pleadings\Affidavit of Service.docx ser

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
Lewiston, Idah o
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Case No.

()J \Z,,2,,1

F,ied

\ti,\l:k

at

o'clock

j
"\ c;--s

IN THE DISTRIC T COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF~
STATE oF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE coUNTY oF cLEARW ATEU

By
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IN THE MATTER OF:
THE REVOCA BLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAE LS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNEL L,

CASE NO. CV 2012-277
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE )

The undersigned, being first duly sworn, on oath deposes and says: That he is now and
at all times herein
mentioned was a citizen of the United States, over the age of twenty-one years, not a party
to or interested in the
above entitled action and competent to be a witness therein;
That on AUGUST 1, 2012, at 4:47 PM. at the address of .6 MILES UP DENT BRIDGE
ROAD FROM
JUNCTIO N WITH RIVERSIDE AVE., OROFINO, ID 83501 this affiant duly served a
PETITION FOR
SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION AND REMOVA L OF TRUSTEE; AND NOTICE
OF HEARING in the
above-entitled action upon TONI C. JOHNSO N by then and there personally delivering
a true and correct copy
thereof into the hands of and leaving same with said TONI C. JOHNSON .

E. L. RENO, PROCESS SERVER
SUBSCR IBED AND SWORN to be~ ~

Notary Public mand fo, the State ofldah;

/~) :1~

SERVICE:
/(--/~
AFF-PERS-2/05

Residing at Lewiston, Idaho
My commission expires: April 23, 2018

RENO & ASSOCIATES
P.O. BOX 104
LEWISTON , ID 83501

26

Karin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813

By

C.rk-

i/J

DGpu!}'

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Nez Perce

)

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277
AFFIDAVIT OF KARIN SEUBERT

KARIN SEUBERT, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am the attorney of record for Respondent Toni C. Johnson in the above-entitled

2.

Counsel for Petitioner John H. Cornell has confirmed that John H. Cornell died on or

matter;

around August 20, 2012 leaving no issue.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and accurate copy of the Revocable Family

Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell dated November 1, 2011.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and accurate copy of the First Amendment to

the Revocable Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell dated August 6, 2009.

AFFIDAVIT OF KARIN SEUBERT

-127

DATED this

)!/;t;t day of September, 2012.
KARIN SEUBERT

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _/!;tj;ctay of September, 2012.

•, ' V

·--

=, --

.. -<::.

.

,,
' ' .,., ')11

,,l\'

CERTIFICATE'OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF
KARIN SEUBERT was, this~
day of
September, 2012,
hand-delivered by providing a
copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;
mailed, postage pre-paid,
by first class mail; or
transmitted via facsimile
to:
Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice and Anegon
1212 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501

By

~~

Kaiin Seubert

AFFIDAVIT OF KARIN SEUBERT

-228

REVOCABLE FAMILY
OF

TRUST

MICH AELS . CORNELL
AND

ARLIE M. CORNELL
MICHAEL

S. CORNELL and ARLIE M. CORNELL, husban d and
wife, reside nts of the State of Califo rnia, County of Orang
e,
desire to set forth a Trust upon the condi tions and for
the
purpo ses herea fter set forth.
This Trust will be known as the
"MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL REVOCABLE
TRUST DATED
.,# d V' ' I ' 99 ' . II

ARTICLE ONE
Sectio n 1.01

Trust Estat e

All prope rty herea fter transf erred or convey ed to and receiv ed
by
the Truste e to be held pursua nt to the terms of this instru ment
is herein called the
"Trust Estate "
and shall be held,
admin istere d, and distri buted by the Truste e as provid ed in
this
Decla ration of Trust.

Sectio n 1.02

Meani ng of Words

a)

The term "Husba nd" shall mean MICHAEL S.

b)

The term "Wife" shall mean ARLIE M.

CORNELL;

CORNELL;

c)
The term "Trus ter" shall refer indivi dually and collec tively
to Husban d and Wife.

Sectio n 1.03

Trust ee Desig nation

Husban d and Wife are hereby design ated as Co-Tr ustees of
all
trusts create d by or to be create d pursua nt to this Decla ration
of Trust. Should eithe r Husban d or Wife become unable becau se
of
death, incap acity or other cause, to serve as such a Co-Tr ustee,
or should eithe r resign as such a Co-Tr ustee, before the natura
l
termin ation of all trusts provid ed for in this Decla ration ,
the
remain ing Co-Tr ustee, Husban d or Wife, shall there after serve
sole Truste e as provid ed in this Decla ration . The term "Trust as
ee"
as used in this Decla ration shall refer collec tively to Husban
d
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and Wife so long as they shall serve as such Co-Tr ustees and
there after to such of them as may serve as sole Truste e.
This
paragr aph is subje ct to Sectio n 9.01.

Sectio n 1.04

Addit ions to Trust Prope rties

a)
At any time during the contin uance of any trust hereun der,
its Truste es, in their sole discre tion after consid eratio n of
the
possib le tax conseq uences thereo f to all concer ned, is autho rized
to receiv e additi ons of cash or other prope rties to such trust,
subje ct to any condi tions to which such Truste es may agree,
from
any source whatso ever withou t limita tion, wheth er by gift, will,
or otherw ise.
Howev er, the Truste es shall accep t all assets
which any person or person s may give, devise , and/o r beque ath
by
last will and testam ent to any trust or trusts hereun der as
well
as all assets which may be transf erred to such trust or trusts
pursu ant to the expres s provis ions of any other trust docum ent
or
docum ents of any kind.
b)
Furthe rmore , at any time any person or person s may design ate
any trust hereun der as the benef iciary , prima ry or contin gent,
any insura nce, pensio n, or other death benef it, relati ng to of
the
life of anyone (such design ation to be presum ed to be revoca
ble
unless it is expre ssly irrevo cable) and, until such benef
it
matur es by reason of death,
the Truste es shall have no
respo nsibil ity whatso ever with respec t theret o, it being intend
ed
that,
unless and until the trust which is the design ated
benef iciary of such death benef it becom es the owner of
the
insura nce procee ds as actua lly becom e payab le by reason of death.
c)
All additi ons, unless speci ficall y design ated to a certai n
trust or trusts hereun der or unless there is only one trust
then
in existe nce hereun der, shall be consid ered as made to the Trust
as herein after define d.
Any additi on, includ ing any income
earned thereo n prior to actual receip t of the additi on by
the
trust, shall be added to the corpus of such trust and there after
held, manag ed, and distri buted by its Truste es as a part of
the
corpus to which the same is added.

Sectio n 1.05

Separ ate Prope rty to Remai n Separ ate

All prope rty now or herea fter convey ed or transf erred to
the
Truste e to be held by the Truste e pursua nt to this Decla ration
which was commu nity prope rty,
quasi- comm unity prope rty,
separ ate prope rty at the time of such convey ance or transf or
er,
shall remain , respe ctivel y, commu nity prope rty, quasi- comm unity
prope rty, or the separa te prope rty of the Trusto r transf erring
such prope rty to the Truste e.
When separ ate prope rty is held in the Trust, it may be withdr
awn
from the Trust on the sole signat ure of the Trusto r who put it
in
the Trust .
This applie s to real prope rty, as well as person al
prope rty.
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Sect ion 1.06

Amen dmen t and Revo catio n

At any time durin g the join t lives of the Trus tors,
join tly as to
Comm unity Prop erty and indiv idua lly as to his or
her
prop erty, Trus tors may, by a duly exec uted instr umen own sepa rate
t;
a)
Amend
this
trust
agree ment
prov ision s) in any mann er and/ or

(incl udin g

its

tech nica l

b)
Revo ke this trus t agree ment in part or in
latte r even t any and all trus t prop ertie s shal l whol e, in which
forth with reve rt
to such Trus tor free of trus t.
Such instr umen t of amen dmen t o~
revo catio n shal l be effec tive imme diate ly upon
its prop er
exec ution by Trus tor(s ), but unti l a copy has been
recei
ved by a
trust ee,
that
Trus tee
shal l not
incu r any liab ility or
resp onsi bilit y eithe r (i) for faili ng to act in
such instr umen t or (ii) for actin g in acco acco rdanc e with
rdanc e with the
prov ision s of this trus t agree ment with out
rega rd to such
instr umen t.

ARTICLE TWO
Sect ion 2.01

Trus t Incom e

Durin g the join t lives of the Trus tors, the Trus
leas t annu ally unle ss other wise direc ted by both tee shal l at
Trus tors in
writi ng, pay to or apply for the bene fit of Husb
and and Wife , all
of the net incom e from the Trus t Esta te in the same
each of thei r resp ectiv e inter ests in the Trus t Estaprop ortio n as
te.

Sect ion 2.02

Prot ectio n
Inca paci ty

of

Trus ter

in

Even t

of

Duri ng the join t lives of the Trus tors, shou ld
eith er Trus tor
becom e inca paci tated as defin ed in Secti on
2.03 below , the
Trus tee may, in the Trus tee's disc retio n;
a)
Pay the entir e net incom e of the Trus t Esta te
othe r conv enien t insta llme nts to the rema ining comp in mont hly or
etent Trus tor;
or
b)
Appl y such porti on of the net incom e, up to
the whole
there of, of the Trus t Esta te as the Trus tee
may
deem
in his
abso lute disc retio n reaso nable and prop er for the
bene
fit
of the
Trus tor so adjud ged to be incom peten t or unab le
to mana ge his or
her own affa irs; or
c)
Decl are void and with out effe ct, any attem pt
to exer cise the reser ved righ ts of revo catio by the Trus tor
amen dmen t,
withd rawa l of asse ts, cont rol over Trus tees, etc., n,
unle
ss
a cour t
of comp etent juris dicti on deter mine s other wise
or Trus tor's
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disa ppea ranc e cons titut es inca paci ty.
Duri ng any peri od of
eith er Trus tor's inca paci ty, this Trus t
unam enda ble. As Trus tors do not inten d that is irrev ocab le and
deem ed made by reas on of such irre voc abil any taxa ble gift be
ity, it is expr essl y
prov ided that , notw ithst andi ng the fore goin
all time s have the powe r to appo int to any g, Trus tors shal l at
pers on, desi gnat ed in
any way in this agre emen t as a vest ed or cont
any and all asse ts cont aine d in this trusinge nt bene ficia ry,
Trus tor's deat h, said powe r bein g exer cisa ble,t at the time of
howe ver, only by
spec ific refe renc e to said powe r in Trus tor's
will
duly prov ided
for prob ate.

Sect ion 2.03

Inca paci ty

In.th e even t that any Trus tee or any bene ficia
ry here unde r come s
into poss essio n of any of the follo wing :
a)
A cour t orde r, whic h such Trus tee or bene ficia
ry deem s to be
juri sdic tion ally prop er and stil l
conc urre ntly appl icab le,
hold ing a pers on to be lega lly inca paci tated
to
own beha lf or appo intin g a guar dian to act for act in his or her
him or her, or
b)
Duly exec uted , witn esse d, ackn owle dged writ ten
cert ific ates ,
at leas t one of whic h is then unre voke
d,
of
two licen sed
phys ician s (each of whom repr esen ts that he
or
she
is cert ifie d
by a reco griiz ed med ical boar d), each cert
ifyi
ng
that such
phys ician has exam ined a pers on and has conc
lude d that , by reas on
of acci dent , or men tal dete rior atio n, or
sim ilar caus e, such
pers on had, at the date ther eof, becom e
inca paci tate d to act
ratio nall y and prud entl y in his or her
own fina ncia l best
inte rest s, or
c)
Evid ence whic h such Trus tee or bene ficia
ry deem s to be
cred itab le and stil l curr entl y appl icab le
that
a pers on has
disa ppea red, is unac coun tably abse nt, or is
bein
g
deta
ined unde r
dure ss wher e he or she is unab le effe ctiv
ely and prud entl y to
look afte r his or her own inte rest s.
Then , in that even t and unde r thos e circu msta
nces :
a)
Such pers on shal l be deem ed to have there
upon beco me
inca paci tated , as that term is used in
and for all of the
purp oses of this instr ume nt, and
b)
Such inca paci ty shal l be deem ed to cont inue
unti l such cour t
orde r,
cert ific ates ,
and/ or
circu msta nces
have
beco me
inap plic able or have been revo ked, and
c)
The name d succ esso r trus tee shal l imm
Trus tee, actin g with all the righ ts and powe edia tely becom e the
rs desc ribe d here in.
Any phy sicia n's afor esai d cert ific ate may be
cert ific ate to the effe ct that such pers on revo ked by a simi lar
is no long er thus
inca paci tate d, exec uted eith er by (i) the
orig inal cert ifyin g
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physician or (ii) two other licensed, board certified physician s.
No Trustee shall be under any duty to institute any inquiry into
a person's possible incapacity , but the expense of any such
inquiry reasonably instituted may be paid from trust assets.
Payment for said inquiry refers both to a reasonable inquiry as
to the incapacity of such individua l and to that inquiry as to
the revocation of such a Certifica te.

Section 2. 04

Protectio n
Illness

in

the

Event

of

Catastrop hic

If both Trustors are living and a catastroph ic illness affects
one of the Trustors, then the remaining Trustor may divide the
Trust assets in such a way as to qualify the infirm Trustor for
state assistance payments and may remove the infirm Trustor as a
Trustee of this Trust.
A catastroph ic illness is one which is
reasonably anticipate d to extend for a period of six (6) months
or longer, and which renders the affected Trustor incompete nt or
in need of full time care.
If competent, a Trustor may make the
determina tion to divide the Trust Estate in accordance with these
provision s.
If the Trustor affected by the catastroph ic illness
is not competent to manage his or her affairs, then the division
shall be made by the person designated as the affected Trustor's
attorney- in-fact in his or her durable power of attorney, or by a
court appointed conservat or of the affected Trustor.
From and after the division of the Trust assets, the share of the
Trust Estate set aside for each Trustor shall be his or her sole
and separate property for all purposes, and if that property
remains part of the Trust Estate, subject to the terms and
conditions set forth within this trust agreement .
The Trustor
who is not infirm may use assets of the infirm Trustor to
purchase an annuity or other assets which do not disqualify the
infirm Trustor from state assistance .

Section 2.05

Principal Invasion

During the joint lives of the Trustors, should the net income of
the Trust Estate be insufficie nt to provide for the care,
maintenan ce or support of the Trustors as herein defined, the
Trustee may, in the Trustee's absolute discretion , pay to or
apply for the benefit of the Trustors, or either of them, or any
of their dependent s, such amounts from the principal of the
Trust Estate as the Trustee may, in the Trustee's absolute
discretion , from time to time deem necessary or advisable for
the care, maintenan ce or support of the Trustors.
As used in
this section, the term "care, maintenanc e or support of the
Trustors" shall mean:
a)
The providing of proper care, maintenanc e and support for
the Trustors, or either of them, during any period of illness, or
other want or necessity ;
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b)
The mainten ance of the Trusto rs, and each of them, in the
manner of living to which they, and each of them, are accusto med
on the date of this Declar ation;
c)
The suppor t and mainten ance in the manner in which they are
accusto med on the date of this Declar ation whethe r adult or
minor, depend ent on the Trust ors, or either of them, for such
suppor t and mainten ance; and
d)
The educat ion in the manner desired by the Trusto rs of any
person , whethe r adult or minor, depend ent on the Trusto rs, or
either of them, for such educat ion.

ARTICLE THREE
Sectio n 3.01

Provis ions After First Death

On the death of either Trusto r, leaving the other Trusto r
survivi ng him or her, the then Trustee shall collec t all
insuran ce procee ds payable to the Trustee by reason of such
death, all beques ts and devises distrib utable to the Trust Estate
under the terms of the Last Will and Testam ent of the decease d
Trusto r and convey the assets accord ing to the instruc tions set
forth herein.
The Trustee may use all income and princip al for
the benefi t of the survivi ng Trusto r.

Sectio n 3.02

Last Expens es

On the death of the first of the Trusto rs to die, the Trust shall
pay either from the income or princip al of the Trust as the
Trustee in the Truste e's absolu te discre tion may determ ine, the
expens es of the decease d Trusto r's last illness , funera l, burial
and any inherit ance, estate or death taxes that may be due by
reason of the decease d Trusto r' s death, unless that Trustee in
his or her absolu te discre tion determ ines that other adequa te
provisi ons have been made for the paymen t of such expens es and
taxes.

Sectio n 3.03

Surviv ing Spouse

The Trustee shall hold, admini ster and distrib ute all Trust
assets for the benefi t of the survivi ng spouse , both as to income
and princip al, unless otherw ise herein provide d.

ARTICLE FOUR
Sectio n 4.01

Second Death

On the death of the Trusto r last to die, herein called "Surviv ing
Trusto r",
the princip al of the Trust and any accrued or
undist ributed net income from the Trust shall go to the success or
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Trustee and the Trustee shall apply and distribute the net income
and principal of the Trust Estate as set forth herein.

Section 4.02

Payment of the Second Death Expenses

On the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trustee shall pay
either from the income or principal of the Trust or partly from
the income and partly from the principal of the Trust, as the
Trustee in his or her absolute discretion may determine, the
expenses of the Surviving Trustor's last illness, funeral, burial
and any inheritance, estate or death taxes that may be due by
reason of the inclusion of any portion of the Trust Estate in the
Surviving Trustor' s estate for the purposes of any such tax,
unless the Trustee in his or her absolute discretion determines
that other adequate provisions have been made for the payment of
such expenses and taxes.

Section 4.03

Trust Income and Principal Distribution

On the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trust shall terminate
and the Trustee shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the
net income and principal remaining in the Trust into two(2) equal
shares and distribute them to the following beneficiaries:

TONIC. JOHNSON and JOHN H. CORNELL

a)
If any child, for whom a share of the Trust Estate has been
set aside, should die prior to the above distribution, then the
Trustee shall distribute all of such deceased child's share of
the Trust Estate to his or her surviving issue in equal shares.
If any issue are minors, the funds from the Trust Estate shall be
held in a bank, savings and loan or money market fund and used
for their care, welfare and college education.
Any funds
remaining shall be distributed at age 25.
If there is no
surviving issue, then all of the deceased child's share of the
Trust Estate shall be added to the shares set aside for the
benefit of the Trustors' other living child, as hereinabove
provided, including proportionately both the distributed and the
undistributed portions of each such share, to be distributed as
an equal part of such other shares.
b)
If all of the Trustors' beneficiaries outlined above should
die prior to final distribution of the Trust Estate, all of the
Trust Estate not disposed of as hereinabove provided shall be
distributed one-half (1/2) to the persons who would then be the
husband's heirs and the other one-half (1/2) to the persons-who
would then be the heirs of the wife.
The identities and
respective shares of the aforesaid heirs to be determined in
accordance with the intestate succession laws of the State of
35

California then in effect relating to the succession of separate
property not acquired from a predecease d spouse.
If either of
the Trustors have no such heirs, then all of the Trust estate
shall be distribute d to the aforesaid heirs of the other Trustor.

Section 4.04

Trust Terminati on

Unless sooner terminated as otherwise provided herein, all of the
trusts provided for herein shall terminate on the death of the
survivor of the Trustors and their children living at the date
that
any of
the
trusts
created hereunder
first
becomes
irrevocab le.

Section 4.05

Simultane ous Death

Should
both
Trustors
die
simultaneo usly
or
under
any
circumstan ces rendering it difficult or impossible to determine
which Trustor predecease d the other, each Trustor shall, for the
purpose of disposing of his separate property be deemed to have
predecease d the other Trustor.

ARTICLE FIVE
Section 5.01

Non-Incom e Producing Property

During the lives of either of the Trustors, the Trustee is
authorized to retain in the trusts provided for in this
Declaratio n, for so long as the Trustee may deem advisable and in
the best interest of such trusts, any property received by the
Trustee from the Trustors, or either of them, whether or not such
property is of the character permitted by law for the investmen t
of trust funds.
After the death of the last Trustor to die, the
Successor Trustee may retain any such property in the trust
provided for in this Declaratio n only so long as such property is
productiv e of income, (subject to Section 5. 08 of Article 5
herein) .

Section 5.02

Trustee Powers

The Trustee shall, with respect to any and all property which
may at any time be held by the Trustee in trust pursuant to this
Declaratio n, whether such property constitute s principal or
accumulate d income of any trust provided for in this Declaratio n,
have power, exercisab le in the Trustee's absolute discretion at
any time and from time to time on such terms and in such manner
as the Trustee may deem advisable to:
a)
Sell, convey, exchange, convert, improve, repair, partition,
divide, allot, subdivide, create restrictio ns, easements, or
other servitude s thereon, operate and control;
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b)
Lease for terms within or beyond the term of any trust
provided for in this Declaration and for any purpose, including
exploration for and removal of gas, oil and other minerals; and
enter into any covenants and agreements relating to the property
so leased or any improvements which may then or thereafter be
erected on such property;
c)
Encumber or hypothecate for any trust purpose by mortgage,
deed of trust, pledge or otherwise;
d)
Carry insurance of such kinds and in such amounts at the
expense of the trusts provided for in this Declaration as the
Trustee may deem advisable;
e)
Commence or defend at the expense of any trust provided for
in this Declaration such litigation with respect to any such
trust or any property of the Trust Estate as Trustee may deem
advisable and employ, for reasonable compensation payable by any
such trust, such counsel as the Trustee shall deem advisable for
that purpose;
f)
So long as the original trustee or trustees are managing the
Trust, they may invest and reinvest in common or preferred
stocks, securities, investment trusts, bonds and other property,
real or personal, foreign or domestic, including any undivided
interest in any one or more common trust funds, whether or not
such investments be of the character permissible for investments
by fiduciaries under any applicable law, and without regard to
the effect any such investment may have upon the diversificati on
of investments.
Trustees are specifically authorized to invest
in Mutual Funds, Limited Partnerships, option accounts (covered
or not), including, but not limited to, Currency, Index, Stocks,
Futures, Commodities, Precious Metals, etc.,
traded on the
Chicago Board of Trade or other nationally recognized Boards of
Trade. Trustees expressly have the authority to trade on margin.
g)
Vote, by proxy or otherwise, in such manner as Trustee may
determine to be in the best interests of the trust provided for
in this Declaration, any securities having voting rights held by
the Trustee pursuant to this Declaration;
h)
Pay any assessments or other charges levied on any stock or
other security held by the Trustee in trust pursuant to this
Declaration;
i)
Exercise or not exercise, as Trustee may deem best, any
subscription, conversion or other rights or options which may at
any time attach, belong or be given instruments held by it in
trust pursuant to this Declaration;
j)
Participate in any plans or proceedings for the foreclosure,
reorganizatio n,
consolidation , merger or liquidation of any
corporation or organization that has issued securities held by
the Trustee, or will issue securities to be held by Trustee in
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trust pursuant to the terms of this Declaration, to deposit
securities with and transfer title or securities on such terms as
Trustee may deem in the best interest of the trusts to any
protective or other committee established to further or defeat
any such plan or proceeding;
k)
Enforce any mortgage or deed of trust or pledge held by
Trustee in trust pursuant to this Declaration and at any sale
under any such mortgage, deed of trust or pledge, to bid and
purchase at the expense of any trust provided for in this
Declaration, any property subject to such security instrument;
1)
Compromise, submit to arbitration, release with or without
consideration and otherwise adjust any claims in favor of or
against any trust provided for in this Declaration;
m)
Distribute gifts of up to $10,000.00 per year per donee out
of principal or interest or in any proportion of the two that the
Trustee, in his sole discretion, deems advisable;
n)
Invest in and guarantee a business or Trustee of the Trust
capitalizing on the business venture;
o)
Subject
Declaration
obligations,
exercise all
or exercised

to any limitations expressly set forth in this
and faithful performance of Trustee's fiduciary
to do all such acts, take all such proceedings, and
such rights and privileges as could be done, taken
by an absolute owner of the trust property; and

p)
So long as both of the original Trustees are serving as
Trustees hereunder, either of them shall have the power to bind
the trust in any and all transactions, including, but not limited
to
( 1)
collecting receipts;
( 2)
paying disbursement s;
( 3)
securing assets; (4) writing checks and making withdrawals from
bank accounts; (5) purchasing, selling and pledging securities
and other property; and (6) exercising any power conferred on the
Trustees pursuant to the terms of this Declaration of Trust, and
the action of either original Trustee may be relied upon by third
parties dealing with those Trustees or either of them.
q)
The trustee is empowered to buy, sell, trade and deal in
options, precious metals, stocks, bonds and securities of all
nature
(including
"short"
sales
and
speculative
option
transactions
i.e. uncovered puts and calls, option spreads,
option straddles, and option combinations) and commodities of
every nature,
and contracts
for
the
future
delivery of
commodities of every nature on margin and otherwise; and for such
purpose to maintain and operate margin and commodity accounts
with brokers; and in connection therewith to borrow money and to
pledge any and all stocks, bonds, securities, commodities and
contracts for the future delivery thereof, held or purchased by
the trustee, with such brokers as securities for loans and
advances made to the trustee.
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r)
The successor trustee has the authority to enter the safe
deposit box in Trust ors' names, individually or as Trustees of
the Trust, and remove the contents thereof.

Section 5.03

Power to Borrow

The Trustee shall have the power to borrow money for any trust
purpose ( including from the probate estate for the purpose of
paying taxes) on such terms and conditions as the Trustee may
deem proper from any person, firm or corporation, including the
power to borrow money on behalf of one trust from any other trust
provided for in this Declaration, and to obligate the trusts, or
any of them, provided for in this Declaration to repay such
borrowed money.

Section 5.04 Power To Loan to Trusts
The Trustee is authorized to loan or advance Trustee's own funds
to any trust provided for in this Declaration for any trust
purpose and to charge for such loan or advance the rate of
interest that Trustee, at the time such loan or advance is made,
would have charged had such loan or advance been made to a person
not connected with such trusts having a net worth equal to the
value of the principal of such trust.
Any such loan or advance,
together with the interest accruing on such loan or advance,
shall be a first lien against the principal of the Trust to which
such loan or advance is made and shall be repaid from the income
or principal of such trust as in the discretion of the Trustee
appears
for
the
best
interest
of
such
trust
and
its
beneficiaries .

Section 5.05
The Trustee is
property from and
Estate with or
representativ e of

Section 5.06

Purchase of Securities
authorized to purchase securities or other
to make loans and advancements from the Probate
without security to the executor or other
the estate of either Trustor.

Manner of Holding Title

The Trustee may hold securities or other property held by Trustee
in trust pursuant to this Declaration in Trustee's name as
Trustee under this Declaration, in Trustee's own name without a
designation showing it to be Trustee under this Declaration, in
the name of Trustee's nominee, or the Trustee may hold such
securities unregistered in such condition that ownership will
pass by delivery.

Section 5.07

Expense and Proceeds Allocation

Except as otherwise specifically provided in this· Declaration,
the Trustee shall allocate all receipts and expenditures received
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or incurred by Trustee in administering the trusts provided for
in this Declaration to the income or principal of each such trust
in the manner provided in this Declaration to the income or
principal of each such trust in the manner provided by the
Revised Uniform Principle and Income Act in effect on the date of
this Declaration in the State of California.

Section 5.08

Trustors' Residence

After the death of the first Trustor to die, the Trustee is
authorized to retain in any trust or trusts provided for in this
Declaration for the personal use of the Surviving Trustor any
property occupied by the Trustors as their principle place of
residence at the time of death of the first Trustor to die for so
long as the Surviving Trustor may desire to occupy such residence
property.
During such retention, the Trustee shall pay, from
either the income or principal of the trust provided for in this
Declaration as the Trustee may deem in the best interests of such
trusts and their beneficiaries, all taxes and assessments levied
or assessed against such property and all costs of keeping such
property properly insured, maintained and repaired.
Surviving
Trustor shall not be obligated for payment of rent.
On written
request of the Surviving Trust or, the Trustee may sell such
property and replace it with other property, to be retained in
trust in the same manner as the replaced residence property,
suitable in the Trustee's judgment as a residence for the
Surviving Trustor.

ARTICLE SIX
Section 6.01

Coordination with Truster's Probate Estate

a)
At any time during the continuance of the original trust
hereunder and after the first Trustor's death, its Trustees may
distribute to the deceased Trustor's probate estate, as a
beneficiary of such trust, cash and/or other property out of any
assets then held by such trust,
including any which are
classified as postdeath trust income, to whatever extent such
Trustees,
in their sole and uncontrolled discretion,
deem
advisable in the best interest of Trustor's beneficiaries
generally.
b)
To relieve Trustor's probate estate from the burden of
paying them, any estate,
inheritance, succession, or other
similar death taxes which may be imposed as a result of Trustor's
death, as well as funeral, last illness, and administrative
expense, debts,
and other proper charges against Trustor's
estate, may at any time be paid out of any assets then held by
the original trust hereunder, including any which are classified
as postdeath trust income, to whatever extent the Trustees of the
original Trust hereunder,
in their sole
and uncontrolled
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discretion, deem advisable and in
Trustor's beneficiaries generally.

the

best

interest

of

the

c)
All other provisions hereof to the contrary notwithstanding,
under no circumstances shall any restricted proceeds,
as
hereinafter defined,
be either directly or indirectly
(i)
distributed to or for the benefit of Trustor's executors or
Trustor's probate estate or (ii) used to pay any obligations of
Truster's estate. The term "restricted proceeds" means:
1)
All
qualified
plans,
individual
retirement
accounts, or similar benefits which are received or receivable by
any Trustee hereunder which, if paid solely to a beneficiary
"other than the executor" of the Trustor I s estate, would be
excluded from Trustor's gross estate for federal estate tax
purposes under Section 2039 of the Internal Revenue Code in
effect at Trustor's death; and
2)
All proceeds of insurance on Trustor's life which,
if paid to a beneficiary other than Trustor's estate, would be
exempt from inheritance or similar death taxes under applicable
state death tax laws.
However, the term II restricted proceeds II shall not include any
qualified plan or similar death benefits which would not in fact
be excluded from Trustor' s gross estate under the applicable
subsection of Section 2039 even though such benefits were
receivable by a beneficiary other than Trustor' s executor nor
shall it include any life insurance proceeds which would be
subject to no greater state or federal death tax should this
restriction not exist.

Section 6.02

Direction to Minimize Taxes

In the administration of the trust hereunder, its fiduciaries
shall exercise all tax related elections, options, and choices
which they have, in such manner as they in their sole but
reasonable judgment (where appropriate, receiving advice of tax
counsel) , believe will achieve the overall minimum in total
combined present and reasonably anticipated (but appropriately
discounted) future administrative expenses and taxes of all
kinds, upon not only such trust, but also its beneficiaries, the
other trusts hereunder and their beneficiaries and Trust or I s
probate estate.
Without limitation on the generality of the
foregoing direction (which shall to that extent supersede the
usual fiduciary duty of impartiality), such fiduciaries shall not
be accountable to any person interested in any trust or in
Trust or I s estate for the manner in which they shall carry out
this direction to minimize overall taxes and expenses (including
any decision they may make not to incur the expense of detailed
analysis of alternative choices) and, even though their decisions
in this regard may result in increased tax or decreased
distribution to a trust, to the estate, or to one or more
beneficiaries, there shall in no event be any compensation
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readjustm ents or reimbursem ents between any of the trusts
hereunder or any of the trust or estate accounts or beneficia ries
by reason of the manner in which the fiduciarie s thus carry out
said direction.

ARTICLE SEVEN
Section 7.01

Incontes tability

The beneficia l provision s of this instrumen t (and of Trustor' s
Last Will and Testament) are intended to be in lieu of any other
rights,
claims,
or interest of whatsoeve r nature,
whether
statutory or otherwise , except bona fide pre-death debts, which
any beneficia ry hereunder may have against or in Trustor's estate
or the propertie s in trust hereunder.
According ly, if any
beneficiar y hereunder asserts any claim
(except a legally
enforceab le debt), statutory election, or other right or interest
against or in Trustor's estate, Trustor's Will, or any propertie s
of this Trust, other than pursuant to the express terms hereof or
of said Will, or directly or indirectly contests, disputes, or
calls into question, before any court, the validity of any
provisions of this instrumen t or of said Will, then:
a)
Such beneficia ry shall thereby absolutely forfeit any and
all beneficia ry interests of whatsoeve r kind and nature which
such beneficia ry might otherwise have under this instrumen t and
the interests of the other beneficia ries shall be proportio nately
increased and/or advanced;
b)
All of the provision s of this
they confer any benefits, powers,
claiming, electing, or contesting
become absolutely void and revoked;

instrumen t, to the extent that
or right whatsoeve r upon such
beneficiar y, shall thereupon
and

c)
Such claiming, electing, or contesting beneficiar y, if then
acting as a Trustee hereunder , shall automatic ally cease to be a
Trustee and shall thereafte r be ineligible either to select,
remove or become a Trustee hereunder .
The foregoing shall not be construed , however, to limit the
appearance of any beneficia ry as a witness in any proceeding
involving this instrumen t or said Will nor to limit any
beneficia ry's appearance in any capacity in any proceeding solely
for the constructi on of either of said documents .
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ARTICLE EIGHT
Section 8 . 01

Accrued
Income
on
Beneficia l Interest

Terminati on

of

Whenever the right of any beneficia ry to payments from the net
income or principal of any trust provided for in this Declaratio n
shall terminate either by reason of death or other cause, any
accrued net income from such trust undistribu ted by the Trustee
on the date of such terminatio n shall be held, administe red and
distribute d by the Trustee in the same manner as if such income
had accrued and been received by the Trustee after the date such
beneficia ry's
right
to
receive
payments
from
such
trust
terminated .

Section 8.02

Periodic Accountin gs

A Trustee
shall
be
entitled
to
pay
himself
reasonable
compensat ion from time to time without prior court order and
shall be reimbursed for all out-of-poc ket expenses incurred in
administe ring the Trust.
During the lifetime of either Trustor, the Trustees shall account
only to the Settlors or the survivor of them, and their written
approval shall be final and conclusive in respect to transactio ns
disclosed in the account as to all beneficia ries of the trust,
including unborn and contingen t beneficia ries.
After the deaths
of both Trustors, the Trustees shall render an accounting from
time to time but not less frequently than annually after any
prior accounting regarding the transactio ns of any trust created
in this instrumen t.
Accountin gs shall be made by delivering a written accounting to
each beneficia ry entitled to current income distributi on, or if
there are no current income beneficia ries, to each beneficia ry
entitled to current distributi on out of income or principal in
the Trustees' discretion .
If any person entitled to receive an
accounting is a minor or is under a disability , the accounting
shall be delivered to his parents or the guardian of his person
if he is a minor or to the guardian or conservato r of his person
if he is under any other disability .
Unless any beneficiar y,
including parents, guardians or conservat ors of beneficia ries,
shall deliver a written objection to the Trustees within sixty
( 60) days after receipt of the Trustees' account, the account
shall be final and conclusive in respect to the transactio ns
disclosed in the account as to all beneficia ries of the trust
including
unborn
and
unascerta ined
beneficia ries.
After
settlemen t of the account by agreement of the parties objecting
to it or by the expiration of the sixty (60) day period, the
Trustees shall no longer be liable to any beneficiar y of the
trust
including unborn and unascertai ned beneficia ries,
in
respect to transactio ns disclosed in the account, except for the
Trustees' intentiona l wrongdoin g or fraud.
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Section 8.03

Spendthrift Provision

Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Declaration, no
beneficiary of any trust provided for in this Declaration shall
have any right, power or authority to alienate, encumber or
hypothecate his or her interest in the principal or income of
such trust in any manner, nor shall such interest of any
beneficiary be subject to claims of his or her creditors or
liable to attachment, execution or other process of law.

Section 8.04

Distribution in Kind or Cash

On any division of the assets of the Trust Estate into shares or
partial shares and on any final or partial distribution of the
assets of the Trust Estate or any trust provided for in this
Declaration, the Trustee, in its absolute discretion, may divide
and distribute such assets in kind, may divide or distribute
undivided interests of such assets, or may sell all or any part
of such assets and make di vision or distribution in cash or
partly in cash and partly in kind.
The decision of the Trustee,
either prior to or on any division or distribution of such
assets, as to what constitutes a proper division of such assets
of the Trust Estate or any trust provided for in this Declaration
shall be binding on all persons in any manner interested in any
trust provided for in this Declaration.

Section 8.05

Definition of Children

The terms "child" and "children" as used in this Trust shall mean
the lawful issue of the Trustors or either of them and include
children legally adopted by the Trustors or either of them.

ARTICLE NINE
Section 9.01
The following will
succession:
FIRST:

ARLIE M.

Trustees
act

as

Trustees

in the

fallowing order of

The undersigned, MICHAEL S. CORNELL,
CORNELL, Wife, together as co-trustees.

Husband and

SECOND:
At the death or incapacity of the last survivor of the
undersigned, TONIC. JOHNSON and JOHN H. CORNELL shall act as CoTrustees.
THIRD:
A trustee chosen by the majority of beneficiaries , with
a parent or legal guardian voting for minor beneficiaries ;
provided, however, that the issue of any deceased child shall
have collectively only one vote.
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ARTICLE TEN
Section 10.01 Perpetu ities Savings Clause
In any event and anything to the contrary herein containe d
notwiths tanding, the trusts created in this agreeme nt shall
terminat e upon the day next precedin g the expirati on of twentyone (21) years after the death of the undersig ned and their issue
now living.
In the event these trusts shall not have previou sly
terminat ed in accordan ce with the terms provided for in this
paragrap h, the Trustee shall distribu te the Trust Estate as it
shall then be constitu ted, together with any net income, to the
benefic iaries then entitled to the income from the Trust Estate
in the same proporti ons in which they are entitled to such
income.

ARTICLE ELEVEN
Section 11.01 Governi ng Law
It is not intended that the laws of only one particu lar state
shall necessa rily govern all question s pertaini ng to all of the
trusts hereund er. Rather;
a)
The validity of the trust hereund er, as well as that
validity of the particu lar provisio ns of that trust, shall be
governed by the laws of whateve r state having any sufficie nt
connecti on with such trust will support such validity .
b)
The meaning and effect of the terms of this trust instrume nt
and of any other trust instrume nt related hereto shall be
governed by the laws of the state in which the initial trust
under that trust instrume nt was created, that is, Californ ia in
the case of this instrume nt, and such other state as may be
designat ed in the governin g instrume nt of any trust receivin g an
appointm ent hereund er.
c)
The adminis tration of the trust hereunde r shall be governed
by the laws of the state in which that trust is then being
adminis tered (based on the location of the principa l off ice of
the Trustee then having custody of that Trust's principa l assets
and records) ,
which state's
courts
shall
have
exclusiv e
jurisdic tion over that adminis tration of the trust with respect
to any period during which it was thus being adminis tered in that
state.
The foregoin g shall apply even though the situs of some trust
assets or the home of the Trustor, a trustee, or benefic iary may
at some time or times be elsewhe re.
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Section 11.02 Invalidity of Any Provision
Should any provision of this Declaration be or become invalid or
unenforceable , the remaining provisions of this Declaration shall
be and continue to be fully effective.

Section 11.03 Successor Trustees
Any successor Trustee taking office pursuant to Article Nine of
this Declaration shall forthwith succeed to all title of the
prior Trustee and shall have all the power, rights, discretions
and obligations conferred on such Trustee by this Declaration.
1.
We, and each of us, have read the foregoing Declaration of
Trust;
The foregoing Declaration of Trust correctly states the
terms and conditions under which the Trust Estate is to be held,
managed, administered and disposed of by the Trustee;
2.
We, and each of us, approve such Declaration of Trust in all
particulars; and
3.
As the Trustee named in such Declaration of Trust, we and
each of us, approve and accept the trusts provided for in such
Declaration.
EXECUTED ON THIS
I J ,_- DAY OF ------'-#
__,_,/_._____ , 19 -rl,, AT
.$'0\t\):.... A,,A.... , CALIFORNIA.

~---"-'-----L-=-'L---.,...~,::_--------

BY: _ _

MICHAELS. CORNELL

TRUSTEE

&L=---~-"---~hJ.,,_,___.__--t~-~.df.--.....'L.-'~
I/_______ TRUSTEE

BY: _ ....

iRLit' M. CORNiLt

BY: _ _~ - - - ~ ~ - ~ •~~-~~---~,..(,~,/
_ _ _~TRUSTOR

MICHAELS. CORNELL
BY:---4~64-4,.4.~....,,L"""'-'----"'--}1,J...:......fc__::,.............._~~".Ltt.C,£..J(A,r.e,_...,.~~···~·----TRUSTOR

ARLIE M. CORNELL
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ST ATE OF CALIFORNIA )
)SS

COUNTY OF (J rr¥''7t,_

)

/I- , -9 G ,

hl ~

(}kw:-1J.,~

oN
BEFORE
ME,
PERsoNALLY
APPEARED MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL __x_ PERSONALLY ~o\_m TO ME OR
PROVED TO ME ON THE BASIS OF SATISFACTORY EVIDENCE TO BE THE PERSONS WHOSE
NAMES ARE SUBSCRIBED TO THE WITHIN INSTRUMENT, AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY EXECUTED
THE SAME IN THEIR AUTHORIZED CAPACITIES, AND THAT BY THEIR SIGNATURES ON THE
INSTRUMENT THE PERSONS, OR THE ENTITY UPON BEHALF OF WHICH THE PERSONS ACTED,
EXECUTED THE INSTRUMENT.
WITNESS MY

?

Hurd Tllorntc~
Comr.i. &10782:'J
~-wnOTARY PU6L!8. C!,!..':'O:,;;;,\
ORAN"r: CO',,,_ (
0

Comm. Ex~.-J2~.'--.:..·:.

NOTARY PUBLIC

!)

0

:::ooo _.
.(
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:MEMORANDUM OF TRUST
THIS AGREEMENT made this
/J'J,---d ay of _ _~;{
__
t_V___ _ ,
by and between MICHA ELS. CORNELL and ARLIE M. CORNELL, as
Trusto rs and Truste es.

19~1"h,

WITNESSETH THAT:

1.
Contemp oraneous ly herewith Trustors
Revocab le Living Trust known as
the

''MICHAEL

S.

CORNELL

/l-l -~"

AND

ARLIE

M.

and Trustees

CORNELL

have

entered into

REVOCABLE

TRUST

a

dated

I I

2.

This Memorand um of Trust is executed as evidence of the existenc e of the
S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL REVOCABLE TRUST, the terms and
conditio ns of which are hereby incorpo rated herein by this referenc e.

MICHAEL

3.
Said Trust Agreeme nt grants to the Trustee all of the powers containe
d
in West's Annotate d Californ ia Probate Code Sections 16,200 et seq.,
all of
which are incorpo rated herein by this referenc e.
See Exhibit "A" attached
hereto.
4.
Any person may rely on this Memorand um of Trust as proof of the
existenc e of said Trust and is relieved of any obligati on to verify that
any
transact ion entered into by the Trustee is consiste nt with the terms
and
conditio ns of said Trust.
5.

The Co-Succ essor Trustees are TONIC. JOHNSON and JOHN H. CORNELL.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Trustors and the Trustees have signed this Memorand
um
of Trust the day and year first above written.

;;a ::; 7~
MICHAEL S. CORNELL

ARLIE M. CORNELL

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
)SS
COUNTY OF g'Y--"'1 ()

II-

Qk"+-°""'

ON
I _... q C,
BEFORE ME,
PERSONALLY
APPEARED MICHAEL S. CORNELL and ARLIE M. CORNELL '
PERSONALLY KNOWN TO
ME OR ----X.-- PROVED TO ME ON THE BASIS OF SATISFACTORY EVIDENCE TO
BE THE
PERSONS 'WHOSE NAMES ARE SUBSCRIBED TO THE WITHIN INSTRUMENT, AND ACKNOWLE
DGE
THAT THEY EXECUTED THE SAME IN THEIR AUTHORIZED CAPACITY, AND THAT BY
THEIR
SIGNATURES ON THE INSTRUMENT THE PERSONS, OR THE ENTITY UPON BEHALF OF
WHICH
THE PERSONS ACTED, EXECUTED THE INSTRUMENT.
I

\\-...,....,.--,<

I

WITNESS MY HAND AND OFFICIAL SEAL

NOTARY PUBLIC
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EXHIBIT "A" TO MEMORANDUM OF TRUST
SUMMARY OF TRUST POWERS

SELL, CONVEY, EXCHANGE, CONVERT, IMPROVE, REPAIR, PARTITION, DIVIDE,
A)
ALLOT, SUBDIVIDE, CREATE RESTRICTIONS, EASEMENTS, OR OTHER SERVITUDE
THEREON, OPERATE AND CONTROL;
LEASE FOR TERMS WITHIN OR BEYOND THE TERM OF ANY TRUST PROVIDED FOR
B)
IN THIS DECLARATION AND FOR ANY PURPOSE, INCLUDING EXPLORATION FOR AND
REMOVAL OF GAS, OIL AND OTHER MINERALS;
ENCUMBER OR HYPOTHECATE FOR ANY TRUST PURPOSE BY MORTGAGE, DEED
OF TRUST, PLEDGE OR OTHERWISE;

C)

CARRY INSURANCE OF SUCH KINDS AND IN SUCH AMOUNTS AT THE EXPENSE OF
D)
THE TRUSTS PROVIDED FOR IN THIS DECLARATION AS THE TRUSTEE MAY DEEM
ADVISABLE;
COMMENCE OR DEFEND AT THE EXPENSE OF ANT TRUST PROVIDED FOR IN THIS
E)
DECLARATION SUCH LITIGATION WITH RESPECT TO ANY SUCH TRUST OR ANY PROPERTY
OF THE TRUST ESTATE AS TRUSTEE MAY DEEM ADVISABLE.
SO LONG AS THE ORIGINAL TRUSTEE OR TRUSTEES ARE MANAGING THE TRUST,
F)
THEY MAY INVEST AND REINVEST IN COMMON OR PREFERRED STOCKS, SECURITIES,
INVESTMENT TRUSTS, BONDS AND OTHER PROPERTY, REAL OR PERSONAL, FOREIGN OR
DOMESTIC, INCLUDING ANY UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN ANY ONE OR MORE COMMON
TRUST FUNDS, WHETHER OR NOT SUCH INVESTMENTS BE OF THE CHARACTER
PERMISSIBLE FOR INVESTMENTS BY FIDUCIARIES UNDER ANY APPLICABLE LAW;
VOTE, BY PROXY OR OTHERWISE, IN SUCH MANNER AS TRUSTEE MAY
G)
DETERMINE TO BE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE TRUST;
PAY ANY ASSESSMENTS OR OTHER CHARGES LEVIED ON ANY STOCK OR OTHER
H)
SECURITY HELD BY TRUSTEE PURSUANT TO THIS DECLARATION;
EXERCISE OR EXERCISE AS TRUSTEE MAY DEEM BEST ANY SUBSCRIPTION,
I)
CONVERSION OR OTHER RIGHTS OR OPTIONS;
PARTICIPATE IN ANY PLANS OR PROCEEDINGS FOR THE FORECLOSURE,
J)
REORGANIZATION, CONSOLIDATION, MERGER OR LIQUIDATION OF ANY CORPORATION
OR ORGANIZATION THAT HAS ISSUED SECURITIES HELD BY THE TRUSTEE OR WILL ISSUE
SECURITIES TO BE HELD BY TRUSTEE IN TRUST;
K)

ENFORCE ANY MORTGAGE OR DEED OF TRUST OR PLEDGE BY TRUSTEE IN TRUST;

COMPROMISE, SUBMIT TO ARBITRATION, RELEASE
L)
CONSIDERATION AND OTHERWISE ADJUST ANY CLAIMS;

WITH

OR

WITHOUT

DISTRIBUTE GIFTS OF UP TO $10,000 PER YEAR PER DONEE OUT OF PRINCIPAL OR
M)
INTEREST OR IN ANY PROPORTION OF THE TWO THAT THE TRUSTEE, IN HIS SOLE
DISCRETION, DEEMS ADVISABLE;
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N)
INVEST IN AND GUARANTEE A BUSINESS OR TRUSTEE OF THE
TRUST
CAPITALIZING ON THE BUSINESS VENTURE;
0)
TAKE ALL SUCH PROCEEDINGS, AND EXERCISE ALL SUCH RIGHTS
AND
PRIVILEGES AS COULD BE DONE, TAKEN OR EXERCISED BY AN ABSOLUTE OWNER
OF THE
TRUST PROPERTY;
P)
SO LONG AS BOTH OF THE ORIGINAL TRUSTEES ARE SERVING AS TRUSTE
ES
HEREUNDER, EITHER OF THEM SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO BIND THE TRUST
IN ANY AND
ALL TRANSACTIONS, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO (1) COLLECTING
RECEIPTS; (2)
PA YING DISBURSEMENTS; (3) SECURING ASSETS; (4) WRITING CHECKS
AND MAKING
WITHDRAWALS FROM BANK ACCOUNTS; AND (5) PURCHASING, SELLING AND
PLEDGING
SECURITIES AND OTHER PROPERTY;
Q)
THE TRUSTEE IS EMPOWERED TO BUY, SELL, TRADE AND DEAL IN OPTION
S,
PRECIOUS METALS, STOCKS, BONDS AND SECURITIES OF ALL MATURE
(INCLUDING
"SHORT" SALES AND SPECULATIVE OPTION TRANSACTIONS;

R)
HE SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ENTER THE SAFE DEPOSIT
BOX
IN TRUSTO RS' NAMES, INDIVIDUALLY OR AS TRUSTEES OF THE TRUST, AND
REMOVE THE
CONTENTS THEREOF;
S)
THE TRUSTEE SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO BORROW MONEY FOR ANY
TRUST
PURPOSE (INCLUDING FROM THE PROBATE ESTATE FOR THE PURPOSE OF PA
YING TAXES)
ON SUCH TERMS AND CONDITIONS AS THE TRUSTEE MAY DEEM PROPER
FROM ANY
PERSON, FIRM OR CORPORATION;
T)
THE TRUSTEE IS AUTHORIZED TO LOAN OR ADVANCE TRUSTEE'S OWN FUNDS
TO
ANY TRUST PROVIDED FOR IN THIS DECLARATION FOR ANY TRUST PURPOS
E AND TO
CHARGE FOR SUCH LOAN OR ADVANCE TO THE TRUST;
U)
THE TRUSTEE IS AUTHORIZED TO PURCHASE SECURITIES OR OTHER PROPER
TY
FROM AND TO MAKE LOANS AND ADVANCEMENTS FROM THE PROBATE ESTATE
WITH OR
WITHOUT SECURITY TO THE EXECUTOR OR OTHER REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
ESTATE OF
EITHER TRUSTOR; AND
V)
THE TRUSTEE MAY HOLD SECURITIES OR OTHER PROPERTY HELD BY TRUSTE
E IN
TRUST PURSUANT TO THIS DECLARATION IN TRUSTEE'S NAME AS TRUSTE
E UNDER THIS
DECLARATION, IN TRUSTEE'S OWN NAME WITHOUT A DESIGNATION SHOWIN
G IT TO BE
TRUSTEE UNDER THIS DECLARATION, IN THE NAME OF TRUSTEE'S NOMINE
E, OR THE
TRUSTEE MAY HOLD SUCH SECURITIES UNREGISTERED IN SUCH CONDIT
ION THAT
OWNERSHIP WILL PASS BY DELIVERY;
W)
THE TRUSTEE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE ANY POWER OF ATTORN
EY
FORM FOR ANY ACCOUNT HELD IN TRUSTORS' NAMES IN ANY BANK;
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FI~'T AMENDMEN'l' TO
THE REVOCABLE TRUST O
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE . . CORNELL
This First Amendment to THE REVOCABLE TRUST OF
M. CORNELL, dated this 6th day of August, 2009 , is made

CaAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE
Michael S. Cornell, as Siirviving

Grantor and Surviving Trustee of THE REVOCABLE TRUS
OF MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND
ARLIE M. CORNELL and accepted and consented to. by MI
capacity as Surviving Grantor and Surviving Trustee, on this

th

day of August, 2009.

By agree.ment with the Trustees dated Novc.mher 1, 1996,
Granters, Michael S. Cornell

and Arlie M. Cornell created and placed into effect ~fHE R OCAB
LE TRUST Of MICHAELS.
CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL; Arlie M. Cornell hasp sed
leaving Michael S. Cornell as
Surviving Grantor and Surviving Trustee; and as Sur~iving ranto
r the said Michael S. Cornell
desires to amend said trust agreement, and the Surviving Truste
e is willing to accept and
consent to such amendment.
NOW, THEREFOR£, Surviving Grantor and Surviving rustee agree
as follows:

Article Nine Section 9.01 Trustees SECOND of THE R£ OCABLE TRUS
T OF MICHAELS.
CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL shall be amended to read as follow
s:
SECOND: At the death or incapacity of the undersign , TONI C.
JOHNSON shall act as
Tru:.tee/Successor Trustee. ln the event that TONI C. JOHNS N
is unavailable or unwilling to
act, then in that event,JOHN HENRY CORNELL shall act as T stee/S
uccessor Trustee.
AH other terms and provisions of THE REVOCABLE TR ST OF MICH
AEL S. CORNELL
AND ARLIE M. CORNELL shall remain in full force and effect.
DATED this 61h day of August, 2009.

Surviving
FIRST AMENDMt:NT TO TH£ REVOCABLE 'l'KUST OF
MlCUAEL S. CORNELL AND A.RUE M. CORNELL
l'a8e l of 2

EX HIB IT_ L
10

39~d
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MICHAE S. CORNELL

STATE Of IDAHO
County of Clearwater

)
)ss.
)

~

On thi, L,'P-',lay of
,,-t r
, ' 009 , before me, a notary pub
in and for the State of Idaho, personallyapp
eaid Michael S. ~ornell, k-nown or identified lic
me to be the person whose name is subscribed
to
REVOCABLE TRUST OF MICHAEL S. CORNEL to the within · strument as Triistee for THE
me that he executed the same as such TrusteeL AND ARLIE M CORNELL, and acknowledged to
for 1'HE REVO · LE TRUST Of MICHAEL S.
CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL.

IN WITNESS WHEREOf,.\l}fVC hereunto set
my hand · d affixed my official seal the
day and year in this cer ti~ ,qj ii:~ ~; writ
ten.
~

,,;;,.'It...... ~':"~~,,
::. :;, . -........ : :~=

/:J/~o't•rti/~~~-'~
.. ..- • ... ·
'· .. ,:
\C· .·· ·.E
\ ~. ;VB\,: ,.• :p~
",,..'1,,
~,.;... c.· •of·
· · •. ,o~
' ,,,"''

111,,,;.H,\'''

?"-

},\.l.~- ,'-

,/\I\ ....

?-

I

V V'·· ····"r")-i.i.,-.,.&---·(-

..:- .=- --

·•-.- ' . ' - - - " ' -........

/No tary Pu lie man ~ for Idaho.
Res i~g ~ · e~L-;~-:-...-~, _
Comnuss1 n Expires: 'L. Lt, · 'Z..0 \ C

FIRST AMfNDMEN'r TO THE R.£VOCABLE Tl<U
MICHA£L S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M CORNELLST OF
Page 2 of 2
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Karin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
208/743 -3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

MOTION TO DISMISS

Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attorney ofrecord, Karin Seubert of Jones,
Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C. , and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b), hereby moves this honorable Court for
an order dismissing the Petition of the petitioner in the above-entitled action. The basis for this
Motion is that the petitioner is now deceased and died without issue. Based thereon, all net income
and principal remaining in the Trust Estate vest in Respondent by the express terms of the Revocable
Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell.
This Motion is supported by the Affidavit filed herewith.
DATED this/!J;tzt day of September, 2012.
'

JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

_W_~_ct
_

By_
~~
- -~-"
Karin Seubert
Attorney for Respondent
MOTION TO DISMISS

-153

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREB Y CERTIF Y that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO
DISMIS S was, this~
ay of September, 2012,
hand-delivered by providing a
copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;
mailed, postage pre-paid,
by first class mail; or
transmitted via facsimile
to:
Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice and Anegon
1212 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501

By

\< ~ ~

Karin Seubert

MOTIO N TO DISMISS

-254

Cr1se No. C;.,J I 2- ·JJ
f; 1;~d

Karin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813

at

9/ n 112--
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7
-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

NOTICE OF HEARING

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through
her attorney of record,. Karin Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C. will call up for
hearing her Motion to Dismiss at the hour of 10:00 a.m. on October 1, 2012, before the
Honorable Magistrate of the above Court
DATED this

/'IJ;I:: day of September, 2012.
JONES, BROWER& CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

By~
\<_
~~~ -----'r¥~
+-' .)j,~lte~~~~
Karin Seubert
Attorney for Respondent

NOTICE OF HEARING

-155

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF
HEARING was, this }litday of September, 2012,
hand-delivered by providing a
copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;
mailed, postage pre-paid,
by first class mail; or
transmitted via facsimile
to:
Darrel W. Aherin
Ahe1in, Rice and Anegon
1212 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501

By_~
+ -----=---V\._.. -~
Karin Seubert

NOTICE OF HEARING

-
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SEP-27- 2012 12:55 From:AHERIN RICE ANEGON

2087463650

AHERJN, RICE & ANEGON
Darrel W. Aherin
1212 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698
(208) 746-3646
ISB# 1534
Attorney for John Henry Cornell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, JN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:

NO. CV 2012-00277

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF

MOTION TO VACATE RESPONDENT'S
NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION TO
DISMISS

MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

COMES NOW Darrel W. Aherin of Aherin, Rice & Ancgon, and moves the Court to
vacate the hearing set by Respondent on her Motion to Dismiss.
A telephonic scheduling conference is currently set for that date and time in this matter.

Counsel for Toni C. Johnson, Karin Seubert, represented to the Court a pre-trial conference was
requested before any further matters should be scheduled.
Respondent has filed a motion seeking dismissal. The issue of the Petition for
Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee of Toni C. Johnson, is still pending.
Justice is served by the trustee providing a full accounting of the trust. Issues which need
to be resolved are:
(1)

John H. Cornell has many creditors that are entitled to payment out of his share of
the trust;

MOTION TO VACATE HEARING ON
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS -N:\corncn. John\Plcadings\Motion to V11cute Hearing on Motion to Di!mliss.d11cx ser

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
Lewiston, Idaho
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SEP-27-2012 12:55 From:RHERIN RICE RNEGON

(2)

2087463650

To:12084769315

The Trust of Michael and Arlie Cornell owe Margaret Watkins over $9,000 for a
loan made by her to Michael Cornell; and

(3)

There is an issue that five acres of the real property is the separate property of
John H. Cornell.

A hearing on Petitioner's Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee
should be set, simultaneously, during the telephonic scheduling conference currently set for

October 1, 2012.
The undersigned needs additional time to respond to the Motion to Dismiss.
DATED this

d?-6-- day of September, 2012.

:E;t;;;JN~
Darrel W. Aherin
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, DARREL W. AHERIN, hereby certify that on the ;2 7'-0.: day of September, 2012., I
caused to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed
to the following:

Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC.,
Attorney at Law
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501

0 U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
~Facsimile

D

~e~-~
DARREL W. AHERIN

MOTION TO VACATE HEARING ON
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS -- 2
N:\Corncll. John\Plcadinss\Motion 10 Vucate Mearing on Motion to Dismiss.du~x str

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
Lewiston, ld~ho
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2087463650

AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON
Darrel W. Aherin
1212 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, IO 83501-0698
(208) 746-3646
TSB# 1S34
Attorney for John Henry Cornell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

Tn the Matter of:

NO. CV 2012-00277

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL,

MOTION TO STRIKE AFFTDA VTT OF
KARIN SEUBERT

COMES NOW Darrel W. Aherin of Aherin, Rice and Anegon, and hereby moves the
Court for an order striking Paragraph 2 of the Affidavit of Karin Seubert.
Paragraph 2 of the Affidavit provides hearsay evidence and is not admissible.
Oral argument is requested.

DATED this (). 7

~

:.. ---day of September, 2012.
AHERTN, RICE & ANEGON

By

JlJLJ o.L

Darrel W. Aherin
Attorney for Petitioner

MOTTON TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF
KARIN SEUBERT -- I
N:\Comc:11, Jo)rn\Plc.~dings\MotiQn tQ Strike Seubert Aniduvi1.docx scr

Aherln, Rice

& Anegon

Attorney~ c1t l..aw
Lewiston, Idaho
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

To:12084769315

~--

1. DARREL W. AHERIN, hereby certify that on the ;27 day of September, 2012, I
caused to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed
to the following:
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC.,
Attorney at Law
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501

MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDA VJT OF
KARIN SEUBERT-- 2
N:\Camell, John\Pleadings\Motion Lo Striko: So:ubert /\ffidavit.,,;locx ,er

D U.S. Mail
D !::Jand Delivery
~Facsimile
U Federal Express

&~H~.~

Aherln, Rice & Anegon

Attorneys at Law
Lewiston, Idaho
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IDAHO
~ICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE
SECONL'
IN An.o FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWA.1.t,,R r--------.......,.....~
150 MICIDGAN A VE
OROFINO, IDAHO 83544

)
)
)
)
)

In The Matter Of
Family Trust of
Michael S. Cornell, and Arlie M Cornell etal.

Case No: CV-201 NOTICE OF SUM:MARY JUDGEMENT
HEARING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:

Tuesday, November 27, 2012
Randall W. Robinson
Magistrate Courtroom

Hearing Scheduled
Judge:
Courtroom:

01:00 PM

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and on file in
this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on October 3rd, 2012.
DARREL W. AHERIN
P.O. BOX 698 1212 IDAHO ST.
LEWISTON ID 83501 -0698

....

Mailed

Hand Delivered

Faxed

(208) 746-0962 ~ Mailed

Hand Delivered

Faxed

(208) 746-3650

KARIN SEUBERT
P.O. BOX 854
LEWISTON ID 83501

Dated: October 3rd, 2012
Carrie Bird
Clerk Of The District Court
By:

DOC22cv 7/96
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/
AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON
Darrel W. Aherin
1212 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698
(208) 746-3646
ISB# 1534

Attorney for Jol"m. Henry Cornell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:

NO. CV 2012-00277

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL,

NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM
OF TONI JOHNSON

TO:

TONI JOHNSON
AND TO:
KARIN SEUBERT, Attorney for Toni Johnson
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the deposition testimony of TONI JOHNSON will

be taken on oral examination before an official court reporter and notary public in and for the

State of Idaho, or some other official authorized by law to administer oaths, at the date, time, and
place herein set forth:
DATE:

October 22, 2012

TIME:

10:00 a.m.

PLACE:

Clearwater County Courthouse
150 Michigan Avenue
Orofino, Idaho

NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES
TECUM OF TONI JOHNSON -- 1
N:\Come ll , John\Pleadings\Notice of Deposition Toni Johnson.docx ser

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
Lewiston, Idaho
62

You are further commanded to bring with you at said time and place the following:
1)

A complete inventory of ALL personal property of Michael S. Cornell and The

Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell as of the date of death of
Michael S . Cornell on December 15, 2009; and
2)

Copies of all bank statements of Michael S. Cornell, Arlie M. Cornell and The

Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell from October 15, 2009 to
date.
This deposition shall be taken pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and shall be
subject to continuance until completed.
DATED this

J

r~h

Y day of October, 2012.
AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON

By

e<!JeuJ U. ~

Darrel W . Aherin
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

·1 r7

I, DARREL W. AHERIN, hereby certify that on the
day of October, 2012, I
caused to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed
to the following:
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower, & Callery
Attorney at Law
1304 Idaho Street
P.O . Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
Keith Evans
Court Reporter
380 Clear Creek Road
Kooskia, ID 83539

D U.S. Mail
D J-Iand Delivery

LWFacsirniie
D

Federal Express

~

U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Facsimile
D Federal Express

~ &J ol--

DARREL W. AHERIN
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES
TECUM OF TONI JOHNSON -- 2
N:\Comell, John\Pleadings\Notice of Deposition Toni Johnson.docx ser

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
Lewiston, Idaho
63

10-12-'12 12:09 FROM-JB & C

2087469553

T-152 P0002/0012 F-463

Karin Seubert

JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813

IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:

)

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF

)

Case No. CV 2012·00277

)

MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. )
CORNELL.
)

MOTION TO SHORTEN TJME

COMES NOW Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attorney of record, Karin

Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L,C., and hereby rnoves the Cowt for an order shottening
the.time in ~bich to have a hear~ng on the M_otionfor Protective Order.

This Motion is made on the basis that the deposition from which protection is sought is set
for October 22, 2012.
DATED this

i

day of October, 2012.

JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

By----+--"'-~-..=(g~~~---&~j~1~,.._)':e...t~
:/·~
Karin Seube1t
Attorney for Respondent

MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME

-1-
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T-152 P0003/0012 F-463

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and

co1Tect copy of the foregoing MOTION TO
SHORTEN TIME was, this \ ;J.... day of October,
2012,
/

hand-delivered by providing a
copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;
mailed, postage pre-paid,
by first class mail; or
transmitted via facsimile

to:
Da11·el W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice and Anegon
1212 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501

By

r~ &u1t-e,tf
Karin Seubert

MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME

-2-
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2087469553

Katin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813

T-152 P0006/0012 F-463

OCT 12 2012
C:e, k D,st. Ccurt
./
Cle::mvat.'.)r Counr,. Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:

)
)

Case No. CV 2012~00277

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.

)
)

MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

CORNELL.

)

Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attorney ofrecord, Ka1in Seube1t of Jones,
Brower and Calle1y, P.L.L.C., and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 25(a)(l) and 26(c), hereby moves this
honorable Court for an order protecting Respondent from Notice ofDeposition Duces Tecum of Toni

Johnson dated October 3, 2012 and attached hereto as Exhibit A.
This Motion is made on the basis that said deposition, if allowed to proceed as scheduled,

would uru-easonably subject Respondent to undue burden and expense, specifically incurring

attor11ey's fees in prepa1ing for and attending said deposition. As the record of the case reflects,
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 14, 2012 on the basis that Petitioner John H.
Comell's claim is extinguished by his death. It is set for summary judgment healing on November
27, 2012. Counsel for John fl. Cornell has twice confirmed Mr. John H. Cornell's death with this

CoU1t, thus said fact is not in dispute. Respondent is entitled to a decision on said Motion to Dismiss
prior to incuning the expense and being subjected to deposition. Protecting Respondent from said
MOTION FOR PROTECTNE ORDER

-1-
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2087469553

T-152 P0007/0012 F-463

depo~ition until after the Court has ruled on the pending Motion to Dismiss does not prejudice
Petitioner's claim because if dismissal is not granted, then Petitioner rnay pursue discovery at that
time.

Additionally, Rule 25(a)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allows dismissal of an

action as to a deceased party if no substitution of parties is made within a reasonable time. Herej the
record of the case reflects that Petitioner's attorney first infonned the Court of Petitioner's death on
August 21, 2012.

No Motion for Substitution of Parties has been filed by a successor or

representative of the deceased party. It is umeasonable and burdensome to subject Respondent to
the expense and burden of deposition in the absence of entry of coui1 order allowing substitution of a

proper party to pursue Petitioner's claim.

Further, the authority under which said Notice of

Deposition Duces Tecum of Toni Johnson was signed is unknown.

For these reasons, Respondent requests entry of a court order protecting Respondent from
said Notice ofDeposition Duces Tecum of Toni Johnson.
Oral argument is requested.
DATED this

JJ.

day of October, 2012.
JONES; BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

By

t~, ~(11~:fKarin Seubert
Attomey for Respondent

MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

-2-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER was, this_JJ,.. day of
October, 2012,

~ hand-delivered by providing a
copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;

mailed, postage pre-paid,
by first class mail; or
transmitted via facsimile
to:

Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice and Anegon
1212 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501

By

~
&v.oW:J
arin Seubert

MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

-3-
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2087469553

AHERJN, RJCE & ANEGON
Darrel W. Aherin
1212 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston1 ID 83S01-0698
(208) 746-3646
ISB# 1534
Attorney for John Henry Cornell
JN TIIE DISTRICT COUR1' OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:

NO. CV2012-00277

THE REVOCABLE FAMJLY TRUST OF
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLTE M.

NOTICE OF DEPOSffJON DUCES TECUM
OF TONI JOHNSON

CORNELL,

TO:

TONI JOHNSON
AND TO:
KA.RJN SEUBERT, Attorney for Toni John.son
NOTICE TS HEREBY CJVEN that the deposition testimony of TONI JOHNSON will

be taken on oral examination before an official court reporter and notary public in and for the
State of Idahos or some other official authorized by law to administer oathst at the date, time, nnd
place. herein st=t forth:

DA TE:

· October 22, 2012

TIME:

10:00 a.m.

PLACE:

Clearwater Couoty Courrhouae
150 Michigan Avenue
Orolinu, Idaho

NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES
TECUM OF TONI JOHNSON-~ I
N:\C,1tnell. John\Pl~Rdines\Nntlllll nf Depru:ition Tl'lhi Juhn~"n-do'"" ,er

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys &t Law
Lewiston, Idaho
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You are further commanded to bring with you at said time and place the following:
l)

A complete inventory of ALL personal property of Michael S. Comell and The

Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell as of the date of death of
Michael S. Comell on December 1S, 2009; and
2)

· Copies of all bank statements of Michael S. Cornell, Arl~e M. Cornell and The

.Revocable Family Trust cf Michael S; Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell from October J5, 2009 Lo
date.
This deposition shall be taken pursuant to the ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure and shall be
subject to continuance un~mpleted.

DATED this

J

day of October; 2012.
AHERIN, RICE & ANEOON

By~iJ.~
Aherin
Darrel W.

Attorney for Petitioner

CERT1F1CA1'E OF SERVICE

3. r?

I, DARREL W. AHERTN) hereby certify that on the
day of October. 2012, I
caused to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed
to the following:
Karin Seubert

Jonest Brower. & Callery
. Attorney at Law
1304 Idaho Street
P.O.Box854

Lewiston, ID 83 SO 1
Keith Evans
Court Reponer
380 CteELT Creek Road
Kooskia. ID 83S39

D U.S. Mail
0 Jfond Delivery

~Facsimile
D Federal Express
~U.S.Mail
O Hand Delivery

D Facsimile

:;;:;p~-~
DAR.REL W. AHERIN

N01'lCE OF DEPOSITION DUCES
TECUM OF TONI JOHNSON -- 2

N:\Cor®II, Jolm\Plaodi11g.,;\Nuli...i or ~posiilon Toni Johnron.doc:,c m

Aherin,·.Ric-e & Anegofi
Attotneys: at Law

Ltl!wiston, ldi!ohD
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
IN THE MATIER OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL, ETAL

_________

)

CASE NO. CV2012-277

)
)

COURT MINUTES

)
)
)

Randall W. Robinson, Presiding Judge
Courtney Baker: Deputy Clerk
Other Parties Council: Darrel Aherin
Other Parties Council: Karin Seubert
Date: 10/17/2012
Time: 10:23 -10:35 a.m. Tape: CD541-1
Subject of proceeding: Motion for protection of discovery

-----------------------------------------------------------------

FOOTAGE:
10:23 Honorable Randall W. Robinson, Magistrate Judge, presiding . Parties present in
the court room: Mr. Aherin, and Ms. Seubert present telephonically.
10:23 Court addresses the Motion for Protection of Discovery.
10:24 Ms. Seubert states the Idaho code that needs to substitute someone if a party of
the case passes away.
10:24 Court asks Mr. Aherin if there is a person to substitute for the Estate.
10:25 Mr. Aherin states that that is the problem that they are facing.
10:26 Ms. Seubert states it is unreasonable to subject her client to discovery at this
time.
10:29- M~Anerm state'snis-opinion on requesfing aiscovery.
10:34 Court states that that is the legal issue, the fiduciary duty.
10:34 Both attorneys agree that the issue of the case is whether there has been
breach of fiduciary duty.

a

10:35 Court will grant the order for protective order, but if there are any facts that

71

survive Mr. Ahern's clients death, the protective order will be terminated .
10:36 Court is in recess.
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Ka:rin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
208/743-3591
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Idaho State Bar No. 7813

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:

)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
M1CHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. )
CORNELL.

ORDER OF PROTECTION
FROM DISCOVERY

)
)

The Court having reviewed Respondent's Motion Protective Order and good cause shown,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Respondent is hereby protected from the Notice of Deposition Duces

Tecum of Toni Johnson dated October 3, 2012 until such time as the Court enters a decision on the
pending Motion to Dismiss.

DATED this

JJr;:h day ofOctober, 2012.

~

(k}j1lt - ---

JlIDGE RANDALL ROBINSON

ORDER OF PROTECTION

FROM DISCOVERY

~1-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and
co1Tect copy of the foregoing ORDER OF

PROTECTION FROM DISCOVERY was, this_
day of October, 2012,
hand-delivered by providing a

copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;
mailed, postage pre-paid,
by first class mail; or
transmitted via facsimile

to:

Dal1'el W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice and Anegon
1212 Idaho St.

P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501

Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C.
1304 Idaho St.
P.O. Box854

Lewiston) ID 83501
By_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Clerk of Comt

ORDER OF PROTECTION

FROM DISCOVERY

-2-
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AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON
Darrel W. Aherin
1212 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698
(208) 746-3646
ISB# 1534
Attorneys for John Henry Cornell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:
NO. CV 2012-00277
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL,

RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER

COMES NOW Darrel W. Aherin of Aherin, Rice & Anegon, and responds to the
Respondent's Motion for Protective Order as follows:
John Cornell began requesting copies of his parents Trust in August of 2010. It was not
provided until October 29, 2010 when the undersigned requested it from attorney Allison Brandt.
Despite numerous requests, Toni C. Johnson, as alternate trustee, failed to provide an
inventory of the property as of the death of Michael S. Cornell on December 15, 2009, the
second to die of Arlie and Michael Cornell, or a full accounting which has been repeatedly
requested. She provided random copies of bank statements and only select pages for the bank
statements immediately following Michael Cornell's death. See Affidavit of Darrel W. Aherin.
A further issue that will need to be addressed is that John Cornell purchased Lot 34,
Lakeview First Addition, from the trust for $27,000 in 2002. He paid the road fees and water
from 2002 until March of 2010. On January 3, 2007, John Cornell conveyed this lot back to the
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER -N :\Corne 11 , John\Pleadings\Respon se to Motion for Protective Order.docx ser

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
Lewiston, Idaho
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Michael Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell Family Trust to protect the asset as he was contemplating
divorce . This lot has now been included as part of the property being sold with the house.
Toni C. Johnson has breached her fiduciary duty to settle and distribute the trust in
accordance with the terms of the trust.
The trust, Section 4.03 provides as follows :
On the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trust shall terminate and the Trustee
shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and principal
remaining in the Trust into two (2) equal shares and distribute them to the
following beneficiaries : TONI C. JOHNSON AND JOHN H. CORNELL.
The assets of the Trust should have been distributed to Toni C. Johnson and John H.
Cornell within a reasonable time after the death of Michael Cornell, not three years later and
John Cornell committing suicide.
Toni C. Johnson has mismanaged The Trust in that she has used a substantial amount of
the monies available to pay her personal expenses. No money has been distributed to John
Henry Cornell. See the Affidavit of Darrel W. Aherin with attached undated handwritten partial
accounting of Toni Johnson showing personal payments from trust funds and a later bank
statement dated October 7, 2011 showing she was continuing to use trust funds for personal use.
John Cornell had no money to live on, Toni Johnson refused to provide him with any
trust money that he was entitled to, John Cornell had to live with his aunt and was supported by
his aunt. John Cornell owed money to his aunt for providing money to him because Toni
Johnson refused to distribute the trust assets. Toni Johnson ' s conduct contributed to the death of
John Cornell.
The undersigned first asked for an accounting on the trust money on November 5, 2010,
to the attorney for the trust, Alison Brandt. Other than a few documents delivered by Alison
Brandt on September 12, 2011, no accounting has been provided.
DATED this

i7~ day of October, 2012.
AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON

By &a,J__tJ. ~
Darrel W. Aherin
Attorney for Petitioner

RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER -- 2
N:\Comell, John\Pleadings\Response to Motion for Protective Order.docx ser

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
Lewiston, Idaho
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, DARREL W. AHERIN, hereby certify that on the /· 7~day of October, 2012, I
caused to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed
to the following :
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC.,
Attorney at Law
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501

D U.S. Mail

~ . J:Iand Delivery
iijf' Facsimile
D Federal Express

lJcuJ;JaL

DARREL W. AHERIN

RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER -- 3
N:\Corne ll, John\Pleadings\Response to Motion for Protective Order.docx ser

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
Lewiston, Idaho
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AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON
Darrel W. Aherin
1212 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698
(208) 746-3646
ISB# 1534
Attorneys for John Hemy Cornell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:
NO. CV 2012-00277
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL,

AFFIDAVIT OF DARREL W. AHERIN

I, DARREL W. AHERIN, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and say:
1.

I am over the age of 18 years and am otherwise competent to make this affidavit.

This affidavit is made upon personal knowledge setting forth facts I believe to be true.
2.

Attached hereto are true and correct copies of the following documents:
A.

January 8, 2010 Wells Fargo Custom Checking, page 7 of 10;

B.

February 9, 2010 Wells Fargo Custom Checking, page 6 of 9;

C.

March 5, 2010 Wells Fargo statement, pages 2 of 9 and 6of 9;

D.

Toni Johnson undated handwritten partial accounting ; and

E.

October 7, 2011 Wells Fargo Checking statement.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT.

i24JJ,).~
DARREL W. AHERIN
AFFIDAVIT OF DARREL W. AHERIN -- 1
N:\Come ll , John\Pleadings\Affidavit of OW A.docx ser

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
Lewiston, Idah o
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.:_·.-

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this ~

day of October, 2012.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at \,ew \4'u.O )>~Ni
My commission expires on ?-::7- ::::;;;JJ ---:J.c,1y

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

;r-

I, DARREL W. AHERIN, hereby certify that on the
day of October, 2012, I
caused to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed
to the following:
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC.,
Attorney at Law
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501

'fA

U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
~
acsimile 746-9553
D Federal Express

DARREL

AFFIDAVIT OF DARREL W. AHERIN -- 2
N:\Comell, John\Pleadings\Affidavit of DWAdocx ser

w. AHERIN

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
Lewiston, Idaho
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Wells Fargo Custom Checking
Activity

®

a

Account number']- 1

summary

Balance on 12/8

18,453.22

Deposits/Additions

21,197.69

Withdrawals/Subtractions
Balance on 1/8

t

J

THE MICHAEL S CORNELL AND ARLIE
MICHAEL S CORNELL TTE
TONI C JOHNSON TTE

-0.00

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., California (Member FDIC)

$39,650.91

Questions about your account:

1-800-742-4932

Worksheet to balance your account and General
Statement Policies can be found towards the
end of this statement.

Transaction
Dale

history
Description

Check No.

Deposits/
Additions

Withdrawals/
Subtractions

18,453.22

Beginning balance on 12/8

12/21

Deposit Made IN A Branch/Store

21,197.69

39,650.91

Ending balance on 1/8
Totals

Ending Daily
Balance

39,650.91
$21,197.69

$0.00

80
10061

Wells Fargo· Custom Checki
Activity

summary

Balance on 1/9
Deposits/Additions
Withdrawals/Subtractions
Balance on 2/5

39,650.91
0.00
-0.00
$39,650.91

RNELL AND ARLIE
MICHAEL S CORNELL TIE
TONI C JOHNSON TIE
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., California

(Member FDIC)

Questions about your account:

1•800-742-4932

Worksheet to balance your account and General
Statement Policies can be found towards the
end of this statement.

81
8960

Ill February 6, 2010 - March 5, 2010 Ill Page 2 of 9

PMA account
Percent
of total

Balance last
month ($)

Balance this
month ($)

Increase/
decrease ($)

Percent
change

18%

6,925.22

8,955.11

2,029.89

29.31%

81%

39,650.91

39,650.91

0.00

0.00%

<1%

479.30

479.35

0.05

Total assets

0.01%

$47,055.43

$49,085.37

$2,029.94

4.31%

Percent
of total

Outstanding
balance last
month ($)

Outstanding
balance this
month ($)

Increase/
decrease ($)

Percent

N/A

490.09

0.00

(490.09)

(100.00)%

Total liabilltles

$490.09

$0.00

Total asset allocatlon (by account type)

~

Checking: 99%

Liabilities
Account

(Account Number)

Wells Fargo Credit Card

t

(5490-9624-9039-9265)

t

($490.09)

change

(100.00)%

Refer to your statement for actual statement dates.

Available credit
The informafion below may not be current. Be sure to verify the credit available on your accounts when accessing
your credit lines
Approved credit line

Account
Wells Fargo Credit Card (5490-9624-9039-9265)

16,400.00
$16,400.00

Total available credit

Credi! used

0.00
$0.00

Credit available

16,400.00
$16,400.00

Interest, dividends and other income
The information

below should not be used for tax planning purposes.
This month

Account
PMA • Prime Checking Account

(344380183)

Wells Fargo Money Market Savings•• (6860432969)

Total interest, dividends and other income

This year

0.69

2.18

0.05

0.20

$0.74

$2.38

82
8686

II 1

Wells Fargo Custom Checking
Activity

TC, 2010 - March 5, 2010 Ill Page 6 of 9

~

®

summa ry

Balance on 2/6
Deposits/Additions
Withdrawals/Subtractions

Balance on 3/5

39,650.91
0.00
-0.00
$39,650.91

ARLIE
MICHAEL S CORNELL TIE
TONI C JOHNSON TIE
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., California (Member FDIC) .
Questions about your account:

1-800-742-4932

Worksheet to balance your account and General
Statement Policies can be found towards the
end of this statement.
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Com plete Adva ntL_ a® Chec king
Account number

Septemb er 9, 2011 - October 7, 2011 111 Page 1 of 5

Questions?
MICHAELS CORNELL
TONI C JOHNSON
5319 LAKEVIEW RD
OROFINO ID 83544-61 27

Available by phone 24 hours a day, 7 days a week:
1-800-TO-WELLS (1-800-869-3557)
TTY: 1-800-877-4833
En espanol: 1-877-727-2932 TTY: 1-888-355-6052
:;!;t~

"I= iii:, 1-800-288-2288 (6 am to 7 pm PT, M-F)

Online: wellsfargo.com

---

Write: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (114)
P.O. Box 6995
Portland, OR 97228-6995

You and Wells Fargo

Account options

- Wells Fargo Bank is consisten tly rated as "Outstand ing" for the Communi ty
Reinvestm ent Act (CRA) by federal regulators, the highest rating a financial
services institution can receive.

A check mark in the box indicates you have these
convenient services with your account. Go to
wel/sfargo.com or call the number above if you have
questions or if you would like to add new services.
Online Banking

[ZJ

Direct Deposit

Online Bill Pay

D
D
D

Rewards Program

Online Statements
Mobile Banking
My Spending Report

[ZJ

D
D

Auto Transfer/Payment

0

Overdraft Protection

[ZJ

Debit Card
Overdraft Service

0

~ IMPORTANT ACCOUNT INFORMATION
Revised Agreemen t for Online Banking
We've updated our Online Access Agreemen t.
To see what has changed, please visit wellsfargo .com/onlin eupdates.

lmg=30

92

(114)
~hPPt <:;;o::,n -
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Account numb

.mber 9, 20'11 - October 7, 2011 111 Page 2 c

With you when you're shopping for the perfect gift
Give yourself extra spending security this season. Our Zero Liability protection keeps your
personal or business Wells Fargo Debit Cards and Credit Cards safe from promptly reported
unauthorized transactions at no extra cost. Speak with a banker, call us at 1-800-WFB-OPEN
or visit wellsfargo.com to learn more today.

Account number

Activity summary
Beginning balance on 9/9

$1,622.46
1,871.04

Deposits/Additions
Withdrawals/Subtractions

- 1,970.87

Ending balance on 10/7

$1,522.63

MICHAEL S CORNELL
TONIC JOHNSON
California account terms and conditions apply

ents use

For Direct Depo
Routing Numbe

Overdraft Protection
draft Protection:

Your account is

a

Credit Card

Interest summary
Interest paid this statement
Average collected balance
Annual percentage yield earned
Interest earned this statement period
Interest paid this year

$0.04
$1,160.54
0.04%
$0,04
$0.58

Transaction history
Check

Deposits/
Additions

Withdrawals!
Subtractions

Ending daily
balance

93

9, 2011 - October 7, 2011 111 Page 3 of 5

Transaction history (continued}
Date

Check
Number Description

10/6
· 11187
f 0/7 ,.. ~,.,.,. . "·" "'"" 11191" Check
Check..

Deposits/
Additions

Withdrawa ls/
Subtractions

Ending daily
balance

·•
· " - " ,. · "'"" "'' ''"- -·
· ·
·
"· ,,_ '""11.65 · · ""1,538.37
..• .......,,,.... ,,.. ,...•,.. '"·"'" ··•·• ,..........,,,, •.. ..... ,, ...•,,,,. ······"·'"·'n.,
,..........,,,,..... ·-· . ....,,....... ...,. , ...... 15.78 ···-····· .... ..,... ·""··-·····-···

1017 ........ .. ...... • ....'.~t.~!.E:~!~<:iY~.le!.':1.L..............
Ending balance on 10/7

...

...

. ............,....

,............9.:<>.'.:1:...

.

!.!:5.??:~31,522.63

Totals

$1,871.04

$1,970.87

The Ending Daily Balance does not reflect any pending withdrawa ls or holds
on deposited funds that may have been outstandin g on your account when
your
transactions posted. Ifyou had insufficient available funds when a transactio
n posted, fees may have been assessed.
I\

Converted check: Check converted to an electronic format by your poyee or designated
representative. Checks converted to electronic format cannot be
returned, copied or imaged.

Summar y of checks written (checks listed are also displayed in the preceding
Transaction history)
Number

Date

Amount

Number

Date

11120

Amount

Number

9/22

Date

53.27

11163

Amount

9/15

2.85

11126"

11175

9/22

9/30

52.22

39.75

11164

9/19

38.48

11135"

11176

9/12

9/30

54.87

16.84

11165

9/15

49.02

11177

10/4

121.00

11151"

9/12

121.00

11166

9/27

10.60

11152

11178

9/12

10/4

100.00

76.15

11167

9/22

125.63

11179

10/5

73.99

11154"

9/20

113.71

11168

9/21

85.00

11155

9/13

141.15

11169

9/22

9.35

11180

10/6

46.25

11185"

10/5

118.91
75.00

11157"

9/9

25.00

11170

9/23

18.98

11158

11186

9/9

10/5

40.28

11171

9/22

49.70

11160*

11187

9/13

10/6

16.50

11.65

11172

9/27

42.76

11190"

10/6

124.59

38.65

11173

9/30

5.00

11191

10/7

2.85

15.78

11174

9/29

50.61

11161

9/9

11162

9/12

• Gap in check sequence.

94
Sheet Seq= 0015041
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1ber 9, 2011 - October 7, 2011 1111 Page 4 of

Pili IMPORTANT ACCOUNT INFORMATION
Enjoy safe and secure savings with a Wells Fargo Time Account (CD). You will get a guaranteed
rate of return and have the peace of
mind of knowing your money is FDIC insured up to applicable limits. Talk with your Wells Fargo
Banker today.

Turn off the paper clutter ... If you bank on line, get your statement on line. It's easy to switch to
Online Only Statements. Sign on at
wellsfargo.c om/turnoffp aper, select Online Only, or check the box Switch All to Online Only Delivery
and click Submit at the bottom of
the page. Online statements reduce paper clutter, help protect against identity theft, and they're
gentle on the environmen t.

95
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Sheet Seq = 0015043
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,/
Karin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813

- ,. . .. v:""' ... '

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
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)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attorney ofrecord, Karin Seubert of Jones,
Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., hereby submits this Memorandum ofLaw in support of Respondent' s

Motion to Dismiss dated September 14, 2012. Said Motion is set for hearing on November 27, 2012.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell established the Revocable Family Trust of
Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell on November 1, 1996. See Exhibit A to Affidavit of

Karin Seubert dated September 14, 2012 (hereinafter "Trust"). Through said trust, Mr. and Mrs.
Cornell named their two children, Toni C. Johnson and John H . Cornell, as the beneficiaries of
the trust upon Mr. and Mrs. Cornell ' s deaths. Id. at § 4.03 . On August 6, 2009, Michael S.
Cornell as surviving grantor and trustee named Toni C. Johnson as sole trustee/successor trustee.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

-199

Id. at Exh. B.

Arlie M. Cornell died on November 9, 2008 and Michael S. Cornell died on December
15, 2009. See Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee, ,r 2.
John H. Cornell died on or around August 20, 2011 leaving no issue. See Affidavit of
Karin Seubert dated September 14, 2012.

Respondent Toni C. Johnson seeks dismissal of said action on the basis that John H.
Cornell's claim was extinguished by his death and that all net income and principal remaining in
the Trust Estate vest in Respondent by the express terms of the Revocable Family Trust of
Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell. See Trust at§ 4.03(a).
Petitioner's counsel objects to said dismissal and argues that the claim for breach of
fiduciary duty survives Petitioner's death and may be pursued by his estate. No substitution of
parties has been made to date in compliance of Rule 25(a)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, but Petitioner's counsel has represented to the Court that said request for substitution
will be forthcoming before the hearing on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss.
II.
A.

ARGUMENT

Summary Judgment Standard
The parties and the Court have agreed in open court that Respondent's Motion to Dismiss

shall be treated as a request for summary judgment because it relies upon facts outside of the
pleading, specifically the death of Petitioner after the filing of this lawsuit.
Summary judgment must be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The
party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of proving an absence of a genuine issue
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of material fact.

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

All facts and

reasonable inferences will be considered in favor of the non-moving party.

Summers v.

Cambridge Joint School Dist. No. 432, 139 Idaho 953, 955, 88 P.3d 772, 774 (2004).

However, the non-moving party cannot "rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that
party's pleadings, but the party's response ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial." Shere v. Pocatello Schoo Dist. No 25, 143 Idaho 486, 489-90, 148 P.3d
1232, 1235-36 (citing I.R.C.P. 56(c)).

As explained below, there are no genuine issues of

material facts to preclude dismissal being granted in light of John H. Cornell's death.

B.

Respondent is entitled to dismissal as a matter of law.
Based on the express terms of the trust, all net income and principal remaining in the

Trust Estate vest in Respondent as the sole surviving beneficiary upon the death of John H.
Cornell with no surviving issue of John H. Cornell. See Trust at§ 4.03(a).
The question then becomes whether John Cornell's claims ofbreach of fiduciary duty
survive his death. The Idaho Supreme Court recently discussed the applicable law relating to
abatement of a litigant's claim upon his or death in the context of a legal malpractice claim as
follows:
The abatement rule holds that in the absence of a legislative enactment addressing
the survivability of a claim, the co1r.mon law rules govern. See I.C. § 73-116
("The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to, or inconsistent
with, the constitution or laws of the United States, in all cases not provided for in
these compiled laws, is the rule of decision in all courts of this state."); see also
Evans v. Twin Falls Cnty., 118 Idaho 210, 215, 796 P.2d 87, 92 (1990). Under
the common law, claims arising out of contracts generally survive the death of the
claimant, while those sounding in pure tort abate. See Helgeson v. Powell, 54
Idaho 667, 674-79, 34 P.2d 957, 960-61 (1934); Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415,
417-18, 184 P. 477,448, 915 P.2d 6, 10 (1996).
Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 620-21, 272 P.3d 1247, 1251-52 (2012).
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It is a settled principle of Idaho law that an action for breach of fiduciary duty sounds in
tort. See Rockfeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 644 39 P.3d 577, 584 (2001) (citing Property

Management West Inc. v. Hunt, 126 Idaho 897, 899-900, 894 P.2d 130, 132-33 (1995)).
Therefore, in the absence of a statute addressing the survivability of the decedent's claim, John
Cornell's claims of breach of fiduciary duty abated upon his death and must be dismissed.
The statutory section that governs the survivability of negligence claims is Idaho Code
Section 5-327(2). Said statute was amended in 2010 with the amendment taking effect on July 1,
2010, so a two-part analysis is needed to properly consider Mr. Cornell's claim.
First, in its earlier form in effect prior to July 1, 2010 read as follows:
Causes of action arising out of injury to the person or property, or death, caused
by the wrongful act or negligence of another, except actions for slander or libel,
shall not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer, and each injured person or the
personal representative of each one meeting death, as above stated, shall have a
cause of action against the personal representative of the wrongdoer; provided,
however, the punitive damages or exemplary damages shall not be awarded nor
penalties adjudged in any such action; provided, however, that the injured person
shall not recover judgment except upon some competent, satisfactory evidence
corroborating the testimony of said injured person regarding negligence and
proximate cause.
I.C. § 5-327 (through July 1, 2010) (emphasis added).
Said language makes clear that said survivability applied only after the death of the
wrongdoer, not the death of the injured party as the subsequent amendment addressed. Because
the amendment to Idaho Code Section 5-327(2) was not retroactive, so said amendment applied
only to actions which arose on or after the statute's effective date. See Bishop, 152 Idaho at 620,
272 P.3d at 1251. Therefore, the statute in its original form applies from the death of Michael S.
Cornell on December 15, 2009 until July 1, 2010. Applying the facts in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, John Cornell would be the injured party if his allegations are proven at
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trial and Toni Johnson is the wrongdoer in this case. Because the alleged "injured party" is the
decedent as opposed to the "wrongdoer," any claims of John Cornell that may have arisen
between December 15, 2009 and July 1, 2010 were extinguished by his death and must be
dismissed.
For the second part of the analysis, one must consider the amendments to said statute,
which divided said statute into two subsections, the second of which is applicable here and reads
in relevant part as follows:
A cause of action for personal injury or property damage caused by the wrongful
act or negligence of another shall not abate upon the death of the injured person
from causes not related to the wrongful act or negligence. Provided however, that
the damages that may be recovered in such action are expressly limited to those
for: (i) medical expenses actually incurred, (ii), other out-of-pocket expenses
actually incurred, and (iii) loss of earnings actually suffered, prior to the death of
such injured person and as a result of the wrongful act or negligence.
LC.§ 5-327 (eff. July 1, 2010).
The tort of breach of fiduciary duty is neither an "action for personal injury" ("personal
injury" being defined in Idaho Code Section 6-1601(7) as "a physical injury, sickness or death
suffered by an individual") nor an action for "property damage" as it does not involve tangible
property that was allegedly damaged as is the common and ordinary meaning of the phrase
"property damage." As such, this action falls outside of the amended Idaho Code Section 5327(2) and the general common law principles govern. In applying the general rule that tort
actions abate upon the injured party's death, the claims of John Cornell that may have arisen
between July 1, 2010 and his death on August 20, 2012 were extinguished by his death and must
be dismissed.
III.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Respondent Toni Johnson respectfully requests that her Motion
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to Dimiss be granted and that John Cornell ' s Petition be dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 31st day of October, 2012.
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

B y _~--=--- ---=~
--------"----'Karin Seubert
Attorney for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM
OF LAW was, this 31st day of October, 2012,

V

hand-delivered by providing a
copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;
mailed, postage pre-paid,
by first class mail; or
transmitted via facsimile

to:
Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice and Anegon
1212 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501

By

~ ~
Karin Seubert

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

-6104

AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON
Darrel W. Aherin
1212 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698
(208) 746-3646
ISB# 1534
Attorneys for John Henry Cornell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:
NO. CV 2012-00277
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL,

RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS

COMES NOW the attorney for the petitioner, Darrel W. Aherin of Aherin, Rice &
Anegon, and responds to the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss.
BACKGROUND
This case heading refers to Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell. They created the
Revocable Family Trust involved in this case. They are the parents of John Cornell and Toni
Johnson. The following is a timeline:
2002 - John Cornell purchased Lot 34, Lakeview First Addition, from his parents
March 21 , 2005 - Michael and Arlie Cornell quitclaimed their property to the Cornell Trust
January 3, 2007 - John Cornell quitclaimed Lot 34 to the Cornell Trust
November 9, 2008 - Arlie Cornell passed away
August 6, 2009 - Michael Cornell signed the First Amendment to the Cornell Trust
December 15, 2009 - Michael Cornell passed away
August 20, 2012 - John Cornell committed suicide
The parties are designated John Cornell, petitioner, and Toni Johnson, respondent.
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ARGUMENT
In respondent's Memorandum of Law, respondent argues that the petitioner, John
Cornell's, claim of breach of fiduciary duty abated upon his death and must be dismissed.
Respondent argues that a breach of fiduciary duty, a claim that sounds in tort, abates upon the
death of the injured person pursuant to common law principles and that Idaho Code Sections 523 7 (2) and 6-1601 (7) do not create survivability to the petitioner's claims. The respondent's
argument first fails because the respondent's breach of fiduciary duty began on the date of
Michael S. Cornell's death, the surviving grantor and trustee of the Michael S. Cornell and Arlie
M. Cornell Trust, and continues until present. Additionally, the respondent has failed to address
petitioner's breach of trust claim set forth in the Petition for Supervised Administration and
Removal of Trustee, hereinafter referred to as the "Petition". A breach of trust claim is a claim
based on the terms of a trust, and, thus, sounds in contract law rather than tort.
A. The petitioner's claims of breach of fiduciary duty for failure to manage the monies of The
Trust and failure to follow the fiduciary requirements of determining and distributing the net
income and principal of the Trust proceeds pursuant to the terms of Trust survive his death
on August 20, 2012 since the respondent's alleged wrongful conduct continued until
petitioner's death.

The Petition sets forth in paragraphs 7, 9, 10, and 11 the alleged breach of fiduciary duty by
the respondent for failing to provide an inventory of the trust assets when a reasonable request
was made by a beneficiary as required by Idaho Code Section 15-7-303 1, using trust assets for
personal expenses and not managing the assets with the standard observed by a prudent person in
dealing with another's property as set forth in Idaho Code Section 15-7-302, and failure to
distribute and follow the terms of the Trust and distribute the net income and principal to the
petitioner pursuant to the Idaho Code Sections 68-10-103, 68-10-201, and 68-10-202.

1

15-7-303. Duty to inform and account to beneficiaries.

The trustee shall keep the beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed of the trust and its administration. In addition:
(a) Within thirty (30) days after his acceptance of the trust, the trustee shall inform in writing the current beneficiaries and if possible, one (1)
or more persons who under section 15-1-403 of this code may represent beneficiaries with future interests, of the court in which the trust is registered and
of his name and address.
(b) Upon reasonable request, the trustee shall provide the beneficiary with a copy of the terms of the trust which describe or affect his interest
and with relevant information about the assets of the trust and the particulars relating to the administration.
(c) Upon reasonable request, a beneficiary is entitled to a statement of the accounts of the trust annually and on termination of the trust or
change of the trustee.
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The various breaches of respondent's fiduciary duty as trustee to the Trust occurred from
the date of Michael S. Cornell's death on December 15, 2009 and continue. As alleged by the
petitioner's Petition and the Affidavit of Margaret M. Watkins, the respondent controlled the
assets of the Trust to her benefit. First, the respondent failed to provide a copy of the Trust
instrument or provide information to the petitioner as to the assets of the Trust despite the
petitioner requesting such information from the respondent and the respondent's former counsel,
Alison Brandt of Orofino, Idaho. The petitioner's letters are attached to the Affidavit of Darrel
W. Aherin. Petitioner wrote three letters dated August 1, 2010, August 20, 2010, and September
17, 2010. The only correspondence that the petitioner received from the respondent and her
former counsel was a letter dated April 26, 2010, filed previously in this case, threatening a
restraining order against the petitioner. Petitioner's written requests occurred after July 1, 2010.
Second, the respondent used funds from the Trust to pay for her own personal expenses
as evidenced by her own ledger, including her own medical expenses, diet program, automobile
insurance and repair, automobile tires, her cell phone bill, her Dish television subscription, and
her personal shopping sprees at Target from November 2009 to December 2011. Additionally,
Wells Fargo bank statements holding the Trust funds, also attached to the Affidavit of Darrel W.
Aherin, also evidence that the respondent used funds for such personal expenses. Such use of
funds is improper and in violation ofldaho Code 15-7-302 since the respondent used Trust
funds, part of which belong to the petitioner as a beneficiary, in a way that is not consistent with
the standards of a prudent person dealing with another person's property. Idaho Code 15-7-302
states as follows:
15-7-302. Trustee's standard of care and performance.
Except as otherwise provided by the terms of the trust, the trustee
shall observe the standards in dealing with the trust assets that would be
observed by a prudent man dealing with the property of another, and if the
trustee has special skills or is named trustee on the basis of representations
of special skills or expertise, he is under a duty to use those skills.
Finally, the respondent failed to follow the terms of the Trust and distribute the net
income and principal to the petitioner pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 68-10-103, 68-10-201,
and 68-10-202. Those statutes are set forth as follows:
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68-10-103. Fiduciary duties - General principles.
(a) In allocating receipts and disbursements to or between principal
and income, and with respect to any matter within the scope of parts 2 and
3 of this chapter, a fiduciary:
(1) Shall administer a trust or estate in accordance with the
terms of the trust or the will, even if there is a different provision in this
chapter;
(2) May administer a trust or estate by the exercise of a
discretionary power of administration given to the fiduciary by the terms
of the trust or the will, even if the exercise of the power produces a result
different from a result required or permitted by this chapter, and no
inference that the fiduciary has improperly exercised the discretion arises
from the fact that the fiduciary has made an allocation contrary to a
provision of this chapter;
(3) Shall administer a trust or estate in accordance with this
chapter if the terms of the trust or the will do not contain a different
provision or do not give the fiduciary a discretionary power of
administration; and
(4) Shall add a receipt or charge a disbursement to principal
to the extent that the terms of the trust and this chapter do not provide a
rule for allocating the receipt or disbursement to or between principal and
income.
(b) In exercising the power to adjust under section 68-10-104( a),
Idaho Code, or a discretionary power of administration regarding a matter
within the scope of this chapter, whether granted by the terms of a trust, a
will, or this chapter, a fiduciary shall administer a trust or estate
impartially, based on what is fair and reasonable to all of the beneficiaries,
except to the extent that the terms of the trust or the will clearly manifest
an intention that the fiduciary shall or may favor one ( 1) or more of the
beneficiaries.
A determination in accordance with this chapter is presumed to be
fair and reasonable to all of the beneficiaries.

68-10-201. Determination and distribution of net income.
After a decedent dies, in the case of an estate, or after an income
interest in a trust ends, the following rules apply:
(I) A fiduciary of an estate or of a terminating income interest
shall determine the amount of net income and net principal receipts
received from property specifically given to a beneficiary under the rules
in parts 3 through 5 of this chapter which apply to trustees and the rules in
subsection (5) of this section. The fiduciary shall distribute the net income
and net principal receipts to the beneficiary who is to receive the specific
property.
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(2) A fiduciary shall determine the remaining net income of a
decedent's estate or a terminating income interest under the rules in parts 3
through 5 of this chapter which apply to trustees and by:
(A) Including in net income all income from property used
to discharge liabilities;
(B) Paying from income or principal, in the fiduciary's
discretion, fees of attorneys, accountants and fiduciaries; court costs and
other expenses of administration; and interest on death taxes, but the
fiduciary may pay those expenses from income of property passing to a
trust for which the fiduciary claims an estate tax marital or charitable
deduction only to the extent that the payment of those expenses from
income will not cause the reduction or loss of the deduction; and
(C) Paying from principal all other disbursements made or
incurred in connection with the settlement of a decedent's estate or the
winding up of a terminating income interest, including debts, funeral
expenses, disposition of remains, family allowances, and death taxes and
related penalties that are apportioned to the estate or terminating income
interest by the will, the terms of the trust, or applicable law.
(3) A fiduciary shall distribute to a beneficiary who receives a
pecuniary amount outright the interest or any other amount provided by
the will, the terms of the trust, or applicable law from net income
determined under subsection (2) of this section or from principal to the
extent that net income is insufficient. If a beneficiary is to receive a
pecuniary amount outright from a trust after an income interest ends and
no interest or other amount is provided for by the terms of the trust or
applicable law, the fiduciary shall distribute the interest or other amount to
which the beneficiary would be entitled under applicable law if the
pecuniary amount were required to be paid under a will.
(4) A fiduciary shall distribute the net income remaining after
distributions required by subsection (3) of this section in the manner
described in section 68-10-202, Idaho Code, to all other beneficiaries,
including a beneficiary who receives a pecuniary amount in trust, even if
the beneficiary holds an unqualified power to withdraw assets from the
trust or other presently exercisable general power of appointment over the
trust.
(5) A fiduciary may not reduce principal or income receipts from
property described in subsection ( 1) of this section because of a payment
described in section 68-10-50 I or 68-10-502, Idaho Code, to the extent
that the will, the terms of the trust, or applicable law requires the fiduciary
to make the payment from assets other than the property or to the extent
that the fiduciary recovers or expects to recover the payment from a third
party. The net income and principal receipts from the property are
determined by including all of the amounts the fiduciary receives or pays
with respect to the property, whether those amounts accrued or became
due before, on, or after the date of a decedent's death or an income
interest's terminating event, and by making a reasonable provision for
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amounts that the fiduciary believes the estate or terminating income
interest may become obligated to pay after the property is distributed.
(2001)

68-10-202. Distribution to residuary and remainder beneficiaries.
(a) Each beneficiary described in section 68-10-201 (4), Idaho
Code, is entitled to receive a portion of the net income equal to the
beneficiary's fractional interest in undistributed principal assets, using
values as of the distribution date. If a fiduciary makes more than one (1)
distribution of assets to beneficiaries to whom this section applies, each
beneficiary, including one who does not receive part of the distribution, is
entitled, as of each distribution date, to the net income the fiduciary has
received after the date of death or terminating event or earlier distribution
date but has not distributed as of the current distribution date.
(b) In determining a beneficiary's share of net income, the
following rules apply:
( 1) The beneficiary is entitled to receive a portion of the net
income equal to the beneficiary's fractional interest in the undistributed
principal assets immediately before the distribution date, including assets
that later may be sold to meet principal obligations.
(2) The beneficiary's fractional interest in the undistributed
principal assets must be calculated without regard to property specifically
given to a beneficiary and property required to pay pecuniary amounts not
in trust.
(3) The beneficiary's fractional interest in the undistributed
principal assets must be calculated on the basis of the aggregate value of
those assets as of the distribution date without reducing the value by any
unpaid principal obligation.
(4) The distribution date for purposes of this section may be
the date as of which the fiduciary calculates the value of the assets if that
date is reasonably near the date on which assets are actually distributed.
(c) If a fiduciary does not distribute all of the collected but
undistributed net income to each person as of a distribution date, the
fiduciary shall maintain appropriate records showing the interest of each
beneficiary in that net income.
(d) A fiduciary may apply the rules in this section, to the extent
that the fiduciary considers it appropriate, to net gain or loss realized after
the date of death or terminating event or earlier distribution date from the
disposition of a principal asset if this section applies to the income from
the asset.
According to Article Four, Section 4.01 of the Trust, "On the death of the Trustor last to die,
herein called "Surviving Trustor" the principal of the Trust and any accrued or undistributed net
income from the Trust shall go to the successor Trustee and the Trustee shall apply and distribute
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the net income and principal of the Trust Estate as set forth herein." Furthermore, Section 4.03
states, "On the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trust shall terminate and the Trustee shall, as
soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and principal remaining in the Trust into two
(2) equal shares and distribute them to the following beneficiates: TONI C. JOHNSON and
JOHN H. CORNELL." The respondent, Toni C. Johnson, who was the successor trustee,
breached her fiduciary duty to abide by the terms of the Trust and distribute the income and
principal of Trust equally to its beneficiaries after Michael C. Cornell's death. Michael C.
Cornell passed away on December 15, 2009 and the petitioner and beneficiary of the Trust, John
H. Cornell, passed away on August 20, 2012. From the date of her father's death to the present,
the successor trustee respondent has failed to distribute the trust to the petitioner or petitioner's
estate. Thus, there has been an ongoing breach from July 1, 2010.
This Response has referred to July 1, 2010 in the above paragraphs because the respondent is
arguing that the prior language ofldaho Code Section 5- 327, in effect until July 1, 2010, does
not change the common law rule that tort actions involving breach of fiduciary duty do not
survive the death of the injured party. Even if petitioner is correct that Section 5-327 in its prior
form applies to events prior to July 1, 2010, it is clear from the exhibits attached to Affidavit of
Darrel W. Aherin and previous exhibits filed herein that breaches of Ms. Johnson's fiduciary
duty continued from July 1, 2010 until the petitioner's death.
Also, the respondent argues that the current form of Section 5-327 does not apply because
this case does not involve a property damage case and relies on Section 6-1601 (8)' s definition of
property damage. Section 6-1601 also provides definitions for economic loss and noneconomic
loss. Subsection 3 provides,
"Economic damages" means objectively verifiable monetary loss, including, but not
limited to, out-of-pocket expenses, loss of earnings, loss of use of property, cost of
replacement or repair, cost of obtaining substitute domestic services, loss of employment,
medical expenses, or loss of business or employment opportunities. Idaho Code Section
6-1601(3).
Subsection 5, provides,
"Noneconomic damages" means subjective, nonmonetary losses including, but not
limited to, pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, disability or disfigurement
incurred by the injured party; emotional distress; loss of society and companionship; loss
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS -- 7
N:\Comell, John\Pleadings\Response to Motion to Dismiss.docx ser

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
Lewiston, Idaho

111

of consortium; or destruction or impairment of the parent-child relationship. Idaho Code
Section 6-1601(5).
The petitioner's damages clearly do not fall under the definition of noneconomic
damages and it is a stretch to call his injury an economic damage since the petitioner did not
claim a consequential loss of employment or medical expenses. Rather, the petitioner claimed in
his Petition that he has suffered a direct loss as result of the destruction of his interest in the Trust
property by respondent's above-described mismanagement, as well as her failure to distribute to
him his share. The petitioner is not arguing a loss of earnings, use of his property, cost or repair
or replacement, loss of wages or medical expenses. The petitioner stated in his Petition that his
property, held in the Trust, has been depleted, damaged and mismanaged by the respondent.
This is property damage, and thus, the petitioner's claim of breach of fiduciary duty survives his
death.
B.

A breach of the trust terms occurred when the First Amendment to the Revocable Trust
of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell was executed on August 6, 2009 in violation
of Section 1. 06 of the Trust, when the respondent failed to divide the net income and
principal remaining in the Trust as required by Section 4.03 of the Trust, and the
respondent failed to render an accounting as required by Section 8.02 of the Trust.
In her Memorandum of Law, respondent argues that the petitioner's claims sound in tort.

However, it is clear from the petitioner's Petition that he claims breach of trust, as well as a
breach of a fiduciary duty. According to Idaho Law, Cruzen v. Boise City, 58 Idaho 406, 74 P.2d
1037 (1937), the Supreme Court ofldaho held that a breach of trust is not based upon a statute
but rather based on the obligation resting on every trustee to fulfill and comply with terms of a
trust. Id., at 415, 74 P.2d at 1048. The Court continued that a breach of trust is an action upon a
contractual obligation. Id., at 416, 74 P.2d at 1049. Since a breach of trust sounds in contract,
then even under common law, a claim of breach of trust would survive the death of the claimant.
See Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616,619,272 P.3d 1247, 1250 (2012).
In this case, the respondent, Toni C. Johnson, breached the trust in three different ways.
The respondent breached the Trust when she encouraged Michael C. Cornell to execute the First
Amendment to the Revocable Trust of Michael C. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell on August 6,
2009, which changed Article Nine Section 9.01 to state that Toni C. Johnson and John Henry
Cornell are no longer co-successor trustees. The amendment stated, "At the death or incapacity
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of the undersigned (Michael C. Cornell) Toni C. Johnson shall act as a Trustee/Successor
Trustee." Parentheses added. This amendment allowed the respondent to control the assets of
the Trust and to commit further breaches of the terms of trust set forth below. The amendment
of the Trust agreement violated Section 1.06 of Article One of the Trust. The trust states "At any
time during the joint lives of the Trustors, jointly as to community property and individually as
to his or her own separate property, Trustors may, by duly executed instrument; (a) Amend this
trust agreement (including his technical provisions) in any manner and/orb) Revoke this trust
agreement in part or in whole, in which latter event any and all trust properties shall forthwith
revert to such trustor free of trust." Michael C. Cornell amended said Trust, removing the
petitioner as a co-trustee in violation of the agreement since Arlie M. Cornell had already passed
and the language of Section 1.06 clearly states that amendment and ratification can occur only
during the joint lives of the Trustors.
In addition to amending the Trust, the respondent failed to divide the trust income and
principal remaining in the Trust into two equal shares and distribute them to herself and her
brother, petitioner, John H. Cornell. Said failure is a breach of the trust term in Section 4.03 that
specifically states that "On the death of the surviving trustor, the Trust shall terminate and the
Trustee shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and principal remaining in
the Trust into (2) equal shares and distribute them to the following beneficiaries: Toni C.
Johnson and John H. Cornell." To date, the respondent has failed to distribute any assets of the
Trust, has listed the real property of the Trust at an umeasonably high sale price, has used the
funds for herself and failed to distribute any kind of income to the petitioner and has in fact
actually demanded the petitioner turn over $3,000.00 to her for a death claim from Michael C.
Cornell's International Brotherhood of the Electrical Workers Benefit Fund. As stated in the
affidavit of Margaret M. Watkins, when the respondent discovered that the petitioner received a
$3,000.00 benefit from the Workers Benefit Fund, she demanded that it be turned over to her.
The petitioner sent the respondent a check for $2,500.00 and the petitioner kept $500.00 for his
living expenses.
Also, the respondent has failed to abide by and has breached the trust terms of Article
Eight, Section 8.02 regarding periodic accounting. In Section 8.02, "After the deaths of both
Trustors, the Trustees shall render an accounting from time to time but not less frequently than
annually after any prior accounting regarding the transactions of any trust created in this
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instrument." Section 8.02 provides the procedures which a trustee must follow in delivering a
written accounting to each beneficiary. The petitioner requested in writing an accounting on
three different occasions as stated earlier in this response. The respondent has only provided an
incomplete handwritten ledger which indicates the respondent used the Trust for her own
personal benefit.
Therefore, there remain genuine issues of material facts which preclude dismissal. This
case cannot be dismissed upon grounds that John H. Cornell has passed away. Clearly, Section
5-327 of the Idaho Code permits the petitioner's estate to claim breach of fiduciary duty as
petitioner's property was damaged due to mismanagement and no statute or common law
principles prevents the petitioner's estate from pursuing a cause of action for breach of trust,
which sound in contract rather than tort. Further, it is a settled matter of law that a breach of a
fiduciary duty is different than an action of breach of trust. See Pikering vs. El Jay Equipment
Co., Inc., 108 Idaho 512,517, 700 P.2d 134, 139 (App. 1985). Thus, the petitioner's claims of

breach of trust do not abate upon his death and, at a minimum, should be treated as breach of
contract, which under the common law principle survives the death of an injured party.
CONCLUSION
Toni Johnson is seeking to obtain money for herself when her fiduciary duties required
her to divide the money between two beneficiaries and distribute it. Toni Johnson is seeking a
huge financial gain because she intentionally withheld trust distribution to the other beneficiary
by refusing to distribute the assets for nearly three years. Toni Johnson was living individually
off the trust. The trust was to be divided one-half to each. John Cornell's estate is entitled to
one-half of the trust measured as of the date of death of Michael S. Cornell.
DATED this 13th day of November, 2012.

Darrel W. Aherin
Attorney for Petitioner
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Darrel W. Aherin
1212 Idaho Street
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Lewiston, ID 83501-0698
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ISB# 1534
Attorneys for John Henry Cornell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:
NO. CV 2012-00277
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL,

AFFIDAVIT OF MARGARET M. WATKINS

I, MARGARET M. WATKINS, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and say:
1.

I am over the age of 18 years and am otherwise competent to make this affidavit.

This affidavit is made upon personal knowledge setting forth facts I believe to be true.
2.

I am the aunt of John H. Cornell and Toni Johnson. My sister was Arlie M.

Cornell.
3.

John Cornell lived with me from April through September of 2010 and again from

December of 2011 until his death on August 20, 2012.
4.

John was the beneficiary under his father's International Brotherhood of Electrical

Workers Benefit Fund. He was entitled to payment of $3,000 for the death claim. When Toni
found out he received this money, she demanded he turn it over to her. He had used $500 for
living expenses, but sent Toni a check for $2,500. John could really have used that $2,500 to get
by. As part of John' s records is the letter from the Pension Benefit Fund and the refund check to
Toni, see attached.
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5.

In April 2010, while John was living with me, he tried getting information from

Toni about the trusts, requesting copies of the trust documents, etc. Toni refused to talk to him.
As part of John's records was a letter from the trust attorney, Alison Brandt, stating if he
continued to try to contact Toni or tried to come on the property, they would get a restraining
order against him. A poor copy of that letter is attached.
6.

In May of 2010, John Cornell's doctors at Centennial Hills Hospital, Las Vegas,

Nevada, felt he needed emergency treatment at a rehabilitation and pain control program at
Mission Hospital in Laguna Beach, California due to his traumatic brain injury. I requested that
Toni Johnson advance funds to John, which John was entitled to as a beneficiary of the trust, for
John to receive this treatment and she refused. Due to Toni's refusal to advance any money to
John, my sister had to put the expenses for this treatment on her credit card.
7.

Both John and Toni told me that their parents had a medical savings account, but

this was not included as part of the assets of the trust.
8.

The circumstances surrounding John's death can be partially attributed to his

inability to afford proper medical help he desperately needed. After John's death, I visited with
Dr. Hopper, John's neuropsychologist, and he told us that John was supposed to see him once a
week, but only came in approximately once a month. Prior to John's death, he told me he was
tired of asking me for money for his doctor and other living expenses.
9.

John needed sleep apnea testing, colonoscopy and pain management for his brain

injuries, previous broken back and neck injuries and several neurological tests. He suffered with
PTSD. His extremely high blood pressure sent him to the emergency room and urgent care
several times. We were told he needed to be on high blood pressure medication called
Propranolol because his high blood pressure was caused by the brain not the heart.
10.

I strongly believe John's death, in part, can be attributed to the extreme stress and

disturbing situation with his sister and the trust.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT.
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AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON
Darrel W. Aherin
1212 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698
(208) 746-3646
ISB# 1534
Attorneys for John Henry Cornell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:
NO. CV 2012-00277
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL,

AFFIDAVIT OF DARREL W. AHERIN

I, DARREL W. AHERIN, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and say:
1.

I am over the age of 18 years and am otherwise competent to make this affidavit.

This affidavit is made upon personal knowledge setting forth facts I believe to be true.
2.

Attached hereto are true and correct copies of the following documents:
A.

A copy of John Cornell's letter to Alison Brandt dated August 1, 2010;

B.

A copy of John Cornell's letter to Alison Brandt dated August 20, 201 O;

C.

A copy of John Cornell's letter to your affiant dated August 27, 201 O;

D.

A copy of John Cornell's letter to Alison Brandt dated September 17,

E.

A copy of Wells Fargo Overview of PMA account for the period February

2010;

6, 2010 to March 5, 2010.
F.

A copy of Wells Fargo PMA Checking bank statement for the period

September 9, 2010 to October 7, 201 O;
AFFIDAVIT OF DARREL W. AHERIN -N:\Cornell, John\PleadingslA tlidavit of DW A 11-12-12.docx ser
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G.

A copy of Wells Fargo PMA Checking bank statement for the period

October 8, 2010 to November 5, 2010;
H.

A copy of Wells Fargo Complete Advantage Checking bank statement for

the period January 8, 2011 to February 7, 2011 ;
I.

A copy of Wells Fargo Complete Advantage Checking bank statement for

the period May 7, 2011 to June 7, 2011 ;
J.

A copy of Wells Fargo Complete Advantage Checking bank statement for

the period September 9, 2011 to October 7, 2011;

J

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAU~

~

DARREL W.A HERIN

xJ
day of November, 2012 .

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this ~

~~Q«~
O'\\.~ , ~c\~o
~-e,
a\~~~
Notary Public for 'Idaho
>J \~ "'
Residing at
My commission expires on

-
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/J &

day of November, 2012, I
I, DARREL W. AHERIN, hereby certify that on the
below and addressed
indicated
method
the
by
foregoing
the
of
caused to be served a copy/copies
to the following:
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC.,
Attorney at Law
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501

D JJ .S. Mail

~ Hand Delivery
D Facsimile 746-9553
D Federal Express

A)_~ ,J.~

DARREL W.A HERIN

AFFIDAV IT OF DARREL W. AHERIN -- 2
N: \Cornell, John\Pleadings\Affid avit of DW A 11-12-12.docx ser

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
125
Lewiston, Idaho

-WOJ~

/,,,,· ... r

(.../~-., ,... ,.(~. .:'~.>.

EXHIBIT
Page
, I

.., n.11"1

I

_ \+-,_

... ;.. :. :::.

I··> . ........... ..

• •( V

of

Pages

126

Wd on:~

OL/L2/0a

UU/~//lU

I""''!:''-'

~M

~:Ul
127

io ~

\:--1

se6ed

~

a6ed

1181HX3

. :!
'.t

•

.,.

,,

.,·

''
,,'

::

:',

,f,,r,-'°,, ,
I.. ---r.~'
·;,•· )".) ,..\.,.,. . ,,
/. VJ
,' .)/_,·· . .?//! . ). ,..,.,-]_;"'17./·I''''}·
;-' ,·
I... -....,,....
,. , , .
I ~.-

~-\~,:u_.

•'

(

'.'-' ..~ . .10 \ (~\
. "'~<·,'
i) I \'

I

~}'°"\ ,.\:,) ('
'

;:,

\.,f.,?

. 1
{' :···.).. ,("'. , . . .-:,\
"""··· ...f- ·1

-~ .. ·

'I(.)
. .:r~"

.: !''\ ,:

r

I

\

(:J -·'..
_1

l..-1 (' ,,),

J'

.. _

()

Q--\·

L:;-t-

\··

""" . '

'?'~'·(1<0n".'.),-\. :

d .
\ , . " H . ', ..

"\-\-...;~, \

~

~;::·, ,_,, \. .. j (') •': \, \\'\:/,.'l.._.,l :·,
rY\ .. ~ '\) · .
, _! t../ C?_.!.. . 'f·-r - ~ r-·1 . -..f~::i,,y·; +·\·\ e~J
' ... ·-- v,,., '\·\ ~· \.-~-'\.7
-~ ..L.
, . .\1 ..\ ·\ '(l,,.,,.'.) ',,' ' \· ) . -,.),...\
•.. ''""
···\· ,-·.) \l ,")
• ' • <-., I
\ .. ~J···-· .. ...., ··,
I
1·
\
.

'l,r~.:)

-:::i. •.

·

,-t. ~· ,.;1- n
'

,
,9 \ .,v
,·7 't>!v

r,:~·· '\ '\ :J \\ •'()'(:.\
.

',,.)

'

~ :,.rl,

"\.,.,

--(,-

\) l.J

,,

\,,

'

l,•7

•'"

#

'•,

''";

C::-:1(~,.,-? ···, ....... ,. ' ,(
I

\.

.!• ,,· .:,:.

•,

~ '. ,.

,

.. ·\~) \
• _.~.ll
-,

.....

.\'
\', 't_.,'...\
A'(l......
•
,4

-·

·

I,,,,

·-11• ...

,.., :·..:'....-

I

(.,,

:

.;_·')
,,..,

·.,

c··er, '\·Nl
t

··'.

1

:i :

Received

OB-27-10

03:5Bpm

From-

To-Aherin,Rice &Aneion

Paie 011

-WOJ:t

Dl-lZ-BD

WciBQ:£0

' '\ j

1'J l .:, \ l")
.,.
I ••.

j /

.'(
;, •.t,

.

,1

1') ' ,.,
"

•.• 1

(
\ .•. ;.J

EXHIBIT_
Page

. I

"""'~

I

_

;::)

< I\
'·1 'c, .,
"· ...
I....

11

.,.,.·\··\,,,.,··,.\,r··.J'

,..) r·~
\ " 'v (.)

. ..\'

,,•.•

:'

,•'

',,
;'
\

f.

,"1

,, ..

r ··

/l.'.ttl.~.'....

, ;\! ., l,

. I/

PBA!B~BM

'·· .

./:'

,, ...

~ ..l..._---1..

of

'---\

'

Pages

128

Wd to:~

Ot/lZ/00

BOO

U0!9UV

9! l!d

!

wdeg:€0

- WOJ~

;llV- 01

9:1 ' . .

01 -lZ-BO

P9Al9:19M

,.- -

('.\

\\.
.

~·)

C:. c) ' c e..'() ft .)., D ('l,c:: \.

·1

c..)

. ~
l_,... 1::,\. '
'••

,,

...
~

C -~l::._

~

~ ~'-\ ...( ~.. c..) .. Y'\.

·-7~·
..-·., _), ,·,.,;.-·~( (\n \)C. . ~ : r_,) c~·

(:> ..( \

c:"7-;.
'

"''l

<-.) ..\:

("

C.

--·

r

.

.f- .....
'- ·· -··
/-l .,.,

?\

l) ·e~ (\5,
'·-

- ··· ... . ... :~::-:=- --· ·· ···-·---····· .... ..

~ II ~!;1;;1,.... . ..

-=...: =::::::=-::- - ~ ==-=:-:===

CROSSROADS STATION
LAS VEGAS, Nevada
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Sal es Receipt
Sale Ur, it
Qty Price

I

r l' )

1-rnri I

Price

OROFINO ID 83544
Zone 5 rirst-Clas5
Lettar
1. 20

j

t• /t, ..·;\ irl 07: I fl: 77 f'M

••-• • • • --• ._ , ...... _~.,!;:::;: . ,,=:: R•' ""' -• -

$0.Bl

oz,

[xpected Delivery: Thu 08/05/10
Return Rcpt (GrgQn
©2.30
Card)
Certifie::d
$2,60
labal #:
70101060000022215739
______
··------_ ,..

Iss1Je PVI:

$h.

TCJ'li1 l :
Paid by:
D~IJ i l Card

Account#:
Approval II :

Tran:
2390'

Recr.

I

{l

$h . /1

$5 .71
XXXXXXXXXXXX1317
171381
I-ill
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Augus t 20, 2010
Secon d Reque st by mail Regis tered
I hrcc I clcph onc Kcquc sts
No RP.turn Ci:ill - No Respo11se by Mail
Alison M. Brand t, Esq.

125 Johns on Avenu e
Kendr ick, Idaho 83537
(208) 476-7 212

Ms. Alison Brand t,
t's, Micha el and
This IP.ttP.r is bP.ing writte n to you to reque st a copy of my paren
Arlie Corne ll's Trust.

Inform ed of the
The rcclson I nm reque sting a copy is becau se I have not been
~ls ror a copy of
details of the estate . My sister Toni Johns on has rnfus~ d my reque
Trust with mP. . I
my paren t's Trust. My sister refuse s to disc.:uss ;,my cfolc1ils or lhe
the
hc:1ve nPvPr rnr.P.ivP.d or been given the oppor tunity to read or review
the estate . I am
Will/T rust. I have absolu tely no details regard ing the il!i~cts of
paren t's prope rty.
conce rned .:ibout mv perso nal prope rty which is adjace nt to my
notific i:itiur, i:md
How is the prope rty I own being handle d? I would appre ciate
Lh~ pr uperly been
details of the listing if and when the prope rties are listf:!d. Hc1s
are to be
listed for sale? It is my ur1der ~landi ng by lr.1w thP. details of the estate
estate .
discL1 ssed with rm~ b~rure action is tr.1kfm in any way regard ing the
been given to me by
Since I have alread y waite d tor the inform .Jtion nnd it has not
g
my sister and the letter I sent to you, ilftcr check ing with the USPS trackin
was infur rm~d Lile
1nform ntion regard ing the Regist ered Return Receip t Letter , I
rnPd for
letter has been sitting In your Post Office Box in Orufi11u, Idaho unc.lai
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RP.turn RecP.i pt
fiftPen dr1ys. I am hopP.f ul you will rP.cP.iVP. this sP.con d RP.gistf!rP.d
sted inform ation
Letter at your Ke11drick, Idaho addres s and send to me the reque
immed iately.

Please conta ct me if you have any questi ons or conce rns.

Sincer ely,

John H. Corne ll

7309 Ruslic.: Cre~l Slreel

Las Vegas, Nevad a 89149
(702) 685 6721

(abl1v e) is my
Please Note: The addre ss and tr:!leph une nurnb(: !r ~ive11 Lu yuu
For tt'!lephone
Cousi n's home . Plec1se ~erid c:111 corres pondP .ncP to this ~ddrP. ss.

Rober t or Cathe rine
r:onta ct i-nessages please leave your name and numb er with

Jones and I will return your call. Thank you.
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by your attorne y Alison Brandt.
This is my :,ccond attemp t to h.:ivc thir, letter l·orward ed to you

Toni,
loss of both of our ptircnts , osp(!tia lly so
I would like to take a momen t to tell you I know you suffer the
pain greatly. I would like to t:.,11< ,:o you I
close togethe r. I also sutter trom tho1r loss. I know and feel the
thP r.1rrlnnc; yn11 h;:ivµ, r;:ilcrn . Sine:£) I ;,1rn
know this rs no·t an option. 1 am sorry you felt thf'-1 need to 1:akP.
copy of t,ur parents Wlll/Truc ;.r I nPPrl rn
unabla to talk to you in person I am asking you in writing for a
know wh.:it i~ r,..iyi; arid where I stand.
Vour brother ,
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Prociuot

!Jale

Flm:il

l lflsc:r 1r,t 1on

ow

Price

Pi ck up a im.1r:htm;; ancl card ins hfo, tt1on
app I y at M11•1. Sho l l 8ave rC,11·d. coin.

!b1~ I tu~ :-~hr·!l 1 Saver Car·tJ 1:0 mwa 2
cEmt,;/g;,i 1 on ENE:f':Y' ·1· 1.10 I putch..inc !

1

bl Lt:1 tlt11 ·

$0.Gi

((lr.imi:i~:1; i G)

THANH YOU COM[ AriAJN

(KENDrlICI<, IO 83537)
fWl'lt otn ·n I t, 'I rn n:n
1

Cortifiod

$2.80

$:>. :m

Relur·n Rcpt

$::i. 7'1

Tot~l

--~·-····· ~----------- .. ····--- - -- ·
$5.71

Dabit C;;rd

Thank you!

Bl 11#;

1 13744 1 1469000 .. 2

Chwk:

CAT

AI I ».:i I i:l6 f i na 1 cm

1.:

l.;;i1Tipo and pc":;togc .
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August 1.7, 2010

Dear Mr. Ahcrin 1

Tiu~ rulluwing highlights a few of my concerns regarding my porcnt'!i cstiltc.
There have been t;;P\ll'rril ,111~111pl:') to obtain a copy of mv parent's trust from mv sister Toni C.
Johnson and my parent's attorney Ms. Alison M. Brandt. On 08/0'J/?01 0 ,md OR/1.9/201 0, I sent
letters ta Ms. Drandt and to my sister. I sent my letter to Toni in care of Ms. Brandt, by
R~gbl~1~d rnail with a request for a signed Oeturn Receipt. There h.::is been no response. Upon
checking with the Postal .5Prvic:f-! I WH:"> i11run11ed that Ms. Brandt had not picked up my first
letter trom her P.O. ~ox for frftccn days and thP. l(.•nr,r s0.nr to hP.r Kendrick Idaho cJdc.Jr~:,:, wd:,
also denied. I have tried scvcrul times to contact Ms. ~randt by telephone messages and my
calls wr•n• rml rt-!lu111~u. My sister has denied me a copy of my parent's Trust ond she rcquc!itcd
!Vis. Brandt send to me a letter thn>rlH~nin g lo pliit:t~ d 11:!~Lraining order on me and stating I was
not to contact my !iistcr in any way. I hG:i lcttN also stated to only contact Toni throu8h hPr
dllur ncy Ms. Brandt and Ms. Drandt

will not accept my letter:. or telephone calls~??

1-rrst, I am very conr.erh,-,,rl .1hour my parent's il!>lle!>. Tllt:y dr i: ,;'IL the house and I would like to
have o 5crvicc tor my parent's or some type of memorlal.

Mv (.Onc.erns are the Listing of my parent's property without my input or cons,mt. Please
review the artrldu-icl i11rrn 111c:1Lion that I found by calling our original Rcol Estotc .::igcnt ;:ind
sc,irching the internet. I was never informed the propr,,rry w;.rs lbl.~d.
Mv personal property thilt is adjacent to my parent's property, Lot 37, th~t I p11rr:hr1s~d rrnm
my rn1.l1!:!r for $27,000.00 in 2002. I have paid rood fees and w~tcr trom 2UUl to March 2.010. I
put my property Into my f,nhP.r's name whe11 I ,narricd to protect rnv asset and left the
property in my father's name for tax purposes.

Tlii::. property has been combined into the listing ot my parent's propNty. I am concerned how I
wlll be compen'ir1I P.d wli~ri the property is sold. I am concerned the hou:;c b li!;tcd too hish
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making it impossible to sell. I believe the value of the property is around 5300,000.0 0 to
$350,000.0 0. I also believe It Is llstGd high so my sister can remain In the house.

My concern is resardins the handllns or my parent's accounts. 1 am aware of an Annuit.y
Account, Savings Accounts (Wells rar~o-Orof ino), Mcdicc1I Sclving Account, Retiremen t
Benefits, possible Dt::c::1Lh Bt::rtl:!l'ib dr1u d Sdf ~ D~µu:)il Bux. A Lhrc:c Thousand Dollar check was
sent to me by rny Father's IBEW Electrlcal Union ;lftF~r his rlr>,uh. I rnld my sisl<·)r I n~c~ivt-!d lht-!
check which wa::; intended tor me. She was upset and requested that I imm~diate ly send to hQr
the monev for my father's cremation. I sent her $2800.00 instead $3000.00 bccau::;c the other
$200.00 I used for food. I am on um,mployrm ~r,I ,md my wift-! i~ 011 uisdbiliLy from her work due
to severe leg circulotion issuc5. I hilve tiled tor Ions term disability for sev~re physical and brain
injuries. My Neurolo~is t and Neuropsych ologi::;t ore certain I will be ilWilrded SSD. My sister
rlPniPn my A11rtl 's r~q11~~1. rur 111ur1l::!y for nw crnergency hospital expenses, medicine, co-pays
and the plane fare necessary to admit me to Mission Hospital In California
When my tather died I was told by my sister my father only had $20,000.00 . I became?
suspicious when my father's good friend and nei~hbor told me my father told him at the
rl f r,r l'rrlt-!fll it lllt-!d iiU:lJLJI I b.
I here aro it0ms I would like to have of my parnm's and my sister would not dls:cuss with mP rhP
shi'.lring ot these items. <.:ertam rte ms were promised to me. The items have little value bLlt are
sentimenta l. There is a lifetime of items in the house and I would lil<c il few thing!.i. When I
would rry ;mrl rJisc:11ss l'hf-~ ii.ems m dt:!dll uul cmd organile my sister would go into c;1 crying fit
telling me she had ttJ havt:::! control and she jusr. r.ould nm dc,r1I wil h ,myl hirrg. I l r ied l.o
understand .:ind give her time but she w:1s unwillins to cooperate. I was willing to give her
ulmu:.,l l:!ve1 yll1i11g ant.! even told her the trees on my land could be sold if she needed monetary
help in the future and she was still unwilling l.o wmk wilt, me. I lit-!c.-:1111e exlrl::!111ely frustrated
when my sister hod M:;, Br.lndt send to me a letter threat,mm g a Kestraining Order. I was very
ill and the stress of everything put me into a complete tilil spin. I was ildmittcd into the
rmPrgr-nc:y Rnom .-:1ruf lnl.er Lr d11:.forrcd to a hospital in California. I remember our last
telephone convgrsatio n was extremely emotional due to Ms. Brandt'5 IPT.T.P.r ;.:mrl I "cn~,,mt-!d
obsct;!nities at my si::;ter over the telephone that I later learn<:!d she:? recorded and played for
I do not
01 her~ Lu hedr. I was very angry to be threatened and I am sorry I became so angered.
know if a legal Restraining Order has been flied.
Another concern is my personal home I sham with my wife in Burley. This home WIii iikeiy be
guirrg ir,lu ru11:!dosure and my wife wants to file Dankruptcy . I am contempla ting leaving my
wife. I am wnrriPrl .-1ho111 ,my rut.we d~:.els being protected from foreclosure , bankruptcy or
divorce.

__C_____
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Th;.mk yn11 rm your I irnl:-!, umu~ni d11d expertise regarding the above issues.

Sincerely,

John H. Cornell

Plec:1!>e !>t!llt.l dll c.orresponden ce to;
7375 Rll.._l'ic: l.f'PSI ~lr~~I

Las Vagas, Nevada 89149

{702) 453 7749
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Septemh M 17, 2010 Thiru Allernpt
August

:.w, .2010 Second Attemrr

Second Request by Hogistere d mall

Thrl'fi TP.lephon e Requests
No Return Call - No R,~~pun.s.e by Mail
Alison M. Drandt, Esq.

125 Johnson Avenue
Kendrick, Idaho 83537
(208) 47fi-7712

Ms. Alison Brandt,
Cornell':;
This letter i:; bcins written to you to request a copy or my µ,H l:!trt's, Michael and Arlie
Trust.

nu.• ,~r1:-.tm I am requestin g a copy is because I hove not be~n informed of the detail-. or I II~
My
estate. My sister Tnni lr1h11!'-.on has refused my reql1ests for a copy at my parenl's Trust.
been given
sister refuse::; to di&cuss any details of the Trust with 1111•. I I 1r.1ve never received or
I ht-! n!>!>t:b of
the uµportun ity to read or review lhc Tru~t. I h<lve absolutel y no dE:!talls reearding
parent's
the estatP.. I r1m c:rn1et-!I ned about my personal property which is adjacent to my
;:rnd details
property. How is the property I nwri h~i11g l1d11dled? I would apprecia te notific;:iti on
sale?
of the listing it and when the propertie s ar(' llsrP.d. Has the µr U!Jt!I Ly been listed for
of a listing?
If so why was I not given the opportun ity to discuss or be lnvolvPd willi ll1t: details
TCl11i lidve
Why l1dve I been told I cannot enter my purcnt's property? On what legal basis doP-.
sister.
to keep me from my parent's prr.ipt->r I y? The property belongs to both me und my
I incur living
I::; it foir that Toni has a place to live and I do not h.-1vr·\ ti pldc1: Lo live? Why .should
rn1-.1 .-ind
expenses and she is in complete control ot everythin g, living off the money In thP
living frpp i11 my pd11:nt's house, which is also my house?
Why are the detail<; rif my pdr eriL'!> financial informati on being kept from my revicw·:1
before
It is my understa nding by law the det;.111, nf rhP FsrntP. an:! tu I.Je ui:ii.:ussed with me
action is taken in any way regarding the l:state.

'-----\:)
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my sister
Since I have ;::ilready waited tor the informc1t ion ;incl It hils nol t.Jee11 given to me by
the
1:=garding
r
it,11
,md lhe letters I sent to you, utter checking with the USPS tracklne inforrn;.il
Office Bo)( In
Hegr~tcre d Return Receipt, I w;.i~ informed the letters had been sitting in your !,Jost
was
Orofino, Idaho unclaime d for fifteen day,. Th~ ~t-!currd Registere d Return Receipt Letter
requeste d
,ri111 t.n your Kendrick, Idaho address ond was returned to me. Please send I c1 mt-! Lhc
informati on lmmedi;.i1 Ply.

Mail. I
My :::ittorney Nlr. Aherin In Lewiston , ,~1:1rn1111ended that I send this "third'' letter Regular
d letter::.
told him I would follow hi~ instructio ns however, Ms. Brandl hr1~ r duscd two registere
never
I
1.;c:111.
n11u my telephon e calls. My telephon e messages included a reque,;:t fnr ;.i n~l urn
go
received a return c.:ill frnm yuu. You requeste d that all correspo ndence with my sister
thi:;
throuch you .:ind you wall not answer my correspmuf~11ct-! ur calls. How do you expect
.irrangem cnt to work when you will not r~spond to my attempt~ In i:imlr.1Ll you?

I am in much better health c1L Lhis ·1 irnP. and ready to protect my poG1tion and

assets

regardir ie

thP Pst;::ite a11d my rights.

Please conl:tict me it you have any questions or concerns .

Sincsrcly ,

10h11 H. Cornell

7325 nustic Crc:;t Street
Las Vega:;, Ncv.Jda 8~1'19

(702) 453-77ll8

home.
Please Note: The .Jddress and telephon e number elven 1n y11u (r.11Jovc) is my Aunt's
IP;.i\/P
Plt-!n~t:! ~~nd all correspo ndence to this addrc55. !=or telephon e contact messages please
your n,m,c• ,md r1u111ber with my Aunts and I will return your c::ill. Thank you .
issue:;. This
Please keep informati on confldem lal. My Au11I'!-. du not want to be involved in these
is between my sister and me. ·1hank you .
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February 6, 2010 - March 5, 2010 !Iii Page 2 of 9

r PMA account
Percent
of total

Balance last
month ($)

Balance this
month ($)

Increase/
decrease ($)

Percent
change

29.31%

18%

6,925.22

8,955.11

2,029.89

81%

39,650.91

39,650.91

0.00

0.00%

<1%

479.30

479.35

0.05

0.01%

Total assets

$47,055.43

$49,085.37

$2,029.94

4.31%

Outstanding
balance last
month ($)

Outstanding
balance this
month ($)

Increase/
decrease ($)

Percent
change

Total asset allocation {by account type)

.C )

Checking: 99%

Liabilities
Account

Percent
of total

(Accounl Number)

Wells Fargo Credit Card t (5490-9624 -9039-9265)

NIA

490.09

0.00

Total liabilities

$490.09

$0.00

(490.09)
($490.09)

(100.00)%
(100.00)%

t Refer to your statement for actual statement dates.

Available credit
The information

below may not be current. Be sure to verify the credit available on your accounls when accessing

your credit lines.
Account

Approved credit line

Wells Fargo Credit Card (5490-9624-9039,9265)
Total available credit

16.400.00
$16,400.00

Credit used

0.00
$0.00

Credit available

16.400.00
$16,400.00

Interest, dividends and other income
The information

below should not be used for tax planning purposes.

Account
PMA• Prime Checking Account

This month
(344 360183)

Wells Fargo Money Market Savings•• (6860432969)
Total interest, dividends and other income

This year

0.69

2.18

0.05

0.20

$0.74

$2.38

EXHIBIT__~~ - - -8686
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Wells Fargo Custom Checking
Activi ty

summ ary

Balance on 2/6
Deposits/Additions
Withdrawals/Subtractions
Balance on 3/5

®
A=oun t numbe~

39,650.91

0.00
-0.00
$39,650.91

15000 2374 0

THE MICHAEL S CORNELL AND ARLIE
MICHAEL S CORNELL TTE
TONI C JOHNSON TTE
Wells Fargo Bank, NA, California (Member FDIC)
·
Questions about your account:

1-800-7 42-49 32

Worksheet lo balance your account and Genera
l
Statement Policies can be found towards the
end of this statement.
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Q. of --'-Qaa.-- Pages
140

®

Wells Fargo® PMA Package
i9
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If you have questions about this statement or
your accounts:

----

Phone: 1-800-7 42-4932, TTY: i -800-600-4833
Spanish: 1-877-727-2932, TTY: 1-888-355-6052
Chinese: 1-800-288-2288
Online: wellsfargo.com
Write: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
P.O. Box 6995

-

-

Portland, OR 97228-6995

MICHAEL S CORNELL
TONI C JOHNSON
5319 LAKEVIEW RD
OROFINO ID 83544-6127

Ui J

October 7,2010
Total assets:
Last month:
Change in$:
Change in%:

$34,970.78
$36,262.89
$(1,292.11)
(3.56)%

--

$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
0.00%

Total liabilities:
Last month:
Change in$:
Change in%:
PMA Qualifying Balance:

$34,970.78
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Ov er vie w of yo ur PM A ac co un t
Ass ets
Percent
of total

Balance last
month (SJ

Balance this
month (SJ

Increase/

Percent

7%

decrease (S)

1,807.38

chang e

93%

2,315.26
32,625.91

507.BB

34,425 .91

25.10%

(1,800 .00)

(S .23)%

< 1%

29.60

29.61

Tot11I 11ssets

0.0,

$36,26 2.89

0.03%

$34,97 0.78

($1,29 2.11)

(3.56)%

Total 11sset 11lloc11tion (by 11ccount type)

0

Checking: 100%

Interest, div ide nds ©lnd oth er income
The information below should not be used for tax
planni ng purposes.
Account
PMA" Prime Checking Account (344380183)
Wells Fargo Money Market Savings•• (6860432969)

Tot11I interest, dividends 11nd other income

Thism anth

This year

0.06

3.86

0.01

0.46

$0.07

$4.32
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PMA® Prime .Check ing Accou nt
Activity summary

Account number: 344380183

Balance on 9/9

1,807.38

Deposits/Additions

1,800.06

Withdrawals/Subtractions

MICHAELS CORNELL
TONIC JOHNSON

-1,292.18

Balance on 10/7

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A, California (Member FDIC)

$2,315.26

Questions about your account: 1-800-7 42-4932
Worksheet to balance your account and General
Statement Policies can be found towards the
end ofthis statement.

-

Overdraft protection
Your account is linked to the following forOverd iaft Protection:
m Credit c

Interest you've earned
Interest earned this month
Average collected balanc;e this month
Annual percentage yield earned

$0.06
$1,605.78
0.05%

Interest paid this year

$3_86

Tram.s~dion hist~ry
Date

Description

Beginning balance on 9/9

9/9
9/10
9/10
9/13
9/14
9/14
9/16
9/20
9/20
9/21
9/21
9/21
9/21
9/23
9/23
9/23
9/24
9/24
9/27
9/28
9/28
9/28
9/28
9/28
9/28
9/29
9/30
10/1
10/1
10/1
10/1
10/4
10/5
9573

Check
Check Crd Purchase 09/09 Vesta *MCINerizon 800-3171656 OR
434256Xxxxxx9288 253040007281626 7McC~4814 01
Check
Check
Check
Check
Check
Check
Check
Check
Check
Check
Check
ATM Withdrawal -09/23 Mach ID 1079B 210 Michigan Ave
Orofino ID 9288 0002865
Check
Amerigas Propane Checkpymt 092210 10794 5491082660
Check
Check
Check
Check
Frontier 13 Arc Bill Pymt 100927 10799
0000000301251003906656
Check
Check
Check
Check
Check
Check
Transfer From ODA# 000001500023740
Dish Network Bill Pymt 100930 10809 *'*"""**"*""3655
Check
Check
Check
Check

Deposits/
Additions

Check No.

C
L

EXHIBIT
~

Page

\ \)

10781

Withdrawals/
Subtractions

j

18.77

j

Ending Daily
Balance
1,807.38
1,788.61

(~

10785 v /
10787
.I
10789
10788
10791
10795 .//
10793 ·./ /
10786~.//
10796
10797 ~/
10798,./');

55.00
123.65
31.04
17.47
40.19
90.88
17.09
117.13
3.66

?!_;

fl
J;
.J ,;

1

1,722.11
1,598.46
1,549.95
1,509.76
1,401.79

2.71

21.64
- 60.00

».%

%
·1;

1,206.65

10800
A 10794
1080411
10792
10802
10784
A 10799•

13.07
9.54
12.67
9.95
8.64
83.95
43.97

·-:£.

35.00
26.36
23.36
14.32
6.36
73.11

865.82
859.46
786.35

68.99
29.12
3.90
15.1 6
26.00

2,484.34
2,469.18
143

ry;

10803
10806
10810¥
10805
·
10811
10808:;;;
A 10809

!/;

/

1,124.04
1,101.42
1,092.78

1,800.00'

108121
10813
10819 ,
10807

IIIII I IIIITTlll l l l llllll ll l~~l~lll lllll lllll l l l lllll l\\ l l\l\\ ll\\l l ll\111
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PMA" PRIME CHECKING ACCOUNT (CONTINUED)
Date
Description
10/5
Check
10/5
Check
10/6
Check
10/7
Check
10/7
Interest Payment
Ending balance on 10/7

Check No.
10817
10816/
10818

Withdrawals/
Subtractions
24.29
6.00
35.58

10820

Ending Daily
Balance
2,412.89
2,377.31

62.ll

0.06

2,315.26
2,315 .26

Totals
Key to symbols:

Deposits/
Additions

-as,

$1,800.06

$1,292.18

" . Convt:rted check: Paper check i::onver1ed to an electronic format by your payee or designated representative.

Converted checks cannot be rerurned, copied or imaged.

Summary of checks written

(checks listed are also displayed in the preceding Transaction history section)

Number

Date

$Amount

Number

Date

$Amount

10781

9/9

18.77

10796

9/21

33.66

Number
10808

10784 *

9/28

9/30

83.95

10797

73.11

9/21

22.71

10809

10/1

68.99
23.36

Date

$Amount

10785

9(10

55.00

10798

9/21

21.64 ·

10810

10786

9/28

9/21

117.13

10799

9/28

43.97

10811

10787

· 9/13

9/29

.123.65

6.36

10800

9/23

13.07

10812

10/1

29.12

10788

9/14

17.47

10802 *

9/27

8.64

10789

9/14

31.04

10803

9/28

35.00

10813

10/1

3.90

10816*

10/5

6.00

10791 *

9/16

40.19

10804

9/24

12.67

10817

10792

10/5

9/24

9.95

24.29

10805

9/28

14.32

10818

10/6

10793

9/20

35.58

17.09

10806

9/28

26.36

10619

10794

10/4

9/23

15.16

9.54

10807

10/5

26.00

10820

10/7

10795

9/20

62.11

90.88

• Gap in check sequence.

Direct Deposit Advance Important Change in Terms Notice -Additiona l terms regarding Payment
by Mail Set-up fee
- Effective immediately the following 'terms are added. All other repayment terms as communic
ated in the
'Important Change in Terms Notice' you received when you opened your consumer checking account
or received
within your consumer checking account statement remain the same.
Payment by Mail - Refundable Set-up fee. The set-up fee is refundable and will be automatica lly
credited to your
consumer checking account if your first two (2) payments under the Payment by Mail method
are made for the ful I
amount outstanding on or before the Payment Due Date as indicated on your periodic billing statement.
You do not
need to use the service immediate ly or for consecutive statement periods to qualify for the refund.
In order to be
eligible for the refund a late fee cannot have been assessed prior to making your first two (2) payments.
The refund
will appear on your checking account statement following the 2nd full payment.
For complete details about this service, please refer to the Direct Deposit Advance Service Agreemen
t and Product
Guide and any addendum or amendme nt or speak with a banker at the phone number listed above.

\-
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WelUs Fargo Custom Checkin g ®
Activity summary ·

Account number: 15000237 40

Balance on 9/9

34,425.91

Deposits/Additions
Withdrawals/Subtractions

0.00
-1,800.00

Balance on 10/7

THE MICHAELS CORNELL AND ARLIE
MICHAELS CORNELL TIE
TO NIC JOHNSON TIE
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., California (Member FDIC)

$32,625.91

Questions about your account: 1-800-7 42-4932
Worksheet to balance your account and General
Statement Policies can be found towards the
end of this statement.

Transaction history
. Date

Description

Check No.

Deposits/
Additions

Beginning balance on 9/9
10/1
Transfer to DDA #\i%iii!WtAf'iiW>%rit-9
Ending balance on 10/7
Totals

$0.00

Withdrawals/
Subtractions

Ending Daily
Balance

1,800.00

34,425.91
32,625.91
32,625.91

-

$1,800.00

Get your credit report and heip protect your identity
There's a new way to help manage your credit and protect your identity: Enhanced Identity Theft Protection.
When you enroll, you'll gain insight into how your everyday financial decisions impact your credit and cred it score.
Then, you can make decisions to help reach your financial goals - whether it's paying off debt, saving more or
increasing your credit score. Enhanced Identity Theft Protection delivers monthly, triple credit bureau reports and
scores, online calculators, a credit score tracker, cred it score alerts and more.
Start protecting your credit and identity today by enrolling for just $1 for the first month and only $15.99 monthly
.thereafter. Visit wellsfargo.com/enha nced to enroll today.
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-We1Ds Fargo Money Market Savingssnn
Activit y summary

Account number: q/i)jl@ilji¢@i,""u)$

Balance on 9/9

29.60

Deposits/Additions

O.Ql
-0.00

Withdrawals/Subtractions
Balance on 10/7

$29.6 1

MICHAELS CORN ELL
TO NIC JOHNSON
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Idaho (Member FDIC)

Questions about your account: 1-800-7 42-493 2
Worksheet to balance your account and General
Statement Policies can be found toward s the
end of this statement .

Interes t you've earned
Interest earned this month
Average collected balance this month
Annual percentag e yield earned
Interest paid this year

$0.01
$29.60
0.43%

$0.46

Transaction history
Date

Description
Bcg;nning b'4! ~n-c e on 9/9

10/7
Interest Payment
Ending bala nce on 10/7
TotlllS

Deposits/
Additions

Withdrawals/
Subtractions

Ending Daily .
Balance

2~.sc
0.Dl

29.61
29.61

$0.0 1

$0.00
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Com plete Adv anta _
Account numbe
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Chec king

1i1J September 9, 2011 - October 7, 2011 ll'!lJ Page 1 of 5

Questio ns?
MICHAEL S CORNELL
TON I C JOHNSON
5319 LAKEVIEW RD
OROFINO ID 83544-61 27

Available by phone 24 hours a day, 7 days a week:

1-800-TO-WELLS (l -800-869-3557)
ITY: 1-800-877-4833
En espanol: 1-877-727- 2932 ITY: 1-888-355 -6052
~!;E

"'!= ""' 1-800-288- 2288

(6 am to 7 pm PT, M-F)

Online: wellsfargo .com
Write: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (114)
P.O. Box 6995
Portland, OR 97228-6995

You and Wells Fargo
- Wells Fargo Bank is consisten tly rated as "Outstand ing" for the Communi ty
Reinvestm ent Act (CRA) by federal regulato rs, the highest rating a financial
services institution can receive.

--

Account options
A check mark in the box indicates you have these
convenient services with your account. Go to
we/Jsfargo.com or call the number above if you have
questions or if you would like to add new services.
Online Banking

[Z]

Online Bill Pay

D
D
D

Overd raft Protection

[Z]

Debit Card

Online Statements
Mobile Banking
My Spending Report

D
D
Auto Transfer/ Payment D
Direct Deposit

Rewards Program

Overdraft Ser vice

[Z]

D

~ IMPORTANT ACCOUNT INFORMATION
Revised Agreemen t fo r Onl ine Banking
We've updat ed ou r Online Access Agreement.
To see what has changed, please visit wellsfargo .com/onli neupdates.
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With you when you're shopping for the perfect gift
Give yourself extra spending security this season. Our Zero Liability protection keeps your
personal or business Wells Fargo Debit Cards and Credit Cards safe from promptly reported
unauthorized transactions at no extra cost. Speak with a banker, call us at 1-800-WFB-OPEN
or visit wellsfargo.com to learn more today.

Account numb

Activity summary

MICHAEL S CO
TONIC JOHNSON

$1,622.46

Beginning balance on 9/9

1,871.04

Deposits/Additions
Withdrawals/Subtractions

- 1,970.87

Ending b<1kmce on 10/7

$1,522 .63

California account terms ond conditions apply

For Direct Deposit and Automatic Payments use
Routing Number (RTN): 121042882

Overdraft Protection
Your account is linked to the following for Overdraft Protection:
·Ill Credit Card

Interest summary
$0.04

Interest paid this statement

$1 ,160.54

Average collected balance
Annual percentage yield earned

0.04%

Interest earned this statement period

$0.04

Interest paid this year

$0.58

Transaction history

Date
9/9
9/9
9/9 .
9/12

~~H
g/12

Check
Number
11161
11158
.. jffs7
11151

Descriplion
Check
.... ·· ... _.........
Check
...... ,,., ..... _,_,,,_,. ...
'"''" ...... ,..... ...
·check
. -·--·-·---.. ,, ......... ..
Check

:~·~~·~r~:f

.

•:· · ···· .· ··.··

fl162 Check

· ··· iiiiis ttieck

9h5 ... , ........ ·11163 « check -

9/19
9/20
9/21

ll.1.?~.. ,c~~ck
11154 Check
. . . ... 11168 check

?hi ::
9/22
9/22
9/22

9ii2 ., ......... ......

--

.

"'" -

Ending daily
Withdrawals/
balance
Subtractions
124.59
40.28 ...... ······ · ..... , ·· ·
. 25:00 ,.,. -·· 'i;.is:2:s9
. . .
·---- .....
121.00 . - -

eec~a.FcLiCheckPyint\ff$2·· · · · · ··· · ·.·· · .· · :· ··.· · ·· · · ···.·:········ · · :·····.·.··::····· ··· · · · · · · · ···· · · · · ·· ··· · .·· · · · · · · ··.·· ··· ..... . . . . . . . , . ~~4:~~ '"'"' "
............. ...

9fit ... · ........: _11_1s5 ·_<thecl< __"_
11160 Check
9/13

9hs ·

Deposits/
Additions

fas

.. ... -·

·. ·. ···-<·- .......·"--···· · · __ · ............____ .... · ........_...,.
... . .... ..._,. . ., ...... , ...........,,....,w...

,w, .. - - · - · ·

_ , ...........,, ...

·.- .•,......... ,, .....,............- -......................................,........,.... ... . .

............ .. ....

··1..i1.15 _____ : ·· ,w···· ···996.22
16.50

49:02 ·

···························· · · · · ····· · · · ·· · · · · · · · · · · ·
.....

., ,. . . , , , "'"'

. . · 1,153.87

. ... ...

·.···· 2.85....... .......,....w-944.3s

::•:::•:::= : :::::=::.... ::~••: •: :=.:~::.:.:.,. . ...

.

..

?.~;,,4~.............. :29?:8J.
::. ::::: ... , .......... ·.. ..
792.16
113.71
. . . .. ... . .......... - . .- ...................."',,......................................- ...........................,.................................................. . . .............................'i\s':Ci6 .................._:ioii 6,

Aiiiiii iMgefsarikctie:Skp~y3itifri922iifiiiooooi4963is :

:.

ij s:ii3 : ::..

:

s.

.: :

53.27
Check
11120
..., ....., .. .
. .., ..... ij';i' .
... ., .. .
............... ., ............................,...............
11·126 Check· ...... ....,.....
.......................... ., "·"'"""•"" ,
49.70
..
.
.
.. ........ .,,..,,...- .,..... .- ............"........ ..... .......................
.. ..... 1·1·i71"' ·chec1< ""'"'""" ......... ,. ................. .....
· ... , ""·"'4fi5:99
9 .35
11169 ·· Check ·· · · .... ,.,....................., ........... . . ,,. .,,,,.. .. ......... ...,,,,,-.. -·,······ ..... .....,,,,..,"_,.....,..............,.,........,................................,.....,............,,............

T____
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Transaction historry (continued)
Check
Deposits/
Withdrawals!
Ending daily
Date
Number Descriptian
Additions
Subtractions
balance
9/26 ___",-·, _________ Tele-Transfer Fr Savirrgm xxxx8663 Reference# Tfe58H9Yjn
___,,.___,._,__ 100.00
,. ,,,_______,,,,,__ ,,_____ 49R(H
9/27
· I\ 11172 Frontier 13 Arc Bill Pymt 110926 11172
42.76
0000000301 2510039066 56
.
9/27 _,,,,,,,,,,_,, _ _ "11166 Ameri~s ~~e Ch~¥mt 09261.1 11166 5491082660
__,,_,____
,,_,,,____, :~-/ _____,,,._.__10.60 ._.,,,,.
· · • 44-4.65
___,, _______,,__,,,,,,, ~~=~~r~ ~~f;urc~: ~i~mo;::~ ~~:~~~~W i~ti~:~D - · ___,,_,,,, 1,500.00
:0.48 . ,,,.,., .__ 1,941:T7
xx9288 271140012 375516 ?McC=5211 90
9/29
_ ,. '"11174 434256xxxx
Check •., •.,. ............. , ..........
··-···--· -··---- · ......,•.., ......, . ..
................ ·- ······
1;s~JO:s6
9/30 ·---·---·- ·- 11175 • Check _____,,_ __,,______,,,____,,.,,,,,,_____,_,,_,
__,,._____,.,,,,_,,,,,., -------- --------39.75 ·----,- - - 9/30 _,,_____11176 . Check
- · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , , 16.84 .,,. ,,,._,, _______ ._
9/30
· 11173 Check
·
·
·
· 5.00
10/4 ·--·-··-·-· 11177- Check -·-·-·-- ,,
------- ·--···-- --··--·-- --------- --------- -- 121.00 --·--·---..,,,,1,828.97
_ __ _
ioJ.;r--· · .... ·" TiYis ··cfieck
· ,, .,,.
·· ·· ... .... · ---- ·
········ · i6:1s ·· ·-· · ... 1,631.82
10/5 ··------ ---·-.... Tele-Transfer Fr Savingsxxxxxx8663 Referenc~ #~tr),92R
·
_,_
271.00
-----·--·-·--10/5
11185 Check
118.91
10/5
11186 Check
·
· - - - - - -..··-··"·-··---- -----·------ ..--·----··-- --,.--,,.,- .----·--·"·"""'-""'·'"'"""-"·
"'"'"""'75,00 ""'"'"· ·- --·-,,,, 10/S _,,, .............. - " l 11.79_ Di.sh Network Bill Py1'Tlt 11.1004 1..1179 ********"***3655···--····--··
· ·---· ..... . . · .. . . .....,.-............ ,. __ . '""' .- ...... 73_.99 __ ..,, ...... ,,, 1,634.92
10/6
11180 Check
46.25
10/6
11190 Chi,ck
---- - - -- - - - · 38.65 - - - - · ---··
10/6
11187 Check
11.65
10/7
1,538.37
--11191 Check · - · - - - -·- - · - - - - - - - - - · - - - -15.78· - · - - · ·
·
1.0/7 ..................,.. ···-·-- • ······-·. Interest.Pay ment ...... _ ................... -~:.:::..... - ~:..... ....
9:.2'.!
.
.
................
.
..
.
.
.
,
.
•
,,
.........
,,
.•....
""---"T,52
2'.63
Ending balance on 10/7
1,522.63
Totals
$1,871.04
$1,970.87
The Ending Daily Balance does not reflect any pending withdrawals or holds on deposited
funds that may have been outstanding an your account when your
transactions posted. If you had insufficient available funds when a transaction posted, fees
may have been assessed.

:~~~

)1________

so:iff

%

· -·--

_ _ . , , , , , • .,, . . . . . . .

-

. . . . .. . . .. •

" Converted check: Check converted to an electronic farmat by your payee or designated representati
ve. Checks converted ta e/ectranic farmat cannot be
returned, copied or imaged.

Summary of checks written (checks listed are also displayed in the preceding Transactio

n history)

Number
11120

Date
9/22

Amount
53.27

Number
11163

Date
9/15

Amount
2.85

Number
11175

Date
9/30

Amount
39.75

11126 *

9/22

52.22

11164

9/19

38.48

11135 *

11176

9/30

9/12

16.84

54.87

11165

9/15

49.02

11177

10/4

121.00

11151 *

9/12

121.00

11166

9/27

10.60

11178

11152

10/4

9/12

76.15

100.00

11167

9/22

125.63

11179

10/5

73.99

11154 *

9/20

113.71

11168

9/21

85.00

11155

9/13

141.15

11169

9/22

9.35

11180

10/6

46.25

11185 *

10/5

118.91
75.00

11157 *

9/9

25.00

11170

9/23

18.98

11186

11158

10/5

9/9

40.28

11171

9/22

49.70

11187

11160*

10/6

9/13

11.65

16.50

11172

9/27

42.76

11161

11190 *

10/6

9/9

124.59

38.65

11173

9/30

5.00

11191

11162

10/7

9/12

15.78

2.85

11174

9/29

50.61

* Gap in check sequence.
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~ IMPORTANT ACCOUNT INFORMATION
Enjoy safe and secure savings with a Wells Fargo Time Account (CD). You will get a guaranteed rate of return and have the peace of
mind of knowing your money is FDIC insured up to applicable limits. Talk with your Wells Fargo Banker today.

Turn off the paper clutter ... If you bank online, get your statement online. It's easy to switch to Online Only Statements. Sign on at
wellsfargo.com/turnoffpaper, select Online Only, or check the box Switch All to Online Only Delivery and click Submit at the bottom of
the page. Online statements reduce paper clutter, help protect against identity theft, and they're gentle on the environment.
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Questions?
Available by phone 24 hours a day, 7 days a week:
1-800-TO-WELLS (1-800-869-3557)

MICHAELS CORNELL

TONIC JOHNSON
5319 LAKEVIEW RD

TTY: 1-800-877-4833
En espaflol: 1-877-727-2932 TTY: 1-888-355-6052

OROFINO ID 83544-6127

~;Ji

~ iio 1-800-288-2288 (8 am to 7 pm PT,

M-F)

Online: wellsfargo.com

-

Write: Wells Fargo Bank,.N.A. (114)
P.O. Box 6995
Portland, OR 97228-6995

-

You arid Wells Fargo

Account options

Thank you for being a Wells Fargo customer. We appreciate your business and
understand that you are entrusting us with your banking needs. Let us assist you
in finding the right accounts and services to help you reach your financial goals.
Please visit us on line at wellsfargo.com, call us at the number at the top of your
statemen t, or visit any Wells Fargo store - we'd love to hear from youl

A check mark in the box indicates you hove these
convenient services with your account. Go to·
wellsfargo.com or call the number above if you have
questions or if you would like to add new services.
Online Banking

[Z]

Direct Deposit

D
D

D

Online Bill Pay

Overdraft Protection

0

Online Statements
Mobile Banking
My Spending Report

D
D Auto Transfer/Payment 0
Rewards Program

[Z]

IMPORTANT ACCOUNT INFORMATION
Shared ATM Deposits
Effective July 28, 2011, we will no longer accept deposits made at non-Wells Fargo STAR and Instant Cash Shared Network ATMs. To
make an ATM deposit, please visit on e of our 12,000 Wells Fargo or Wachovia a Wells Fargo company, ATMs.

n
8

With you when you're protecting the things you value most
Protecting the things that matter most in your life is easier with Wells Fargo Insurance.
We can help you find the type of coverage that fits your needs. And, with competitive
quotes from the multiple companies we represent, you'll get a pi;ice that's right for you.
Meet with us or visit wellsfargo.com/insurance to learn more today.

k....______
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Account number:

Activity summary

MICHAELS COR
TONIC JOHNSON

$1,739.27

Beginning balance on 5/7

1,500.06

Deposits/Additions
Withdrawals/Subtractions ·

- 1,779.28

California account terms and conditions apply

Ending balance on 6/7

$1,460.05

For Direct Deposit and Automatic Payments use
Routing Number (RTN): 121042882

Overdraft Protection
Your account is linked to the following for Overdraft Protection:

Iii Credit Card

Interest summary
$0.06

Interest paid this statement

$1,355.78

Average collected balance

0.05%

Annual percentage yield ealned
Interest earned this statement period

$0.06

Interest paid this year

$0.37

Transaction history

s!io ·
s110··

····

s111 ··

5/13 ······ .

.

5/13

.

s/16 . ·

5/18

sh'8 · ·

sh<)

''"'"""'" . , .

Check .

i1iisl

. .

:Si24 '' ..

Purchase

6rofino 115 .

chec1<erd
05J2ci Hayes Foods &1-iardw
434256xxxxxx9288 142140012909126 ?M,cC=54 ll 90

ciieck

11052•n•,Check

·

.

5h6 · ··· ·

1i

..... . ...

Check .

6/2

6/f

1,257.92

. . . i ,061.83

. ... ........
\044.56..

40.00
21.33
53.80
53,80 ···· ·

·

49.57
52.22

· ····' 4957

11 007 · check' ..
check

.... ii 029

724,27

52.22

5jfj"

6/2 ·····

1,573.73
\4'.i2.73

.

i2i.oo ·
i1i:Uii
75.00
i49,4i
46.62
. 8Ai

. a.so ··

...... . . . . . .

5/31

1,625.02

o,is check ···

·· ·1io1is

s12r,-···
s/27 · ·· ··
s/31
5/31

17, 18
.. 30.02 · . .

' h ,•,Nn'"· '·'•'•"" '' "''• .. h A•

i io4:f' check
·· ······ ii 033 check · ·

5/25
:S12:s ···· ·

5/27·····

i ,649.:26

11050 Cl1eck ...

5/24"
5/25 .

balance

2f27
·

sa:nrc~ec1<p_axfr;i,59stfil§46§¢§oJ4?~3fa .,...... . . ·
oieck ·

"" ' '' . . iio49 "'check

5/23 . .

Ending daily

9.35
7 . 06

.

i 1044 '"check
11045 ·c heck ···.
? 11046 -)a/9.ei
11047 Check
1103s

5i23 .

. . "" "' ,_,, .• "

.. Clieck Crd Purchasebsjj iiNorttiwest Drug& Gift Orofino ID
434256xxxxxx9288 131140012404209 ?McC=5912 90
iio4i check ·

i 1043·

Withdrawals!
Subtractions
53.20
..
17.86 .
.. ... 9~60

11040 Check
· i 1037 Check ·······
.. ... ..... 11036 ·'check
11035 Check

5/10
5/10

s119 ··

Deposits/
Additions

Check
Number Description

Date

. .... , , . • • .,.. . . . . . , ~

39.8:f

0

... 38.24 .

i1cis6 check······

9s:;ixxxx?~i5IR.~fer~~~~:~:Y¥.eJJ3~?fi:

... ..... .. ... ··· .. · )e:ie-Tra~_s,f,er(f}~~i:~
11039 Check
.... I\ 1 ios3 . Froriiiei-' i3Afc Biii Pymt iios2:i ii0s3 .
0000000301251003906656.
" ; 1054 bish Network Eiii1 ·
ii 06cff i fo54 **" ' '"''"''36ss ····· ··
· i iiis8 ciieck
·· ·· ····· ···· ···· · ···· ··· ····· ·· ·········· · · ··· · ·,
11057 check ·'
,,, , ... . ,.,.,,,, . . ,

·.·. .._i3ii_o:oo······· .•

.. 593.98

so.of

. 42.53

rymr

1,97'i.42

73.99 ..
7.90
. 75.00

. ),889.53

---r
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Transaction history (continued)
Date
6/3

Check
Number Description
11 060 Check

6/j" "" •""'' ·-::~~if9§(:~~~~k• HOW"" "''°'"""" '""'"'""" '°'"'"""" "°""°''"" "'"'''"'"'" ""'''"'

Deposits/
Additions

~>~·· · . . . . . . ·-11 ~~; . .2~:~~. . .. --- .,. . . . -..,.,. . . . ., _,, ,_, _ -···-·--·-·-··-··. -· . ,., . . . . . . . . .
•••d .. ••

..

•

Withdrawals/
Subtractions
50.24
.,m ..... •• • 23.58

Ending daily
balance
.

.. ..... . ._. , . ., ~~=-~: ~~Hr-: . . -· . . .

--

1/40,?1 .

)~6-§z.?2
61i·· ·
i\ iio63. kineciai'cucheckryirit'iio63. ·
iocioo
6/i ··..·· • ················ ········ ··· ·········· ·····inieiesti'aYment·············· ·. . ....................... .... ....... ·· ··· ····:····· · · ··· ·······
····· · ······················· ············ ··· : · ··········· ·········· · o:oi5····· ··•••: ·:••~··········-•· ·•·····················•···· •••··:··~····;'46Q:o~
Ending balance on 617

1,460.05

Totals

$1,500.0 6

$1,779. 28

The Ending Daily Balance does not reflect any pending withdraw
als or holds on deposited funds that may have been outstanding
on your account when your
transactions posted. If you had insufficient available funds when
a transaction posted, fees may have been assessed.
I\ Convert ed check: Check converted to
an electronic format by your payee or designated representative.
Checks converted to electronic format cannot be
returned, copied or imaged.

Summary of checks written (checks listed are also display ed in
the precedi ng Transac tion history)
Number
11007

Date
5/26

Amount
49.57

Number
11041

Date
5/11

Amount
17.18

Number
11052

Date
5/24

Amount
21.33

11016 *

5/26

52.22

11042

5/25

11023 *

53.80

5/27 .

11053

5/31

39.83

11043

42.53

5/13

30.02

11029*

11054

5/27

6/2

52.22

11044

73.99

5/13

21 .27

11033*

11056 *

5/25

5/27

49.57

11045

38.24

5./16

121.00

11035 •

11057

5/10

6/3

9.35

75.00

11046

5/18

119.81

11058

11036

5/10

6/2

9.60

11047

7.90

5/18

75.00

11060 •

6/3

50.24

11037

5/10

17.86

11048

5/25

53.80

11061

11038

5/19

6/3

149.47

23.58

11049

5/19

46.62

11062

11039

6/6

5/31

80.03

73.11

11050

5/24

40.00

11063

11040

6/7

5/10

100.00

53.20

11051

5/23

8.80

11065 *

6/7

107.61

-

• Gap in check sequence.

~IM PO RTA NT ACCOUNT INFORMATION
Save time with Online Bill Pay
Save time avoid late fees, and save on postag e costs. Be at ease
knowing your payme nts get there fast-with over 90% of our top
payees ab!e to.receive payme nts in 2 days or less. You can even
make same day payment:; to Wells Fargo credit accoun ts, and
to other
select merchants. Pay your bills efficiently with Wells Fargo Bill
Pay-backed by our Payme nt Guaran tee. We guaran tee your payme
nts
will be paid as scheduled, on time, every time. Go to wellsfargo.com
or wellsfargo.com/biz to sign up or sign on today.

-r
__ __ __
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Worksheet to. balance your .account

General statement policies for Wells Fargo Bank

Follow the steps below to reconcile your stat.e ment balance with your
account register balance. Be sure that your register shows any interest
paid into your account and any service charges, automatic payments or
ATM transactions withdrawn from your account during this statement
period.
[Kl Enter the ending balance on this statement.
~$_ _ _ _ __

Ill To dispute or report inaccuracies in information we have furnished to a
Consumer Reporting Agency about your accounts. You have the right to
dispute the accuracy of information that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. has
furnished to a consumer reporting agency by writing to us at Wells Furgo
...-Servicing, P.O. Box 14415, Des Moines, IA 50306-3415. Please describe the
specific information that is inaccurate or in dispute and t he basis for the
dispute along with supporting documentation. If you believe the
information furnished is the result of identity theft, please provide us with
an identity theft report.

(fil List outstanding deposits and other
credits to your account that do not appear on
this statement. Enter the total in the column ·
to the right.

Iii In case of errors or questions about your electronic transfers,
telephone us at the number printed on the front of this statement or write
us at Wells Fargo Bank, P.O. Box 6995, Portland, OR 97228-6995 as soon as
you can, if you think your statement or receipt is wrong or if you need more
information about a transfer on the statement or receipt. We must hear
from you no later than 60 days after we sent you the FIRST statement on
which the error or problem appeared .

Amount

Description

+

T.;tal $

[I]

1. Tell us your name and account number (if any).
2. Describe the error or the transfer you are unsure about, and explain a!;
clearly as you can why you believe it is an error or why you need more
information.
3. Tell us the dollar amount of the suspected error.

s; L· · -r

_¥·~~· _ _ ]_..

Add[Kj and @] to calculate the subtotal.

We will investigate your complaint and will correct any error promptly. If
we take more than 10 business days to do this, we will credit your account
for the amount you think is in error, so that you will have the use of the
money during the time It takes us to complete our investigation.

[Q]

List outstanding checks, withdrawals, and
other debits to your account that do not appear
on this statement. Enter the total in the column
to the right.

a

----:--··- - - ~ - - - - - - - - - ,
Number/Description

Amount

-- - - - ~ -. ---:_:.::~_L_·_ t:..-

i·

I

,· .1 ·. .

~

·----- - - - - - + - - -~~~--:--1

~

..._.....-·

~~----------·- ..; ~;- .-~!-·~·:~.~
-,
· ro----- -- - - - J _ ./-··

·'./

I ...

_-5

In case of errors or questions about your Direct Deposit Advance•
service
If you think your bill is wrong, or if you need more information about a
transaction on your bill, write us at Wells Fargo Bank, P. 0. Box 6995,
Portland, OR 97228-6995 as soon as pos·sible. We must hear from you no
later than 60 days after we sent you the first bill on which the error or
· problem appeared: You can telephone us, but doing so will not preserve
your rights.
In your letter, give us the following information:

.----· - -- - · - - + - - - - - ' ' - - - I

1. Your name and account number
2. The dollar amount of the suspected error
3. Describe the error and explain, if you can, why you believe there is an
error. If you need more information, describe the item you are unsure
about.

I
I

I
I

You do not have to pay any amount in question while we are investigating,
but you are still obligated to pay the parts of your bill that are not in
question. While we investigate your question, we cannot report you as
delinquent or take any action to collect the amount you question.

I

I

I
I
I

y

I

I
I

I
,;' ./

I

Total $
~
l..---------'--------~

L :~··

- $ \ -

IT]

Subtract [Q] from[fl to calculate the
adjusted ending balance. This amount should be
the same as the current balance shown in y·our
register.

= ..
$ _______

@
..-201OWells Fargo Bank, N.A. All rights reserved. NMLSR ID 399801
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Wells Fargo® PMA Package

-

If you have questions about this statement or
your accounts:

-

Phone: 1-800-742- 4932, TTY: 1-800-600-4 833
Spanish: 1-877-727-2 932, TTY: 1-888-355-6052
Chinese: 1-800-288-2 288
Online: wellsfargo.c om

Write: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
P.O. Box 6995
Portland, OR 97228-6995 ·

MICHAEL S CORNELL
TONI C JOHNSON
5319 LAKEVIE W RD
OROFINO ID 83544-6127

Novem ber 5, 201 O
Total assets:

$32,793.7 2
$34,970.78

Last month:
Change in$:
Change in%:

$(2, 177.06)
(6.23)%

Total liabilities:

$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
0.00%

Last month:
Change in$:
Change in%:

--

PMA Qualifying Balance:

$32,793.7 2
WWW

Contents

Page

Overview. . ... . ... .. .. .... . .... . . . ..... . 2
PMA· Prime Checking Account. . . . . . . • . . ... .. . . 4
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Over view of your PMA acco unt
Assets
Percent
of total
6%

Balance last
month (SJ
2,315.26

Balance this
month (SJ
1,938.20

lncreasei
decrease (SJ
(377.06)

Percent
change
(16.29)%
(5.52)%

94%

32,625.91

30,825.91

(1,800.00)

<1%

29.61

29.61

0.00

0.00%

Total assets

$34,970.78

$32,793.72

($2,177.06)

(6.23)%

Total asset allocation (by account type)

0

Checking: 100%

Interest., dividen ds and other income
The information below should not be used for tax planning purposes.
Account

This month

PMA 0 Prime Checking Account
-Wells Fargo Money Market Sav
Total interest, dividends and other income

3.93

0.00

0.46

$0.07

$4.39

EXHIBITPage

This year

0,07
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: , OVERVIEW OF YO UR PMA ACCOU NT (CONTINUED)

Upcoming changes to your Wells Fargo PMA Package and Brokerage Account Benefits
On January 1, 2011, Wells Fargo Investments, LLC brokerage accounts will be tramforred to our affiliat ed
broker-dealer, Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC. The following is a summary of changes to the PMA Package Brokerage
Account Benefits described in the Wells Fargo Consumer Account Fee and Information Schedule:
All references to Wells Fargo Investments, LLC are replaced with Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC. Financial Consultants are
now called Financial Advisors. WellsTrade and Full Service Brokerage Account Maintenance Fees and IRA Custodial
Fees are now described as Annual Account Fees. Annual Account Fees also includes any other annua l fees described
in your Wells Fargo Advisors Brokerage Account fee schedule.
WellsTrade Brokerage Accounts
WellsTrade accounts link.ed to a PMA Package: 100 commission-fre e online trades per year ($8.95 per trade
thereafter, starting on January 18, 2011 ). Annual Account Fees will be waived for WellsTrade accounts linked to a
PMA Package as of June 30 of each year.
·

-

Full Service Brokerage Accounts
For qualifying brokerage accounts linked to a PMA Package on or after January 1, 2011 , Annual Account Fees will be
waived with a PMA qualifying balance of $250,000 or more as of June 30 of each year. (Certain brokerage accounts
are not eligible for this fee waiver.)
For brokerage accounts . linked to a PMA Package prior to January 1, 2011, Annual Account Fees c1re wa ived fqr
non-IRA brokerage accounts that remain linked to a PMA Package as of June 30 of each year, with no qualifying PMA
balance ($100,000 or more qualifying PMA balance required for Brokerage IRAs, excluding Education Savings
Accounts).
Certain brokerage accounts are not eligible to be linked to a PMA Package and their balances will not count toward
the qualifying PMA relationship and they will not receive PMA benefits. Please contact your Financial Advisor or
Investment Professional to see if your brokerage account can be linked to your Wells Fargo PMA Package.
INVESTMENT PRODUCTS:
-ARE NOT INSURED BY THE FDIC OR ANY OTHER FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCY
-ARE NOT DEPOSITS OF OR GUARANTEED BY THE BANK OR ANY BANK AFFILIATE
-MAY LOSE VALUE
Investment products and services, including WellsTrade accounts are offered through Wells Fargo Investments, LLC
(member SIPC), a registered broker dealer and non-bank affiliate of Wells Fargo & Company.

Please see an important message on the last page of your statement that describes how Wells Fargo posts
transactions to your account.

G ---------
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PMA ® Pri me Che cki ng Acc oun t
Activity summary

Accountn umber: 3443801 83

Balance on 10/8

2,315.26

Deposits/Additions
Withdrawals/Subtractions

MICHAEL S CORNELL
TONI C JOHNSON

1,800.07
-2, 177.13

Balance on 11 /5

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., California (Member FDIC)

$1,938.20

Questions about your account: 1-800-74 2-4932
Worksheet to balance your account and General
Statement Policies can be found towards the
end of this statement .

Overdra ft protection
Your account Is
Iii

erdraft Protection:

Credit car

Interes t you've earned
Interest earned this month
Average collected. balance this month
Annual percentag e yield earned
Interest paid this year

$0.07
$1,671.99
0.05%
$3.93

Transaction history
Date

Description

Deposits!
Additions

Check Na.

Beginning balance on 10/8

10/8
10/12
10/12
10/12
10/13
10/13
10/13
10/14
10/18
10/18
10/19
10/19
10/19
10/19
10/19
10/19
10/20
10/20
10/20
10/20
10/20
10/25
10/25
10/26
10/26
10/26
10/26
10/27
10/29
11/2
1112
1112
10664

Check
ATM Withdraw al-10/12 Mach ID 10798 210 Michigan Ave
Orofino ID 9288 0003969
Check Crd Purchase 10/09 Frontier Foo.ds Orofino ID
434256Xxxxxx9288 284040005965771 ?McC=5411 90
Check
Check
Check
Check
Check
Amerigas Propane Checkpymt 101510 10828 5491082660
Check
Check
Check
Check
Check
Check
Check
Check
Check
Check
Check
Check
Check
Check
ATM Withdrawal - 10/26 Mach ID 10798 210 Michigan Ave
Orofino ID 9288 0004816
Frontier 13 Arc Bill Pymt 101025 10836
000000030125.1003906656
Check
Check
Check
Transfer From O D A ~
Check
)
Check
EXHI BIT_. !....~. :.'---- --Check

L\_...._ of ___,..,......_ Pages

Page __

Withdrawals!
Subtractions

Ending Daily
Balance
2,315.26

10815

~.00
40.00

2,195.26

.ji.91
10825
10826

·"Y.

10827 1
10829,
10330
1110828,
10833/
10832 :.-10782 .,...10801, 10790.-10834 10835
10822 ;:::::::
1083710831 ,-10821 · 10814 · 10824 __.
10823 - -

y-

111083 6-

_

2,005.11
1,931.38
1,920.22
1,583.29

1,353.77

l.015.78
800.00

46.26

10840 . -

.·-

128.24
40.88
26.51
6.34
11.16
328.13
8.80
45.00
42.47
41.41
41.41
30.08
29.15
109.40
108.06
41.94
41.41
37.18
135.00
80.78
.--60.00
...

39.62

10841· -

23.61

630.51

10838

75.00

555.51
2,355.51

10844 ,-....
10848
10849

.J...800.00
120.00
89.75
28.25

2,117.51 171
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: , PMA® PRIME CHECKING ACCOUNT (CONTINUED)
Description
Date
Dish Network Bill Pymt 101102 1
11/3
Check
11/3
Check
11/4
Check
11/4
Check
11/5
Interest Payment
11/5
Ending balance on 11/S

Check No.
1110845 ·
10847,-10852~
10342v
10850

Withdrawals/
Subtractions
68.99
5.45
23.83
8.00
73.11

0.07

Totals

Key to symbols:

Deposits/
dditions

$1,800.07
II

Ending Daily
Balance
2,043.07
2,011.24
1,938.20
1,938.20

$2,177.13

Converted check: Paper check converted to an electronic format by your payee or designated representative.
.
Converted checks cannot be returned, copied or imaged.

Summary of checks written (checks listed are also displayed in the preceding Transaction history section)
Date

Number
10782

10/19

$Amount
42.47

10790 *

10/19

41.41

Number
10827

Date
10/13

$Amount
26.51

Number
10838

Date
10/27

10828

10/18

328.13

10840 •

10/26

39.62

10841
c,.J.0 842,. .'· Y

10/26

23.61

11/4

8.00

11/2

120.00
68,99

$Amount
75.00

--- ·- ·- - --

10801 *

10/19

41.41

10829

10/13

10814 *

10/20

37.18

10830

10/14

6.34
i·'.· J.U6

10815

10/8

120.00

10831

10/20

41.94

10844 •
10845

11/3

10847 •

11/3

5.45

10848

11/2

89.75

10821 *

10/20

41.41

10832

10/19

45.00

10822

10/20

109.40

10833

10/18

8.80

10823

10/25

80.78

10834

10/19

30.08

10824

10/25

135.00

10835

10/19

29.15

10849

11/2

28.25

10825

10/12

128.24

10836

10/26

46.26

10850

11/5

73.11

10826

10/13

40.88

10837

10/ 20

108.06

10852 *

11 /4

23.83

-

• Gap in check sequence.

Track seasonal spending online
Get your seasonal spending, bills, budget, and savings under control with My Spending Report with Budget Watch,
and other free online tools from Wells Fargo Online.
Save time, spend wisely and save more by using Account Alerts, My Spending Report with Budget Watch and My
Savings Plan, and Mobile and Text Banking*. You can also download an App for your mobile device at wf.com
(optimized for your mobile device).
Sign up or sign on today! Visit wellsfargo.com, wellsfargo.com/biz, or wf.com for more details.
*Your mobile carrier's text messaging and Web access charges may apply.
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Wells Fargo Custo m Checking®
Activity summary

Account number

Balance on 10/8

32,625.91

Deposits/Additions

0,00
-1,800.00

Withdrawals/Subtractions
Balance on 11 /5

THE MICHAELS CORNELL AND ARLIE
MICHAELS CORNELL TTE
TONIC JOHNSON TTE
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., California (Member FDIC)

$30,825.91

Questions about your account: 1-800-742-49 32
Worksheet to balance your account and General
Statement Policies can be found towards the
end of this statement.

Transaction history
Date

Description

Check No.

Deposits/
Additions

Withdrawals(
Subtractions

Ending Daily
Balance

1,800.00

32,625.91
30,825.91
30,825.91

Beginning balance on 10/8

.·
Transfer to DD~l1it£\li!' P:t:'t/i\;'/;~
Ending balance on 11/5
10/29 ·

.Totals

$0.00

$1,800.00

EXHIBIT_ ___.,..
b~,- - - Page
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oney Markert Savingssm

Activity summary
Balance on 10/8
Deposits/Additions
Withdrawals/Subtractions

Balance on 11/5

-

Account number
29.61

0.00
-0.00
$29.61

MICHAELS CORNELL
TONIC JOHNSON
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Idaho (Member FDIC)

Questions about your account: 1-800-7 4 2-4932
Worksheet to balance your account and General
Statement Policies can be found towards the
end of this statement.

Interest you've earned
Interest paid on 11 /5
Average collected balance this month
Annual percentage yield earned
Interest paid this year

$0.00
$29.61
0.00%
$0.46
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Worksheet to balance your checking account
1. Go through your check register and mark each check {this includes
cancelled, converted and substitute checks that may appear on your
statement), withd,ti;!WiJ,!~.f.l}!\.Jransqc:tion, payment, deposit or other credit
listed in the "Transaction history" section of your statement. Be sure your
register shows any interest or dividends paid into your account and any
service charges, automatic payments or transfers withdrawn from your

2. Using the chart below, list any outstanding, converted or substitute
checks, as well as any ATM withdrawals, payments or any other
withdrawals {including any from previous months) which are listed in your
register but are not shown on your statement.
3. Balance your account by filling in the spaces below.

account during this statement period.

@

ENTER

~ The "ending balance"

shown on your statement

@ADD

ill]

Any deposits listed in
your register or transfers into
your account which are not
shown on your statement

$

Items outstanding
Check number

$
$
$
$
$

Amount

/ c(<;

/16'-·

)

~.

'
··-

l§>(ALCULATESUBTOTAL
(Add parts [Al and~)

},
''

I

4$

$

@SUBTRAC T

@] Total of outstanding

..

checks and withdrawals from
the chart at right

-$

4-

@CALCULATE
ENDING BALANCE
(Part [fil + Part~ - Part@])
This amount should be the
same as the current balance
shown in your check register.
~

~

Total

General stateme nt policies for Wells Fargo Bank
l!Jll To dispute or report
!ill Checking account information. After
inaccuracies in information we
have furnished to a Consumer
Reporting Agency 11bout your
accounts. You have the right to
dispute the accuracy of
information that Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. has furnished to a consumer
reporting agency by writing to us
at Wells Fargo Servicing, P.0. Box
14415, Des Moines, IA
50306-3415, Please describe the
specific information that is
inaccurate or in dispute and the
basis for the dispute along with
supporting documentatio n. If you
believe the information furnished
is the result of identity theft,
please provide us with an identity
theft report.

1, Tell us your name and account number ,(if any).

balancing your checking account, please report
any differences to us as soon as possible but no
later than within 30 d11ys. Special provisions,
including a reporting period of up to 60 days,
apply if the difference involves an electronic funds
transfer. These provisions are explained below.

2. Describe the error or the transfer you are
unsure about, and explain as clearly as you can
why you believe it Is an error or why you need
more information.

!llJ

3. Tell us the dollar amount of the suspected
error.

In case of errors or questions about your
electronic transfers, telephone us at the number
printed on the front of this statement or write us at
Wells Fargo Bank, 735 West Wisconsin Avenue,
Milwaukee, WI 53201 -2057 as soon as you can, if
you think your statement or receipt is wrong or if
you need more information about a transfer on
the statement or receipt. We must hear from you
no later than 60 days after we sent you the FIRST
statement on which the error or problem
appeared.

©2007 Wells Fargo Bank, NA All rights reserved .

C

We will investigate your complaint and will
correct any error promptly. If we take more than
10 business days to do this, we will credit your
account for the amount you think is in error, so
that you will have the use of the money during the
time It takes us to complete our investigation.

Ii

Deposit and loan products, including
PMA Package, offered by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
Member FDIC.
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This message will clarify the way Wells Fargo posts transact ions to your account
and assesses Overdra ft and Returne d
Item fees as of Novemb er 29, 2010.
Wells Fargo posts transact ions during our nightly processi ng each business
day. Generally, we first post depos its or
incomin g transfers received before the deposit cut-off time that day. We then
post your withdra wals (such as ATM, debit
card or check transact ions) that have been received for paymen t from your
account. We pay some categori es (or types)
of transact ions, such as debit card transacti on s, before other types of transacti
ons, such as checks. If there are multiple
transact ions within a category , the order in which the transact ions are posted
will vary dependi ng on the type of
transact ion.
For example, effective Novemb er 29, 2010, we will pay the most common
types of transact ions in the followin g order:
-ATM and debit card transact ions - transact ions will be sorted by the date
the transact ion was conduct ed. If a merchan t
does not seek pre-auth orizatio n from the bank at the time of the transacti
on, we will use the date the transact ion is
received for paymen t from your account . If there are multiple transact ions
on a date, those transact ions will be sorted
by time (where that informa tion is available to our posting systems ); the remainin
g transact ions on that date will be
. sorted and paid from lowest to highest dollar amount .
-Accoun t transfers , teller cashed checks and teller cash withdraw als - If there
are multiple transact ions, the transact ions
will be sorted and paid from highest to lowest dollar amount .
·
- Checks, Bill Pay and automat ic paymen ts (also known as ACH) - If there are
multiple transact ions, the transact ions will
be sorted and paid from highest to lowest dollar amount .

-

If you do not have sufficien t availabl e funds to cover a transact ion, we will
take one or more of the following actions:
transfer available funds from any linked Overdraft Protecti on account(s); pay
the transact ion, creating an overdra ft in
your account; or return the transact ion unpaid due to insuffici ent funds . Applicab
le Overdra ft and Returne d Item fees
will post to your account the morning following our nightly processi ng.
In determi ning whether you have sufficien t funds to cover a transaction, we
will conside r all transact ions that have
posted to your account , any holds that may be in place on deposits you have
made, and pending transact ions (such as
pending debit card purchas es or ATM withdrawals) that the bank has authoriz
ed but that have not yet posted to your
account . Overdra ft and/or Returne d Item fees will ordinari ly be assessed on
posted transact ions that exceed your
available balance . (Overdr aft fees will not apply to ATM and one-tim e debit
card transact ions that post against
insufficient funds, unless you have enrolled in our Debit Card Overdra ft Service.)
If we receive multiple transact ions within a category for paymen t and if we
determi ne there are sufficient funds to pay
one or more but _n ot all of the transact ions, then the number of transact ions
paid and the Overdra ft and Returne d Item
fees assessed could be affected by the order that we choose to post those
transact ions. For all categor ies of transact ions
(other than ATM and one-tim e debit card transact ions), we post transact ions
in the order of highest to lowest dollar
amount, which could result in more Overdraft and Ret urned Item fees than
if we were to post the transact ions in a
different order.

---"C0
'-~ ----

EXHIBIT

C)-'--- of \ N

Page __

176

10669

Illllll lllll llll l l l llllll llll lllill l lll lll lllll lllll l lll lillll lll lllll llllllll llll

Pages

complete Advantagr ~ Checking

,· . ·~·--t

;1

Account number- l h u January l, Jl 1 - February 7, 2011 Ill Page 1 of 4

I-

~ -- JI f- () ;t ~· 7- f

f

-

Questions?
MICHA~L S CORNELL
TONIC JOHNSON
5319 LAKEVIEW RD
OROFINO ID 83544-6127

Available by phone 24 hours a day, 7 days a week:

1-800-TO-WELLS {1-soo-869-3557)
ITT: 1-800-877-4833
Enespafiol: 1-877-727-2932 ITT: 1-888-355-6052
1;£~

"t=-~o

Online:
Write:

1-800-288-2288 (8 am to 7 pm PT, M-F)

wellsfargo.com

-

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (114)
P.O. Box 6995
Portland, OR 97228-6995

You and Wells Fargo

Account options

At Wells Fargo, we are committed to doing what's right for our customers based
on their changing needs. That's why we periodically meet with our customers to
ensure they have the right accounts and. services for their financial needs. Visit a
banker today and request a financial review.

A check mark in the box indicates you have the5e
convenient services with your account. Ga to
wellsfargo.com or call the number above if you have
questians or if you would like to add new services.
Online Banking
Online.Bill Pay
Online Statements
Mobile Banking
My Spending Report

0

0
D
D
D
0

D
0
Rewards Program
D
Auto Transfer/Payment 0
Direct Deposit

Overdraft Protection

With you when you want help balancing spending with saving
With a Wells Fargo Cash Back'" Credit Card, you can automatically apply your cash back earnings
toward an eligible Wells Fargo checking, st1i:ng!lfy>ei.'t onal loan, or home equity account. To learn
more, call 1-800-WFB-OPEN, talk with us, or visit wellsfargo.com today.

Account number:

Activity summary
Beginning balance on 1/8
Deposits/Additiom
Withdrawal s/Subtractions

Ending bala nce on 2/7

$2,149.02
1,595.07

MICHAELS CORN
TO NIC JOHNSON

- 1,634.73

California account terms and conditions apply

$2,1 09.36

For Direct beposit and Automatic Payments use
Routing Number (RTN): 121042882
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Overdraft Protection
Your account i~
1"11

ft Protection:

Credit Card

lnterestsurnrnary
Interest paid this statement
Average collected balance

Annual percentage yield earned

$0.07
$1,527.82

0.05%

Interest earned this statement period

$0.07

Interest paic.i this year

$0.13

Total interest paid in 2010

$3.99

Transaction history

Totals

$1,634.73

$1,595.07

Tl,e Ending Daily Balance does not rer1ect any pending withdrawals or holds on depasited funds that may have been outstanding on your ac::cunt when your
transactions posted. If you had insufticient availablefunds when a transaction posted, fees may have been assessPd.
11

Converted check: Check converted to an electronic format by your payee or designated representative. Checks converted to electronic format cannot be
returned, copied or imaged.

---'-\-+~ ----

EXHIBIT_
·

Page __tj
=---- of __'~] - Pages
181

f\LLUUIIL IIUIIIUe ~ ! ! H f i ' Y ! ' ~ JdllUdlY

o,

LlJ I I -

reuruary

I , LU I I CS

t'age

j

or 4

Summary of checks written (checks listed are also displayed in the preceding Transactio
n history)
Number

Date

Amount

Number

Date

Amount

Number

Date

Amount

27.47

10922

2/7

49.57

10935

1/14

22.07

10945

10926 •

1/26

1/11

100.00

10936

1/13

1.90

10946

10927

1/20

1/28

199.61

75.00

10937

1/19

188.57

10947

2/2

68.99
14.69

10929 *

1/18

135.00

10938

2/4

3.72

10948

10930

2/4

1/18

89.00

10940*

1/20

38.36

10949

10931

2/3

1/11

7.90

80.10

10941

1/24

121.00

10950

2/3

73.11

10932

1/12

75.00

10942

1/26

43.34

10951

10933

1/31

1/13

7.90

7.41

10943

2/7

48.43

10934

10953 *

2/7

2/2

37.18

39.98

10944

1/28

19.43

--

• Gap in check sequence.

-

Read the latest updates about the integration efforts under way between Wells Fargo and
Wachovia. Visit
wellsfargo.com/wachovia/news.

Help save trees! Switch to free Online Statement s today!
Online Statement s are convenien t, secure and better for the environm ent than paper statement
s. If you bank on line, get your
statement online! It's easy to switch to Online Statement s. Sign on at wellsfargo.com/turno
ffpaper, select Online Only or check the box
Switch All to Online Only Delivery and click Submit at the bottom of the page to begin
saving paper and trees today.
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Work sheet to balan ce your accou nt

Gener al statem ent policies for Wells Fargo Bank

Follow the steps below to reconcil e your stateme nt balance
with your
account register balance. Be sure that your register shows any
interest
paid into your account and any service charges, automat ic paymen
ts or
ATM trJn.sactions withdraw n from your account during this stateme
nt
period.
[Kl Enter the ending balance on this stateme nt.
$,} / . 1-j'

[ill

Ill To dispute or report inaccuracies in information we have
furnished to a
Consumer Reporting Agency about your account s. You have
the right to
dispute the accuracy of information that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
has
furnishe d to a consum er reportin g agency by writing to us at
Wells Fargo
Servicing, P.O. Box 14415, Des Moines, IA 50306-3415. Please
describ~ the
specific information that is inaccura te or in dispute and the
basis for the
dispute along with supporti ng docume ntation. If you believe
the
informa tion fumishe d is the result of identity theft, please provide
us with
an identity theft report.

List outstanding deposit s and other

credits to your account that do not .;ppear on

this stateme nt. Enter the total in the coiumn
to the right.

A_m_ o_u~

Description

l---- ---- --+-·L 5 .'LC.t2-~~/~

1--------1-==-·-~
Total $

[I)

+ ~$-- --~-

Add~ and~ to calculat e the subtotal .

In case of errors or question s about your electron ic transfer
s,
telepho ne us at the number printed on the front of this stateme
nt-or write
us at Wells Fargo Bank, P.O. Box 6995, Portland , OR 9722B-6 995
as soon as
you can, if you think your st;;teme nt or receipt is wrong or if
you need more
informa tion about a transfer on the stateme nt or receipt. We
must hear
from you no later than 60 days after we sent you the FIRST stateme
nt on
which the error or problem appeare d.
1. Tell us your name and account number (if any).
2. Describe the error or the transfer you are unsure about,
and explain as
clearly as you can why you believe it is an error or why you need
more
informa tion.
·
3. Tell us the dollar amount of the suspect ed error.
We will investig ate your complai nt and will correct any error
promptl y. If
we take more than 10 business days tc do this, we will credit
your account
for the amount you think is in error, so that you will have the
use of the
money during the time it takes us to complet e our investig alion.
II In case of errors or question s 11bout your Direct Deposit Advanc
e•
service
1:11

= $ ·::

I

.'.:\

,-

· 1,:,

@]

List outsttinding checks, withdrilwtils,_tind
other debits to your account that do not appear
on this statemen t. Enter the tottil In the column
to the right.

If you think your bill is wrong, or if you need more informa tion
about a
transact ion on your bill, write us at Wells Fargo Bank, P. 0. Box
6995,
Portland, OR 9722B-6995 as soon as possible . We must hear
from you no
later than 60 days after we sent you the first bill on which the
error or
problem appeare d. You can telephon e us, but doing so will
not preserve
your rights.
In your letter, give us the following information:
1. Your name and account number
2. lhe dollar amount of the suspecte d error
3. Describe the error and explain, if you can, why you believe
there is an
error. If you need more information, describe the item you are
unsure
about.

I

I
I

You do not have to pay any amount in question while we are
investigating,
but you are still obligate d to pay the parts of your bill that are
not in
question . While we investigate your question , we cannot report
you as
delinqu ent or take any action to collect the amount you queslion
.

I_
[__
___L___

I
I

I
I

I

I
i

I
Total $

~

,-

; (,/

l

1

- $

[I]

Subtract [Q] fromW to calculat e the
adjusted ending balance . This aniount should be
the same as the current balance shown in your
register.

/ . ..

·... ·.·.-~- :_., f ·.··'

/ / ·- ~?,;"'"/

<ci2010We lls Fargo gank, NA All rights reserved.

}
Member FDIC.
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Karin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CAU.ERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law

l
~...
0 ICIOC k -------

Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.

CORNELL.

)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

)

IN"'

RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DIS:MISS \_

)

COMES NOW Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attorney of record, Karin
Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., hereby submits this Respondent's Reply Brief in

Support ofMotion-to Dismiss. Said Motion. is set for hearing on November 27, 2012.
Respondent's Memorandum of Law dated October 31, 2012 summarized the procedural and
factual background of the case and the applicable law. This Reply Brief will not restate said
background and argument. Instead, this Reply Brief is limited in scope to the points raised by
Petitioner in his Brief dated November 13, 2012.

REPLY BRIEF

-1-

184

11-20-'12 16:01 FROM-JB &C

2087469553

I.

T-232 P0003/0011 F-684

ARGUMENT

In his Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated November 13, 2012
(hereinafter "Response"), Petitioner argues that his claims for breach of fiduciary duty survive
his death, and that Petitioner additionally has separate claims for breach of trust, which survive
his death under contract theory.

A.

Petitioner~s claim for breach of fiduciary duty does not survive his death.
The parties agree that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty arises in tort. See generally

Memorandum of Lmv; Response. Specifically, ''a claim for a breach of a fiduciary duty is a
negligence action in which the duty to act is created by the relationship between the parties."

Jones v. Kootenai County Title Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 607,614,873 P.2d 861, 868 (Idaho 1994). In
the absence of statutory authority addressing the survivability of a claim, claims arising out of
tort abate upon a claimant's death. See Bishop -v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 620-21, 272 P.3d 1247,

1251 ~52 (2012).

As discussed in Respondent's initial brief, Idaho Code Section 5-327 governs the
survivability of Petitioner's breach of fiduciary duty claims.

As further discussed in said

briefing, Petitioner's claim as it relates to acts from prior to July 1, 2010 do not survive his death
because the prior language of said statute provide for the survivability of claims only after the
death of the wrongdoer, not the death of the injured party.

Said statute was amended effective July 1, 2010 to allow fo:r: the survivability of tort
claims after the death of the injured party in limited instances. The parties disagree on whether
one such limited instance is found here. Petitioner contends that Respondent's alleged breach is

ongoing from July 1, 2010 and that because his alleged damages are neither noneconomic and
economic damages, said damages should be deemed to be property damage for purposes of Idaho
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Code Section 5-327(2). See Response at 7-8.
However, parsing of whether the alleged damages are property damage or not is

unnecessary because of the express limitation of recoverable damages :in such actions: medical
expenses actually incurred, other out-of-pocket expenses actually incurred, and loss of earnings

actually suffered, prior to the death of such injured person and as a result of the wrongful act or
negligence.

I.e. § 5-327(2).

Petitioner concedes that ''[t)he petitioner is not arguing ... loss of

wages or medical expenses." Response at 8 (emphasis added). Instead, petitioner describes the
damages sought as follows: "he has suffered a direct loss as result of the destruction of bis

interest in the Trust property." Id. ( emphasis added).
Based on Petitioner's admissions, the only question that remains is whether said alleged

damages for "direct loss as result of the destruction of his interest in the Trust" falls with:ln the
scope of recoverable damages for "out-of-pock.et expenses actually incurred." Response at 8; LC.

§ 5-327(2). It clearly does not because under Petitioner's theory of the case, he was allegedly
denied disbursement of his share of the Trust proceeds, so by definition had no ''out-of-pocket
expenses actually incurred."
The only allegations which could possibly constitute an out-of-pocket expense relate to
$3j000.00 of death benefits received by Petitioner under Michael Cornell's International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Benefit Fund. See Affidavit of Margaret M. Watkins at 'Il 4.
Ms. Watkins alleges that Respondent "demanded" that Petitioner turn said funds over to

Respondent and he ultimately turned over $2,500.00 after spending $500.00 on his own living
expenses. 1 Id.

' Respondent notes that the dates of the subject letter and remittance of $2,500.00 from Petitioner to Respondent are
in January and February 2010, respectively, both of which are prior to the statutory amendment to Idaho Code
Section 5-327 discussed above.
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There is no dispute that Petitioner was the named beneficiary of said death benefits, not
the Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell. Id. at<[ 4, attached letter
dated January 21, 2010. What Petitioner chose to do with said funds, even if he later regretted it,

does not change their character: said funds were Petitioner's property, not property of the
Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arile M. Cornell. Because said funds were
not a Trust asset, then Respondent's alleged demands or actions related to said death benefit

cannot be considered a breach of hex fiduciary duty as trustee, even if they had occurred after July
1, 2010. Said death benefit simply has no relation to the Revocable Family Trust of Michael S.
Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell, or this proceeding.
No other factual allegations have been made to support the conclusion that Petitioner
suffered actual "out-of-pocket expenses" as a result of Respondent's actions after July 1, 2010.
Instead, the facts alleged indicate that Petitioner would have applied said funds to medical and
living expenses if said funds had been available, but did not obtain said services due to lack of

available funds. See Affidavit of Margaret M. Watkins at fl 6, 8, and 9. There are no allegations
before the Court that Petitioner suffered actual "out-of-pocket" damages from Respondent's
alleged breach of her fiduciary duty as trustee or any other damages that are recoverable after his

death.

As discussed above, "a claim for a breach of a fiduciary duty is a negligence action[.]"
Jones v. Kootenai County Title Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 607,614,873 P.2d 861, 868 (Idaho 1994). It
is well established under Idaho law that a "cause in negligence includes proof of: (1) a duty,
recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a

breach of duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting
injuries; and (4) actual loss or damage." West v. Sanke, 132 Idaho 133, 142, 968 P.2d 228, 237
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(1998) (citing Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484, 489, 903 P.2d 73, 78 (1995); Black Canyon

Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171; 175-76, 804 P.2d 900,
904-05 (1991); Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617,619,619 P.2d 135, 135 (1980)). ·
Petitioner's response to a request for summary judgment "must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," Shere v. Pocatello School Dist. No. 25, 143 Idaho
486, 489-90, 48 P.3d 1232, 1235-36 (citing I.R.C.P. 56(c)). For the reasons discussed above,
Petitioner's response does not show that there is a genuine issue for trial because there are no
alleged facts to support the conclusion that Petitioner suffered actual loss or damage of actual
"out-of-pocket" expenses as a result of Respondent's actions as trustee prior to his death.
Because there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and Respondent is entitled to
judgment as a matter oflaw, summary judgment must be granted. I.R.C.P 56(c).

B.

Petitioner's claims for breach of trust should be dismissed.
Petitioner contends that in addition to Respondent's alleged breach of fiduciary duty as

trustee, Respondent has a claim for breach of trust arising in contract.
Respondent relies upon Cruzen v. Boise City, 58 Idaho 406, 74 P.2d 1037 (1937), to

support his argument that a breach of trust arises in contract. Respondent disagrees with
Petitioner's analysis of Cruzen, which Respondent contends is limited in scope as opposed to
establishing a general principle that a claim for breach of trust arises in contract. Further, the

Cruzen decision is distinguishable from the facts at hand. Said case involved a dispute over
liability a municipal corporation owes to bondholders for a deficiency in the collection of
assessments due to embezzlement by the city clerk of the levied special assessments. Id. at 408,
74 P.2d at 1039. The Cruzen Court held that the subject bonds constituted an enforceable
contract between the city and its bondholders and was not time barred. Id. at415-417, 74 P.2d at
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1046-48 (declining to consider whether statute concerning safekeeping of money by a county or
the statute of limitations for breach of contract was implicated).
The relationship be.tween a bondholder and municipal corporation issuing bonds clearly
conforms with the general :requirements of an enforceable contract: offer, acceptance, meeting of
the minds, and consideration. Thompson v. Pike, 122 Idaho 690, 838 P.2d 293 (1992); Haener v.

Adam Co. Highway Dist..; 108 Idaho 170; 697 P.2d 1184 (1985); Gyurkey v. Bahler, 103 Idaho
663; 651 P.2d 928 (1982); Vance v. Connell) 96 Idaho 417,529 P.2d 1289 (1974).
No such contractual relationship between the successor trustee and beneficiary of a trust
ex:ists.

Just because a written document (the Trust Agreement) is implicated, this does not

establish a contractual relation between Petitioner and Respondent nor a potential claim by
Petitioner against Respondent grounded in contract.
Instead, a review of applicable case law finds no Idaho decision directly addressing
whether a claim for breach of trust arises in tort, contract or equity. The Washington Court of
Appeals addressed this question in Foster v. Gilliam, 165 Wn.App. 33, 268 P.3d 945 (Wash.
App. Div. 1 2011), in the context of a dispute concerning a revocable living trust as follows:
This cas.e arises from probate. A probate court is a court of equity. The Trust and
Estate Dispute Resolution Act gives broad authority to the courts to administer
and settle all estate and trust matters. . .. We have reasoned that claims for
breach of trust are equitable in nature. This is in accord with the general
recognition that a trust beneficiary's remedies are equitable in origin and depend
upon the application of equitable principles.

165 Wn.App. at 39-40, 40-41, 268 P.3d at 951-52, 952-53 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
Being equitable in nature, a claim for breach of trust is neither grounded in tort nor in
contract. As such, Petitioner's claims of breach of trust should not be treated as non-abated
breach of contract claims as Petitioner contends, but instead as claims in equity that do abate
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upon Petitioner's death.
Even if Petitioner is correct that a claim for breach of trust survives his death under
contract law principles, it is further appropriate for the Court to consider whether Petitioner's
alleged breach of trust claims are appropriately characterized as such.

Petitioner describes

Respondent's alleged three breaches of trust as follows:
1.

2.
3.

"Encouraging" the surviving grantor during his lifetime to amend the
terms of the Trust (see Response at 8w9);
Failing to divide the trust income and principal remaining in the Trust to
the two equal shares during Petitioner's lifetime (see Response at 9); and
Failing to provide a periodic accounting (see Response at 9-10).

This Memorandum will briefly discuss each in tum.
First, as to the alleged "encouragement" by Respondent to surviving grantor Michael
Cornell to amend the terms of the Trust, said alleged acts are not supported by an affidavit and,
even if they were, are beyond the scope of Petitioner's Petition and this litigation. See Petition

for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee dated July 9, 2012. Said alleged acts
occurred on or around August 6, 2009, prior to Michael Cornell's death and prior to authority as
successor trustee vesting in Respondent. See Affidavit of Karin Seubert dated September 14,
2012 at <JI 4, Exh. B.; Response at 8-9. Said alleged acts have no relevance to Respondent's
alleged action or inaction as trustee as she had no autlio£ity as trustee at that time. Instead, if the
· Amendment was invalid as being executed after Arlie Cornell's death as Petitioner implies, then
Petitioner would have £emained co-trustee and had authority to act under the original terms of the
Trust. See Affidavit of Karin Seubert dated September 14, 2012 at Exh. A. Petitioner failed to
assert said authority during his lifetime and this issue is moot in light of his death.

More

importantly for consideration of summary judgment, said allegations are not probative to whether
supervision of the Trust ore removal of Respondent as Trustee is appropriate, faus do not
REPLY BRIEF
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preclude summary judgment.
Second, as for Respondenf s alleged failure to divide the trust income and principal
between the two beneficiaries during Petitioner's lifetime; Petitioner makes no distinction how
said alleged acts constitute "breach of trust" when the same actions or inactions are also alleged
to be a breach of Respondent's fiduciary duty as trustee. See Response at 7 ("The respondent,
Toni C. Johnson, who was the successor trustee, b:reached her fiduciary duty to abide by the
terms of the Trust and distribute the income and principal of Trust equally to its beneficiaries
after Michael C. Cornell's death.") and at 9 ("the respondent failed to divide the trust income and
principal remaining in the Trust into two equal shares and distribute them to herself and her
brother, petitioner, John H. Cornell. Said failure is a breach of the trust term in Section 4.03")
(emphasis added in both quotations).
The Idaho Courts have looked to the Restatement (2nd) of Torts in analyzing actions for
breach of trust as follows:

If the trustee commits a breach of trust, he is chargeable with any profit which
would have accrued to the trust estate if he had not committed such breach of
trust. On the other hand, if the trustee commits a breach of trust and if a loss is
incurred, the trustee may not be chargeable with the amount of the loss if it would
have occurred in the absence of a breach of trust.
A trustee is guilty of a breach of trust if he knowingly pays more than he should
have paid for an item. and he is chargeable with the difference between what he
paid and the market value of the item

Pickering v. El Jay Equipment Co., Inc., 108 Idaho 512,517, 518, 700 P.2d 134, 139, 140 (App.
1985) {citing Restatement (2d) of Trusts § 205 comments e, i and f (1959)). This analysis
reflects the application of breach of trust in terms of the management or potential
mismanagement of trust assets, not the alleged violation of a duty as Petitioner argues has
occurred here. As such, said alleged actions or inactions do not constitute a breach of trust, but
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instead are appropriately characterized as a breach of fiduciary duty alone.
Thrrd, as for the alleged lack of periodic accounting, said claim is also duplicative of one

of Petitioner's claim for breach of fiduciary duty and is more appropriately characterized only as
such. The presence or lack of periodic accounting does not impact the profits or principal of the
trust assets as the principles from Picketing, infra, assume.

Instead, said alleged lack of

accounting relates to a trustee's fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries, so when violated, constitute a
breach of fiduciary duty alone. As discussed above, said claim arises in tort and does not survive
Petitioner's death.
For these reasons, Petitioner's claims for breach of trust are either outside the scope of
this litigation or more properly considered to be claims for breach of fiduciary duty, which do not
survive Petitioner's death. See infra. Respondent is therefore entitled to sununary judgment as a
matter of law.

C.

No substitution of parties has occurred.
Last, Rule 25(a)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allows dismissal of an action as

to a deceased party if no substitution of parties is made within a reasonable time. Here, the
record of the case reflects that Petitioner's first informed the Court of Petitioner's death on
August 21, 2012. Nearly three months have passed since said date of death. No Motion for

Substitution of Parties has been filed by a successor or representative of the deceased party as of
the date of this Reply Brief. The hearing on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is now seven days
away, so there is insufficient time for notice to be given in advance of a hearing on any
subsequently filed Motion for Substitution of Parties.
For this additional reason, it is appropriate to grant summary judgment in favor of
Respondent and to dismiss Petitioner's action in its entirety.
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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Respondent Toni Johnson respectfully requests ·that her Motion

to Dimiss be granted and that John Cornell's Petition be dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this .;lb day of November, 2012.
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

.__..____.&-<~~~~±~

By____,._tJ___.l{~A..L::'.v:l~·

Karin Seubert
Attorney for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and

correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDE NT'S
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISMISS was, this~ day of November, 2012,

hand-delivered by providing a
copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;
mailed, postage pre-paid,
by first class mail; or
~ transmitted via facsimile
to:

Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice and Anegon
1212 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501

By~~
Karin Seubert
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

_ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _
I.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

MEMORANDUM
RE: RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This case was instituted to protect John Cornell's interests in property held in trust by the
trustee of the The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell. In his
petition, John Cornell set forth facts showing that the trustee, Toni Johnson, was (1) acting
without proper authority as trustee, (2) abusing and diminishing the trust res, and (3) attempting
to diminish or extinguish his property interests.

John Cornell died before his rights in the

property could be adjudicated and his demand for distribution could be granted. Toni Johnson
seeks dismissal of this action on the grounds that (A) the Estate of John H. Cornell failed to
timely substitute into this action pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 25; and (B) John
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Cornell's causes of action did not survive his death. In regard to her Rule 25 arguments, Johnson
failed to raise Rule 25 as a grounds for dismissal in her motion, instead attempting to incorporate
it as a ground for dismissal through argument in her Reply Brief. It must be recognized that the
Estate holds a strong interest in protecting the property rights of the deceased by being
substituted into this action upon resolution of the dispute regarding the proper personal
representative.
In regard to the survival of the causes of action pled in this case, both common law and
statutory law support a finding that causes of action regarding property rights survive the death of
the claimant. Further, Johnson premises her arguments upon the assumption that there exists no
genuine issue as to her entitlement of the entirety of the trust res. Johnson's entitlement to the
trust res is an issue that requires briefing and, almost assuredly, discovery into whether she
engaged in inequitable conduct while acting in a fiduciary capacity for the decedent
Johnson's motion should be denied.

II.

FACTS & PROCEDURE

John Henry Cornell ("John") instituted this action on July 11, 2012. John petitioned the
Court to, among other things, remove Toni C. Johnson as trustee of The Revocable Family Trust
of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell ("the Trust") and order that the trust be subject to
supervised administration.

John's petition seeks relief based upon claims that (1) Johnson's

service as sole trustee of the Trust conflicts with the terms of the Trust,,, 5-6; (2) Johnson failed
to provide an inventory of the assets of the Trust, as required by law, , 7; (3) Johnson failed to
distribute the Trust res in accordance with the terms of the Trust,,, 8-9, 11; and (4) Johnson has
misused assets of the Trust,,, 9-10.
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John died on August 20, 2012.

John is survived by his spouse, Kareen Cornell

("Kareen"). He is also survived by his sister, Johnson, and his aunt, Margaret Watkins. It is
believed by all parties involved in this matter that John died without issue.
On September 14, Johnson filed her motion to dismiss this case. Johnson argued for
dismissal on the ground that the issue of survivability is governed by the common law. Johnson
argues that John's claims sound in tort and, therefore, do not survive his death under the common
law. Johnson premised this argument upon the assumption that she is entitled to the entirety of
the Trust res.

Johnson assumes, without argument, that the Trust res did not vest in the

beneficiaries until after John's death-at which time it vested in Johnson.
On November 13, Watkins filed a Petition for Formal Probate of the Estate of John C.
Cornell ("the Estate"), by and through attorney Darrel Aherin. Watkins sought appointment as
Personal Representative of the Estate based upon her position as a creditor of the Estate. She
also proffered a document purported to be John's will.
On November 15, Watkins was appointed temporary personal representative in the Estate
case. That same day, a memorandum in opposition to Johnson's motion to dismiss was filed by
Mr. Aherin. Mr. Aherin appears to have filed on behalf of the Estate. No substitution, however,
has been made. In the memorandum, Mr. Aherin argues that (1) the issue of survivability is
governed by statutory law, not common law-at least as to a number of claims; and (2) the
claims of the petition sound in contract, which claims survive death at common law.
On November 20, Johnson filed a reply brief. In addition to arguing the points raised in
Mr. Aherin' s response brief, Johnson asked the Court to grant her motion to dismiss pursuant to
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Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(l). Johnson's reply brief marks the first time she raised
Rule 25(a)(l) as grounds for dismissal.
On November 27, Kareen filed an objection to Watkin's petition in the Estate case. On
December 19, Kareen filed (1) a petition for formal adjudication of intestacy and formal
appointment of Kareen as personal representative; (2) a memorandum in support of her petition,
setting forth the invalidity of Watkin's purported will; and (3) a motion asking the Court to
restrain Watkins from taking any action on behalf of the Estate until such time as the Court could
rule on Kareen's petition.

III.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Court should deny Johnson's request for dismissal pursuant to Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 25(a)(l) and allow the Estate to substitute into the action for John.

It has long been the law in Idaho that an action cannot be continued in the name of a
deceased, on behalf of his heirs, without substitution of the deceased's representative or
successor in interest. See Arthur v. Kilpatrick Bros. Co., 47 Idaho 306,274 P. 800 (1929). Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(l) sets forth the process for substitution of the deceased party's
representative.

Johnson seeks dismissal of this action based upon the argument that John's

representative has failed to substitute into the action in a timely manner; a ground Johnson raises
for the first time in her reply brief. However, the failure to effect substitution has not been the
result of unnecessary delay or disinterest, but rather the result of a dispute as to the proper
representative of the deceased. Therefore, the Court should deny Johnson's request for dismissal
and should grant the anticipated motion for substitution of the Estate.
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Motions seeking a court order must set forth the grounds of the motion with particularity.
Idaho R. Civ. P. 7(b)(l); see also Idaho Mercantile Co. v. Kalanquin, 7 Idaho 295, 62 P. 925
(1900) (applying the requirement of particularity to motions for nonsuit). Johnson's motion set
forth a single ground for her motion: that John's claims were rendered moot because the Trust
res vested entirely in her at the time of John's death and all other claims of the petition abated
upon death. A claim of mootness and abatement rests upon different dispositive facts than a
claim of failure to timely substitute. Therefore, the Court should not consider failure to timely
substitute as a ground for dismissal.
Even if the Court does consider Johnson's Rule 25( a)(l) argument, it fails on its merits.
Dismissal for failure to timely substitute is left to the discretion of the Court. See Idaho R. Civ.
P. 25(a)(l) (using the permissive may rather than the compulsory must). In determining whether
a party ought to be nonsuited for delay, the Court should consider the length of delay, the
prejudice caused by the delay, and the reason for delay. See Gerstner v. Washington Water
Power Co., 122 Idaho 673, 677, 837 P.2d 799, 803 (1992) (analogous case law on motions to

dismiss based upon lack of prosecution). First, this case has been delayed approximately three
months. Three months is a relatively short delay when compared to the rate of prosecution in the
average civil action. Second, Johnson has not made any showing of actual prejudice caused by
the delay.
Third, the justification for delay provides even stronger support for excusing the delay.
Watkins is currently the only person entitled to represent the Estate. However, Kareen has
opposed Watkins' appointment based upon her priority to act as personal representative as John's
surviving spouse, Idaho Code§ 15-3-203, and the patent inadequacy of the Will which Watkins'
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has proffered. Further, Kareen has requested that the Court restrain Watkins from taking any
action on behalf of the Estate. Thus, the decedent's interests are represented by a temporary
personal representative with an inferior and dubious claim to appointment, and a surviving
spouse who has not been appointed to act on behalf of the Estate. Thus, the Court should first
resolve who is the rightful personal representative and then entertain a motion for substitution.
The propriety of this course of action is further supported by the uncertainty as to the preclusive
effect any judgment entered before resolution of the Estate dispute would have on Kareen or the
Estate.
Therefore, Kareen asks this Court to deny Johnson's request for dismissal pursuant to
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(l) as not properly before the Court. In the alternative,
Kareen asks the Court deny the request on its merits, finding the delay excusable.

Finally,

Kareen asks the Court to entertain a motion for substitution from the rightful personal
representative of the Estate, once that dispute has been resolved.
B.

The causes of action pied in the petition survive the death of John under both the
common law and Idaho Code § 5-327(2).

The causes of action pled in the petition survive the death of John under both the
common law and Idaho Code § 5-327(2) because they are actions regarding an interest in
property. In the petition, John sought compensation for the diminution and attempted extinction
of his interest in the Trust res. The petition alleges that Johnson engaged in misfeasance and
malfeasance that caused injury to the real and personal property of the Trust. At its core, the
action seeks to (1) obtain reimbursement of the Trust for all diminishment resulting from
wrongful acts and (2) compel distribution of the Trust res.
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property rights and order proper distribution of the subject property survive the death of the
claimant under both the common law and the relevant statutory provisions.
Johnson premises her argument regarding the survivability of this action upon the
assumption that the entirety of the Trust res has vested in her.

This conclusion is neither

conceded by Kareen nor is it clear under the law. Several legal issues must be fully briefed and
presented before the Court, including (1) whether distribution can serve as the proper event for
vesting; (2) if so, whether the law presumes vesting within a reasonable period of time regardless
of actual distribution; (3) whether the terms of vesting in the Trust violate the common law or
statutory rule against perpetuities as to both Johnson's and John's interest; and (4) whether
Johnson's conduct resulted in her holding that portion of the Trust res due to John in a
constructive trust for the benefit of John and his heirs. The lack of briefing on these issues call
into question Johnson's assumed premise.
Many of the equitable theories under which John's heirs might recover give rise to
genuine issues of material fact. Those theories are often dependent upon the establishment of
improper conduct; a triable issue of fact. Because triable issues of material fact remain, the
motion to dismiss should be denied. Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). For example, constructive trusts
arise where "one party obtains the legal title to property, not only by fraud or by violation of
confidence of fiduciary relations, but in any other unconscientious manner." Hanger v. Hess, 49
Idaho 325, 328, 288 P. 160, 161 (1930). The result of such conduct is that the Court, ruling in
equity, "impress[es] a constructive trust on the property in favor of the one who is in good
conscience entitled to it, and who is considered in equity as the beneficial owner." Id. Specific
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facts that may give rise to the creation of a constructive trust were set forth in the Affidavit of
Margaret M. Watkins, filed with the Court on November 15, 2012.
The common law governs the issue of survivability of an action upon death of the injured
party in all actions where the injured party's cause of action arose prior to July 1, 2010. See
Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 619 (2012).

Johnson's argument on survival under the

common law relies upon the analysis in Bishop. The Bishop Court set forth the general rule
regarding survival of claims at common law: "Under the common law, claims arising out of
contracts generally survive the death of the claimant, while those sounding in pure tort abate."
Id. This case, however, does not fall under that general rule. The cause of action before the
Bishop Court sounded in "pure tort" as it was for attorney malpractice. The cause of action did

not involve a claim to property held in trust by another.
While the Bishop Court identified the general rule, the common law is more nuanced in
cases involving property. In such cases, the survival of an action depends upon the nature of the
interest affected.
At common law survivable actions are those in which the wrong complained of
affects primarily property and property rights, and in which any injury to the
person is incidental, while nonsurvivable actions are those in which the injury
complained of is to the person and any effect on property or property rights is
incidental. ...
. . . The general rule is that, in addition to the causes of action arising out of
contract recognized at common law, causes of action arising from torts to real and
personal property survive and pass to the personal representative of the decedent,
while purely personal torts do not survive in the absence of statutory provision.
1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 51. "All causes of action arising from torts to
real or personal property, by which its value is diminished, as well as actions based on contract,
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are generally assignable and survive and pass to the executor or administrator." 1 Am. Jur. 2d

Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 56. Thus, in cases where the injured party alleged an injury
to his property-such as the existence or amount of his interest in a trust-the claim survives.

See Henshaw v. Miller, 58 U.S. 212 (1854) (cause for taking of chattels survives). See also,
Barnes v. Barnes, 135 Idaho 103, 105, 15 P.3d 816, 818 (2000) (holding that issues regarding
property survive).
The survivability of this action is further supported by the fact that it arises pursuant to a
remedial statute and that it is equitable in nature. The petition seeks recovery based upon a
trustee's breach. A cause of action which is founded under Idaho Code§§ 15-7-101 through 157-601. "A cause of action that is founded on a remedial statute ... survives the death of the party
possessing the cause of action." 1 Arn. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 59. Further,
the causes of action pled here are equitable in nature-as noted by Johnson in her Reply Brief
The principle that a cause of action expires with the death or disability of a party
generally does not apply to suits in equity; equitable remedies exist to the same
extent in favor of and against executors and administrators as they do against the
decedent, as long as the court can continue to grant effective relief in spite of the
death. One of the main reasons for this stance for suits in equity is that such suits
primarily pertain to property rights.
1 Arn. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 60 (footnotes omitted).

Thus, under the

common law, the causes of action pled in this case survive John's death.
Idaho Code § 5-327(2) governs the issue of survivability of an action upon death of the
injured party in all actions where the injured party's cause of action arose after July 1, 2010.
While the causes of action in this case survive John's death under the common law (as set forth
above), the Idaho legislature made survival explicit in its enactment of section 5-327(2):
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A cause of action for personal injury or property damage caused by the wrongful
act or negligence of another shall not abate upon the death of the injured person
from causes not related to the wrongful act or negligence. Provided however, that
the damages that may be recovered in such action are expressly limited to those
for: (i) medical expenses actually incurred, (ii) other out-of-pocket expenses
actually incurred, and (iii) loss of earnings actually suffered, prior to the death of
such injured person and as a result of the wrongful act or negligence. Such action
shall be commenced or, if already commenced at the time of the death of the
injured person, shall be thereafter prosecuted by the personal representative of the
estate of the deceased person or, if there be no personal representative appointed,
then by those persons who would be entitled to succeed to the property of the
deceased person according to the provisions of section 5-311(2)(a), Idaho Code.
The facts pled in the petition give rise to an action against Johnson for the damage caused by her
improper conduct. The alleged damage is diminution of the Trust res; a diminution in the value
of the property interest John held in the Trust res. Johnson claims this action falls outside the
scope of the term "property damage" because (1) the action "does not involve tangible property
that was allegedly damaged [in] the common and ordinary meaning of the phrase," and (2) the
action does not seek the limited damages available to a surviving action.
(1)

Johnson does not provide a definition for the "common and ordinary meaning" of

the term "property damage." One is left to assume that Johnson proposes that the term be
confined to causes of action arising out of facts where the wrongdoer caused damage to tangible
property through the application of physical force. No foundation exists for such a distinction in
law. While the statute discusses the survivability of "causes of action", Johnson proposes an
interpretation that would condition survivability based upon facts within the cause of action. For
example, a trespass to chattels cause of action would survive where the trespass was in the form
of physical contact, but not where the trespass took the form of barring the owner's access to the
property.

MEMORANDUM RE: RESPONDENT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS - 10

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231

207

(2)

Johnson attempts to limit recovery on all actions surviving pursuant to Idaho Code

§ 5-327(2) to those grounds set forth in the second sentence of the subsection.

Johnson's

interpretation fails to account for the limited applicability of the second sentence. Subsection (2)
governs the survivability of causes of action for personal injury or property damage. The second
sentence of the subsection limits recovery where the suit seeks damages for injury to a deceased
person. Statutory provisions are to be interpreted in accord with common sense and reason.
Smith v. Dep't of Employment, 100 Idaho 520, 522, 602 P.2d 18, 20 (1979). Interpreting Idaho
Code § 5-327(2) in a manner that limits recovery in property damage causes of action to the
grounds set forth in the second sentence conflicts both with common sense and reason.
Both the common law and Idaho Code § 5-327 support a ruling that the causes of action
set forth in this case survive the death of John. If the deceased held a property interest at the time
of death, that interest falls into the estate, where it is later distributed to the beneficiaries. The
alleged wrongdoer does not get to convert the deceased's property to her own simply because the
deceased did not survive to the point of judgment. Kareen asks this Court to reject Johnson's
proposed interpretations would result in an unjust and inequitable conclusion.
C.

Granting Johnson's motion to dismiss would not be in the interest of justice because
it would only result in duplicative litigation.

In the event that the Court granted Johnson's motion to dismiss, Kareen could file a
petition for a judicial proceeding declaring the Estate's rights or legal relations to the Trust
pursuant to the Idaho Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act, Idaho Code§§ 15-8-101 through
15-8-305. The conduct alleged in the petition is the same as that which would be set forth in a
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TEDRA action instituted by Kareen or the Estate. No proper purpose is served by requiring
repetitive filing, causing additional costs and fees.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Kareen asks this Court to deny Johnson's motion to dismiss.

DATED this 17th day of January, 2013.
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC
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Darrel W. Aherin
1212 Idaho Street
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Lewiston, ID 83501-0698
(208) 746-3646
ISB# 1534
Attorney for John Henry Cornell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:

NO. CV 2012-00277

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL,

MOTION TO MEDIA TE

COMES NOW the petitioner by and through her attorney, Darrel W. Aherin of Aherin,
Rice & Anegon, and hereby requests the Court set this case for mediation. This motion is made
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(k)(A). Petitioner believes a mediation would be beneficial to reaching a
resolution in this case and In the Matter of the Estate of John Henry Cornell, Clearwater County
Case No. CV 2012-439. If the parties are not able to agree on a mediator, a request wili be made
for the Court to designate a mediator.
Oral argument is requested.
DATED this ____ _/ (.t:"day of February, 2013.
AHE~

RICE & ~ NEGON .- /}

~ ~ - ~
By:_
Darrel W. Aherin
Attorney for Petitioner
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Karin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CAllERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law

Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street

Lewiston, ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Mauer of:

)
)

THE REVOCABLE FAMil..,Y 1RUST OF
MICHAELS. CORNEIL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELl.,.

)

_______ _______)

)
)

Case No. CV 2012~00277

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN REPLY
TO BRIEF OF SURVIVING SPOUSE

COMES NOW Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attorney of record, Karin
Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.LC., hereby submits this Respondent's Brief in Reply to

Brief of Su1Viving Spouse. Respondent's subject Motion to Dismiss is set for further hearing on
February 6, 2013.
Respondent's Memorandum of Law dated October 31, 2012 sununarized the procedur~l and
factual background of the case and the applicable law. This Reply Brief will not restate said
background and argument. Instead, this Reply Brief is limited in scope to the points raised by the

Memorandum re: Respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated January 17, 2013 and filed by Kareen
Cornell (hereinafter ''Mrs. Cornell"), surviving spouse of John H. Cornell, by and through counsel.
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ARGUMENT

In her Memorandum dated January 17, 2013 (hereinafter "Memorandum"), Mrs. Cornell
contends that dismissal of this action is not proper pursuant to Rule 25(a)(l) of the Idaho

Rules

of Civil Procedure, that the causes of action in this case survive the death of John H. Cornell. ,
and that judicial economy precludes dismissal. This Brief will address each in turn.

A.

Dismissal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 25(a)(l) is appropriate.

In her Memorandum, Mrs. Cornell argues that Respondent's request for dismissal
pursuant to Rule 25(a)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is not properly before the Court
because it was not cited to in the Motion to Dismiss, but instead was not raised until
Respondent's Reply Brief As the record of the case reflects, the subject Motion to Dismiss is
dated September 17, 2012 "within one month of Mr. John Cornell's death. Said Motion was

original set for hearing on October 1, 2012; then continued to November 27, 2012; then further
continued to January 8, 2013, which took place; and then subsequently re-opened and re-set for
February 8, 2013 to allow further opportunity to Mrs. Cornell to be heard. As of the February 8,

2013 hearing, Mr. John Cornell, the Petitioner in this action, will have been deceased for nearly
six months (the six month anniversary of his death being only 12 days later).
When the Motfon to Dismiss was prepared on September 17, 2012, a reasonable time

frame had not yet passed after the death of Mr. John H. Cornell where it would have been
appropriate to include Rule 25(a)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure as a potential grounds
for dismissal.

Respondent could not have foreseen the long and contentious path that this

litigation has taken since that time.

During the nearly six month period since Mr. Cornell's death, no Motion for Substitution
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO SURVIVING SPOUSE
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has been filed by either the temporary personal representative, or by Mrs. Cornell. Rule 25(a){l)
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[i]f substitution is not made within a

reasonable time, the action may be dismissed as to the deceased party." More than a reasonable
time has passed; and thus dismissal as to Mr. Cornell is appropriate and well within the
discretion of the Court.

B.

The causes of action in this proceeding do not survive Mr. John Cornelrs death.
Mrs. Cornell asserts in her Memorandum that "the causes of action pled in the petition

survive the death of John under both common law and Idaho Code§ 5~327(2) because they are
!!9!ions regarding an interest in property." Memorandum at 6 (emphasis added). Mrs. Cornell
does not state her assessment of the legal basis for said claims other than potential, undefined
"equitable theories." Id.

As the previously submitted briefing discussed at length. this is an

action for breach of fiduciary duty action arising out of Respondent's alleged misconduct as
trustee of the Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell after the deaths
of Michael and Arlie Cornell. See Respondent's Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss
dated Nov. 20, 2012. Temporary Personal Representative of the estate of John H. Cornell,
Margaret Watkins, has submitted briefing and argument in support of her position that the
alleged facts also support an action for breach of trust arising in contract, but for reasons
previously briefed and argued, the alleged facts fail to support a claim for breach of trust.
A claim fot breach of fiduciary duty sounds in tort. See Jones v. Kootenai County Title
Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 607 1 614, 873 P.2d 861, 868 (Idaho 1994) ("a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty is a negligence action in which the duty to act is created by the relationship between the
parties.")
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The Idaho Supreme Court's reasoning the context of similar analysis of a legal
malpractice claim is informative here:
As this Court previously recognized, legal malpractice actions are an amalgam of
tort and contract theories. The tort basis of legal malpractice actions flows for the
elements of legal malpractice: (a) the existence of an attorney-client relationship;
(b) the existence of a duty on the party of the lawyer; (c) failure to perform the
duty; and ( d) the negligence of the lawyer must have been a proximate cause of
the damage to the client. The scope of an attorney• s contractual duty to a client is
defined by the purposes for which the attorney is retained. Breach of an attorney's
duty is negligence in tort. The contract basis of legal malpractice actions is the
failure to perform obligations specified in the written contract. Thus, under the
abatement rule, breach of duty is an action in tort, not contract; that is, unless an
attomey foolhardily contracts with his client guaranteeing a specific outcome in
the litigation or p1·ovides for a higher standard of care in the contract, he is held to
the standard of care expected of an attorney. Breach of that duty is a tort.
. . . [T]he contours of the duties owed by an attorney to his or her client are
defined by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. If an attorney and client
want to provide for a higher standard of care, they may do so by express language
in the contract. Here, the standard of care in the contract is essentially the same as
in any attorney-client relationship. Because this claim sounds in tort, it abated
upon [the client's] death.

Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 620j 272 P.3d 1247, 1251 (2012) (citations omitted).
Similar to the attorney-client relationship at issue in Bishop, the contours of the duties
owed by a trustee to trust beneficiaries are defined by the Uniform Probate Code and Principal
and Income Act. Here, the trust documents contain no greater requirements than are set forth in
said statutes. Therefore) the analysis of Idaho Code Section 5-327(2), and the common law rule
of abatement prior to its amendment, applies. Based thereon, Mr. Cornell's claims for breach of
fiduciary duty brought as a trust beneficiary against the trustee Respondent are abated upon his
death for the reasons previously briefed.
Mrs. Cornell asserts that these claims are equitable in nature, thus do not abate, however
cites only to treatises that contradict Idaho law to support said assertion. Memorandum at 8-9.
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As discussed above and at length in prior briefing. the general rule under Idaho law is that claims
arising in pure tort abate upon the death of the claimant. Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616. 62021. 272 P.3d 1247, 1251-52 (2012). Despite the well-established nature of that principle, which
l\.1rs. Cornell herself acknowledges, Mrs. Cornell proposes that this Court reject the clear
principle established in Bishop v. Owens and instead draw a distinction between personal torts
and property torts that has no basis in Idaho law. Memorandum at 8. She cites to no case law or
statutory authority in support of this distinction, but instead relies upon a treatise, 1 Am.Jur.2d
Abatement, Survival

and Revival, without further authority or relation to Idaho law.

Id.

Mrs. Cornell does cite to the Idaho decision of Barnes v. Barnes, 135 Idaho 103, 15 .3d
816 (2000), however, said case was a divorce action where the husband died during the pendency
of an appeal after entry of an interlocutory divorce.

There, the surviving wife sought to

''posthumously reunite the parties based on a procedural flaw in the motion for summary
judgment." Id. at 107, 15 P.3d at 820. The Barnes decision stands for the limited principle that
where a divorced spouse dies prior to resolution of the division of community property and debts,

the resolution of said division of property survives. Id. Said principle has no application to the
Court's determination of whether a breach of fiduciary duty claim survives the allegedly injured
party's death.
Mrs. Cornell further argues that this Court should adopt a broader definition of "property
damage" in interpreting Idaho Code Section 5~327(2) than that proposed by Respondent.

Memorandum at 10. Respondent disagrees with such expanded definition, however, as discussed
at length in prior briefing, it is unnecessary for the Court to base its decision on the definition of
''property damage" as even if the Court were to adopt Mrs. Cornell's definition> there remains no
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question _that the damages sought in this action are not recoverable under Idaho Code Section 5327(2): those permissible being expressly limited to medical expenses actually incurred, other
out-of-pocket expenses actually incurred, and loss of earnings actually suffered.

No such

damages are plead or sought here. Mrs. Cornell has not asserted any faces to preclude dismissal.
Mrs. Cornell correctly notes that that Idaho law requires that statutory provisions be
interpreted in ac~ord with common sense and reason. Memorandum at 11 (citing Smith v. Dep't
of Employment, 100 Idaho 520, 522, 602 P.2d 18, 20 (1980)).

However, in this instancej

interpretation of Idaho Code Section 5J327(2) in accordance with common sense and reason
requires abatement of Mr. Camell' s claims upon his death and dismissal of this action.
For these reasons, Mr. Comell 's claims abated upon his death and should be dismissed.

C.

The causes of action in this proceeding do not survive Mr. John Cornell~s death.
Mrs. Cornell raises her potential right to file a lawsuit under the Trust and Estate Dispute

Resolution Act, Idaho Code § 15-8'"' 101 et seq., as further grounds to oppose dismissal of this
lawsuit on a basis of judicial economy.

Memorandum at 11.

Said argument is entirely

speculative in nature, inappropriately seeks to expand the scope of this proceeding> and should be

disregarded by the Court. The Court has gone to great lengths to ensure that Mrs. Cornell have
the opportunity to participate and be heard. She has done so. She has ample opportunity to raise
questions relating to the interpretation of the Trust in other proceedings. Said issues are not
properly before the Court.
Instead, this is an action for breach of fiduciary duty. The only question before the Court
is whether said action survives the death of Mr. John Cornell. As discussed above and in prior
briefing, based upon Idaho law, it does not and dismissal is required.
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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Respondent Toni Johnson respectfully requests that her Motion

to Dimiss be granted and that John Cornell's Petition be dismissed· with prejudice.
DATED this 1st day of February, 2013.
JONES, BROWER & CAllERY, P.L.L.C.

By

~ - r '

&:tJW

Karin Seubert
Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISMISS was, this 1st day of February, 2013,
transmitted via facsimile to:

Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice and Anegon
1212 Idaho St.

P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501
Theodore 0. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, P.L.L.C.

1219 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

By

{~

&112>-Rrt

Karin Seubert
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

COURT MINUTES

CV-2012-0000277
The Matter of Michael S Cornell
Hearing type: Motion to Dismiss
CV2012-0000439
The Matter of the Estate of John Henry Cornell, Deceased
Hearing type: Court Trial
Hearing date: 02/06/2013
Time: 2:09-3:09
Judge: Randall W. Robinson
Courtroom: 001
Court reporter: None
Minutes Clerk: Jodie
Tape Number: CD551-1
2:09

The Honorable Randall W. Robinson presiding. Present in Court:
Ted Creason, Karin Seubert, Darrel Aherin

2:10

Mr. Aherin - Motion for Mediation
Court asks which case will be first.

2:11

Discussion addressing Briefs

2:28

Discussion continues addressing the Trust and Estate

2:32

Mr. Aherin - addresses the Trust Document; Terms of

219

2:35

Discussion continues Terms of the Trust and subject of Personal Representative

2:52

Mr. Creason inquires time for a Personal Representative

2:55

Ms. Seubert who is the surviving spouse?

2:56

Mr. Aherin not prepared to go into the issue of Personal Representative

2:58

Court suggests addressing Personal Representative another day

2:59

Mr. Creason will submit an Order for Personal Representative

3:04

Court grants Motion to Dismiss CV2012-277
Will allow Personal Representative to file claim within 20 days
Will provide a written decision

3:05

Discussion addressing Mediation? Clarifying who all the Parties are going
forward?
CV2012-439 - to Continue

3:09

Recess
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Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC
1219 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-1516
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231
Attorneys for Personal Representative
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST
OF MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND
ARLIE M. CORNELL.

_ _ _ _ __ _ _ __

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

NOTICE OF SERVICE

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 33 and
34 that on the 22nd day of March, 2013, the Petitioner, Kareen Cornell, by and through her
attorney of record, Theodore O. Creason, served by messenger one ( 1) copy of Petitioner,
Personal Representative of the Estate Of John Cornell, Kareen Cornell' s First Set of
Interrogatories and First Set of Requests For Production and Requests For Admission
Propounded To Respondent, Karin Seubert, attorney for Respondent, Toni C. Johnson.
DATED this

r;/0

day ofFebruary, 2013.
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

/ ,J,,.J_ [ t c:f~

d<-----

Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563
Attorney for Petitioner, Kareen Cornell
NOTICE OF SERVICE PURSUANT TO
I.R.C.P. 33 AND 34 - 1

Theodore 0. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drnwer 835, Lewiston ID 83501
(208)743-1516; Fax(208)746-2231
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~-day of February, 2013, a copy of the
foregoing NOTICE OF SERVICE PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 33 AND 34 was served by the
method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Callery, PLLC
1304 Idaho Street
P. 0. Box 854
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
--

FIRST-CLASS MAIL

-x- HAND DELIVERED

OVERNIGHT MAIL
FAX TRANSMISSION

NOTICE OF SERVICE PURSUANT TO
I.R.C.P. 33 AND 34 - 2

Theodore 0. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston ID 83501
(208)743-1516; Fax(208)746-2231
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Theodore 0 . Creason, ISB #1563
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC
1219 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-1516
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231
Attorneys for Personal Representative
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

_ _ __ _ _ _ _ __

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No . CV 2012-00277
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION
OF TONI C. JOHNSON

TO: RESPONDENT, TONI C. JOHNSON, TRUSTEE OF THE REVOCABLE
FAMILY TRUST OF MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL,
AND TO KARIN SEUBERT, HER ATTORNEY
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney for Kareen Cornell, Personal
Representative of the Estate of John C. Cornell, will take the testimony, upon oral examination,
of Toni C. Johnson before K&K Reporting, certified shorthand reporters of the State ofldaho, or
in the case of their inability to act or be present, before some other person authorized to
administer oaths, on Wednesday, March 22, 2013, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. of that day and
thereafter from day to day as the taking of the deposition may be adjourned, at the offices of
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC, 1219 Idaho Street, Lewiston, Idaho 83501.
This deposition shall be taken pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION
OF TONI C. JOHNSON - 1

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516 ; Fax: (208) 746-2231
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DATED this ,z't- ay ofFebruary, 2013.
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

Theodore 0. Cteason, ISB # 1563
Attorneys for Kareen Cornell, Personal
Representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ( Z:-day of February, 2013, a copy of the foregoing
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION OF TONI C. JOHNSON was served by the method
indicated below and addressed to the following:
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C.
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
Keith and Kristi Evans
Certified Court Reporters
P. 0. Box 574
Lewiston ID 83501
Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice & Anegon
1212 Idaho Street
P . 0 . Drawer 698
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563

NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION
OF TONI C. JOHNSON - 2

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231
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Theodore 0 . Creason, ISB #1563
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC
1219 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-1516
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231
Attorneys for Personal Representative
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.
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Case No . CV 2012-00277

MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF
PARTY (I.R.C.P. 25(a)(l))

COMES NOW Kareen Cornell, Personal Representative of the Estate of John Henry
Cornell, by and through her attorney of record, Theodore 0. Creason of Creason, Moore, Dokken
& Geidl, PLLC, and hereby moves this Court to approve substitution of the Estate of John Henry
Cornell for John Henry Cornell. The Estate brings this motion pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 25(a)(l) and the order of this Court, dated February 6, 2013.
7"1
DATED this 1,l - day ofFebruary, 2013 .

CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563
Attorneys for Personal Representative

MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF PARTY - 1

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
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P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
taay of February, 2013, I filed the foregoing
MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF PARTY with the Clerk of the Court, and provided a paper
copy to the following persons:
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C.
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501

Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice & Anegon
1212 Idaho Street
P. 0. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501

Theodore 0. Creason,ISB #1563

MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF PARTY - 2

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
226
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231

Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC
1219 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-1516
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231
Attorneys for Personal Representative
Of Estate of Jolm Hemy Cornell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
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In the Matter of:

)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

~

NOTICE OF HEARING

)
)

)

Notice is hereby given that the undersigned will call on for hearing Petitioner's Motion
for Substitution of Party (I.R.C.P. 25(a)(l)) on Tuesday, February 26, 2012, at 11:00 a.m., or as
soon thereafter as counsel may be heard in the courtroom at the Clearwater County Comihouse,
Orofino, Idaho.
DATED this 121h day of February, 2013.
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC
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Theodore 0 . Creason, ISB # 1563
Attorney for Petitioner Kareen Cornell

NOTICE OF HEARING - 1
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston ID 83501
(208)743-1516; Fax(208)746-2231
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this lih day of February. 2013, a copy of the foregoing
NOTICE OF HEARING RE: PETITIONER' S MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF PARTY
(I.R.C.P. 25 (a)(l)) was served by the method indicated below and addressed to the following :
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Callery, PLLP
1304 Idaho Street
P. 0. Box 854
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

X

Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice & Anegon
1212 Idaho Street
P. 0. Drawer 698
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

FIRST-CLASS MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
FAX TRANSMISSION
(208)344-5510

FIRST-CLASS MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
FAX TRANSMISSION
(208)344-5510
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odore 0 . Creason, ISB # 1563

NOTICE OF HEARING - 2
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston ID 83501
(208)743-1516; Fax(208)746-2231
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWA TER
MAGISTRA TE DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF THE

Case No. CV 2012-277

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAELS . CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL

MEMORANDUM OPINION

i.}_:__/_!_[

On September 14, 2012, Karin Seubert representing Toni C. Johnson ("Toni")
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition of John H. Cornell ("John") based upon abatement
of John's claims following John's death. Darrell Aherin appeared on behalf of the
deceased John Cornell. The parties have provided affidavits and briefs on the issue of
abatement. Oral argument was originally set for November 27, 2012, but continued to
January 8, 2012. Karin Seubert and Darrel Aherin submitted written memoranda and
on January 8, 2013 presented oral argument.
After the hearing, Theodore Creason representing the widow of the deceased
John Cornell, Kareen Cornell ("Kareen"), was permitted to file a memorandum and
participate in another hearing. Kareen filed her Memorandum on January 18, 2013. On
February 1, 2013, Toni filed a reply memorandum. Another hearing was conducted on
MEMORANDUM OPINION-1
229

•

\.v /

February 6, 2013 on the Motion to Dismiss with Karin Seubert, Darrel Aherin, and
Theodore Creason present and providing oral argument. The Motion, affidavits of the
parties, the parties' memoranda, the oral argument of the parties and the file have been
carefully considered.
I. Statement of Facts
On November 1, 1996, Michael Cornell and Arlie Cornell, husband and wife, and
parents to Toni and John, created a revocable family trust. The Trust provides "On the
death of the surviving Trustor, the Trust shall terminate and the Trustee shall, as soon
as reasonably possible, divide the net income and principal remaining in the Trust into
two (2) equal shares and distribute them to the following beneficiaries: Toni C. Johnson
and John H. Cornell." Trust§ 4.03.
On November 9, 2008, Arlie Cornell passed away. On August 6, 2009, Michael
Cornell signed the First Amendment of the Cornell Trust which named Toni as sole
trustee/successor trustee instead of Toni and John jointly serving in that capacity as
provided for in the original Trust. On December 15, 2009, Michael Cornell, the last
Trustor, passed away.
John was experiencing serious health and financial problems at the time his
father passed away. John failed to obtain necessary medical care because of his lack
of finances. John contacted his sister, Toni, regarding the status of the Trust following
his father's death, but his sister refused to speak to him. John wrote several letters and
made several phone calls to the attorney for the estate requesting information as to the
status of the trust without a response from the attorney. In his third letter to the attorney
dated September 17, 2010, John wrote, "Is it fair that Toni has a place to live and I do
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not have a place to live. Why should I incur living expenses and she is in complete
control of everything, living off the money in the trust and living free in my parent's
house which is also my house?"
In the nearly two (2) years from the last truster's death through John's death,
Toni failed to distribute any part of the trust to John even while she lived rent free in the
home that is included in the trust and apparently paid all her living expenses from trust
funds. Toni has not distributed any of the funds from the trust other than for her own
use.
John received $3000 as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy on his father's
life. Upon Toni's demand that he turn the money over to her, he sent a check for $2500
to Toni and retained $500 for living expenses.
On July 11, 2012 John filed a Petition for supervised administration and removal
of trustee. The Petition alleges that Toni as trustee has "breached her fiduciary duty to
settle and distribute The Trust in accordance with the terms of the Trust." Petition at§
11. The Petition also alleges that Toni mismanaged the estate by Toni paying her own
personal expenses and paying the expenses associated with the real property on which
she resided while failing to pay John his one-half share of the estate. Petition at § 10.
Finally, the Petition alleges Toni failed to provide an inventory of the assets in the Trust.
Petition at § 7.
On August 20, 2012, John committed suicide. In the case of death of one of the
beneficiaries, the Trust provides at 4.03(a),
If any child, for whom a share of the Trust Estate has been set aside,
should die prior to the above distribution, then the Trustee shall distribute
all of such deceased child's share of the Trust Estate to his or her
surviving issue in equal shares . . . If there is no surviving issue,, then all
MEMORANDUM OPINION-3
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of the deceased child's share of the Trust Estate shall be added to the
shares set aside for the benefit of the Trustors' other living child .... "
John's wife, Kareen Cornell, survives him. However, John left no issue. Thus,
the Trust Estate, in the absence of any distribution prior to John's death, will go in its
entirety to Toni. Toni seeks to dismiss John's Petition on the basis that John's claims of
mismanagement, breach of trust, and breach of fiduciary duty are abated by John's
death.

11. Legal Analysis
A. Standard.
Affidavits have been filed and considered. In considering matters outside the
pleadings on a motion to dismiss, such motion must be treated as a motion for summary
judgment. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Hellickson v Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 276, 769 P.2d 150, 153
(Ct. App. 1990).
The standard for granting a motion for summary judgment has been often
repeated by the appellate courts.
All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving
party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are
to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119
Idaho 539,541 ,808 P.2d 876,878 (1991). Summary judgment is
appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360, 364
(1991).
Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 529, 887 P.2d 1034, 1036 (1994).

With respect to the abatement issue presented by Toni's Motion to Dismiss, there
is no genuine issue of any material fact with respect to John's claims. I find it
appropriate to consider Toni's motion for summary judgment. Toni's Motion for
MEMORANDUM OPINION-4
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Summary Judgment raises two issues: (1) Do John's claims survive his death under
the common law? (2) If not, has the Idaho legislature abrogated the common law and
provided for the survivability of John's claims?
B. John's claims do not survive his death under common law.
The Supreme Court recently considered in Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 272
P.3d 1247 (2012) when the claims of deceased individuals are abated or terminated.
The abatement rule holds that in the absence of a legislative enactment
addressing the survivability of a claim, the common law rules govern. See
I.C. § 73-116 ("The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant
to, or inconsistent with, the constitution or laws of the United States, in all
cases not provided for in these compiled laws, is the rule of decision in all
courts of this state."); see also Evans v. Twin Falls Cnty., 118 Idaho 210,
215, 796 P.2d 87, 92 (1990). Under the common law, claims arising out of
contracts generally survive the death of the claimant, while those sounding
in pure tort abate. See Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667, 674-79, 34 P.2d
957, 960-61 (1934); Kloepferv. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 417-18, 184 P. 477,
477 (1919).
Id. at 619-620.

Thus, in order for John's claims to survive his death, his claims must
sound in contract, and not in tort. The Bishop decision is instructive as to how to
analyze whether a case sounds in contract or tort for purposes of abatement of
the claim. The Bishop case involved a legal malpractice claim. Although the
malpractice claim arose out of a contractual claim to perform legal services, the
Supreme Court held the claim to sound in tort for purposes of abatement.
As this Court previously recognized, "[l)egal malpractice actions are an
amalgam of tort and contract theories." See Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho
702, 706, 652 P.2d 650, 654 (1982). The tort basis of legal malpractice
actions flows from the elements of legal malpractice: "(a) the existence of
an attorney-client relationship; (b) the existence of a duty on the part of the
lawyer; (c) failure to perform the duty; and (d) the negligence.of the lawyer
must have been a proximate cause of the damage to the client. ... " Id.
(quoting Sherry v. Diercks, 29 Wash.App. 433, 437, 628 P.2d 1336, 1338
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(1981)). "The scope of an attorney's contractual duty to a client is defined
by the purposes for which the attorney is retained." Johnson, 103 Idaho at
704, 652 P.2d at 652; Fuller, 119 Idaho at 425, 807 P.2d at 643 (holding
that the tort of legal malpractice is also a breach of the attorney-client
relationship). Breach of an attorney's duty in negligence is a tort. See
Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 136, 90 P.3d 884, 886 (2004);
Johnson, 103 Idaho at 704, 706-07, 652 P.2d at 652, 654-55. The
contract basis of legal malpractice actions is the failure to perform
obligations directly specified in the written contract. See Johnson, 103
Idaho at 704, 706-07, 652 P.2d at 652, 654-55 (holding that a breach of
contract claim would arise if the attorney did not do what he promised to
do in the contract, e.g., failing to draw up a contract of sale). Thus, under
the abatement rule, breach of duty is an action in tort, not contract; that is,
unless an attorney foolhardily contracts with his client guaranteeing a
specific outcome in the litigation or provides for a higher standard of care
in the contract, he is held to the standard of care expected of an attorney.
Breach of that duty is a tort.
Id. at 620.

The Idaho Supreme Court's analysis of whether legal malpractice claims
are abated is very clearly applicable to this case. This case is a mixed tort and
contract case. This case also involves torts arising from a contractual
agreement. A tort basis for John's claims against Toni exists just as they were
found to exist with respect to the legal malpractice claim in Bishop: (a) The
existence of a fiduciary relationship is established by Toni being appointed as
and acting as a trustee (b) the existence of a duty on the part of Toni, the
trustee; (c) the alleged failure to meet that duty; (d) the failure of Toni to perform
her duty was the proximate cause of John not receiving his share of the trust
during his lifetime.
John relies on the directive of Trust§ 4.03 that the trust be divided as soon as
reasonably possible to argue that he states a contract claim which cannot be abated.
The Supreme Court in Bishop considered a similar claim. The deceased client's estate
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argued that the attorney-client relationship provided by contract that the attorney
provide services and therefore exempted the claims of the estate from abatement. The
Court held that
the contours of the duties owed by an attorney to his or her client are
defined by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. If an attorney and
client want to provide for a higher standard of care, they may do so by
express language in the contract. Here, the standard of care in the
contract is essentially the same as in any attorney-client relationship.
Because this claim sounds in tort, it abated upon Patricia Shelton's death.
Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616,620,272 P.3d 1247, 1251 (2012).

Similarly, in this case, the contours of the duties owed by the trustee to the
beneficiary are defined by sources outside the contract: Chapter 7 of the Uniform
Probate Act, Idaho Code§ 15-7-101 et seq., and the Uniform Principal and Trust Act at
Idaho Code§ 68-10-101 et seq. As exhaustively described in John's Memorandum at
2-6, Toni has allegedly violated her fiduciary duties as defined by Idaho Code§§ 15-7302, 15-7-703, 68-10-103, 68-10-201 and 68-10-202. Violation of these fiduciary duties
arising under statute is a tort.
The Trust provision upon which John relies that the assets be distributed as
reasonably soon as possible is essentially the same as any trust fiduciary relationship
governed by the Idaho Code. Idaho Code§ 15-7-301 provides, "Except as specifically
provided, the general duty of the trustee to administer a trust expeditiously for the
benefit of the beneficiaries is not altered by this code." (emphasis added). Thus, John's
claim abates since a tort arising under Idaho Code§ 15-7-301 covers John's claim
John also relies upon § 8.02 of the Trust which requires periodic accountings.
This provision virtually replicates Idaho Code § 15-7-303(a) except that the statute
requires that Toni provide notice to John of the trust within thirty (30) days of her
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acceptance of her status as trustee, while the trust has no such provision. Again, the
Trust provision imposes no greater duty than that which the Idaho statutes already
impose upon trustees. Therefore, as in Bishop, John's claim sounds in tort and abates
upon his death under the common law.
John relies upon Cruzen v. Boise City, 58 Idaho 406, 74 P.2d 1037 (1937) to
argue that "a breach of trust is not based upon a statute but rather upon a contractual
obligation resting on every trustee to fulfill and comply with terms of a trust." Response
to Motion to Dismiss at 8. Toni counters that "'a claim for a breach of a fiduciary duty is
a negligence action[.]' Jones v, Kootenai County Title Ins. Co., 1 125 Idaho 607, 614,
873 P.2d 861, 868 (Idaho 1994)." Reply Brief at 4. Both parties ignore the specific
facts of the case they cite that prevent the principles the parties draw from being
universally applied.
In Cruzen, while there were statutes governing the procedural ability of the
Plaintiff to sue the city, there was no state law imposing a duty upon the City to pay the
Plaintiff bondholder. Unlike Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616,620,272 P.3d 1247, 1251
(2012), therefore, there was no mixed question of tort and contract. In Cruzen, the only
duties imposed upon the city were contractual.
In Jones, cited by Toni, the Supreme Court clearly limited its holding: "the
breach of an assumed duty claim sounds in tort." Jones v. Runft, Leroy, Coffin &

Matthews, Chartered, 125 Idaho 607, 612, 873 P.2d 861, 866 (1994). Jones does not
hold that all fiduciary breaches are to be treated as torts. This case does not involve an
assumed duty.

1

While Kootenai County Title Ins. Co. is the first identified defendant, the title of the
case is actually Jones v. Runft,. Leroy, Coffin & Matthews, Chartered.
MEMORANDUM OPINION-8
236

However, Jones does support finding that this case involves a tort and not a
contract action for purposes of abatement. The Court observed, "'A contract may ...
create a state of things which furnishes the occasion for a tort. If the relation of the
plaintiff and the defendants is such that a duty to take due care arises therefrom
irrespective of contract and the defendant is negligent, then the action is one of tort.'
Jones, 125 Idaho at 612, 873 at 866. As stated above, the duties John asserts Toni
breaches arise irrespective of contract. The duties are grounded in state law regardless
of what the contract states.
Finally, John argues that Toni breached the Trust "when she encouraged Michael
C. Cornell to execute the First Amendment to the Revocable Trust of Michael C. Cornell
and Arlie M. Cornell on August 6, 2009, which changed Article Nine Section 9.01 to
state that Toni C. Johnson and John Henry Cornell are no longer co-successor
trustees." Response to Motion at 8. There are several problems with John's argument.
First, there are no specific facts supporting the allegation that Toni encouraged the
Amendment. Even if there were such facts, John does not argue nor provide any
specific facts demonstrating undue influence or Michael Cornell's incapacity to be
present when Michael Cornell made the change. Mere encouragement does not
provide a basis for rescinding the amendment.
Second, even if Toni could somehow be held responsible for the amendment to
the trust, no facts are present showing that the change made by Michael Cornell was
the proximate cause for the damages John alleges he suffered because of Toni's
wrongful acts. Review of the checks submitted by John discloses that Toni was a joint
signatory to the checking account and did not write checks in the capacity of a trustee.
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John does not point to any specific action taken by Toni with regards to the
property that she could not have accomplished even if John had remained a cotrustee.
The Amendment of the Trust by itself did not cause the harm for which John seeks
relief. John has failed to show a single instance in which Toni acted in her capacity as a
Trustee, as opposed to her individual capacity as a joint account holder, to John's
detriment.
Third, the Amendment took place on August 6, 2009, prior to the amendment of
Idaho Code § 6-327 permitting the survival of wrongful actions as John alleges here.
Therefore, John's claim cannot survive his death.
Fourth, the Uniform Principal and Income Act incorporates the provisions of the
trust as part of the fiduciary duties of the Trustee. Idaho Code§ 68-10-103(a)((1) states
that a fiduciary as part of the fiduciary duties "shall administer a trust or estate in
accordance with the terms of the trust or the will, even if there is a different provision in
this chapter." Thus, by rendering any violation of the trust a violation of a fiduciary duty
imposed by statute, the legislature within the meaning of Bishop created a tort of any
violation of the Trust and thus abatable upon death.
Finally, if John's argument is correct that the trust forbade the amendment of the
trust, the Amendment was then ineffective. John could have exercised his powers of a
cotrustee and not suffered any harm that he alleges occurred.
John's claims abate under common law. The alleged wrongful acts of Toni are
all breaches of fiduciary duties under state law that for purposes of abatement are in the
nature of torts. In the absence of any state law supplanting the common law, John's
claims are abated and must be dismissed.
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John argues that such fine parsing of the law is inconsistent with the equities of
this case that cry for action against Toni's wrongdoing in failing to distribute to John
during his lifetime his one-half share of the trust. This court cannot ignore the
legislature or the Idaho Supreme Court's interpretations, regardless of the perceived
injustice. Nor is it even clear that the Trustors would have desired the result urged by
John. The Trustors could have provided in the trust for John's heirs as John now seeks
as relief, but chose not to, instead limiting distribution of the trust solely to the issue of
the deceased.
Kareen relies upon Barnes v. Barnes, 135 Idaho 103, 15 P.3d 816 (2000) to
argue that any action regarding property survives abatement. The Supreme Court in
Barnes held that once a divorce is granted, the associated issues of property and debt
distribution survive the parties. Unlike the later Bishop decision, Barnes does not
involve a mixed question of tort and contract.
Kareen also relies upon Am Jur cites for the principles that any tort to property
survives the death of a party and an action pursuant to a remedial statute, as in this
case, survives the death of the party. Memorandum Re: Respondent's Motion to
Dismiss at 9. While Kareen correctly sets forth these principles, she provides no
explanation as to how they are consistent with Bishop. The Supreme Court in Bishop
did not distinguish torts done to persons or to property in determining whether the action
survived the death of the party. Nor did the Supreme Court analyze whether the rules
of professional conduct are remedial in nature for purposes of surviving the party's
death. Therefore, Kareen's argument is rejected.
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Kareen argues that Toni's Motion to Dismiss is premised upon the entirety of the
trust vesting in her. Kareen makes four (4) arguments not made by John which she
asserts undermines Toni's premise and which therefore must be considered before
summary judgment can be considered.

Memorandum Re: Respondent's Motion to

Dismiss at 7. Kareen argues that these additional issues must be briefed and
considered including "(1) whether distribution can serve as the proper event for vesting;
(2) if so, whether the law presumes vesting within a reasonable period of time
regardless of actual distribution; (3) whether the terms of vesting in the Trust violate the
common law or statutory rule against perpetuities as to both Johnson's and John's
interest; and (4) whether Johnson's conduct resulted in her holding that portion of the
Trust res due to John in a constructive trust for the benefit of John and his heirs." Id.
First, the merits of who takes from the trust are irrelevant to whether John's
claims survive his death. Kareen fails to point to how the issue is relevant to
consideration of Toni's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Second, the issues are not articulated in John's Petition and therefore cannot be
considered. Nowhere in John's Petition does he challenge the trust on the basis that
the trust is ineffective under either common law, the rule of perpetuities or its provision
for vesting upon distribution. Nor is there any challenge to the trust based upon a
presumption under the law that presumes vesting within a reasonable period of time
regardless of distribution.
Third, Kareen states that the arguments require further legal briefing, but then
provides no legal argument to support her theories. Kareen's arguments cannot
therefore be considered.
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Fourth, Kareen argues that the issue of a constructive trust requires
establishment of improper conduct which is a triable issue of fact. However, Kareen
points to no additional facts to those already provided in the Affidavit of Margaret
Wilkins which Kareen relies upon to argue her right to a constructive trust.
Memorandum Re: Respondent's Motion to Dismiss at 9. In addition, under the Bishop
analysis, the arguments regarding a constructive trust speak to wrongdoing, a tort, and
one that is already subsumed under the Uniform Probate Act and the Uniform Principal
and Trust Act. The constructive trust argument is indistinguishable from John's
arguments regarding Toni's breaches of fiduciary duties.
Kareen in her Memorandum and orally at the hearing requested an opportunity to
present her arguments if she is appointed personal representative of John's estate.
Kareen was appointed personal representative of John's estate on February 6, 2013,
the same date as the final argument in this case on the Motion to Dismiss. Kareen shall
be given twenty (20) days to substitute for John and present issues free of the pleadings
filed by John's attorney during John's lifetime.
B. The Idaho state legislature has not abrogated the common law and provided
for the survivability of John's claims.
On July 1, 2010, the legislature abrogated the common law regarding abatement
of certain civil actions while limiting relief in the form of damages that can be obtained.
Idaho Code§ 5-237(2) provides:
A cause of action for personal injury or property damage caused by
the wrongful act or negligence of another shall not abate upon the death of
the injured person from causes not related to the wrongful act or
negligence. Provided however, that the damages that may be recovered in
such action are expressly limited to those for: (i) medical expenses
actually incurred, (ii) other out-of-pocket expenses actually incurred, and
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(iii) loss of earnings actually suffered, prior to the death of such injured
person and as a result of the wrongful act or negligence. Such action shall
be commenced or, if already commenced at the time of the death of the
injured person, shall be thereafter prosecuted by the personal
representative of the estate of the deceased person or, if there be no
personal representative appointed, then by those persons who would be
entitled to succeed to the property of the deceased person according to
the provisions of section 5-311 (2)(a), Idaho Code.
The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that Idaho Code § 5-327 cannot be
applied retroactively: Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho at 1052. Thus, the issue presents
itself as to whether Idaho Code § 5-327 permits consideration of John's claims after July
1, 2010, the effective date of the statute.
John makes several claims that are abated since they do not present any claim
for damages. These include the allegations of the alleged "breach of fiduciary duty by
the respondent [Toni] for failing to provide an inventory of the trust assets when a
reasonable request was made by a beneficiary as required by Idaho Code Section 15-7303." Response to Motion to Dismiss at 2; the alleged breach of the trust when Toni
2
allegedly encouraged Michael C. Cornell to change the trust on August 6, 2009 .

Response to Motion to Dismiss at 8-9 ; and the failure to provide accountings.
Response to Motion to Dismiss at 9-10.
Idaho Code§ 5-327(2) broadly allows for "a cause of action for "personal injury
or property damage caused by the wrongful act ... " Toni argues that the tort of breach
of fiduciary duty in this case is not a personal injury action nor involving property
damage and therefore not subject to Idaho Code§ 5-327. Toni relies on the limited
definition of property damage given at Idaho Code§ 6-1601 (8) which defines property

As this alleged wrongdoing by Toni took place in 2009, prior to the adoption of Idaho
Code§ 5-327(2) in 2010, John's claim rising in tort would be abated under the common
law in any event.

2
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damage as "loss in value or in use of real or personal property where such loss arises
from physical damage or destruction of the property."
I find the circumstances of this case to constitute property damage within the
meaning of Idaho Code§ 5-327(2). The damages alleged in this case arise from
property being made unavailable by being retained by Toni and by Toni's expenditures
on her personal needs instead of being distributed to John as required under the trust.
The unavailability of the funds has resulted in loss of use of the property within the
meaning of Idaho Code§ 6-1601.
In any event, the definition of property damage at Idaho Code§ 6-1601 is too
restrictive. While Idaho Code§ 6-1601 limits property damage to losses that arise from
physical damage or destruction of property, Idaho Code § 5-327(2) refers to property
damage caused by a wrongful act. Certainly, the misappropriation of funds resulting in
deprival of property to which John is entitled constitutes damage to his right to property
caused by a wrongful act.
It is not enough to find that Idaho Code 5-327(2) abrogates the common law with
regards to John's tort claims against Toni. John's action may only proceed if the relief
sought is one of the three types of damages specifically listed at Idaho Code§ 5-327(2).
John does not seek lost wages or medical expenses which are two of the three types of
damages which can be obtained. Thus, the issue is joined as to whether Toni's alleged
misappropriation of the trust by using the trust proceeds on herself and Toni's failure to
distribute John's share of the trust to him are "out of pocket expenses incurred." Idaho
Code§ 5-327(2)(ii).
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John argues that the term, "out of pocket expenses actually incurred",
encompasses the value of John's share of the trust that was not distributed to him and
the amounts that Toni misappropriated for herself. Thus, John argues "out of pocket
expenses" should be defined as including property wrongfully taken and withheld as
allegedly occurred in this case.
However, the Idaho state legislature has already indicated in the Crime Victims
Compensation Act that the definition of out of pocket expenses excludes property
wrongfully taken.
Under I.C. § 19-5304(2), the trial court may order restitution for any
economic loss that the victim actually suffers. The statute gives a broad
definition of economic loss:
"Economic loss" includes, but is not limited to, the value of property taken,
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, lost wages, and direct out-ofpocket losses or expenses, such as medical expenses resulting from the
criminal conduct, but does not include less tangible damage such as pain
and suffering, wrongful death, or emotional distress.
I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a) (emphasis added).
State v. Olpin, 140 Idaho 377, 379, 93 P.3d 708, 710 (Ct. App. 2004).

Idaho Code§ 19-5304(1)(a)(ii) separately identifies "direct out of pocket losses
or expenses such as medical expenses" and "the value of property taken, destroyed,
broken or otherwise harmed." John seeks compensation for the value of property taken
from him by Toni's wrongful acts in failing to give John his share of the estate and
misappropriating property of John for her own benefit. The state legislature knew how
to express language that would cover John's type of losses. Instead, the state
legislature chose not to do so at Idaho Code § 5-327(2) by limiting damages to direct
out of pocket expenses and not adding property taken as a form of damages that is not
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abated. John did not incur any out of pocket expenses within the meaning of the statute
and so his claims are abated.
The Crime Victim's Compensation Act is also significant for its broad definition of
the type of expenses that can be reimbursed under the Act. The Act provides that the
definition of economic loss reimbursable "includes, but is not limited to" a broad list of
forms of loss. Idaho Code§ 19-5304(1). Thus, the Idaho Court of Appeals in Olpin, in
light of the broad purposes and liberal definitions underlying the Victims Compensation
Act, had no problem in analogizing to "lost wages" to find that the costs associated with
employees researching the losses incurred by the business and the cost of testifying in
court to be reimbursable economic costs.
In contrast, Idaho Code§ 5-327(2) by its express limitation does not permit
analogizing or stretching the definitions to cover costs that do not come within the strict
definitions. Damages are "expressly limited" to three types of damages.
The damages John seeks- recovery of property wrongfully withheld from him- do
not meet the definition of out of pocket expenses. Therefore, Idaho Code§ 5-327(2)
does not overrule the common law abatement of John's causes of action.
John makes no claim against Toni and the administration of the estate of their
parents that survives his death under the common law or under Idaho Code§ 5-327.
Under the terms of the trust, John's heirs have no claim against the estate as he left no
surviving issue. Trust§ 4.03(a).
Ill. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and there
being no material facts in dispute, the Motion to Dismiss filed by Toni C. Johnson of the
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Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee, converted into a Motion
for Summary Judgment by the filing of Affidavits, shall be granted and the Petition for
Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee will be dismissed as John's claims
set forth in his Petition do not survive his death under common law, state law or the
trust. Kareen, as the newly personal representative of John's estate, shall be given
twenty (20) days to file claims on behalf of the estate in the above entitled case.
Dated this ]z'lday of February, 2013.

~~L

Randall W Robinson, Magistrate
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MAGISTRATE DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF THE

Case No. CV 2012-277

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARUE M.
CORNELL

JUDGMEN T FOR DISMISSAL

Based upon Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as set forth in the
Memorandum Opinion filed in this case on February 15, 2013, and good cause
appearing thereby, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
That the Motion to Dismiss filed by Toni C. Johnson of the Petition for Supervised
Administration and Removal of Trustee, converted into a Motion for Summary Judgment
by the filing of Affidavits, IS HEREBY GRANTED and the Petition for Supervised
Administration and Removal of Trustee is HEREBY DISMISSED.
Kareen Cornell, the personal representative for John Cornell's estate shall be
given twenty (20) days to set forth in the above entitled action the claims of the estate.
Dated this

/Sdaay of February, 2013.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

COURT MINUTES

CV-2012-0000277
The Matter of Michael S Cornell
CV2012-0000439
The Matter of the Estate of John Henry Cornell
Hearing type: Motion for Consolidation
Hearing date: 02/26/2013
Time: 11:12 am
Judge: Randall W. Robinson
Courtroom: 001
Court reporter: None
Minutes Clerk: Jodie
Tape Number: CD552-1
11:12 The Honorable Randall W. Robinson presiding. Present in Court:
Ted Creason, Sam Creason; Karin Seubert; Telephonically- Darrel Aherin
11:13 Court addressing Mr Aherin's concerns
11:14 Mr Aherin objects John Cornell not a resident of Idaho; was living in Nevada
11:15 Mr Creason -John was living in Nevada for several months due to health &
finance issues
Clarifies domicile vs residing
11:17 Legal issue is Domicile? Personal Representative? Or Will?
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11:19 Mr Aherin - discussion about jurisdiction of this Will/Trust being property is in
Clearwater County
11:21 Court - regarding the issue of Appointing Personal Representative
Mr Creason had offered to have client appear in person but did not request for
today's attendance
11:22 Court Trust/Estate located here in Idaho - Court does have jurisdiction
11:24 Court clarifying jurisdiction and Amending his Order
11:25 Ms Seubert - discussion and clear record to confirm that ALL parties agree that
John Cornell was domiciled in Idaho at time of death
11:27 Court- jurisdiction?
11:30 Mr Creason clarifies Domicile issue - IDAHO and verified Petition
11:31 Mr Aherin Probate property because Court has jurisdiction being the land is in
Clearwater County
11:32 Ms Seubert - clarifies this is a TRUST Issue!
11:32 Parties in agreement
11:35 Discussion continues regarding Jurisdiction and the Trust
11:44 Court - will sign Order?
11:51 Mr Creason - New allegations
11:52 Ms Seubert has new pleadings that will file today, 02/26/13
11:53 Mr Creason requests time to explain merits of this case
11:54 All Parties - discussion
12:00 Ms Seubert asks to have issues resolved now or at a later time?
12:01 Court - wants more time to review all the information
12:03 Date set for next hearing: March 13, 2013 at 3:00 PM
12:04 Recess
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F[~:3 '.) ·· 20B
Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC
1219 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-1516
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231
Attorneys for Petitioner/Personal Representative
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION
(I.R.C.P. 42(a))

- - - -- - - - -- -- - -- - )
COMES NOW Kareen Cornell, Petitioner in this matter and Personal Representative of
the Estate of John Henry Cornell, by and through her attorney of record, Theodore 0. Creason of
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC, and hereby moves this Court to order consolidation of
this action with Case No. CV 2012-439, In the Matter of The Estate of John H Cornell pursuant
to the Court's powers under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a).
Petitioner brings this motion upon the grounds that consolidation would expedite the
Court's business and further the interests of the litigants. See Branam v. Smith Frozen Foods of

Idaho, Inc. , 83 Idaho 502, 509, 365 P.2d 958 , 961 (1961) .

MOTIO N FOR CONSOLIDATION - 1

Creason , Moo re, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835 , Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516 ; Fax: (208) 746-2231
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DATED this 26th day of February, 2013.
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

0. Creason, ISB #1563
Attorneys for Petitioner/Personal Representative
HvL•U.VJLv

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of February, 2013, I filed the foregoing
PETITION FOR SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION AND COURT ORDERED DISTRIBUTION with the
Clerk of the Court, and hand-delivered a paper copy to the following persons:
Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice & Anegon
1212 Idaho Street
P. 0. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501

MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION -2

Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C.
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231
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Theodore 0 . Creason, ISB #1563
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC
1219 Idaho Street
P .O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-1516
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231
Attorney for Kareen Cornell, Surviving
Spouse Of John Hemy Cornell
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO , IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
)
)
)
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
)
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
)
CORNELL,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
_ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ )
In the Matter of:

CV 2012-277
PETITION BY KAREEN CORNELL AS
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
ESTATE OF JOHN HENRY CORNELL AND
AS SURVIVING SPOUSE OF JOHN HENRY
CORNELL, DECEASED BENEFICIARY OF
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL FOR SUPERVISED
ADMINISTRATION AND COURT
ORDERED DISTRIBUTION

COMES NOW Kareen Cornell, in her capacity as personal representative of the estate of
the Estate of John Hemy Cornell and as surviving spouse of John Hemy Cornell (hereinafter
"Petitioner") by and through her attorney of record, Theodore O. Creason of Creason, Moore,
Dokken & Geidl, PLLC, and hereby alleges as follows:

PETITION FOR SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION
AND COURT ORDERED DISTRIBUTION OF TRUST - 1

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston , ID 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fax : (208) 746-2231
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I.
1.1.

PARTIES

Petitioner brings this action on behalf of the Estate of John Hemy Cornell

(hereinafter "Estate"). The Estate has been admitted into formal probate before this Court in
Case No. CV 2012-439.
1.2.

The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell

(hereafter "the Trust") was formed and has been administered in the State of Idaho. The acting
successor trustee of the Trust is Toni Johnson (nee Cornell).

II.
2.1.

JURISDICTION & VENUE

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter and the parties thereto pursuant to the

Idaho Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act, Idaho Code§§ 15-8-101 through 15-8-305.
2.2.

This Court is the proper venue for administration of the Trust pursuant to Idaho

Code§ 15-7-202.
2.3.

This case was instituted on July 11, 2012. Since that time, the Trust has not

asserted lack of personal jurisdiction or requested a change of venue.

III.
3.1.

FACTS

Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell created the Trust on November 1, 1996,

a copy of the Trust document is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
3.2.

John Cornell was a beneficiary of the Trust.

3 .3.

As a beneficiary of the Trust, John Cornell held an equitable property interest in

the property of the Trust.
3.4.

Arlie M. Cornell died on November 9, 2008.

3.5.

On August 6, 2009, Michael S. Cornell amended the terms of the Trust from

having John Cornell and Toni Johnson serve as co-trustees of the Trust upon his death, to
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designating Toni Johnson as the sole successor trustee upon his death, a copy of the amendment
is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
3.6.

Michael S. Cornell died on December 15, 2009.

3.7.

Toni Johnson (hereinafter, "Successor Trustee") has been servmg as sole

successor trustee since the death of Michael S. Cornell.
3.8.

On or about January 3, 2007, John Henry Cornell deposited by quitclaim, separate

property into the Trust in the form of Lot 34, Lakeview First Addition, real property adjacent to
real property owned by his parents, Michael S. and Arlie M. Cornell, into the Revocable Family
Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell.
3.9.

John Cornell instituted this action on July 11, 2012 by filing a Petition for

Supervised Administration and Removal of Successor Trustee.
3.10.

John Cornell died on August 20, 2012.

3.11.

On February 15, 2013, this Court dismissed all claims raised by John Cornell,

personally, and granted the Estate twenty (20) days in which to raise the claims of the Estate in
this matter.
3.12.

Under the terms of the Trust, the Trust assets were to be distributed equally to

John Cornell and Toni Johnson upon the death of Michael S. and Arlie M. Cornell.
3.13.

Successor Trustee has not made reasonable efforts to distribute the Trust in a

timely manner, in contravention of her fiduciary duties and statutory duties under Idaho Code
§§ 15-7-301, 15-7-302 & 15-7-305.

3.14.

Despite demands, Successor Trustee has not provided records or any accounting

of her management of the Trust, in contravention of her fiduciary duties and statutory duties
under Idaho Code§§ 15-7-302 & 15-7-303.
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3.15.

Successor Trustee has not created an inventory of the assets in the Trust at any

time during her service as Successor Trustee of the Trust, in contravention of her fiduciary duties
and statutory duties under Idaho Code§§ 15-7-302 & 15-7-303.
3 .16.

Successor Trustee has not kept John Cornell or Petitioner reasonably informed of

the status of the Trust, in contravention of her fiduciary duties and statutory duties under Idaho
Code§§ 15-7-302 & 15-7-303.
3.17.

Successor Trustee has mismanaged the Trust through negligent and inequitable

conduct, in contravention of her fiduciary duties and statutory duties under Idaho Code § § 15-7301 & 15-7-302.
3.18.

Successor Trustee has resided and otherwise occupied and used the real property

belonging to the Trust without accounting to the Trust or paying rent during her tenancy at the
property, in contravention of her contractual, fiduciary and statutory duties and under Idaho
Code§§ 15-7-301 & 15-7-302.
3.19.

Successor Trustee has used assets of the Trust to pay personal expenses, in

contravention of her contractual, fiduciary, and statutory duties under Idaho Code§§ 15-7-301 &
15-7-302.
3.20.

As a result of losses suffered from the Successor Trustee's inequitable conduct,

the Trust holds a creditor's claim against Successor Trustee.
3.21.

As a result of losses suffered from the Successor Trustee's inequitable conduct,

Petitioner holds a creditor's claim against Successor Trustee and the Trust.
3.21.

Successor Trustee converted assets of the Trust into personal assets.

3.22.

As a result of Successor Trustee's conversion, the Trust holds a creditor's claim

against Successor Trustee until such time as restitution is made.

PETITION FOR SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION AND
COURT ORDERED DISTRIBUTION OF TRUST - 4

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
257
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231

3 .23.

As a result of Successor Trustee's inequitable conduct, Successor Trustee holds

assets, personally in constructive trust, for the Estate and/or the Trust.

IV.

LIABILITY

4.1.

Petitioner realleges paragraphs 1-3 above.

4.2.

Upon accepting and undertaking her duties as successor trustee, Successor

Trustee became party to a third-party beneficiary contract charged with the responsibility of
carrying out the terms of the Trust in an equitable, reasonable and timely manner for the
benefit of the third-party beneficiaries named and in compliance with the laws of the State of
Idaho.
4.3.

Upon accepting her duties as successor trustee, Successor Trustee agreed and

undertook to hold assets in Trust for the benefit of the true owner(s). Successor Trustee's
actions constitute breaches of Successor Trustee's fiduciary duties (1) of loyalty toward all
beneficiaries; (2) to act in good faith while administering the Trust; (3) to keep clear and
accurate accounts and adequate records of transactions; (4) to keep beneficiaries informed of
all material facts that might affect their rights under the Trust; (5) to provide beneficiaries an
accounting of the Trust; ( 6) to not engage in self-dealing; (7) to properly care for assets of the
Trust, including its financial records, and (8) to conform administration to the terms of the
Trust.
4.4.

The Trust is entitled to damages pursuant to an action in claim and delivery

under the common law action for conversion and equitable actions of detinue or replevin.
4.5.

Successor Trustee's actions constitute inequitable conduct giving rise to a

constructive trust for all assets (a) obtained by Successor Trustee, personally, through the
inequitable conduct; or (b) diminished from another's interest by the Successor Trustee.
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4.6.

The Trust, on behalf of the beneficiaries, is entitled to damages pursuant to an

action for unjust emichment.
4.7.

The Trust, on behalf of the beneficiaries, is entitled to an accounting and to

enforce the contractual provisions of the Trust instrument in favor of the beneficiaries.
4.8.

The Trust is entitled to relief pursuant to all other causes of action in law or

equity supported by the facts as set forth herein.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests that:
1.

Successor Trustee be ordered to file an inventory of Trust assets and accounting

of management of those assets during her tenure as successor trustee of the Trust.
2.

Successor Trustee be ordered to make restitution to the Trust for damages

caused by Successor Trustee's wrongful conduct.
3.

Upon approval of the inventory and accounting by the Court, Successor Trustee

be ordered to file a proposed distribution of the Trust assets.
4.

Upon approval of the proposed distribution by the Court, Successor Trustee be

ordered to distribute the property by a time certain, as set forth by the Court.
5.

The Court order legal fees and costs incurred by Petitioner be paid by Toni C.

Johnson, personally, or from Toni C. Johnson's share of The Trust assets.
6.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

DATED this 26th day of February, 2013.
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

Theodore 0. Cr;ason, ISB #1563
Attorneys for Petitioner, Kareen Cornell
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of February, 2013, I filed the foregoing
PETITION FOR SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION AND COURT ORDERED
DISTRIBUTION with the Clerk of the Court, and hand-delivered a paper copy to the
following persons:
Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice & Anegon
1212 Idaho Street
P. 0. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501

PETITION FOR SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION AND
COURT ORDERED DISTRIBUTION OF TRUST - 7

Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C.
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
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MEMORANDUM OF TRUST
TRIS AGREEMENT made this
{J'r day of
J{tf i/
, 19'7 'f,,
by and hetw een MIC HAE LS. CORNELL and
ARLIE M. CORNELL, as
Tru stor s and Tru stee s.
WITNESSETH THAT:
l.

Cont empo raneo usly here with Trus tors

Revo cable Livin g Trus t known as
the

"MIC HA.EL

S.

CORNELL

)l- /-< ;0

AND

ARLI E

M,

and Trus tees

CORNELL

have enter ed

REVOCABLE

TRUST

11

into a

dated

2.

This Memo randu m of Trus t is exec uted
as evide nce of the exist ence of the
S. CORNELL AND ARLI E M.
CORNELL REVOCABLE TRUST, the terms
and
cond ition s of whic h are hereb y inco rpor
ated here in by this refer ence .

MICH AEL

3.
Said Trus t Agre emen t gran ts to the Trus
tee all of the powe rs conta ined
in Wes t's Anno tated Cali forn ia Prob ate
Code Secti ons 16,20 0 et seq., all of
. whic h are inco rpora ted here in by this
refer ence .
See Exhi bit "A" attac hed
here to.
4.
Any perso n may rely on· this Memo
randu m of Trus t as proo f of the
exist ence of said Trus t and· is relie
ved of any oblig ation to veri fy that
any
trans actio n ente red into by the Trus
tee is . cons isten t with the terms and
cond ition s of said Trus t.

5.

The Co-S ucce ssor Trus tees are TON IC.
JOHNSON and JOBN H. CORNELL.

IN WITNESS_ WHEREOF, the Trus tors· anct
the Trus tees have signe d this Memo randu
m
of Trus t the day and year firs t abov e
writt en.

;; z ;: :; 7 ~
MICH AELS . CORNELL

ARLI E M. CORNELL

STATE OF CALIFO:RNlA)
)SS

COUNTY OF

Q'..,-"'1 ,f'.)

If-

\\v- .d, (lbo::c'\-+-°"::)

ON
I - q G,
I
BEFORE ME,
PERSONALLY
APPEARED MICHAEL S. CORNELL and ARLI E
M. CORNELL
PERSONALLY KNOWN TO
ME OR __:;i _ PROVED TO ME ON THE BASI
S OF SATISFACTORY EVIDENCE TO BE THE
PERSONS <'WHOSE NAMES ARE SUBSCRIBED TO
TEE WITHIN INSTRUMENT, AND ACKNOWLEDGE
THAT THEY EXECUTED THE SAME IN THEI
R AUTHORIZED CAPACITY, AND THAT BY THEIR
SIGNATURES ON THE INSTRUMENT THE PERSO
NS, OR THE ENTITY UPON BEHALF OF WHICH
THE PERSONS ACTED, EXECU'I'ED THE INSTR
UMENT.

,

WITNESS MY HAND AND OFFIC IAL SEAL

NOTARY PUBLIC

Hurd Thor ilton
Ccr.i;:-i. t;: c-:-.::: - •
"7.il- =No,1 .m r-ueu: :. c::--;.: 1:-.,.,))

r

ORAt,c ~ cou::, ·f
Q
Comm. Exp. Jan. 2.J, 2000 _.
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EXHIBIT "A" TO MEMORAN DUM OF TRUST
SUMMARY OF TRUST POWERS

SELL, CONVEY, EXCHANGE, CONVERT, IMPROVE, REPAIR, PARTITION, DJVIDE,
A)
ALLOT, SUBDIVIDE, CREATE RESTRICTIONS, EASEM:ENTS, OR OTHER SERVITUDE
THEREON, OPERATE AND CONTROL;
B)

LEASE FOR TERMS WITHIN OR BEYOND THE TERM OF ANY TRUST PROVIDED FOR

IN THIS DECLARATION AND FOR ANY PURPOSE, INCLUDING EXPLORATION FOR AND
REMOVAL OF GAS, OIL AND OTHER MINERALS;

ENCUMBER OR HYPOTHECATE FOR ANY TRUST PURPOSE BY MORTGAGE, DEED
C)
OF TRUST, PLEDGE OR OTHERWISE;

CARRY INSURANCE OF SUCH KINDS AND IN SUCH AMOUNTS AT THE EXPENSE OF
THE TRUSTS PROVIDED FOR IN THIS DECLARATION AS THE TRUSTEE MAY DEEM

D)

ADVISABLE;
COMMENCE OR DEFEND AT THE EXPENSE OF ANT TRUST PROVIDED FOR IN THIS
E)
DECLARATION SUCH LITIGATION WITH RESPECT TO ANY SUCH TRUST OR ANY PROPERTY
OF THE TRUST ESTATE AS TRUSTEE MAY DEEM ADVISABLE.
SO LONG AS. THE ORJGINAL TRUSTEE OR TRUSTEES ARE MANAGING THE TRUST,
F)
THEY MAY INVEST AND REINVEST IN COMMON OR PREFERRED STOCKS, SECURITIES,
INVESTMENT TRUSTS, BONDS AND OIBER PROPERTY, REAL OR PERSONAL, FOREIGN OR
DOMESTIC,. INCLUDING ANY UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN ANY ONE OR MORE COMMON
TRUST FUNDS, WHETHER OR NOT SUCH INVESTMENTS BE OF THE CHARACTER
PERMISSIBLE FOR INVESTMENTS BY FIDUCIARIES UNDER ANY APPLICABLE LAW;
VOTJ1_ :SY PROXY OR .OTHERWISE, IN SUCH MANNER AS TRUSTEE MAY
G)
DETERMINE TO BE IN TifE BEST INTERESTS OF THE TRUST;
PAY ANY ASSESSMENTS OR OTHER CHARGES LEVIED ON ANY STOCK OR OTHER
SECURlTY HELD BY TRUSTEE PURSUANT TO THlS DECLARATION;

H)

EXERCISE OR EXERCISE AS TRUSTEE MAY DEEM BEST ANY SUBSCRIPTION,
I)
CONVERSION OR OTB.EK KlGHT::i UK UYnuN;:;;
PARTJCIPATE IN ANY PLANS OR PROCEEDINGS FOR 1HE FORECLOSURE,
REORGANIZATION, CONSOLIDATION, MERGER OR LIQUIDATION OF ANY CORPORATION
OR ORGANIZATION THAT HAS ISSUED SECURITIES HELD BY THE TRUSTEE OR WILL ISSUE
SECURITIES TO BE HELD BY TRUSTEE IN TRUST;

J)

K)

ENFORCE ANY MORTGAGE OR DEED OF TRUST OR PLEDGE BY TRUSTEE IN TRUST;

RELEASE WITH OR WITHOUT
CLAIMS;
CONSJDERATION AND OTHERWISE ADJUST ANY
,/
DISTRIBUTE GIFTS OF UP TO $10,000 PER YEAR PER DONEE OUT OF PRINCIPAL OR
M)
INTEREST OR IN ANY PROPORTION OF THE TWO TI-MT THE TRUSTEE, IN HlS SOLE
DJSCRETION, DEEMS ADVISABLE;

L)

COMPROMISE,

SUBMIT

TO ARBITRATION,
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N)
INVEST IN AND · GUARANTEE A BUSINESS. OR TRUSTEE OF THE TRUST
CAPITALIZING ON THE BUSINESS VENTURE;
0)
TAKE ALL SUCH PRGeEEDINGS ; AND EXERCISE ALL SUCH RJGHTS AND
PRJVILEGES AS COULD BEDONE, TAKEN OR EXERCISED BY AN ABSOLUTE O\VNER OF THE
TRUST PROPERTY;
P)
SO LONG AS BOTH OF THE ORJGINAL TRUSTEES ARE SERVING AS TRUSTEES
HEREUNDER, EITHER OF THEM SHALL HA VE THE POWER TO BIND THE TRUST IN ANY AND
ALL TRANSACTION S, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO (1) COLLECTING RECEIPTS; (2)
PAYING DlSBURSEMEN TS; (3) SECURlNG ASSETS; (4) WRJTING CHECKS AND MAKING
WJTHDRA WALS FROM BANK ACCOUNTS; AND (5) PURCHASING, SELLING AND PLEDGING
SECURITIES AND OTHER PROPERTY;

Q)
THE TRUSTEE IS EMPOWERED TO BUY, SELL, TRADE AND DEAL IN OPTlONS,
PRECIOUS METALS, STOCKS, BONDS AND SECURITIES OF ALL MATURE (INCLUDING
"SHORT' SALES AND SPECULATIVE OPTION TRANSACTIONS;
R)
HE SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ENTER THE SAFE DEPOSIT BOX
IN TRUSTORS' NAMES, INDIVIDUALLY OR AS TRUSTEES OF THE TRUST, AND REMOVE THE
CONTENTS THEREOF;
S)
THE TRUSTEE SHALL HAVE TI:IE POWER TO BORROW MONEY FOR ANY TRUST
PURPOSE (INCLUDING FROM Tiffi PROBATE ESTATE FOR THE PURPOSE OF PAYING TAXES)
ON SUCH TERMS AND CONDITIONS AS THE TRUSTEE MAY DEEM PROPER FROM ANY
PERSON, FIRM OR CORPORATION ;
T)
THE TRUSTEE IS AUTHORIZED TO LOAN OR ADVANCE TRUSTEE'S OWN FUNDS TO
ANY TRUST PROVIDED FOR IN THIS DECLARATION FOR ANY TRUST PURPOSE AND TO
CHARGE FOR SUCH LOAN OR ADVANCE TO THE TRUST;
U)
THE TRUSTEE IS. AUTHORIZED TO PURCHASE SECURITIES OR OTHER PROPERTY
FROM AND TO MAKE LOANS AND. AfJV AN CEMENTS FROM TIIE PROBATE ESTA TE WITH OR
WITifOUT SECURITY TO- THE EXECUTOR
OR OTHER REPRESENTAT
IVE OF THE ESTATE OF
.
I •
EITHER TRUSTOR; AND . ·
;

V)
THE TRUSTEE MAY HOLD SECURITIES OR OTHER PROPERTY HELD BY TRUSTEE IN
TRUST PURSUANT TO THIS DECLARATION
IN TRUSTEE'S NAME AS TRUSTEE UNDER THIS
.

DECLA_R.JI.T!ON, IN TRUSTEE'S O\VN N./'Jvffi V-!IlliOUT

'

A. DESIGNATION SHOVvTI,,;G IT TO BE

TRUSTEE UNDER THIS DECLARATION, IN THE NAME OF TRUSTEE'S NOMINEE, OR THE
TRUSTEE MAY HOLD SUCH SECURITIES UNREGISTERED IN SUCH CONDITION TBA T
OWNERSHIP WILL PASS BY DELIVERY;
'

W)

THE TRUSTEE HAS THE AUTHORJTY TO EXECUTE ANY POWER OF ATTORNEY

FORM FOR ANY ACCOUNT HELD IN 1RUSTORS' NAMES IN ANY BANK;
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Exhibit
FIRST AMENDMENf TO
THE REVOCABLE TRUST OF
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL
This First Amendment to THE REVOCABLE TRUST OF MJCHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE
M. CORNELL, dated this 6th day of August, 2009, is made by Michael S. Cornell, as Surviving
Grantor and Surviving Trustee of THE REVOCABLE TRUST OF MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND
ARLIE M. CORNELL and acce1-1ted and consented to by tvgCHAEL S. CORNELL, acting in his
capacity as Surviving Grantor and Surviving Trustee, on this

6th

day of August, 2009.

By agreement with the Trustees dated November 1, 1996, Grantors, Michael S. Cornell
and Arlie M. Cornell created and placed into effect THE REVOCABLE_TR1JST.OF. MICHAELS .
.. ···---~:· .. ,. '·-~·
·--·-··· . ----- .. -·. --·--·-·
.. ··- __:,.. -

+.----· -·-

----· -- . .

·-

----····

.

. . ·---·· .,

CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL; Arlie M. Cornell has passed leaving Michael S. Cornell as
Surviving Grantor and Surviving Trustee; and as Surviving Grantor the said Michael S. Cornell
desires to amenq said trust agreement, and the Surviving Trustee is willing to accept and
consent to such amendment.
NOW, THEREFORE, Surviving
Grantor and Surviving Trustee·agree as follows:
.. _, ...
l-\rticle Nine Section 9.01 Trustees SECOND of THE REVOCABLE TRUST OF MJCHAEL S.
CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL shall be amended to read as follows:
SECOND: At the death or incapacity of the undersigned, TONIC. JOHNSON shall act as
Trustee/Successor Trustee. In the event that TONIC. JOHNSON is unavailable or unwilling to
act, then in that event,JOHN HENRY CORNELL shall act as Trustee/Successor Trustee.
All other terms and provisions of THE REVOCABLE TRUST OF MICHAELS. CORNELL
AND ARLIE M. CORNELL shall remain in full force and 'effect.

DATED this 6th day of August, 2009.

/~~J2xJJ/,~,/JY(/
MICHAELS. CORNELL
Surviving Grantor

/
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)

STATE OF IDAHO

) ss.
)

County of Clearwater

, 2009, before me, a notary public in.and
On this C_;·\J" day of >AL1;=\;-.'):t
for the State of Idaho, personally appea'.-red Michael S. Cornell, a single person, known or
identified to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within insfrument , and
acknowled ged to me that he executed the same .
.

,,\\.\l_lOU,, .

.. !f~ff,y9-~to set my ,,hand and affixed my official seal the
IN WI~'NE~S WH~~; ~-~
;
. .
day and year m this cerh~~O '~(~~V.~ {en. · l\
·
\L
r\~
i/\
l
r--1.
.
.
.·
.
..
_
_ -..J , ~
\J__ •\ A..Jl-,-c''-X " . l 2 --z._,.~"
·•,:. •._::
- . ·• .-; ::<=<
- <e
2 ..--~
• •• .._,;,.,..,-.--.
=
No~ry Publi~_:1 a11d for Idaho.
-:;_ • . ·- a<..\G./6 ~
Res1dmg at: 0 rtr(. . . ,,,.-..,-~ . . _
-:;,. · •. PU :· · .·)' :J::. . . .
;._,f'· ~~~ . " Commission E:iqJfres: 2. 2 C.r · l. .c \ c,

=

. . . ..-.,/?~,-;' •
./,1
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I
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ACCEPTED this

••

- '

I

,

2009 ..

{)

MICHAEL s. CORNELL
Surviving Trustee
STATE Of IDAHO

)

County of Clearwater

)

)ss~

.

.

(:

'tl"

I
, 2009, before me, a notary public
day of ~~ \.J-.--o--+On this lC
in and for the State of Idaho, personalfy appea d Michael S. Cornell, known or identified to
me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within insfrument as Trustee for THE
REVOCABLE TRUST OF MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL, and acknowled zed to
me that he executed the same as such Trustee for TrIE REVOCABLE TRUST OF MICHAEL S.
CORNELL AND ARLIE Ivi. CORNELL.

WH~~qf,!\Bfle

hereu:1to set my hand and affixed my official seal the
IN ~ S
day and year rn this certi~~ r,IJ~~e written.
·\
,, 0 •. •·.· ... .:.of~ /,-

$:·~oiARv··.~,.i;:S
j !C(":
~- ·. · =
.

::

~ ·· . ~·"-

:, · ·=

/ O~
-:;,.~ ·($\·• ~..PUB\.\O
,·· .-!W • .;t- ~
0
:O~
·
•
·
·
,....,/ /~~·1, (:; Of' \ .. ,,

_I

r

f\f\

,

9-~\.Uy-·~

\

'-

l~

~7_

<!)l-+~"- <'' . ·-

.>Now.ry Public in and for Idaho.
·,,-c,
/C:.H,l'J-~,
at: l_
Residin<:r
- ~
0
Commission Expires: -l ·1L , , ·
<('

·1 0 \ C\

,,,, fJ ,ii'\\"''\..
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1
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,~.t J~:/5 o•clock
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Karin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewjston, ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813

P ,'11
WY'r,e. 13 ,.,,J

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, fN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

)

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND

)

ATTORNEY FEES

COMES NOW Karin Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., on behalf of the
Respondent Toni Johnson, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 15-8-208 and Rule 54(d), 54(e)(l)
and 54(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, submit the following items of costs to which
the Court may order to be awarded to Respondent Toni Johnson as follows:

Costs (filing fee)

$66.00

Reasonable attorney fees to be
fixed by the Court as set out in
the Affidavit for Attorney Fees
filed herewith (specifically does
not include costs related to
probate of Estate of John Cornell
or filings by Estate/Kareen Cornell
after dismissal of original
petition).

$6,422.50

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
AND ATTORNEY FEES

1
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03-01-'13 12:14 FROM-JB &C

2087469553

T-355 P0003/0010 F-085

DATED this 1st day of March, 2013.

JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

KARIN SEUBERT being first duly sworn and on oath, deposes and says:
That she is the attorney for Respondent Toni Johnson and as such is well informed as to
the costs, disbursements and attorney fees of Toni Johnson; that to the best of her knowledge and
belief, the items in the Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees are correct and that the said
disbursements have been necessarily incurred in said action and are being claimed in compliance
with Rule 54(d) and 54(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this 1st day of March, 2013.

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE. )
STATE OF IDAHO,

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 1st day of March, 2013.

(SEAL)

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
AND ATTORNEY FEES

2
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03-01-'13 12:14 FROM-JB &C

2087469553

T-355 P0004/0010 F-085

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
AND ATTORNEY FEES was, this 1st day of March,
2013.

/

hand-delivered by providing a
copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;
mailed, postage pre-paid,
by first class mail; or

transmitted via facsimile
transmitted via e-mail
to:

Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin; Rice and Anegon
1212 Idaho St,
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501

Theodore 0. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl

1219 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

By_____.~-'-'---~~-KARIN SEUBERT

.MEMORANDUM OF COSTS

AND ATTORNEY FEES

3
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2087469553
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·? M
. _/J : l!Jo'clock

Karin Seubert

JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813

C..O..\" r I €...

13 I l"cl_

6 -·

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

)

In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

STATE OF IDAHO

)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
ATIORNEY FEES

)
: ss

County of Nez Perce )
KARIN SEUBERT, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That I am an attorney duly admitted to practice law before the Courts of the State of

Idaho. The finn of Jones, Brower and Callery has been retained by Toni Johnson to defend
against the Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee dated July 11, 2012. I
am well informed as to the costs, disbursements and attorney fees of Toni Johnson in defending
against said Petition; that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the items in Exhibits A and B

to this Affidavit are correct and that the said disbursements have been necessarily incurred in this
action and are being claimed in compliance with Rule 54(d) and 54(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of

Civil Procedure.

I make this Affidavit on behalf of Toni Johnson and in support of the

AFFIDAVlT IN SUPPORT OF
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
AND ATTORNEY FEES

1

269

7

03-01-'13 12:14 FROM-JB & C

2087469553

T-355 P0006/0010 F-085

Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees and, in particular; in support of a request for costs in
the sum of $66.00 and for attorney's fees in the sum of $6,422.50, for a total of Six Thousand
Four Hundred Eighty Eight and 50/100 Dollars ($6,488.50).
To date either I have performed the following professional services in connection with
said Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee dated July 11, 2012:
See Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part hereof.
That the attorney time of the office for Karin Seubert was charged at the rate of $150,00
per hour. Said rate is within the rates prevailing in the Second Judicial District for the State of

Idaho.
In my opinion, based upon the appropriate factors to be considered by the Court,
confirmation of $6;488.50 to Toni Johnson for costs and attorney fees necessarily expended in
the good faith defense of this action is reasonable.
Said figure specifically excludes amounts incurred for the probate of the estate of John
Henry Cornell, deceased, or in defending against the Petition by Kareen Cornell as Personal
Representative of the Estate of John Remy Cornell and as Surviving Spouse of John Henry
Cornell, Deceased Beneficiary of the Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie
M. Cornell for Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution filed February 26,
2013 and related filings and discovery filed prior to and since the filing of said second Petition.
Additionally, to date, this firm has advanced the following costs for a filing fee in
connection with the defense of the Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of
Trustee dated July 11, 2012:
s·ee Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof.

In my opinion, based on the appropriate factors to be considered by the Cou11, an award
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of Sixty Six Dollars ($66.00) to Toni Johnson for costs necessarily expended in the good faith
defense of this action is reasonable.
DATED this 1st day of March, 2013.
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P .L.L.C.

By_~P==--~c~~~K.ARlNSEUBERT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY
FEES was, this 1st day of March, 2013, handdelivered by providing a copy to Valley Messenger

Service addressed to:
Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice and Anegon
1212 Idaho St.

P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501
Theodore 0. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl
1219 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

By~~------'.~=-----KARIN SEUBERT
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EXHIBIT A: Attorney Fees

12/10/2012

Service Provided
Initial consultation.
Reviewed pleadings and trust documents. Prepared
notice of appearance, motion to continue.
Reviewed correspondence. Research. Telephone
conferences with client and Aherin.
Multiple telephone conferences re: John Cornell's
death. Letter to Aherin, Attended telephonic
motion hearing.
Telephone conference with client.
Telephone conference with client.
Research. Prepared Motion to Dismiss and notice.
Reviewed Motion to Vacate. Telephone conference
with Aherin.
Telephone conference with client. Confirming
letter.
Attended telephonic status conference. Telephone
conference with client.
Reviewed deposition notice. Telephone conference
with Aherin.
Research. Prepared Motion for Protective Order
and related documents; correspondence.
Telephone conference with client.
Telephone conferences with Aherin and Court.
·
Telephone conference with client.
Protection
for
Motion
Preparation for and attended
Order telephonically.
Telephone conference with client. Confirming
letter.
Telephone conference with Ted Creason.
Research. Prepared Memorandum of Law.
Reviewed response brief and affidavits. Research.
Research. Started reply brief.
Research. Completed reply brief
Telephone conference with client.
Traveled to/from Orofino. Attended hearing on
Motion to Dismiss, which was continued.
Telephone conference with Creason's office.
Correspondence.
Telephone conference with Creason. Reviewed

12/10/2012
12/14/2012

Telephone conference with Creason.
Telephone conference with Creason.

Date

8/12/2012
8/15/2012

8/20/2012
8/21/2012

8/27/2012
8/29/2012
9/14/2012
9/27/2012
9/28/2012
10/1/2012
10/4/2012
10/12/2012

10/15/2012
10/16/2012
. 10/16/2012

10/17/2012
10/17/2012
10/30/2012
10/30/2012
11/14/2012
11/15/2012

11/19/2012
11/21/2012
1 I/27/2012
11/28/2012

1.50
2.00

Fee
$100.00 (flat fee)
$300.00

1.00

$150.00

2.15

$322.50

0.25

$37.50

Time

No charge
0.25

$300.00
$37.50

0.50

$75.00

0.50

$75.00

0.25

$37.50

1.50

$225.00

0.25
0.25
0.25

$37.50
$37.50
$37.50

1.00

$150.00

0.75

$112.50

0.25
3.00

$37.50
$450.00
$300.00

2.00

2.00
No charge

4.00

$600.00

No charge
3.00

$450.00

No charge.

1.00

$150.00

0.25
0.25

$37.50
$37.50

file.
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Service Provided
Telephone conference with client.
Telephone conference with client.

Time
0.25
Hearing 1.00

Fee
$37.50
$150.00

preparation.
1/8/2013
1/10/2013
1/11/2013
1/22/2013
li22/2013
1/23/2013
2/1/2013
2/6/2013
2/6/2013

2/19/2013
3/1/2013

Attended hearing on
Travel to/from Orofino.
Motion to Dismiss.
Telephone conferences with Aherin and Creason.
Conference call with Court, Aherin and Creason.
Telephone conference with client.,
Reviewed Creason memoranduni. Research.
Letter to client. Research.
Research. Prepared reply brief.
Prepared for second hearing on Motion to Dismiss.
Travel to/from Orofino. Attended second hearing
on Motion to Dismiss.
Reviewed Judgment and Memorandum Decision.
Prepared Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees

4.00

$600.00

1.00

$150.00

0.50
0.25
0.50

$75.00
$37.50
$75.00
$150.00
$600.00
$150.00

1.00
4.00
1.00
3.00

$150.00

No charge
1.00

$150.00

TOTAL

$6,422.50

and related documents.
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EXHIBIT B: Costs
Cost Incurred

Amount

Filing Fee

$66.00

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES

274

;J-Ji;A

0 4 2013
Karin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M .
CORNELL.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

MOTION TO DISMISS

Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attorney ofrecord, Karin Seubert of Jones,
Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), hereby moves this honorable Court
for an order dismissing the Petition by Kareen Cornell as Personal Representative of the Estate of
John Henry Cornell and as Surviving Spouse of John Henry Cornell, Deceased Beneficiary of the
Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell for Supervised Administration
and Court Ordered Distribution filed February 26, 2013 in the above-entitled action.
This Motion is made on the basis that Petitioner Kareen Cornell, as personal representative
of the Estate of John Henry Cornell, deceased, has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. Respondent reserves the right to submit supplemental briefing and authority in support of
her Motion in advance of the hearing on this Motion in accordance with I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3).

MOTION TO DISMISS

- 1275

DATED this 1st day of March, 2013 .
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

t~~ L

By

Karin Seubert
Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO
DISMISS was, this 1st day of March, 2013,

~hand-delivered by providing a
copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;
mailed, postage pre-paid,
by first class mail; or
transmitted via facsimile
to:
Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice and Anegon
1212 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501
Theodore O. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl
1219 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

By

~ ~
Karin Seubert
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Karin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attorney of record, Karin Seubert of Jones,
Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(c), hereby moves this honorable Court for
an order protecting Respondent from Notice of Taking Deposition of Toni C. Johnson dated
February 12, 2013, attached hereto as Exhibit A, and Petition, Personal Representative of the Estate

of John Cornell, Kareen Cornell's First Set of Interrogatories and First Set of Requests for
Production and Requests for Admission Propounded to Respondent dated February 12, 2013
attached hereto as Exhibit B.
This Motion is made on the basis that said discovery unreasonably subjects Respondent to
undue burden and expense, specifically incurring attorney's fees in preparing for and attending said
deposition and responding to said discovery, where it remains in dispute whether Petitioner Kareen
Cornell has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Petition by Kareen Cornell as

Personal Representative of the Estate ofJohn Henry Cornell and as Surviving Spouse ofJohn Henry
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
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Cornell, deceased beneficiary of the Revocable Family Trust of Michael C. Cornell and Arlie M
Cornell for Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution ("Second Petition") is
largely duplicative of the Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee ("First
Petition") filed by John Henry Cornell, which this Court has dismissed and concluded that such
claims did not survive the death of John Henry Cornell.
As the record of the case reflects, this is not new territory in this action. The current posture
of the case is the same as was previously before the Court in October 2012, when this Court entered
its Order of Protection from Discovery on October 17, 2012 protecting Respondent from discovery
then sought by attorney Darrel Aherin representing (then deceased) John Henry Cornell.
To that end, although the Court had made an oral ruling in open court on February 5, 2013,
the written Judgment for Dismissal and Memorandum Opinion were not entered until February 15,
2013 - after the subject deposition had been propounded. This Court's Order of Protection from

Discovery dated October 17, 2012 remains by its terms in effect until the decision itself was entered.
While said Order specifically references the Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum of Toni Johnson
dated October 3, 2012, the clear intent of said Order was to suspend discovery until it was
determined whether any claims had survived the death of John Henry Cornell. Therefore, the
premature nature of the discovery now at issue violated the intent of this Court's Order ofProtection

from Discovery dated October 17, 2012.
Additionally, the discovery at issue was propounded before now Petitioner Kareen Cornell
had even filed her Second Petition on February 26, 2013. At that time, no pleadings of any party
were pending before the Court in this action. As such, Petitioner Kareen Cornell had no authority to
propound discovery as discovery may only be obtained regarding "any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." While Respondent acknowledges
that depositions may be taken by an expected adverse party, the requirements ofl.R.C.P. 27 were not
complied with in this instance.
For these reasons, Respondent requests entry of a court order protecting Respondent from

MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
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discovery, specifically including the Notice and Requests attached hereto, until such time as the
Court enters a decision on the pending Motion to Dismiss dated March 1, 2013 .
Oral argument is requested.
DATED this 1st day of March, 2013.
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

By--+-~Karin
~
~
~
~
~~
Seubert
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER was, this 1st day of March,
2013,
/

hand-delivered by providing a
copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;
mailed, postage pre-paid,
by first class mail; or
transmitted via facsimile

to:
Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice and Anegon
1212 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501
Theodore 0. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl
1219 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

By ~ ~
Karin Seubert
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
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Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC
1219 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-1516
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231
Attorneys for Personal Representative
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell

BROWER 2.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION
OF TONI C. JOHNSON

----------------)
TO: RESPONDENT, TONI C. JOHNSON, TRUSTEE OF THE REVOCABLE
FAMILY TRUST OF MICHAELS . CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL,
AND TO KARIN SEUBERT, HER ATTORNEY
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney for Kareen Cornell, Personal
Representative of the Estate of John C. Cornell, will take the testimony, upon oral examination,
of Toni C. Johnson before K&K Reporting, certified shorthand reporters of the State ofldaho, or
in the case of their inability to act or be present, before some other person authorized to
administer oaths, on Wednesday, lv1arch~22, 2013, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. of that day and
thereafter from day to day as the taking of the deposition may be adjourned, at the offices of
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC, 1219 Idaho Street, Lewiston, Idaho 83501.
This deposition shall be taken pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION
OF TONI C. JOHNSON - 1

Creason, Moore, Do
P.O. Drawer 835, 1o11»:,L1L\lll,1'1;1-J.
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (20
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DATED this ,z'1.!fiay of February, 2013.
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

Theodore 0. Creason, ISB # 1563
Attorneys for Kareen Cornell, Personal
Representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this (C'day of February, 2013, a copy of the foregoing
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION OF TONI C. JOHNSON was served by the method
indicated below and addressed to the following:
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C.
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
Keith and Kristi Evans
Certified Court Reporters
P. 0. Box 574
Lewiston ID 83501
Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice & Anegon
1212 Idaho Street
P. 0. Drawer 698
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
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Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563

NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION
OF TONIC. JOHNSON - 2
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Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC
1219 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-1516
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231
Attorneys for Personal Representative
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
.)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

PETITIONER, PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE
OF JOHN CORNELL, KAREEN
CORNELL'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND FIRST SET
OF REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
PROPOUNDED TO RESPONDENT

----------------)

TO: RESPONDENT, TONI C. JOHNSON, TRUSTEE OF THE REVOCABLE
FAMILY TRUST OF MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL,
AND TO KARIN SEUBERT, HER ATTORNEY
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that petitioner Kareen Cornell, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell, requires respondent to answer the following
Interrogatories, within thirty (30) days from the date of service herein, pursuant to Rule 33 of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure; that said Interrogatories shall be answered separately and fully
under oath in writing and said answers shall contain the composite knowledge which is available
to respondent personally or through her attorney, agents, officers, directors, employees, insurers,
PETITIONER'S FIRST SET OF
DISCOVERY REQUESTS - 1

Creason, Moore, D.oli.ken &:Geitll, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231
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or accountants; that said Interrogatories shall be deemed to be continuing, and if respondent or
her attorney discovers additional information as to the matter inquired of in these Interrogatories
between the time the answers are made and the time of trial, supplemental answers should be
made informing petitioner Kareen Cornell and her attorney as to the newly discovered
information prior to trial.
Pursuant to Rule 34 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner Kareen Cornell, as
Personal Representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell, requires that respondent produce
and/or permit the authorized representatives of said petitioner to inspect and copy the documents
and things requested herein on March 29, 2012, at 2:00 p.m., at the offices of Creason, Moore,
Dokken & Geidl, PLLC, 1219 Idaho Street, Lewiston, Idaho 83501, or at such other time and
place convenient to counsel for the petitioner prior thereto.
Petitioner Kareen Cornell, as Personal Representative of the Estate of John Henry
Cornell, requires that respondent respond to the following Requests for Admission, within thirty
(30) days from the date of service herein, pursuant to Rule 36 of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure.

I. GENERALPROCEDURES
You are requested to produce all documents in your possession, custody, or
control that are described below. In so doing, please furnish documents that are in the possession
of your employees, attorneys, insurers, accountants, or agents, or that are otherwise subject to
your custody or control. All documents that respond, in whole or in part, to any portion of the
production requests set forth below shall be produced in their entirety, INCLUDING ALL
ATTACHMENTS AND ENCLOSURES.
1.

2.
(a)
(b)
addressee(s),
pages;
( c)

When identifying a document, specifically state separately the following for each:
The type of document (e.g., letter, interoffice memo, etc.);
Information sufficient to identify the document, including its date, the name of the
the name of the signor(s), the title or heading of the document and the number of
The identity of the person or persons to whom copies were sent;

PETITIONER'S FIRST SET OF
DISCOVERY REQUESTS - 2
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The present or last known location of the original of the document or, if that is
(d)
unavailable, the most legible copy; and
If any document was, but is no longer in your possession, custody or control, state
(e)
what disposition was made of it and the reason for such disposition.
When identifying a person, furnish information separately for each individual
3.
sufficient to identify and locate the person, including, to the extent that the information is
available, the full name and present or last known address of the person, together with the person
or entity by whom said person is employed or with whom he or she is affiliated and his or her
position therein.
IF YOU CONTEND THAT ANY OF THE DOCUMENTS SOUGHT BY THIS
4.
REQUEST ARE PRIVILEGED OR OTHERWISE PROTECTED FROM PRODUCTION IN
WHOLE OR IN PART OR IF YOU OTHERWISE OBJECT TO ANY OF THESE REQUESTS,
STATE SEPARATELY FOR EACH SUCH DOCUMENT THE REASONS FOR EACH
OBJECTION OR NON-PRODUCTION AND IDENTIFY EACH DOCUMENT WITHHELD
FROM PRODUCTION BY ITS AUTHOR, DATE, RECIPIENT OR RECIPIENTS, ALL
INDIVIDUALS WHO RECEIVED COPIES OF THE DOCUMENT AND THE GENERAL
SUBJECT MATTER.
If you object to any part of a request for production, produce all documents
5.
responding to the request to which you do not object and, as to each part to which you do object,
set forth the basis for the objection and the documents being withheld pursuant thereto.

You must respond under oath to these discovery requests within thirty (30) days
6.
of the date on which they were served.
THESE REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION ARE CONTINUING. IN THE
7.
EVENT YOU DISCOVER FURTHER INFORMATION OR DOCUMENTATION THAT
ALTERS, MODIFIES, DELETES OR AUGMENTS THE ANSWERS GIVEN NOW OR ANY
TIME HEREAFTER, YOU ARE TO PROVIDE SUCH INFORMATION BY
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS AND/OR PRODUCTION OF SUCH DOCUMENTS.
II. DEFINITIONS

For purposes of these discovery requests, the following terms shall have the meanings set
forth:
AND or OR mean AND/OR, with the singular form being deemed to include the
1.
plural and vice versa.
DOCUMENT or DOCUMENTS is used in the broadest possible sense and
2.
means, writings of every kind or character pertaining to the designated subject matter, including,
without limitation, the original and any copy or draft, regardless of origin or location, of any
book, pamphlet, periodical, letter, memorandum, diary, file, note, calendar, newspaper,
PETITIONER'S FIRST SET OF
DISCOVERY REQUESTS - 3
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magazine, statement, bill, invoice, order, policy, telegram, correspondence, summary, receipt,
opinion, investigation statement or report, schedule, manual, financing statement, audit, tax
return, articles of incorporation, bylaws, stock book, minute book, agreement, contract, deed,
security agreement, mortgage, deed of trust, title or other insurance policy, report, record, study,
handwritten note, map, drawing, working paper, chart, paper, index, tape, microfilm, data sheet,
data processing card, computer printout, computer program, check, bank statement, passbook, or
any other written, typed, printed, photocopied, dittoed, mimeographed, telecopied, faxed,
recorded, transcribed, punched, taped, filmed, photographic or graphic matter, however
produced. DOCUMENT or DOCUMENTS includes the file and folder tabs associated with
each document as above-described, all correspondence transmitting such documents or
explaining or commenting on the contents thereof, and all working or supporting papers.
IDENTIFY, IDENTITY or IDENTIFICATION means (a) when used with
3.
reference to a natural person, to state his or her full name, present home address, present business
address, present home and business telephone numbers, and present or last known position
and/or business affiliation; (b) when used with reference to an entity, such as a partnership (either
general or limited), joint venture, trust corporation, to state the full legal name of such entity,
each trade name under which such entity does business, the entity's telephone number and the
identity of the chief operating officer, manager, trustee or other principal representative or
managing agent or agents; and ( c) when used with reference to documents, state specifically (i)
the type of document involved (e.g., letter, interoffice memorandum, etc.), the date it was
prepared, the preparer, all distributees, its title or the heading and the number of pages; and (ii)
the identity of the custodian or other person last known to have possession of the document
together with the present or last known location of the document.
PERSON or PERSONS refers to any natural person or any entity other than a
4.
natural person including, but not limited to, any business entity whether a sole proprietorship,
corporation, partnership, limited partnership, association, joint venture, co-venture, and any other
legally recognized entity of any description whatever, as well as all divisions, departments,
affiliates, subsidiaries, or other subunits of the foregoing entities.
RELATING TO or RELATE TO means pertinent, relevant, or material to,
5.
evidencing, having a bearing on, concerning, affecting, discussing, dealing with considering or
otherwise relating in any manner whatsoever to the subject matter of the inquiry.
STATEMENT refers to any oral, written, stenographic, electronic or recorded
6.
declaration of any kind or description.
DEFENDANTS refers to the defendants Rob Vance and Becky Vance, either
7.
collectively or individually, unless otherwise specifically indicated.

PETITIONER'S FffiST SET OF
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III. INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
& REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Set forth the following as to all assets held by the Trust
during the time which you have served as a Trustee (whether joint or sole), including, but not
limited to, assets which have since been consumed or transferred during administration and
assets which have been generated or acquired during administration.
(a)

Description of asset;

(b)

Location of asset;

(c)

Estimated fair market value of asset; and

(d)

Any and all administrative action taken with regard to asset.

ANSWER:

INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Set forth all actions taken by you to distribute the assets of
the Trust during the time which you have served as a Trustee (whether joint or sole) of the Trust.
ANSWER:

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1:

Please produce copies of all financial

accountings of the Trust, whether created before or during the time which you have served as a
Trustee.
RESPONSE:

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2: Please produce a copy of a current financial
accounting of the Trust.
PETITIONER'S FIRST SET OF
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RESPONSE:

INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Set forth all facts regarding the manner in which the the

accountings produced in response to Requests for Production Nos. 2 & 3 were generated.
ANSWER:

INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Set forth the name and contact information for any and all

persons assisting with the accountings produced in Response to Requests for Production Nos.
2&3 and those persons assisting with the creation or review of information upon which those
accountings were based.
ANSWER:

INTERROGATORY NO. 5:

With respect to those assets which have since been

consumed or transferred during administration and assets which have been generated or acquired
during administration, please set forth the following:
(a)

The date the asset was consumed, transferred, generated or acquired;

(b)

Name, address and telephone nun1ber of the person to whom the property was

transferred or sold, or from whom property was acquired;
(c)

The sales price or consideration for the asset; and

(d)

Name, address and telephone number of any persons with personal knowledge

regarding the facts set forth in your answers to (a)-(d).
ANSWER:

PETITIONER'S FIRST SET OF
DISCOVERY REQUEST S - 6

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3:

Please produce a copy of all written

documents evidencing the sale or transfer of the property referred to in the preceding
interrogatory.

RESPONSE:

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: Please produce a copy of all correspondence
between you and the decedent, John Henry Cornell, including correspondence through which you
advised him of the state of Trust assets and your administration of the Trust.

RESPONSE:

INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Do you intend 'to rely on any statement, whether oral or
written, given by Maragaret Watkins or Kareen Cornell, or any of their representatives or agents
to support any of your claims or defenses? If your answer is in the affirmative, please state:
(a)

The name, address and telephone number of the person making the statement;

(b)

The date and place the statement was made;

(c)

The name, address and telephone number of the person to whom the statement

was made;
(d)

The name, address and telephone number of each person who was present when

the statement was made;
(e)

If the statement was oral, please briefly describe the content of the statement.

ANSWER:

PETITIONER'S FIRST SET OF
DISCOVERY REQUESTS - 7

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P .0. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5:

Please produce any and all statements

referred to in the preceding interrogatory, whether in written or electronic format.

RESPONSE:

INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

Do you intend to rely on statement, whether oral or

or
written, given by the decedent, John Henry Cornell, or any of the decedent's representatives
please
agents to support any of your claims or defenses? If your answer is in the affirmative,
state:
(a)

The name, address and telephone number of the person making the statement;

(b)

The date and place the statement was made;

(c)

The name, address and telephone number of the person to whom the statement

was made;
(d)

The name, address and telephone number of each person who was present when

the statement was made;
( e)

If the statement was oral, please briefly describe the content of the statement.

ANSWER:

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6:

Please produce any and all statements

referred to in the preceding interrogatory, whether in written or electronic format.

RESPONSE:

INTERROGATORY NO. 8:

If you, your attorney, or any other person, firm, or

at trial
corporation acting on your behalf consulted with or engaged any experts you intend to call
PETITIONER'S FIRST SET OF
DISCOVERY REQUESTS - 8

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231
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in connection with this litigation, please fully identify each such expert. For each such expert,
state the following:
(a)

Set forth in full and complete detail the nature of his/her education and training,

including the name and address of each school or university where (s)he received special
education or training in the field in which (s)he is expected to testify, the date (s)he attended each
institution, and the degree or certifications received from each institution;
(b)

If any expert tested, analyzed, or examined any physical evidence relating to this

litigation, state the dates on which such test, analysis, or examination was conducted and
identify, all persons who assisted or were present;
(c)

Set forth in full and complete detail the substance of the facts, conclusions, and

opinions to which each expert is expected to testify;
(d)

Identify each person who has present custody of each item tested, analyzed, or

examined by each such expert;
( e)

Identify each document reporting or setting forth the objective findings, opinions,

or conclusions of each expert; and
(f)

Describe in detail all facts and opinions underlying your expert's opinion(s).

ANSWER:

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7:

Please produce a copy of the documents

referred to in subsection (e) of the preceding interrogatory.

RESPONSE:

PETITIO NER'S FIRST SET OF
DISCOV ERY REQUESTS - 9

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231
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INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Please identify all exhibits you intend to offer in evidence
at the time of trial.

ANSWER:

· INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Identify all witnesses who you intend to or may call as
witnesses to testify in support of your claims or defenses in this action, and specify the substance
of the subject matter of the testimony as it is expected to be given by each witness.

ANSWER:

INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Please identify by name, address, telephone number,
employer and job title each person who was consulted or who assisted in the answering of these
discovery requests, or who furnished information which was used in answering them.

ANSWER:

INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Identify each and every person by name, address and
telephone number who has any knowledge or purports to have any knowledge of the facts of this
case and a brief description of the knowledge held by each person, if known.

ANSWER:

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8: Please produce copies of all records not
produced in response to one of the foregoing requests that are in your possession, custody or
control regarding administration of the Trust.

RESPONSE:
PETITIONER'S FIRST SET OF
DISCOVERY REQUESTS - 10

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1: Admit that John Henry Cornell transferred real
property into the Trust.

RESPONSE:

INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Set forth all facts upon which you base any claim of
legal interest in the real property discussed in Request for Admission No. 1.

ANSWER:

DATED thisf-ZY.~ay of February, 2013.

CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

Attorneys for Kareen Cornell, Personal
Representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell

PETITIONER'S FIRST SET OF
DISCOVERY REQUESTS - 11

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ( l t_day of February, 2013,· a copy of the foregoing
PETITIONER, KAREEN CORNELL'S, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE
OF JOHN CORNELL, FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND FIRST SET OF
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION PROPOUNDED TO
RESPONDENT was served by the method indicated below and addressed to the following:

Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C.
13 04 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501

PETITIONER'S FIRST SET OF
DISCOVERY REQUESTS - 12

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231
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Karin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M .
CORNELL.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

NOTICE OF HEARING

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through
her attorney of record, Karin Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C. will call up for
hearing her Motion for Protective Order dated March 1, 2013 at the hour of 3 :00 p.m. on March
13, 2013, before the Honorable Magistrate of the above Court.
DATED this 1st day of March, 2013.
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

Karin Seubert
Attorney for Respondent

NOTICE OF HEARING

-1294

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF
HEARING was, this 1st day of March, 2013,
/

hand-delivered by providing a
copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;
mailed, postage pre-paid,
by first class mail; or
transmitted via facsimile

to:
Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice and Anegon
1212 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501
Theodore O. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl
1219 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

By

K~~
Karin Seubert

NOTICE OF HEARING

-2295

MAR-11-2013 17 :12 From:AHERIN RlL~ ANEGON

2087463650

To: 1<... 1847693 15

2 13

F-

AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON
Darrel W. Aherin
1212 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewistoni ID 83501-0698
(208) 746-3646
ISB# 1534
Attorneys for John Henry Cornell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND WDICIAL DISTRlCl'
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:

NO. CV 2012-00277

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUSl OP
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL,

OBJECTION TO I-IEARYNG

COMES NOW Margaret Watkins, by and through her attorney, Darrel W. Aherin, of
Aherin, Rice and Anegon, and objects to the Court hearing the Respondent Toni C. Johnson's
Motion for Protective Order on March 13, 2013 .

l.R.C .P. 7(b)(3)(A) provides that the Notice of Hearing shall be filed and served

so the parties receive the Noi-ice of Hearing and Motion no later than fourteen (14) days before
the hearing.
On March 1, 2013, a Motion for Protective Order and Notice of Hearing for March 13,
2013, was received by the undersigned. Clearly fourteen days notice was not provided. Serving
the Notice on March 1, 2013 , means the earliest a hearing could have been noticed for hearing is
March 15, 2013.
Because the proper procedure regarding notice was not provided the hearing cannot be
called on for hearing on March 13, 2013.

OBJECTION TO HEARING -- 1
N:\Comcll, fohn\Plcadings\Objcction to

Notice of He~ring.docx -~cw
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MRR-11-2013 17:12 From:RHERIN RlLE RNEGON

DATED this

2087463650

To:lc'.084769315

/J~ay of March, 2013.

:~J.~
Darrel W. Aherin
Atlomcy for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

//-f'>-

1, Darrel W. Aherin, hereby certify that on the
day of March, 2013, l caused to be
served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed to the
following:
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC.
Attorney at Law
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501

D U.S.Mail
D Hand Delivery
~acsimile 746-9553
D Federal Express

Theodore 0. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl
Attorney at Law

U.S. Mail
!:land Delivery
[Ij"""_Facsimile 746-2231
0 Federal Express

1219Idaho
P.O. Drawer 835

[l

0

Lewiston, ID 83501

ByWJ.~
Darrel W. Aherin

OBJECTION TO HEARING -- 2
N:\Cornell, fohn\Plc11dings\Objllctiot1 to Nolice of Heuring.docx •CCW
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
IN THE MATIER OF
MICHAELS. CORNELL, ETAL

_________ _____

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV2012-277
COURT MINUTES

Randall W . Robinson, Presiding Judge
Courtney Baker: Deputy Clerk
Plaintiff's Council:
Defendant's Council:
Date: 03/13/2013 Time: 3:05 - a.m. Tape: CD554-1
Subject of proceeding: Eviction Hearing

-----------------------------------------------------------------

FOOTAGE:
3:05 Honorable Randall W. Robinson, Magistrate Judge, presiding. Parties present in
the court room: Mr. Aherin, Mr. Creason, and Ms. Seubert present telephonically.
3:05

Court addresses Mr. Aherin's objection to the motion for protective order hearing

3:06

Mr. Aherin states his objection .

3:06

Ms. Seubert addresses Mr. Aherin's objection to the hearing .

3:07

Court explains that it deems appropriate to move the hearing date up.

3:08

Mr. Aherin asks about the deposition scheduled, on March 22, 2013.

3: 10

The Court states that it would be appropriate for Mr. Aherin to file a notice of
appearance.

3: 11

The court addresses the Protective order.

3: 11

Ms. Seubert addresses the Protective order.

3: 16

Mr. Creason addresses the Protective order.

3:27

The Court questions on why they would need discovery at this point.

298

3:28

Parties explain why they want discovery.

3:32

Court addresses the matter at hand.

3:37

Parties address the trust.

3:45

The Court addresses concerns.

3:50

Court will allow discovery.

3:51

Ms. Seubert discusses briefing dates.

3:52

Mr. Creason discusses briefing dates.

3:56

Written discovery is to be completed by April 15, 2013; Deposition is to be
completed by April 22, 2013; Motion to dismiss hearing June 4, 2013

4:01

Court is in recess.
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MRR-14-2013 16:53 From:RHERIN RICE Rt~EGDN

2087463650

To: 12084769315

-

J

AHERTN, RJCE & ANEGON
Darrel W. Aherin
1212 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, lD 83501-0698
(208) 746-3646
ISB# 1534
Attorney for Margaret Watkins

fN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:

NO. CV 2012-00277

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLlE M.

MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES CLAIMED BY TONI C.
JOHNSON AGAINST THE TRUST

CORNELL,

COME~ NOW Darrel W. Aherin of Aherin, Rice & Anegon, on behalf of Margaret
Watkins and moves the Court pursuant to l.R.C.P. 54(d)(6) for an order disallowing the costs and

attorney fees sought in the Memoi::andum of Costs and Attorney Fees filed by Toni C. Johnson
and Affidavit in Support of Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees as follows:
Under the terms of The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M.
Cornell, dated November 1, 1996, hereinafter 'The Trust," Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M.
Cornell, or the survivor between them, were Co-Trustees. The Trust further provided that upon
the death or incapacity of the last survivor of the initial trustees, Toni C. Johnson and John H.
Cornell would act as successor trustees. This could not be modified after Arlie M. Cornell died.
After the death of Arlie M. Camell, Michael S. Cornell illegally modified The Trust to
appoint Tonl C. Johnson as sole successor trustee upon his death or incapacity, and John H.
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES CLAIMED BY TONIC.
JOHNSON AGAINST THE TRUST -- 1

Aherln, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law

Lewiston, Idaho

N:\Comell, John\Pleadings\Motion to Disallow Costs and Mtomcy Fees.docx ,er
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MRR-14-2013 16:53 From:RHERIN RICE RNEGON

2087463650

To:121J84769315

Cornell as trustee in the event Toni C. Johnson could not act. Section 1.06 of The Trust provides
that amendments to The Trust could be made "during the joint lives of the Trustors" (emphasis
added).
Toni C. Johnson has been serving as sole successor trustee since the death of Michael S.
Cornell on December 15, 2009 in violation of the trust.
No inventory of the assets in The Trust at the time of the death of Michael S. Cornell has
been provided.
The Trust, Section 4.03 provides as follows:
On the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trust shall terminate and the Trustee
shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and principal
remaining in the Trust into two (2) equal shares and distribute thern to the
following beneficiaries: TONl C. JOHNSON AND JOHN H. CORNELL.
Toni C. Johnson is asking this court to continue rewarding her for intentionally breaching
the trust because the trust terminated on December 15, 2009. Toni C. Johnson should pay the
attorney foes personally because had she distributed the assets timely, the claimed attorney fees
and costs would not have been incurred.
The main asset of The Trust is the house and Teal property. Toni C. Johnson has been
residing in the house since Michael S. Cornell's death on December 15 2009. The property
remains in the name of The Trust and was not distributed to the two beneficiaries "as soon as

reasonably possible". Toni C. Johnson has paid no rent during her tenancy of the premises.
Toni C. Johnson has mismanaged the Trust in that she has used a substantial amount of
the monies available to pay both expenses of maintaining the real property, where she has
resided for three years.and to pay her personal expenses. No money was distributed to John
Henry Cornell.
Toni C. Johnson has breached her fiduciary duty to settle and distribute the Trust in
accordance with the terms of the Trust. The actions and mismanagement of The Revocable
Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell by Toni C. Johnson are the sole cause
of this action.

The Trust should not be responsible for Toni C. Johnson's attorney foes or costs.

Oral argument is requested.
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES CLAIMED BY TONI C.
JOHNSON AGAINST THE TRUST -- 2

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys .it Law
LtitWiston, Idaho

N:\Comdl. John\Pleadings\Motion to Ois11llow Costs und Auomey F'ees.docx scr
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MRR-14-2013 16:54 From:RHERIN RICE RNEGON

DATED this

2087463650

To:12084769315

/ 4"t- day of March, 2013.
AHERJN, RICE & ANEGON
By

/;J@J). 0- ~

Darrel w. Aherin-·

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, DARREL W. AHERIN, hereby certify that on the / t.f fj.. day of March, 2013, I
caused to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed
to the following:

Karin Seubert

D U.S. Mail

Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC.,

D Hand Deli very
~acsimile 746-9553
0 Federal Express

P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
Theodore 0. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

0 U.S. Mail
D !;land Delivery
~Facsimile 746"2231

DARREl,., W. AHERIN

MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES CLAIMED SY TONIC.
JOHNSON AGAINST THE TRUST -- 3

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law

Lewiston, Idaho

N:\Cornell. John\Plcading~\Motion to Oisullow Costs and /\!Tomey Fc~5.docx scr
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746-2231

Theodore 0 . Creason, ISB #1563
~amtLcl r. Cre,-L-;on r~m #8183
CREASON, MOOKE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC
17. 1 9 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone : (208) 743- l S 16
Facsimile : (208) 746-2231
Attorneys for Petitioner/Personal Reprcsentati ve
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell

IN THI:<: UISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND .JUOICJAL DISTlUCT
Ol~ THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF CLEARWATER
)

)
)
)
)
)

In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY 'l'RUST OF
MICHAELS . CORNELL AND ARLIE M .
CORNELL.

Case No. CV 2012-00277

MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS ANO
ATTORNl£Y FEES (I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6))

)
COMES NOW Kareen Cornell, Personal Representative of the Estate of John Henry
Cornell, by and through h<.:r all<.m1ey 01· record, Theodore 0 . Crca:,on or Creason, Moore, Dokken

& Ccidl. PLLC, and hereby moves this Court to disallow all or parl of the costs and attorney fees
set forth in Toni Johnson's Memorandum

or Costs and

Attorney Fees. Ms. Cornell basis Lhis

motion upon the authorities and arguments set faith in the Memorandum in Support filed
herewith.

DATED Lhi:; l.'.ilh <luy oCMarch, 2013 .
CR.sf.SON , MOORE, DOKKEN & GElDL, PLLC

f dti.,,,,L.- tJa~·=·:....-&.:....L....._'.1_

~-l;oJore 0. Creason, lSB # 1563

Attorneys for Petitioner/ Personal Representative
MOTION TO UlSALLOW COSTS ANO ATTORNEY
FBF.S (I.R.C l'. 5J(d)(6)) - I

C r c:t,ou, Moore, lloldccn & Gei<ll, l'LLC
l'.0. 0nawcr 835, l.,·.wi,tm, , ID 83501
(ZON) 743-1516; l•'i,,: (211!1) 7-4<i-22JI
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p.4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of March, 2013, I filed the foregoing
MOTION TO DlSALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES (LR.C.P. 54(d)(6)) with th~
Clerk of the Court (via facsimile to (208) 476-9315), and also delivered a copy via facsimile to
tbe following person~ at the fax numbers designated below:
Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin_ Ric1:: & /\.ncgon
1212 Idaho Street

P. 0. Drnwer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501
h1x: 208-746-3650

MOTION TO l>lSAl,LOW COSTS ANO ATTORNEY
FEES (I.R.C.l'. 54(d)(6)) - 2

Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C.
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
l,ewiston, ID 83501

Fax: 208-746-9553

Cr~i1so11, l\1uorc, l)okkc1l & Gddl, Pl.LC
P.O. l)r·:iwc1·83s, Lc,,iston, ID 83501
(208) 743-151(;; l'ax; (:208) 746-n31
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Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563
Sauwcl T. Cn;,·1::;v11 ISR /.1-8183

CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GElDL. PLLC
121 9 Idaho S lred
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501
T~k:µhum::: (208) 743- l 516
Facsimile: (208) 7 46-223 l
ALtorney:,, 1<.ir PetiLioncr/Personal Representative
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STAT~ OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
)

In the Mauer oC:

)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

)

TIIE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF

MICIIAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M
CORNELL.

____

)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

)
)

(l.RC.P. 54(d)(6))

RE: MOTION TO DISALLOW
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES

PRELIMINARY STATEMENl'

Kareen Cornell, Personal Representative of the Estate
''Estate") objects to Jolmson's memorandum

or John Henry Cornell (hereinafter,

or costs and attorney fees on the grounds that the

foes should not be awarded. Toni Johnson brings her claim for attorney fees pursuant to Idaho

Code § 15-8-208. Section 15-8-208 provides Lhat the court "may, in its discretion, order costs,
in.duding n~u:,onnblc utton1cy':, fees .. .. " The Court should disn.llow Johnson'() motion for

Ceef;

becaw,e (1) Johnson foiled lo identify the source from which she is seeking an ,-1w;i.rd of fees;
(2) an award cannot be granted against the Estate, as it is not a party to the action; (3) an award

IVIElYIORANlJUM. lN SUI'PORT RE: MOTION TO

DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES

Cn\ltson, f"1o<Jt'l': 1 Dokl,;c,n & Ci!llll, PLLC

l'.O . Ul'aw,•r 835, tewi.mrn, II) 835111
(!08) 7J3-l516; F,,,c (20!!) 7J6,2231

(I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) - I
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Moore,

~

Dokken

(208)

p.6

746-2231

shOLlld not be granted against John Cornell, as doing so would be inequitable; and ( 4) an award
should not be granted against the properly of the Trust until such time as Johnson has apprised

the Court

or the stale of the Trust.
ANALYSIS

l.

Procedurnl Requirements
A party's clain1 for attorney fees is to be "processed in the same manner as costs and

included in the mernorandurn of cost::-; provided, however, the claim for attorney fees as costs
shall be supported by an affidavit of the attorney stating the basis and method of computation of
the attorney foes clnimcd." Idaho R. Civ. P_ 54(c)(5)_ A proper

1T1Cm()rnn<lun:i.

of coc1t::i "rnay not

be filed laler llmn fourteen (14) days after entry of judgment." ldaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(5)_ "Any
party may o~ject to the claimed costs of another party ... by filing and serving on adverse parties
a motion to disallow part or all of such costs within fouttcen ( 14) days of service of the
men10randun1 of cost." Idaho R Civ. P. 54(d)(6). Johnson served the memorandum of costs
upon Cornell on Maeoh l, 2013. Thci-eforc, il'thc EHtute it., deemed u pu.rty, then the Estate has

through F rid<LY, March l 5, 2013 to file its motion to disallow the claimed costs and fees.

II.

Substantive Standards

Filing Fee: Johnson seeks recovery

or the initial appearance filing fee of $66.00.

This is

a cost that is awarded to the prevailing party "by right", subject to the Court's discretion to
disallow the co~L

See IRCP 54(J)(1)(C).

Limitation \vould be particularly appropriate here

where the Court is considering, continuing the action and, therefore, Joh11so11 will not be assessed

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT RR: MOTION TO

DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
(Ln._c_p_ 54(d)(6)) - 2

C'rcu~on~ 1'1.ourc, ))old~cn & Cci.tll, 'rLLC

l'_O_ llmwcr ll3S, I .ewistun, Ill ll:lSill
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231
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She may seek recovery of such a foe shoul<l she

prevail in lhe anticipated litigation.

Attorney Fccs: Johnson rai::;cs Idaho Code § 15-8-208 as the statutory grounds upon
whi1,:h ohe claims auorney fees_ Section 15-8-208 places determinations rc;:g<1-rding an award of

fees within the sound discretion of the district court. The Courl may award reasonable attorney
fees (a) from a party to the proceedings; (b) from the assets of the trust; or (c) from any nonprobate asset that is the subject of the proceeding. Johm,011 has failed to set forth the source from
which she seeks an award of fees. Johnson's failure to identify the requested source of the fees
h,:i.-; Jcprivc<l the purtie;:'; agaim,l. whom the fees may be awarded of their right to due procc:,::,_ Si;:,;:

Farber v. lfowe!I, 111 ldaho 132,136,721 P.2d 731,735 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that Rule 54
satisfies the requirements of due process becau::;e it provides the relevant party notice and an
opportunity to be heard). The Court should nol 1;xerci::;e ils discretion in awai-ding foes where
Johnson has fr1.iled to provide clear notice to the party against whom she seeks a recovery.
](lhn:·Hm should not be awtH·ded fees frnm the Estate. The Court had not recognized the

Estate as a party to this proceeding due, in paii, to Johnson's opposilion of the Estate's
intervention. Theret'ore, the Estate was not a party to the proceeding. Nor is t.he fatale holding
property of the Trusl (Jr non-probate assets that arc the subject of the proceeding. Thus, the Court
should not award Johnson foes from the Estate.
Joh1rno11 ,;houl<l not be awarded foes fi.·om Jolu1 Cornell. Johnson sought and received a

dismissal of Cornell's petition on the grounds that because Corne II is deceased (]) there exists no
standing to bring claims in his name, and (2) the claims in the petition abated upon his death. In

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT RE: MO'flON TO

DISALLOW COSTS ANO ATTORNEY FEES
(I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) - 3

C1·e;l.son, Moo,·(' 1 J)okk~n ..\:. <.,:~i<,11, Pl.t.(:

1'.0. D1·11wc1· S35, Lewiston, Ill 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fnx: (20S) 746-2231
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determining wbether lo award fees against a party under section 15-8-208, Lhe courts consider
whether an award would be equitable. Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixso11 Irrevocable

Trust, 147 Idaho 117,133,206 P.3d 481,497 (2009). An award againl:lt John Cornell would be
incquiti:tble for the two rcui:1ons.

1.

Jolmson did not prevail on whether John Cornell could establish the prirna facie

elements of ihe causes of action pied. Rather, Johnson prevailed on the issue of abaternent of
those causes of action upon the unfortunate and unft)n-~seen demise

or John

CornclL In fact,

Johnson has sought to avoid disclosure regarding her administration of the Trust-facts which
would support the cause,; of uction

by mcan::i of motions for prolcdivc orders.

Vv'hik thusi.;

motions may not be improper, the unwillingness to disclose facts which would either suppo1t or
refute the petition renders an award against John Cornell for bringing those actions inequitable.
2.

An award ol' attorney's fees against John Con1ell would most likely result in a

claim against the Estate. The Estate has requested approval to proceed in this mailer, which
Johnson has opposed. The Court should not effectively gn:int an award against the Estate when~

the Estate has not, despite its objections, bcer1 recognized as a party to the action.
Finally, Johnson should not be awarded foes from assets of the Trust, at least until such
time as Johnson apprises the Comt of the status of the Trust. This Court holds "full and ample
autllority" to administer and settle the Trust and all trust matters. Idaho Code § 15-8-I02(1) .
.lnhn Cornell asked this Court to intervene ba"ed upon allegations that Jolrn.son ha:., n,i::ima11agcd

the Trust. Johnson has not yet apprised the Collrt or any other interesled party of the stale of the
Trust assels.

An award to Johnson out of the Trust assets for foes incurred by .loh11son in

MlcMORANlJU M IN SUPPORT H.E: MOTION TO

DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
(I.H..C.P. :'i4(d)(6)) - 4

·Crc.a.•mn,, !\'loon.~, Dol(kc.n & Gci1.ll, PLl ,C

P.O. l)1•aw~1· S35, Lcwislnn, m 8350 l
(208) 743-1516; Fax; (208) 746-nJJ
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defendant against allegatior1s of misni.anagernenl, where Johnson has made no showing that those
allegations were false, would re::;i..tlt in an inequily,

CONCLUSION

Johnson asks this Court to order a discretionary award of fees pursuant to Idaho Code

§ l 5-8-208. The Court should decline to grant Johnson's request on the following grounds:
( 1) Johnson failed to identify the source from which she is seeking an award or lees;
(2) an award cannot be granted again::;t the Estate, as it is not a party to the action;
(3) a11 av,•u.r<l should not be granted against John Co ..11cll, as doing :so would be

inequitable; and
(4) an award 8hould not be granted against the property of the Trust until such time as
Johnson has apptised the Court of the state of the Trust.

DATED this 15th day of March, 2013.

CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

11 I) ' /.~.-~) ~;
. Ld~±-~cc£.1,.::-l---c~;;,~·¢'"c'.-Z,.~---Theodore 0. Creason> lSB # I 563
Attorneys for Petitioner/Personal Representative

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT RE; MOTlON TO

DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
(I.R.C.P. S4(ll)(6)) - 5

Cn.~!u;on,

M-00•·1.~,

Ookke.n .,,14 GcidJ, Pl..LC

P.O. ))rawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516; 11,,x: (208) 746-2231
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of March, 2013, I filed the foregoing

MEMOI-lANDllM IN SUPPORT RE:

MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND

ATTORNEY FEES (l.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) with the Clerk of the Court (via facsimile to (208) 4769315), and also dcli, c1-cd a copy via fac~imilc to the following persons at the fax 11umber::;
1

designated below:
Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice & Ancgon
1212 Idaho Street
P. 0. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501
Fax: 208~746-3650

Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C.
1304 Id11ho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
/)

; ~ " 208-746-9553

(-:!l0L~~--£~'u.Z'.:,d-/~~-l
hcodon: 0. Creason, !SR-# I 563

Ml.SMORANDlJM IN SUPPORT RE; MOTION TO

DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
(I.R.C.P. S4(d)(6)) - 6

Moo•·<, Dokken & Geidl, l'LLC
P.O. ll,·,i,vc~ 835, Lcwis!Oll, II) S3501
(208) 743-IS16; liax: (Z08) 746-2231

Cre:1,011,
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746 - 2231

Theodore 0. Creason, ISB # 1563
San1ud T. Crca,~on ISR ff8183

CREASON , MOORE, DOKKEN & GElDL, PLLC
1219 Idaho Street
l'.0. Drawer 835
Lewiston>[0 8350l
'l'clephone: (208) 741-1 'i 16
Facsirnile: (208) 746-2231
Attorneys for Personal Representative
Ol'Eslale of John Henry Corneil

IN THI!: DlSTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND .JUDlCIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE 01<' lOAHO, IN A.ND l<'OR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWAT ER

In the IVlatLer or:

Case No. CV 20 12-00277

THS REVOCABL12 FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAELS . CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

NOTlCE OF HEARlNG RF:: MOTION

TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES (I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6))

Notice is hereby given that the undersigned will call on for hearing Mntinn 1n ni~,,llow
Costs and Attorney Fees (1.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) on Wednesday, April l 0., 2013,

at 9:00 a.m.,

telephonically. Counsel for each party should call (208) 476-8998 to co1mect with the Judge and

attend the Hearing. If counsel inler1ds lo attend in person, the hearing will be heard in the
eourlroom at the Clearwater County Courthouse, Orofino, Idaho.

DATED this 15 111 day orMan.:h, 2013.
CRE\SON , MOORE, DOKKEN & GElDL, PLLC

h~}:J/,~~

c;;z#?&~----

lore 0. Crcaso11, ISB # 1563
Attorney for Petitioner Kareen Cornell

NOTICE OF HEARING RE: MOTION TO
DISALLOW COSTS ANO ATTORNEY fEES

c,·,,ason, Muoi·~, Dukkca & <~cidl, Pl,LC
1>.0. n,·:1wc,· 835, L~wi,lou, II) S351ll
(20S) 743-15H,; l':i~, (208) 746-2231

(I.R.C.P_ 54(<.1)(6)) - l
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CERTIFIC ATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of March, 2013, I filed the foregoing
NOTICE OF HEAlUNG RE; MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNE Y
FEES (I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) with the Clerk of the Court (via facsimile to (208) 476-9315), and also
delivered n copy via fa1.•.:.imi.k to the following persons at the fax nurnbern designated bdow:
Darrel W. Ahcrin
Ahcrin, Rice & Ancgon
l 212 Idaho Street
P. 0. Drawer 698
I,ewiston, 11) 83501

Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Cu.llery, P.LL.C.
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 8.54
Lewiston, ID 83501

h1x: 208-746-3650

Fax: 208-746-9553

~/h,,4 "6 .::)c.0d<¢.,-/,;.c:
~,,{~~re
0.
#
Creason, lSB

NOTICE OF HEARING RE: MOTION TO
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
(I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) - 2

L

1563

Crc:m.rn, Moor~, Dokken & C;1:i11l, l'LLC
I),(), Ornw~r 835, Uwistun, ll) S3S(II
(20l!l 743-151{i; Filx: (208) "146-223 I
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Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC
1219 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-1516
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231
Attorneys for Petitioner/Personal Representative
Of the Estate of John Henry Cornell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
)
)
In the Matter of:
)
)
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M . )
)
CORNELL.
_
_
_ __ _ _ _ _ _ )

Case No. CV 2012-00277
AMENDED NOTICE OF TAKING
DEPOSITION OF TONI C. JOHNSON

TO: RESPONDENT, TONI C. JOHNSON, TRUSTEE OF THE REVOCABLE
FAMILY TRUST OF MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL,
AND TO KARIN SEUBERT, HER ATTORNEY
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney for Kareen Cornell, Personal
Representative of the Estate of John C. Cornell, will take the testimony, upon oral examination,
of Toni C. Jolrnson before Keith Evans of IC&K Rep0rting, certified shorthai1d reporters of the
State of Idaho, or in the case of their inability to act or be present, before some other person
authorized to administer oaths, on Monday, April 22, 2013, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. of that day
and thereafter from day to day until the taking of the deposition may be adjourned, at the offices
of Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC, 1219 Idaho Street, Lewiston, Idaho 83501.
This deposition shall be taken pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

AMENDED NOTICE OF TAKING
DEPOSITION OF TONI C. JOHNSON - 1

Creasoa, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231
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DATED this /r'fa_y of March, 2013.
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

u~a ~~-

Theodore 0. Creason, ISB # 1563
Attorneys for Kareen Cornell, Petitioner/Personal
Representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this.;<O~ay of March, 2013 , a copy of the foregoing
AMENDED NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION OF TONIC. JOHNSON was served by hand
delivering a paper copy to each named individual at the addresses indicated below:
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C.
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice & Anegon
1212 Idaho Street
P. 0. Drawer 698
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

~eO~~~
i i ; o d ~ s o ; , ISB #1563

AMENDED NOTICE OF TAKING
DEPOSITION OF TONI C. JOHNSON - 2

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231
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Clerk Dist. Court
Clearwater Coun , Idaho

AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON
Darrel W. Aherin
1212 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501 -0698
(208) 746-3646
ISB# 1534
Attorney for Margaret Watkins

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:

NO. CV 2012-00277

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL,

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Category L(2)
Fee $61.00

TO:

TONI C. JOHNSON, KAREEN CORNELL AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVEENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

Margaret Watkins appeals to the District Court from the Magistrate's Judgment

for Dismissal granting Toni C. Johnson's Motion for Summary Judgment entered in the aboveentitled case on February 15, 2013, Honorable Randall W. Robinson presiding.
2.

Margaret Watkins, an interested person, has a right to appeal because she was

appointed temporary personal representative and defended Toni Johnson's Motion for Summary
Judgment. The Estate has a right to appeal to the District Judge Division of the District Court in
the County of Clearwater the Judgment described in Paragraph 1 pursuant to Section 17-201(7)
of the Idaho Code.
3.

The appeal is taken upon matters of both law and fact.

NOTICE OF APPEAL -- 1
N:\Cornell ,John\ Pleadings\Notice of Appeal.docx ser

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
315
Lewiston , Ida ho

4.

The proceedings of the hearings were recorded or reported by the method of

electronic recordings and are in the possession of the Clearwater County Clerk located in
Orofino, Idaho. No record of the proceedings are being requested.
5.

The statement of issues on appeal that Margaret Watkins intends to assert are as

follows:
(a)

Does a breach of the contractual provisions of a trust by a trustee equate to

a personal injury tort which would allow the trustee/beneficiary to personally
benefit from the death of the other beneficiary.
(b)

Should the beneficiary/trustee personally benefit from the intentional

breach of a trust contract by the beneficiary/trustee.
(c)

Is a breach of the fiduciary duties by a beneficiary/trustee to be rewarded

by claiming the breach sounds in tort so the beneficiary that dies after being
intentionally denied his distribution of assets under a contract by the
beneficiary/trustee forfeits his assets to the trustee who breached her contractual
duty to distribute the assets as soon as possible.
(d)

Did the court incorrectly apply Idaho Code§ 5-327 by not holding the

property damage claim did not abate.
(e)

Does equity allow the intentional breach of a trust contract by the

beneficiary/trustee to be rewarded to the detriment of the beneficiary.
6.

The above list of issues is not exhaustive and Margaret Watkins may assert other

issues on appeal thereafter discovered by Margaret Watkins.
7.

That this Notice of Appeal is not intended to stay or delay other discovery

proceedings or petitions that have been filed by Kareen Cornell.
DATED this 2- S'~ day of March, 2013 .
AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON

By ~ [) ~
Darrel W. Aherin
Attorney for Margaret Watkins

NOTICE OF APPEAL -- 2
N :\Cornell , J o hn\ Pleadin1,-s\ Notice o r Appeal.docx se r

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
316
Lewiston, Idaho

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, DARREL W. AHERIN, hereby certify that on the 2.S ~ ay of March, 2013, I
caused to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed
to the following :
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC.
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501

lW'U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Facsimile
D Federal Express

Theodore O. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

inJ.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Facsimile
D Federal Express

&a{,,,}_ {,J_ ~
DARREL W. AHERIN

NOTICE OF APPEAL -- 3
N :\ Cornell, John\ Pleadings\Nolice of Appeal.docx ser

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
317
Lewiston, Idaho
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT - ""E~
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:

)

)
)
)
The Revocable Family Trust of
Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M
Cornell

)
)
)
)

. - ·-- cie~ourt

e:.v.:it~.!._Countv. Idaho

New Case No. : CV2012-00277
CLERKS TRANSMITTAL OF COURT
FILE AND CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL
TO DISTRICT COURT

)
TO: The District Court of the Second Judicial District, in and for the County of
Clearwater
Transmitted is the case filed in the above captioned case .
APPEAL FROM: Magistrate Division
ORDER OR JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM:
filed February 15, 2013.

Judgment for Dismissal

HEARING DATE: February 6, 2013
APPEALED BY: Margaret Watkins , Personal Representative
NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: 03/26/2013
APPEAL FEE PAID: $61 .00
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: Darrel W. Aherin
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT: None
OTHER ATTORNEYS: None
DATED this 02nd Day of April 2013.

CLERKS TRANSMITTAL OF
COURT FILE AND CERTIFICATE OF
APPEAL TO DISTRICT COURT - 1
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Clerk's
Transmittal of Court File and Certificate of Appeal To District Court was handdelivered, faxed or mailed, postage pre-paid, on the
d nd..... day of April,2013 to:

Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Callery, PLLC
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
Theodore 0. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501
Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice & Anegon
1212 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501

CLERKS TRANSMITTAL OF
COURT FILE AND CERTIFICATE OF
APPEAL TO DISTRICT COURT-2
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IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNY OF CLEARWATER
)

IN THE MATTER OF:

)

CASE NO. CV 2012-277

)

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF )
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE
)
M.CORNELL.
)

ORDER FOR BRIEFING

Notice of Appeal was filed March 26, 2013.
A transcript of proceedings is not necessary.
Margaret Watkins shall submit a brief in support of her appeal no later than May 13,
2013.
All other interested parties shall file any responsive briefs no later than 28 days after
service of Ms. Watkins' brief.
Ms. Watkins shall file any reply brief no later than 21 days after service of any
responsive briefs.
Failure to comply with this briefing schedule by the appellant may result in the dismissal
of the appeal.
So ORDERED this

4th

day of April, 2013.

/0=~<?/r

Michael J. Gffin
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, the undersigned Deputy Clerk of the above entitled Court, do hereby cert1"hat a copy
day of
of the foregoing was mailed to, faxed to, or delivered by me on the
1 ' 20 13 ' to:

Apn

Darrel Aherin
Aherin, Rice & Anegon
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501

,/ U.S. Mail

Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower, and Callery, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501

,/ U.S. Mail

Theodore 0. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
1219 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

I

U.S. Mail
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APR-09-2013 13:35 From:AHERIN Ri ~E ANEGDN

To: :i...::884769315

2087463650

Cfcarv~ ,'

AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON
Darrel W . Aherin
1212 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698
(208) 746-3646
ISB# 1534
Attorney for John Henry Cornell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:

NO. CV 2012-00277

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.

STIPULATION RESCHEDULING
HEARING

CORNELL,

COME NOW the parties to the above-referenced case, by and through their respective
counsel of record, and hereby stipulate and agree that the hearing currently scheduled for April
10, 2013 at 9:00 a.m. on the Personal Represcntati ve' s Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney
Fees is rescheduled to Wednesday, April 17, 2013 at 9:30 a.m. telcphonically. Counsel for each
party should cal I (208) 4 76-8998 to connect with the Judge and attend the hearing. lf counsel

intends to attend in person, the hearing will be heard in the courtroom at the Clearwater County
Courthouse, Orofino, Ida~
DATED this

_J__ day of April, 2013.
AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON

By~

a,y,J

'
W. Aherin
Darrel

J. ~

Attorney for Margaret Watkins

STlPULATION RESCHEDULING HEARING -- 1
N;\Corncll. John\Pleadings\S!ipululion llcsch~dul ing HearinG_dncx ~er
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APR-09-2013 13:35 From:AHERIN RlCE ANEGON

To:12084769315

2087463650

Creason, Moore, & Dokken
Apr OS 13 09:31a
2087463650
A~R~08-~13 17:23 From:AHERIN RICE AHEGON

DATED this

{vi:} day of April, 20 l l

elf

(208J

7'46-2231

p.3

To:7452231

N, MOOR£, DOKKEN & GEIDL

~J'tkt~ua_
Theodo~ 0. Cn:.mm. Attomey for
Personal Repreunt11ti v¢

DATED this _ _ day of April, 2013.
JONES, HKOWER & CALLERY

By~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Karin Seubert, A Horney for
Tun.i C. JohJ'!Sol')

STIPULATION RESCHEDULING HEARING -- 2
JIJ:\C!Offl~IJ_ Joh~\fl'l~edinp\S1i.,ul,,r;(H1 l11!~..C:"'i!.Jt.dl11,S Plr:wir1t:,,rJvi,:;•
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JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Karin Seubert (ISB No. 7813)
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-3591
Attorneys for Respondent, TONI C. JOHNSON

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the matter of:
CASE NO. CV 2012-00277
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

NOTICE OF SERVICE

I, KARIN SEUBERT, attorney for Respondent Toni Johnson, pursuant to I.R.C.P., Rule
33(a)(5), certify that on the 15th day of April, 2013, the original and one copy (without attachments) of
Respondent's Answers to Kareen Cornell's First Set ofInterrogatories and First Set of Requests for
Production and Requests for Admission were hand-delivered to Theodore 0. Creason, Creason, Moore,

Dokken & Geidl, 1219 Idaho Street, Lewiston, ID 83501 -and- one copy (with attachments) was handdelivered to Darrel W. Aherin, Aherin, Rice & Anegon, 1212 Idaho Street, Lewiston, ID 83501.
DATED this 15th day of April, 2013.
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
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Karin Seubert
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that true and correct
copies of the foregoing NOTICE OF SERVICE
day of April, 2013, hand-delivered
were this
to:

Ir-

Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice and Anegon
1212 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501
Theodore O. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl
1219 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

By

NOTICE OF SERVICE -2-
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Karin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston; ID 83501
208/743-3591

T-465 P0002/0018 F-360

MAY 07 2013
Clerk Dist. C urt
-- Clearwater County, Idaho t\-

Idaho State Bar No. 7813

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO~ IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.

)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012~00277

)

AlVIENDEDNOTICEOFHEARlNG

)
)

CORNELL.

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through
her attorney of record, Karin Seubert of Jones. Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C. will call up for
hearing her Motion to Dismiss dated March 1, 2013 at the hour of 4:00 p.m. on Tuesday, June 4,
2013, before the Honorable Magistrate of the above Court.

DATEDthis

7

dayofMay,2013.

JONES, BROWER& CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
By

t~~
Karin Seubert
Attorney for Respondent

AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and
co1Tect copy of the foregoing AMENDED NOTICE
OF HEARJNG was, this_:]_ day of May, 2013,
hand-delivered by providing a
copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;
mailed, postage pre-paid,
by first class mail; or
transmitted via facsimile
to:

Dauel W. Aherin
Aberin, Rice and Anegon
1212 Idaho St.

P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501
Theodore 0. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, P.L.L.C.
1219 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

By~~
Karin Seubert

AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING
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Karin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law

MAY O7 2013

Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street

Clerk Dist. C urt
Clearwater Count , Idaho

Lewiston, ID 83501

208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Tiffi SECOND JUDICIAL D1STR1CT OF THE
STAIB OF IDAHO, IN" A,1'-.1:D FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:
TIIB REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

)
)
)
}
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

MEMORANDITh'I OF LA,v IN
SUPPORT OF SECOND MOTION
TO DIS.MISS

Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attomey of record, Karin Seubert of Jones,

Brower and Callery; P.L.L.C-, hereby submi.ts this Memorandum ofLaw in support ofRe&TJOnde.nfs
Motion to Dismiss dated March 1, 2013. Said Motion is set for hearing on June 4, 2013.

I.

FACTS MID PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Background

Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell established the Revocable Family Trust of
Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell on November 1, 1996.
Administration and Court Ordered Distribution of Trust at

Petition for Supervised

,r,I 3.1, 3.4, Exh. A (said Exhibit

hereinafter referred to as ' 1Trust"). Through said Trust, :t\.1r. and Mrs. Cornell named thefr two
children, Toni C. Johnson aud John H. Cornell, as the beneficiaries of the trust upon Mr. and
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1.frs. Cornell's deaths. Id. at § 4.03 of Exh. A. O:n August 6. 2009, Michael S. Cornell as
surviving gran:tor and trustee named Toni C. Johnson as sole trustee/successor trustee. Id_ at
Exh.B .

.Arlie M. Cornell died on November 9, 2008 and Michael S. Co.mell died on December

15, 2009. Id. at W 3.4, 3.6.

Litigation r:onr:erning r:nmell Revor.ahle Living Trust
On July 11, 2012, John H. Cornell filed a Petition for Supervised Administration and

Removal ofTrnstee, which originally initiated this proceeding. [d_ at 1f1j 2.3, 3.9.
John H. Cornell died on or around August 20; 2011 leaving no issue. Id. at if 3.10.
Respondent Toni C. Johnson filed a .Afation to Dismiss on September 17, 2012 seeking to
dismiss the Petition for Supef'Vised Administration and Removal of Trostee on the basis that the

claims of John H. Cornell were extinguished by his death.
Briefing in support of and in opposition to dismissal was submitted by lv:t:s. Seubert for
Respondent and 1'Ir. .A.herin for John Henry Cornell (and presumably for Margaret Watkins who
as of November 15, 2012 served as temporary personal representative of the Estate of John

Henry Cornell). Memorandum of Law filed November 1, 2012; Response to Respondent·'s
Motion to Dismiss filed November 15, 2012; Respondent's Rt.ply Brief in Support of Motion to

Dismiss filed November 20, 2012. Said Motion was first called for hearing on November 27,

2012, at which time it was continued to allow participation by Kareen Cornell.
Said Motion was called for hearing for a second time on January 8, 2013, at which time
Ms. Seubert on behalf of the Respondent and Mr. Aherin on behalf of John Henry Cornell (and

presuniably Margaret Watkins who at that tinte served as temporary personal representative of
the Estate of John Henry Comell) presented oral argument. Mr. Creason did not partic.ipate at
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that hearing on Kareen Cornell's behalf due to what was later <liscovered to be a
misunderstanding.
Subsequent briefing in support of and in opposition to dismissal was submitted by Ms.
Seubert for Respondent and Mr. Creason for ¥..areen Cornell. .A1emorandum re: Respondent's
Motion to Dismiss filed January 18, 2013; Respondent's Brief in Reply to Brief of Surviving

Spouse filed February 4, 2013.
Said Motion. was called for hearing for a third time on February 6, 2013, at which Ms.
Seubert for Respondent; Mr. Aherin for John Henry Cornell (and at that time Margaret Watkins
as temporary personal representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell), and Jvf...r. Creason for

Kareen Cornell presented oral argument.
After considering the above-referenced briefing and oral argument presented, this Court

issued an oral ruling in open court on Februaiy 12, 2013 dismissing the Petition for Superv·ised
Administration and Removal of Trustee and granted the Estate twenty days in which to raise any
claims of the Estate. A vVritten opinion and judgment followed. Id. at

,r 3.11; Menwrandum

Opinion and Judgment for Dismissal entered February 15, 2013.
Margaret Watkins, as a self-identified "interested person," has filed an appeal of said
Memorandum Opinion and Judgment for Dismissal, which remains pending before the District
Court.

On February 26, 2013, Kareen Cornell as then personal representi;itive of the Estate of

John H. Comell and as his surviving spouse, filed a Petition for Supervised Administration and
Court Ordered Distribution.
On March 4, 2013, Respondent filed a .A1otion to Dismiss. This :Memorandum of Law is
submitted in support of said Motion to Dismiss.
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Estate ofJohn H Cornell, deceased

John H. Cornell died on or around August 20, 2011 leaving no issue. Id. at if 3.10,
Ou November 15, 2012, in the probate action concerning the Estate of John H. Cornell,

deceased, Margaret Watkins was appointed as Tempora..1)' Personal Representative of the Estate
of John H. Comeli, deceased. See Order ofAppointment of Temporary Personal Representative,
Clearwater County Case No. CV 2012-00439.

On February 12, 2013, in the probate action concerning the Estate of John R Cornell,
deceased, Kareen Camell was appointed as personal representative of the Estate of John R
Cornell, deceased, thereby tenriinating the prior temporary appointment of Margaret Watkins.

See Order Appointing .Personal Representative, Letters of Testamentary~ Clearwater County
Case No. CV 2012-00439.

II.

A.

ARGUMENT

Summary Judgment Standard
The pa_rties and the Court have agreed in open court that Respondent's 1\.1otion to Dismiss

shall be treated as a request for summary judgment on the expectation that the Estate of John H.
Cornell, deceased, will submit information obtained through discovery in opposition to the

Motion to Dismiss.
Sun-unary judgment roust be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, 3I,1,d admissions on
file. together with the affidavits; if any; show that there is no genuine issue as. to any materi.al
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a :matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The
party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of proving an absence of a genuine issue
of material fact.

See Celotex, Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

reasonable inferences will be considered in favor of the non-moving party.

:MEMORANDUM OF LAW
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Cambridge Joint School Dist. No. 432,, 139 Idaho 953" 955,, 88 P.3d 772, 774 (2004).
However, the non-moving pa:rt-y cannot "rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that
party's pleadings, but the party's response ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial/) Shere v. Pocatello Schoo Dist .No 25, 143 Idaho 486, 489-90. 148 P.3d
1232, 1235-36 (citing I.R.C.P. S6(c)). As explained below, there are no genuine issues of

material facts to preclude dismissal being granted in light of John H. Coroen •s death_
B.

Respondent is entitled to dis»Jissal as a matter oflaw.
As the brief summary above reflects; the procedux:al history of this trust dispute has been

highly unusual resulting in th.e current stati.,1.s of a second lawsuit filed within the original
proceeding and the first lawsuit subject to a pending appeal. As such, it does not lend itself to
straightfo:r:ward analysis-

It is Respondent's analysis that the now pending Petition is a

continuation of the original proceeding~ rather than a new and sepBJ.-ate lawsuit. Based on this

analysis, this Memorandum of Law will not address the doctrine of res judicata, which includes
the two legal concepts of issue preclusion and claim :reclusion., because said c.oncepts require
separate proceedings> which is not present here. See Berk.,hire Investments, L.L.C. v. Taylor,
153 Idaho 73, 278 P.3d 943 (2012). To the extent that the Estate argues that its Petition should

be viewed as a separate proceedi...'1g ·mthin this single case, Respondent reserves the right to
respond more fully to any such arguments in her reply brief.
Further, this Memorandum of Law addresses only the claims r3rised by the Estate of John

H. Cornell, not any individual claims of Kareen Cornell as surviving spouse, because a review of

the Petition for Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution finds no claim
individual to Mrs. Cornell a..11.d distinct from her capacity of personal representative of the Estate
of John H. Cornell aud heir of said Estate.
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The Estate asserts causes of action for constructive trust (see

,r 4.5 of Petition

for

Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution of Trust); for breach of contract (see
"i\4il 4.2 and 4.7 of Petition for Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution of

Trust); for breach of fiduciary duty (see

,r 4.3

of Petition for Supervised Administration and .

Court Ordered .Distribution of Trust); for conversion (see

1 4.4

of Petition for Supervised

Administration and Court Ordered Distribution of Trust); and for unjust enrichment {see if 4.6 of
Petition for Supervised Administration and Ct>urt Ordered Distribution of Trust).

This

Memorandum will first discuss the application of law of the case doctrine to this proceeding, and
then each alleged action.
1. The Memorandum Opinion is binding upon the Estate. subject to the outcome of the appeal.

In its Memorandum Opinion entered February 15, 2010, this Court determined that the
claims of breach of fiduciary duty and constnictive tri.ist that were filed by John H. Cornell
during his lifetime and pursued by his attorney after his death were abated by his death under the
common law., and are not within the scope of express limits of Idaho Code § 5-327(2). See

Memorandum Opinion at 10 ("John's claims abate under comm.on law. The alleged WTongful
acts of Toni are all breaches of fiduciary duties under state law that for purposes of abatement
are in the nature of torts. In the absence of any state law supplanting the common law, John.'s

claims are abated and must be dismissed.); at 13 ("The constructive trust argument is
indistinguishable from John's arguments regardi.n.g Toni's breaches of fiduciary duties."); at 17
("The damages John seeks - recovery of property wrongfully withheld from him - do not meet
the definition of out of pocket expenses. Therefore, Idaho Code§ 5-327(2) does not overrule the
common law abatement of John's causes of action.").
This decision is binding upon the Estate, who is not entitled to a second bite at the
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proverbial apple because Kareen Cornell, the surviving wife of John H. Cornell,. has succeeded

!vfargaret V{atkins, the decedent's aunt, as personal representative.
This Court specifically provided that "Kareen shall be given twenty days to substitute for

John and present issues free of the pleadings filed by John's attorney during John's lifetime."
Jvfemoranduin Opinion at 13.

The litigation of the first Petition centered upon Respondent's alleged breach of fiduciary
duty as trustee. See id. The only "newly'' pled fact contained within the second Petition for
Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution o/Trust is that "on. or about January

3, 2007, John Henry Com.ell deposited by quitclaim, separate propeli'J into the Trost in the fou:n

of Lot 34, Lakeview First Addition, real property adjacent to real property owned by his parents,
Michael S. and Arlie M. Cornell, into the Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and

Arlie M. Cornell." See Petition.for Supert1ised Administration and Court Orde7ed Distribution
of Trust at ,i 3.8. This allegation is irrelevant to the causes of action pled or to the Motion to
Dismiss. Furt.her, said act pre-dates llte Grantors' deaths and Respondent's authority as trustee
and no relation has been shovm to how it relates to the alleged misconduct of Respondent since
the death of Michael Cornell.
Absent said A1emorandum Opinion being overturned

on appeal, t.1.e Estate is precluded

from re-litigating the issues previously addressed by this Court uuder the law of the case

doctri__ne. The Iclaho Supreme Court discm,sed the law of the case doctrine in a very recent
decision stating as follows:
This Court adheres to the °'law of the case" doctrine, which we have articulated as
follows:

The doctrine of "law of the case'; is well established i:n Idaho aud provides that
upon an appeal. the Supreme Court in deciding a cas.e presented states in its
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opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision; such pronouncement
becomes the law of the c.ase and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent
progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal. The "law of the
case;' doctrh'"l.e also prevents consideration on a subseq11ent appeal of alleged
errors that might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier appeal.

Park.vest Homes, L.L.C. v. Barns.on, I.S.C. No. 38919 (April 18, 2013) (quoting Swan.son v.
Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 515, 5 P.3d 973. 976 (2000); Taylor v. Maile; 146 Idaho 705, 709, 201
P.3d 1282 1 1286 (2009)). Further, "where the district court acts in an appellate capacity, and

appeal to the Supreme Court is subsequently dismissed by stipulation, the rulings of the district
court became the final rulings in the case, not subject to attack in this appeal, and which stated
the law of the case that the w..agistrate - and even. this appellate court - must follow in this

appeal." Swanson v. Swanson> 134 Idaho 512, 515, 5 P3d 973. 976 (2000) (quoting Wu.if! v.

Peralta, 123 Idaho 567, 568, 850 P.2d 216, 217 (Ct.App. 1993). Further, to the extent a litigant
fails to avail herself from appealing a trial court's rnlin.g, tb.e "law of the case'' doctrine precludes
the litigant from re-opening the issue at a later time. Jd_ at 516-17, 5 P.3d at 978~79.
Here. Margaret Watkins had filed an appeal of the Memora..11.dum Opinion. Said appeal

remains pending before the District Court. No stay has been sought to preclude the presiding

magistrate from ruling on the Motion to Dismiss now before the Court. Subject to the outcome
of the appeal, the A1emorandum Opinion remains the law of the case and is binding upon the
Estate under the ··1aw of the case" doctrfue.
Respondent anticipates that it is the Estate's position t.h.at it is not bound by the Court's

earlier ruling because neither the Estate nor Kareen Cornell were a party to said action. Said
argument is flawed because all authority of the Estate, of Margaret Watkins acting previously as
temporary personal representative, or of Kare.en Comell now acting as personal representative
was derived from John H. Cornell. At all times since his death, the Estate of Jobn H. Cornell has
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been the only legitimate pa_rty adverse to Respondent in this proceeding.
Here, John H. Cornell filed an action for breach of fiduciary duty. Upon his death, the
Estate of John H. Cornell becam.e the successor to John H. Cornell. Upon his death, his former
attorney continued to defend the decedenes interest in this litigation aud opened a probate action

through which Margaret Watkins was. initially appointed as temporary personal representative.
The acts of Margaret Watkins as temporary personal representative relate back in. time to John. H.

Cornell's date of death. See LC. § 15-3-701. A review of the Idaho Probate Code finds no
reference to the tem1 "temporary personal representative /' The only reasonable reading and
application of Title 15; Chapt& 3, Idaho Code is. that a "temporary personal representative ,"
when acting reasonably for the benefit of the interested persons, possesses full authority to act on

behalf of the estate within the authorized parameters of Idaho Code Section 15-3-715, and that

any such acts taken in good faith are binding upon the Estate. Application of said principles'to
this proceeding requires the confirmation of all actions taken by Margaret \Vatkins, including
those of the decedent's attorney, now Ms. Watkins' attorney, as binding upon the Estate of John
H. Cornell, deceased. This includes such acts being binding upon the Estate and its current
personal representative Kareen Cornell.
For these reasons, any effort by Kfu"'een Cornell acting as personal representative or of the
Estate generally to claim that they were not parties to the earlier action are misplaced and should
be disregarded by the Cou1t. The law does not provide for a second bite at the proverbial apple.

Instead, the Court's consideration of the Motion to Dismiss should center on whether the
Petition for Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution of Trust raises facts or
issnes of law not previously addressed by this Court that were not abated by the death of John H.

Cornell. For the reasons discussed below, no such facts or issues have been raised and the
1,1:EMORANDtnvf OF LAW
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Motion to Dismiss should be granted.
2. The facts alleg¢ in the subject Petition do not support a cause of action for constructive trust
The Estate alleges that "[a]s a result of [Respondent]'s inequitable conduct, [Respondent]
holds assets, personally in constructive trust, for the Estate and/or the Trust.... [RespondentYs

actions constitute inequitable conduct giving rise to a constructive trust for all assets (a) obtained
by [Respondent}, personally, through the inequitable conduct; or (b) diminished from another's

interest by the [Respondent.]"

Petition for Supervised Administration and Court Ordered

Distribution of Trust at ml 3.23 and 4.5.
"A cot"l..structive trust arises where legal title to property has. been obtained through. actual
fraud, misrepresentations, concealments. taking advantage of one's necessities, or under
circumstances otherwise rendering it unconscionable for the holder of legal title to retain

beneficial interest iu the property." Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165, 168, 722 P.2d 474,477 (1986)
(citing Davenport v. Burke, 30 Idaho 559, 167 P. 481 (1917)). A "constructive trust arises from
the legal title holder's wrongful actions and not from any intent to create a trust" Snider v.

Arnold, 153 Idaho 641, 289 P.3d 43 (2012) (citing Davenport v. Burke, 30 Idaho 599, 608, 167
P. 481,483 (1917)).
Here, the doctrine of constructive trust is inapplicable because there are no facts alleged

that Respondent has obtained legal title to Trust property. Instead, it is undisputed that the
Cornell Revocable Living Trust remains the title holder of the relevant real property situated in

Clearwater County. not Respondent personally. As such, Mrs. Cornell's claim for constructive
trust must be dismissed.
Further; as discussed above, this Court has previously determined that the "constructive
trust argument is indistinguishable from John's arguments regarding Toni's breaches of fiduciary
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duties," which were abated by John H. Cornell's death. Said determination is binding upon the

Estate subject to the outcome of the pending appeal.
For these reasons and the reasons previously briefed and incorporated by reference
herein, the Estate's .claim for c-onstructive trust should be dismissed subject to the outcome of the

pending appeal.
3. The Estate's claim of breach of contract is actually a breach of fiducianr claim, that abates.

The Estate seeks damages for breach of contract, under a straight breach of contract
theory and under a third party beneficiary theory. See Petition for Supervised Administration

and Court Ordered Distribution at i,r 4.2 and 4.7.
This Court has previously determined that ''the duties John asserts Toni breaches arise
irrespective of contract. The duties are grounded in state law regardless of what the contract
states. . . . The alleged wrongful acts of Toni are all breaches of fiduciary dutieS under state law
that for purposes of abatement are in the nature of torts .... John makes no claim against Toni
and the administration of the estate of their parents that survives his. death under the common law

orunderldaho Code§ 5-327." Memorandum Opinion at 9, 10, 17.
As discussed above, this detennination is binding upon the Estate subject to the outcome

of the pending appeal.
For these reasons and the reasons previously briefed and incorporated by reference
herein, the Estate's claims for breach of contract were extinguished upon the death of John H.
Comell and should be dismissed subject to the outcome of the pending appeal.
4. The Estate's claim for breach of fiduciary duty is abated by Joh:n)s death.
The Estate alleges that Respondent is liable for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty. See
Petition for Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution at 1f 4.3.
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This Court has previously determined that such claims were extinguished by the death of

John H. Cornell. See Memorandum Opinion at 17. Specifically, this Couit ruled that the
damages John sought, and that the Estate now seeks - recovery of property wrongfully withheld
from him - are outside the scope of Idaho Code§ 5-327 - thus are not recoverable after John's
death. Id. As discussed above, this determination is binding upon the Estate subject to the

outcome of the pending appeal.

For these reasons and the reasons previously briefed and incorporated by reference
herein, the Estate's claims for breach of :fiduciary duty were extinguished upon the death of John
H. Cornell and should be dismissed subject to the outcome of the pending appeal.

5. The Estate~s claim of conversion is abated by John's death.
The Estate alleges that Respondent is liable for alleged conversion. See Petition for

Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution at 1f 4.4.

Under Idaho law, conversion is an intentional tort claim. See Brooks v. Gigray Ranches,
Inc., 128 Idaho 72, 77,910 P.2d 744, 749 (1996).
This Court has previously determined that all tort claim were extinguished by the death
of John H. Cornell. See Memorandum Opinion at 17. Specifically, this Court ruled that the

damages John sought, and that the Estate now seeks - recovery of propei:ty w-rongfully ,vithheld
from him - are outside the scope of Idaho Code § 5-327 - thus are not recoverable after Job.n's
death. Id. As discussed above. this determination is binding upon the Estate subject to the

outcome of the pending appeal.
For these reasons and the reasons previously briefed and incorporated by reference
herein, the Estate's claim for conversion was extinguished upon the death of John H. Cornell and

should be dismissed subject to the outcome of the pending appeal.
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6. The Estate's claim of unjust emichment is a breach of fiduciarv duty claitR that abates.

The Estate seeks damages under a theory of unjust enrichment.

See Petition for

Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution at ,i 4.6.

"Unjust enrichment, as a fictional promise or obligation implied by law, allows recovery
where the defendant has received a benefit from the plaintiff that would be inequitable for the

defendant to retain without compensating the plaintiff for the value of the benefit." Great Plains
Equipment; Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 123 Idaho 754, 767; 979 P.2d 627, 640 (1999)

(citing Continental Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler Supply Co., 95 Idaho 739, 743. 518 P.2d
1012, 1205 (1974). Unjust enrichment claims involve claims based on an implicit promise to
pay. Id.• 979 P.2d at 640.
The Courti s prior analysis of the alleged breach of contract claim is instructive: "the
duties John asserts Toni breaches arise i1Tespective of contract. The duties are grounded in state
law regardless of what the contract states. ·... The alleged wrongful acts of Toni are all breaches
of fiduciary duties under state law that for purposes of abatement are in the nature of torts ....

John makes no claim against Toni and the administration of the estate of their parents that
survives his death under the comm.on law or under Idaho Code § 5-327.'' Memorandum Opinion

at 9; 10, 17.
The alleged breaches are for b;reacb of fidudazy duty. The Estate does not allege that
John H. Cornell conveyed a benefit during his lifetime to Respondent that would support a
recoverable claim under the theory of unjust enrichment.

Instead, the Estate alleges that

Respondent withheld benefits under the Trust from John H. Cornell, which supports a claim of
breach of fiduciary duty, which is not recoverable after John H. Cornell's death.
For these reasons and the reasons previously briefed and incorporated by reference

:MEMORANDUM OF LAW
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herein. the Est.ate• s claims for breach of contract were extinguished upon the death of John. H.
Camell and should be dismissed subject to the outcome of the pending appeal.

7. General creditor's claim must be supported by Idaho law.
The Estate alleges that "as a result oflosses suffered from the [Respondent}1s inequitable
conduct~ the Trust holds a creditor's claim against [Respondent]!'

Petition for Supervised

Administration and Court Ordered Distribution at ,r 3.20.

The term "creditor's claim" is most commonly used in the context of a probate action.
See generally Title 15, Ch. 3, Idaho Code. All creditor's claim must be recoverable under Idaho
law to be valid.
For the reasons discussed above; the various claims pursued by the Estate were abated by

the death of John H. Cornell. See supra. The Petition for Supervised Administration and Court

Ordered Distribution fails to allege any new issues or fact& to support a valid claim against
Respondent or the Trost The wo:r:ds of the Court's earlier ruling remain applicable: the Estate
"makes no claim against Toni and the administration of the estate of their parents that survives
[John's] death under common law or under Idaho Code § 5-327. Under the terms of the trust,
John's heirs have no claim against the estate as he left no surviving issue.'' Memorandum
Opinion at 17.

ID.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Respondent Toni Johnson respectfully requests that her Motio.n
to Dismiss be granted and that the Court dismiss the Petition for Supervised Administration and
Court Ordered Distribution with prejudice subject to the outcome of the pending appeal.
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DATED this 7th day of May, 2013.
JONES, BRO\VER & CALLERY) P.L.LC.

By

{G:£u ,&~
i11Seube1t
Attorney for Respondent
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRJCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:

NO. CV 2012-00277

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M ..

BRfEF TN SUPPORT OF APPEAL

CORNELL)

COMES NOW Darrel W. Aherin of Aherin, Rice & Anegon, on behalf of Margaret
Watkins, and provides this Brief in Support of Appeal.

BACKGROUND
This appeal is made by one of the beneficiaries of the trust, John Cornell. Margaret
Watkin:;, John Cornell's aunt, was appointed Temporary Personal Representative and presented
John Cornell's claim. After submitting his claim as a beneficiary of the trust, John Cornell died
on August 20, 2012 (committed suicide) while residing with his aunt, Margaret Watkins.
John Cornell and Toni Johnson are the children of Michael S . Cornell and Arlie M.
Comell. Michael and Arlie Cornell created a family trust. The beneficiaries of the trust) after
the deaths of the parents, were John Cornell and Toni Johnson. On December 1S, 2009, Michael
Cornell died. Arlie Cornell died on November 9, 2008. Margaret Watkins and Arlie Cornell
were sisters.
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Toni Johnson was nominated as the sole alternate trustee at the death of Michael Cornell
on August 6, 2009, by an improper change made to the trust after Arlie Cornell died.
The trust provides "On the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trust shall terminate and
the Trustee shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and principal remaining
in the Trust into two (2) equal shares and distribute them to the following beneficiaries: Toni C.
Johnson and John H. Cornell." Memorandum Opinion, p. 2; Trust§ 4.03.
There is no factual dispute that Toni Johnson has intentionally not divided the trust assets
since Toni Johnson and John Cornell's father, Michael Cornell, died on December 15, 2009, as
required by the trust. The trust dearly says "On the death of the surviving Trustor [Michael
Camell], the Trust shall terminate . __ ,,
In the Memorandum Opinion filed February 15, 2013, on page 3, Judge Robinson stated:
In the nearly two (2) years from the last trustor's death through John's death, Toni
failed to distribute any part of the trust to John even while she lived rent free in
the home that is included in the trust and apparently paid an her living expenses
from trust funds. Toni has not distributed any of the fonds from the trust other
than for her own use.
Memorandum Opinion, p. 3.
Judge Robinson's factual statement makes it clear that Toni Johnson breached the
contract. Judge Robinson has mistakenly applied the wrong legal standard to the current facts.
Looking at page 9 of the Memorandum Opinion will illustrate Judge Robinson is wrong that this
case is decided on"- .. state law regardless of what the contract states." The language of the
contract controls, not state law. The language in the contract said the trust terminated on
Michael Cornell's death and as soon as reasonably possible, distribution of the assets in two
equal shares was to be made. Had the contract said the trust continued at the discretion of the
trustee, Toni Johnson, and said the trustee had the right to decide when assets were distributed,
John Cornell would have had no breach of contract claim. The duties of the trustee are not
grounded in state law regardless of what the contract states. The requirements of what the
trustee was required to do in this case is controlled by the contract.

LEGAL ARGUMENT
This case involves a trust. The written agreement - contract - made it very clear, " ... the
Trust shall terminate and the Trustee shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income
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and principal remaining jn the Trust into two (2) equal shares and distribute them to the
following beneficiaries: Toni C. Johnson and Jolm H. Cornell." Trust§ 4.03.
The case involved a breach of contract. The contract was breached by Toni Johnson.
The Court ruled the case sounded in tort so the claim abated. The citation on page 5 in
the Memorandum Opinion refers to a quote saying" ... those sounding in 12ure tort abate"

(emphasis added). The Court did not follow the law because this case does not sound in pure
tort.
Judge Robinson discussed both statutory law and the common law. It appears the
comparison between Bfahop v. Owens, 152 ldaho 616,272 P_ 3d 1247 (2012) and this case was
relied upon. The use of the cited case was misplaced. In Bishop a contract was signed between
plaintiff and defendant. The defendant was providing legal services. The Idaho Supreme Court
held the standards for performance were the same in the contract as the defendant's professional
standards so the case was deemed a tort case. The trust created by contract in this case had very
specific terms that are not found in any Idaho law. The terms are specific to the contract. John
Cornell alleged these specific contract requirements were breached. The tort damages claimed in
Bishop were claims for malpractice. The contract damages sought by John Cornell were the
specific contract amounts that were his under the written terms of the contract. lf the rule of law
for tort damages is applied to this case, the contract amounts that belonged to John Cornell will
go to the person who intentionally did not timely disburse the assets

lo

John Cornell and if

abatment is applied the person who breached the contract will get money that was not hers_
Application of common law to this case was misplaced by Judge Robinson because this case is
not a pure tort case. The contract is what provides the specific division of the trust property.
The contract requirements were not followed so it is a breach of contract, NOT a pure tort claim.
The case is a contract case. A written trust that had specific contractual requirements is a
contract. The contract was breached. This is not a pure tort case. The contract/trust was
intentionally breached, and the Court's ruling rewards Toni Johnson for intentional breach of the
contract. The Court confirmed these facts as set out above. The Court mixed the duties under
Idaho statutes for a probate and trust and improperly held the claim of John Cornell abated upon
his death because the case was a pure tort case. Claims arising out of a contract generally
survive the death of the claimant.
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From a review of the Memorandum Opinion, Judge Robinson has concluded Idaho law
has evolved to a point where a breach of contract/trust is a tort and the claimant's claim abates if
the claimant dies. Where is equity? Judge Robinson's Opinion says a Court is not to consider
equity and fairness. Judge Robinson says if the damaged party dies, the breach of contract claim
becomes a pure tort claim because of the fiduciary duty of the trustee and abates, and the
perpetrator of the breach of the contract is rewarded because the perpetrator had some fiduciary
duties. This case is not a "pure tort case." The case law involving claims for personal injury do
not apply to this case. Cases involving legal malpractice are founded in tort. A fee agreement
may be involved in a legal malpractice ca..<;e, but the legal duties of a lawyer are based on the
standards applied by law to the lawyer. The trust/contract is not a fee agreement in this case.
The trust had contractual provisions unique to that contract. The specific contract provisions
were breached. That is a breach of contract, not a tort.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Magislmte Court should be reversed. John Cornell's claim for breach
of contract did not abate on his death. The party breaching the contract cannot be rewarded for
intentionally breaching the contract. The contract language determined what was to be done. To
hold otherwise violates Idaho law.
DATED this 13th day of May, 2013.

AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON
By

lla,JjJ _c_L_

Darrel W. Aherin
Attorney for Appellant
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1, DARREL W. AHERIN, hereby certify that on the 13th day of May, 2013, l caused to
be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed to the
following:

Karin Seubert
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TliE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF JDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
)

THE REVOCABLE FAMlLY TRUST OF
MICHAELS . CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.
- --

)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

)

TIME FOR HEARING

MOTTON FOR ORDER SHORTENING

)
)

- -- -- -- - - - -- - - )

COMES NOW Kareen Cornell, Petitioner in this matter and Personal Representative of
the Estate of John Henry Cornell, by and through her attorney ofrecord, Theodore 0. Creason of
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC, and hereby moves this Court, pursuant to Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure 7(b)(3), for an order shortening the time for a hearing on the Motion for Stay
and to set a hearing to be held on the motion frn· Friday, May 17, 2013 at 2:30 p.m., to be
conducted by teleph(me conference initiated by movant's counsel. Movant has filed a Petition
11nder Tdaho's Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (ldaho Code §§ 15-8-101 et s<tq.) in

district court seeking consolidation of this matter with Case No. CV 2012-439 (Jn rhe Maller <<f
the Estate l~l John 1leniy Cornell) and the appeal of Margaret Watkins in this case, cunently

MOTION FOR ORDER SHORTENING
TIM~ OF HEARING- Page 1

,

!J,, [.

un• I. ~_l_r _,

Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563
San,ud T. Crc.:1~vu lSB #8183
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GE[DL, PLLC
1219 ldaho Street
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, JD 83501
Telephone: (208) 743 · 1S 16
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231
Attorneys for Personal Representative
Of btate of.lohn Henry Cornell

ln the Matter of:
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pending before the district cou1i. This request is made on the grounds that responsive bticfing to
the Trustee's motion to dismiss is due on or before May 21, 2013. Pursuit of such briefing will
cause unnecessary increase in expense of litigation should the district court assume jurisdiction
of the case p11rs11;mt to the TEDRA petition.

Counsel for the Trustee has stipulated to shortening the time for the hearing. C()unsel for
all parties arc available for a telephone conforence on Friday, May 17, 2013 at 2:30 p.111.

DATED thi~ 1511, day of May, 2013.

CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

. heodorc 0. Creason, lSB #1563
Attomeys for Personal R~p)·esentativc
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and hand deliv ered a pape r copy to the fc.1llowing pers
ons:

Ka1fo Seub eti
Jone s, Bmw er & Call ery, P.L. L.C.
1304 Idaho Stree t
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Lew1ston., ID 83501

~o re 0. Creason, IS
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lN THE DJSTR lCT COUR T OF THE SECO ND JUDIC IAL DISTR
ICT
Oll' THE STAT E OF IDAH O, IN AND FOR THE COUN TY
OF CLEA KW ATER
In the Matter of:

THE REVOCABLE FAM !TY TRUS T OF
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

- -·-- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-0 0277

MOTI ON TO STA\' PROC EEDIN GS

COME S NOW Kareen Cornel l, Petitio ner in this matter and Person
al Repres entativ e of
the Estate of John Hcmy Cornel l, by and through her attorne y of
record, Theod ore 0. Creaso n of
Creaso n, Moore , Dokke n & Geidl, PLLC, and hereby moves this
Court for an Order ::itnying this
procee ding. Movan t has filed a Petitio n under Idaho ' s Trust and
Estate Disput e Resolu tion Act
(Idaho Code §§ 15-8-10 1 et seq.) in district court seeking consol
idalion of this matter with Case
No . CV 20 l 2-439 (In the Matter q{t.he t'srate <~{John Hemy
Cornel l) and the appeal of Margar et

Watkii1s in this case, cunent ly pendin g before the cfo,tJict court.
Movant. reques ts this C()urt stay
this procee ding until such time as the district court either assume
s jurisdi ction over the case
under the TEDR A petitio n or denies the petition for consol idation
.
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DA TE D thi s 15th day of Ma
y, 2013.

CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN
& GElDL, PLLC

Theodore 0. Creason, lSB #15
63
Attorneys for Personal Repres
entative
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Karin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CALLER Y, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813

IN THE DISTRIC T COURT OF TIIE SECOND JUDICIAL DIS1RIC T OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARW ATER

In the Matter of:

)

)

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAE LS. CORNEL L AND ARLIE M.

)
)

CORNEl.J..,.

)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

OBJECTION TO MOTION TO
STAY PROCEEDINGS

CO~S NOW Respondent Toni Johnson. by and through her attorney of record, Karin
Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., and objects to the Motion to Stay Proceedings

dated May 15, 2013 and filed by Petitioner Kareen Cornell, Personal Representative of the Estate of
John H. Cornell, deceased. Said Motion to Stay Proceedings is set for hearing on Friday, May 17,
2013 at 2:30 p.m.
Movant Kareen Cornell states the basis of her Motion as follows:
Movant has filed a Petition under Idaho's Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act
(Idaho Code§§ 15-8-101 et seq. in district court seeking consolidation of this matter
with Case No. CV 2012-439 (In the Matter of the Estate of John Henry Cornell) and
the appeal of Margaret Watkins in this case, currently pending before the district
court. Movant :requests this Court stay this proceeding until such time as the district
court either assumes jurisdictio n over the case under the TEDRA petition or denies
the petition for consolidation.
Motion to Stay Proceedings at 1. For the Court's convenience, a copy of the referenced "new"
Petition is attached hereto as Exhibit A (exhibits A and B are omitted in the interest of judicial
OBJECTI ON TO MOTION
TO STAY PROCEE DINGS
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economy as they are identical to Exhibits A and B to the Petition filed by Kareen Cornell on

February 26, 2013 and already on file in this proceeding).
Movant' s request is puzzling as her Petition filed in this action filed on February 26, 2013 is
also brought under the Idaho Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act, Idaho Code§§ 15-15-8-101

through 15-8-305. See Petition for Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution
filed Febmary 26, 2013 at 'J[ 2.1. Further, a review .of the two Petitions filed by Mrs. Cornell reflects
that they are nearly identical through paragraphs 3.8 and 3.10 respectively (the paragraph
referencing the death of John Cornell on August 20, 2012). Tue Petition in the ''new" district court
TEDRA action proceeds from that point to set forth the procedural history of this case and the
probate of John H. Cornell, deceased (Clearwater County Case No. CV 2012-439). Toe Petition
previously filed by Mrs. Cornell in this action proceed from that point to set forth her allegations of

Respondent's misconduct in the administration of the Revocable Family Trust of :Michael S.
Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell and also sets forth the procedural history of this case through the date
of said Petition. The "new" TEDRA action appears at this juncture to be a clear violation of the

doctrine of claim preclusion, which protects litigants from litigating an identical issue with the same
party or its privy. See Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. #401; 147 Idaho 277, 288, 207
P.3d 1008, 1019 (2009) (citing Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613,617
(2007).
Further, Mrs. Cornell's "new" IBDRA action seeks the consolidation of this action with the
probate action into the "new" TEDRA action. Respondent is aware of no good :reason to further
complicate this matter by what she considers to be a fourth action (the first being the action
originally filed by John Cornell during his lifetime and now on appeal to district court; the second
being the probate of John Cornell's estate; the third being the Petition filed by Mrs. Cornell in this
action on February 26, 2013 and the subject of Respondent 's Motion to Dismiss that is set for
heming on June 4, 2013; and the fourth being the "new" TEDRA action). Even jf the judicial
economy alone were good cause for some degree of consolidatio~ Mrs. Cornell has not withdrawn

her Motion for Consolidation filed in this action on February 26, 2013, which seeks the
consolidation of this action with the probate action pursuant to I.R.C.P. 42(a) on the gr01.mds that
"consolidati on would expedite the Court's business and further the interests of the litigants."

Motion for Consolidation at 1 (citing Branom v. Smith Frozen Foods of Idaho, Inc., 83 Idaho 502,
OBJECTIO N TO MOTION

TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
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509, 365 P.d 985, 961 (1961)). Mrs. Cornell has never set said Motion for Consolidation for
hearing or otherwise pursued it, and her Motion to Stay Proceedings gives no good cause why she

now instead seeks to consolidate this action into the "new'' TEDRA case and why the district court
should now assmne jurisdiction where the Honorable Randall W. Robinson of the magistrate's
division has already presided over this matter, and the probate of John H. Cornell, deceased, for

many months, has issued multiple substantive opinions, and is familiar with the case.
Respondent is opposed to the consolidation of this Trust action into a probate action, or
both into the "new'' 1EDRA action, except for the limited purpose of resolving common questions
of law or fact, such as the essential question now pending before this Court through Respondent's

Motion to Dismiss set for hearing on June 4, 2013: do the claims of John Cornell or his Estate
related to the admm.istration of the Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M.
Cornell survive his death'?

This Court has already addresses that question once through its

Memorandum Opinion and Judgment for Dismissal entered on February 15, 2013. This Court
expressly gave Mrs. Comell 20 days from its February 2012 decision to file a Petition asserting any
additional claims, which it has done. No good cause has been shown why this proceeding should
be stayed due to her filing of a duplicative lawsuit in district court.
Mrs. Cornell's Motion to Stay Proceedings did not reference what authority her request
relies upon,. so Respondent can only make the following assumptions as to he.r true intent:

If Mrs. Cornell's true intent was to consolidate matters, then the proper remedy would have
been to pursue her previously filed Motion for Consolidation pursuant to I.R.C.P. 42(a). No good
cause for consolidation has been shown, however, because this proceeding concerns administration
of the Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell, and specifically whether
John Cornell's death e~tinguishes any potential claim he or his Estate may have related to said
Trust.

In comparison, the probate action concerning the Estate of John Cornell concerns the

determiuation of whether the will on file with the Court is valid; the determination of his heirs and
creditors, inventory of his estate (which would include any interest that his Estate :rnay have in the
above Trust, but also any other assets or encumbrances of the Estate), and distribution of said assets
accordingly. The only potential common question of law or fact is whether the Estate has any valid
(meaning not extinguished by Mr. Cornell's death) claim in the Trust, which is the subject of the
June 4, 2013 hearing. In detennining whether consolidation is appropriate, it is important to note
OBJECTION TO MOTION
TO STAY PROCEEDING S
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that I.R.C.P. 42(a) specifically authorizes the court to make such orders concerning proceedings as
"may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay." A stay in this proceeding would not avoid delay,

instead it would compound the l9ug sought resolution of this matter. Further, while the timing of
the Motion to Stay Proceedings is such that, if granted, Mrs. Cornell would avoid the cost of
preparing her response brief to the pending Motion to Dismiss, which is due on May 21. 2013.
However, the Court should also consider the unnecessary costs to Respondent: Respondent has now
borne the cost of active and continuous litigation over the issue of whether her brother's clai.ms
survive his death since August 2012. She has previously presented to the Court a Memorandum of

Costs and Attorney Fees indicating that her costs and attorney fees related to the "first" action alone
totaled $6?_488.50 as of March 1, 2013. She has additionally borne the cost of participating in the
.,
probate 'action, pursuing a Motion to Dismiss concerning Mrs. Cornell's Petition in this action
(including preparation of tbe supportive brief filed on May 7, 2013), :responding to formal discovery
and appearing for her deposition, and defending the appeal filed by Margaret Watkins despite
Margaret Watkins's appointment as temporary personal representative having been terminated
before the decision under appeal had been issued. LR.C.P. l(a) establishes that the civil rules are to
"be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of evecy action and
proceeding." For these reasons, if Mrs. Cornell's true intent with her Motion to Stay Proceedings
and ..new" TEDRA action were to consolidate matters, the resultant delay and procedural
complication is contrary to the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of this proceeding, and
should be denied.

If lVfrs. Cornell's true intent was to make additional allegations that were not included. in her
first Petition, then the proper remedy would have been to seek leave of this Court to amend her
Petition pursuant to l.R.C.P. 15(a). However, because the "new" 1EDRA petition merely restates
the procedural history of this case and the probate case, :no good cause for amendment or for further
delay to allow amendment has been sho~ particularly where this Court has allowed discovery to
proceed over Respondent's objections; which discovery has since included responses to
interrogatories and requests for production of documents, and Respondent's deposition.

If Mrs. Com.ell's true intent was to transfer this matter from the magistrate division of
district cou.rt to district court, then the property remedy would have been to request a transfer
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 8(a)(2). However, it is well settled under Idaho law that "proceedings in the
OBJECTION TO MOTION

TO STAY PROCEEDThTGS
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probate of wills and administration of estates of decedents. minors and incompetents" be assigned
to magistrate court. LC. § 1-2208. The probate of John H. Cornell, deceased (Clearwater County

Case No. CV 2012-439) clearly falls within these categories. The only reasonable conclusion that
can be drawn from a review of the Tmst and Estate Dispute and Resolutio n Act, which grants the
power and authority to administer and settle "(a) all matters concerning the estates and assets of
incapacitated, missing, and deceased persons, includmg matters involving nonprobate assets and
powers of attorney, .in accordance with this chapter; and (b) all trusts and trust mattersLr is that
actions brought under TEDRA also fall within the "administ ration of estates" tha.t are categorically
assigned to the ma.gistrate;s division.

For these reasons, no good ca.use for transfer of this

proceeding to district court has been shown.
If Mrs. Cornell's true intent was to seek a stay pursuant to LR.C.P. 83(i) due to the pending
appeal filed and pursued by Margaret Watkins; it would be :inappropriate to grant such a stay to

:Mrs. Cornell where she did not file a cross appeal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(g) within the time
allowed to either join in or supplement Margaret Watkins' appeal. Because Mrs. Cornell, as
personal representative, took no such action during the .time allowed, no good cause has been
shown why this Court should not proceed to determine whether to dismiss Mrs. Comell's Petition
filed February 26, 2013. The clear language of this Court in its Judgment for Dismissal was that
''Kareen Cornell, the personal representative for John Cornell's estate shall be given twenty days to
set forth in the above entitled action the claims of the estate[,] in its corresponding Memorandum

Order that ..Kareen shall be given twenty days to substitute for John and present issues free of the
pleadings filed by John's attorney during John's lifetime." The only reasonable reading of said
statements is that ::Mrs. Cornell was granted express authority to present issues not addressed by the
Court in said ruling. For the reasons discussed in further detail in Responde nt's Memorandum of

Law in Suppon of Second Motion to Dismiss, Mrs. Cornell has failed to present a claim that does
not fall within the Court's earlier ruling and survives the death of John H. Cornell. Jf :Mrs. Cornell
disputes this, then she has the opportunity to submit briefing in opposition to the pending Motion to
Dismiss on or before May 21, 2013.

If Mrs. Cornell's true intent was to relitigate the issues previously determined through this
Court's Memorandum Opinion and Judgment for Dismissal, then the appropriate remedy would
have been for Mrs. Cornell, as personal representative, to file a notice of appeal or notice of cross

OBJECTION TO MOTION
TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
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appeal under I.R.C.P. 83 within the time allowed. The releva
nt time period, which is jurisdictional,
has now ·expired and the record reflects Mrs. Cornell has elected not
to file an appeal. Mrs. Cornell
and the Estate can certainly participate in the appeal filed by Marga
ret Watkins, but will also be

bound by the decision of the district court, just as it is cunen tly bound
by the prior decision of this
court pendin g the outcom e of said appeal. It is Respo ndent' s
position, as will be further elaborated
upon in Respo ndent' s response brief in the appeal, that this Courf
s decision should be affirmed as
being supported by Idaho law, and also becau se appellant
Marga ret Watkins lacks standing to
appeal the Judgment for Dismissal. It is the district court' s
role to consider the appeal. That does
not deprive this Court from authority to determine whether Mrs.
Corne ll's opinio n of February 26,
2013 should be dismissed or not.
For these reasons, Respo ndent Toni Johnso n respectfully reques
ts that this Court deny :Mrs.
Corne ll's Motion to Stay Proceedings.
DATE D this 17th day of May, 2013.
JONE S, BROW ER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

By

~~
Karin Seube rt
Atto;mey for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HERE BY CERT IFY that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO
MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS was, this
17th day of May, 2013, transmitted via facsimile
to:
Darrel W. Aheri n
Aherin, Rice and Anego n
1212 Idaho St.
Lewiston, ID 83501

Theod ore O. Creas on
Creason, Moore, Dokke n & Geidl
1219 Idaho St.
Lewiston, ID 83501

6i ·. (ili. utL ~
OBJECTION TO MOTION
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Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563

Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC
1219 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 835
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Lewiston,ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-1516
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Facsimile: (208) 746-2231

:

-

I•

....

Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
)

In the Matter of:

)
)

THE ESTATE OF JOHN H. CORNELL,

) AlvffiNDED :PETITION
) · FOR CONSOLIDATION AND

and

)

ADiv.QNISIRATION OFTHEESTAIB OF

)
)

)
)

JOHN" H. CORNELL AND THE
REVOCABLE FA.MILX 1RUST OF
:MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL

)
)
)

LC.§§ 15~8-101 through 15-8-305

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAELS- CORNELL A.ND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

---------------

Case No. CV

COMES NOW Kareen Cornell, in her capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate

of Jobn H. Cornell (hereinafter "Petitioner") by and through b.er attor:ney of record, Theodore O.
Creason of Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl) PLLC, and hereby alleges as follows:

I.
1.1.

PARTIES

Petitioner is the personal representative of the Estate of John H. Cornell and

surviving spouse of John Henry Cornell and a resident of Minidoka County, Idaho.

TEDRAPETITION- 1

Creason, Moore, Dokken & ~r;ll, l'LLC
1;'.0. Drll.wer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501

(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-:2231
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The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell

(hereafter ''the Trust") was formed and has been administered in the State of Idaho; an action.
regarding the proper administration of the Trust is before the magistrate division of the District
Court of Clearwater County, Case No. CV 2012-277 (hereinafter, "the Trust Case").
1.3.

A Petition for Formal Probate of the Estate of John H. Cornell (hereafter "'the

Estate") is before the magistrate division of the District Court of Clearwater County; Case No.
CV 2012-439 (hereinafter, "the Estate Case").

II.
2.1.

JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter and the parties thereto pursuant to the

Idaho Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act, Idaho Code §§ 15-8-101 through 15-8-305.

2.2.

This Court is the proper venue for administration of the Estate pursuant to Idaho

Code§ 15-3-201.
2.3.

This Court is the proper venue for administration of the Trust pursuant to Idaho

Code§ 15-7-202.

III.
3.1.

FACTS

Michael S. Cornell and Adie M. Cornell created the Trust on November 1; 1996,

a copy of the Trust document is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
3.2.

John H. Cornell held an interest in the Trust upon the death of Michael S. Cornell

and Arlie M. Cornell.
3.3.

John H. Cornell his sole and separate real property into the Trost in the fonn of

Quit Claim Deed on or about January 3, 2007.
3.4.

Arlie M. Cornell died on November 9, 2008.

TEDRA PETITION - 2

Crci1$(1.1)1 Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PtLC
l>.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 8:3501
(203) 743-1516; Fax: (.208) 74o-2231
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On August 6, 2009, Michael S. Cornell amended the terms of the Trust from

ha-v-ing Joho H. Cornell and Toni C. Cornell serve as co-trustees of the Trust upon his death, to
designating Toni C. Camell as the sole trustee upon his death, a copy of

the

amendment is

attached hereto as Exhibit B.

3.6.

Michael S. Cornell died on December 15, 2009.

3.7.

John Henry Cornell instituted the Trust Case on July 11, 2012 by filing a. Petition

for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee.

3.8.

John Henry Cornell died on August 20, 2012.

3.9.

Petitioner is the surviving spouse of John Henry Cornell.

3.10.

Margaret Watkins, John Henry Cornell's aunt, instituted the Estate Case by filing

a Petition for Formal Probate of the Estate on November 13, 2012.
3.11.

In her petition, Watkins sought appointment as Personal Representative of the

Estate. Watkins offered a document for probate she alleges is the will of John H. Cornell.

Petitioner challenges the validity and authenticity of the document offered by Watkins.
Petitioner alleges John H. Cornell died intestate.
3.12.

On September 17, 2012, Toni C. Johnson, in her capacity as trustee of the Trust,

filed a motion to dismiss the Trust action on the grounds that because John Henry Cornell died
before distribution of the Trust, the entirety of the TIU.St res vested in Toni C. JohnsoIL

3.13. Petitioner filed an objection to the Watkins' petition on November 27, 2012, on
the grounds that Petitioner held priority to serve as personal representative in formal testacy or

administrator in intestacy.

TEDRA. PETITION - 3

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, FlLC
P.O. ;Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(20S) 743-1516; Fu: (208) 746-2231
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3.14.

On February 12, 2013, the magistrate court appointed Petitioner to serve as

Personal Representative in the Estate Case.
3.15.

On February 15, 2013, the magistrate court issued a memorandum opinion

dismissing John Comell;s claims in the Trust Case on the grounds that the causes of action did

not survive his death. The court e:xpressly provided Petitioner twenty (20) days in which to file
claims on behalf of the Estate in that case.
3.16.

Pursuant to the February 15 order, Petitioner filed a petition in the Trust Case on

February 26, 2013.
3.17.

Watkins filed an appeal of the Court's February 15 Order on April 2, 2013.

Watkins' appeal is currently pending before this Court.
3.18.

Cornell filed a motion to dismiss Petitioner's petition on May 7; 2013. ·

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore,. Petitioner prays as follows:
1.

That the Court consolidate the Trust Case and the Estate Case mth this TEDRA

action pursuant to Idaho Code§ 15-3-202(3).
2.

That the Court remove Tooi C. Johnson as Trustee of'the Trust.

3.

Tbat the Court appoint Petitioner, in her capacity as Personal Representative of

the Estate> as Trustee of the Trust.
4.

That the Court order the Trust be subject to supervised administration.

5.

That Petitioner be awarded reasonable attorneys fees for those fees personally

incurred in pursuit of this action.

TEDJ.U PETTI10N - 4

Cr!:llSOn, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawtr 835, Lewiston, ID 3J50l
0

(208) 743-1516; Fu:: (:208) 746'2231
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That petitioner be awarded such other and further relief as the Court may deem

just and equitable.
DATED this 16th day of May, 2013.
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC.

heodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563
Attorneys for Petitioner

T:EDRA PE'fffiON ~ 5

Creason, Moore, Dokken & G~idJ, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, IO 83S0l
(208) 74J-.1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of May, 2013, I filed the foregoing

PETITION FOR CONSOLIDATION AND AD1\1INISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN
H. CORNELL AND Tiffi RECOVABLE FAlvfIL Y TRUST OF MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND

ARLIE M. CORNELL with the Clerk of the Court, and provided a paper copy to the following
persons:

Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice & Anegon
1212 Idaho Street
P. 0. Drawer 698
Levviston. ID 83501
(via Valley Messenger)

TEDRA l'ETITION - 6

Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.LC.
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box. 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
(via Valley Messenger)

Cm1so1,1, Mix,,c, DoJ<l<.i,n & Geidl, PLLG· ·
P.O. l'.l,a.wer 83S, Lewiston, ID 83501

(208) _743-1516; Fu: (20S) 746<Z231
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Karin Seubert
JONES , BROW ER & CALLE RY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law

Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewisto n, ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813

lN THE DISTR ICT COURT OF THE SECON D JUDICI AL DISTR ICT OF
THE
STATE OF IDAHO , IN AND FOR THE COUNT Y OF CLEAR WATE R

In the Matter of:

)

)
THE REVOC ABLE FAMIL Y TRUST OF
MICHA EL S. CORNE LL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

Case No. CV 2012-00 277

)
)
)

MOTIO N TO AUGM ENT RECORD

COME S NOW Appellee Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attorney
of record, Karin
Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., and moves this Court pursuan
t to I.R.C.P. 83(q) and

I.AR. 30, hereby moves this honorable Court for an order augmen ting the clerk's
record to add the
following docume nts from the collateral matter In the Matter of the Estate
of John H Cornell,
deceased, Clearwa ter County Case No. CV 2012-00 439:

l.

Order of Appoin tment of Tempor ary Persona l Represe ntative entered Novem
ber 15,
2012 (certified copy attached hereto as Exhibit A);

2.

Order Appoin ting Persona l Representative entered Februar y 12, 2013 (certifie
d copy
attached hereto as Exhibit B); and

3.

Registr y of Action as of May 7, 2013 (copy attached hereto as Exhibit C).

The specific grounds for the request are that said docume nts are necessa ry
in order to allow
the District Court to be fully advised when detenni ning whethe r Appella
nt Margar et Watkin s has
MOTIO N TO AUGMENT RECOR D

- 1-
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standing to pursue her appeal.

DATEDthis [ ] dayofMay,2013.

JONES, BRO"\VER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

By----1"-'t~~-=---s.,.~~~K.arin Seubert
Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY tbat a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO
AUGMENT RECORD was, this f l day of May,

2013,
hand-delivered by providing a
copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;
mailed, postage pre-paid,
. / by first class mail; or
transmitted via facsimile
to:
Darrel W. Aherin

Aherin, Rice and Anegon
1212 Idaho St.

P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501

Theodore O. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, P.L.L.C.
1219 Idaho St.

P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

By~~~
Karin Seubert

MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD
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AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON ·
Darrel W. Aherin
1212 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698
. (208) 746-3646

ISB# 1534
Attorneys for Petitioner

IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND nJDICIAL DISTRJCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

IN TIIB MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
JOHN HENRY CORNELL,

ORDER OF APPOINTMENT OF

TEMPORARY PERSONAL
Deceased. -

REPRESENTATIVE

Upon consideration of the Petition for Appointment of Temporary Personal
Representative for the Estate of Jolm Henry Cornell, deceased, filed by Darrel W. Aherin,
attorney for petitioner, Margaret Watkins, and the Court being fully apprised of the matter, the

Court finds:
L

The petitioner, Margaret Watkins, is qu.a.Jified to be appointed temporary personal

representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell;
2.

That venue is proper;

3.

That the best interest of the Estate of John Henry Cornell will be served by the

appointment of Margaret Watkins as temporary personal representative;
THEREFORE, Margaret Watkins is hereby appointed temporary personal representative
of the Estate of John Henry Cornell ·pending the hearing on the Petition for Formal Probate of

Will and Formal Appointment of Personal Representative~ or sixty (60) days, whichever occurs

last.
ORDER OF APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE -- 1
N:\Comell, Es1'1~ of John 1-1\Ple~dings\Order of Temporary App-0intment.doex -ser

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
Lewlston, !daho

~J;J;-A,
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JUDG E

STATE OF IDAl-10
County of Ci,;,arwa·:sr
I h,;ir,:;,by c.::-::1:iy ,h.:it ,he foregoing i5> a furl, true
ar.d ¢')!i'ect c-)~y d fln instium 2nt as the same
now refr'.air:<a on file '3.nci cf raco,cl :n my office.

Wm\1~

hand and official seal hereto

this~ dayo Lf\'" )

~

13:

A.D. 20

.

CAR.FliE BIRO, CLERK OFHE DISTRICT
COURT
O AUOlTOR &; RECORDER

By Dep

•

ORDE R OF APPO INTM ENT OF TEMP ORAR Y
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE -- 2

N:\Cornell, Estate of John H\l'leadings\Ordet of Temporary Appointment.docx
-ser

Aherin , Rice & Anegon
Attorrie ys at Law
Lewiston, Idaho
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Theodore 0. Creason/ISB #1563 Samuel T. Creason, ISB #8183
_
. CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL; PLLC
1219 Idaho Street
P .0, Drawer 835

Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-1516
_Facsimile: (208) 746u223 l

Attorney for Surviving Spouse
Of Jolm Henry Cornell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TBE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDABO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

IN THE MATIER OF THE ESTATE

Case No. CV 2012-439
I,

· ORDER APPOINTMENTING
·. PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

OF
JOHN HENRY CORNELL,

Deceased.

The petitioner Kareen Cornell for an adjudication of intestacy and determination
of heirs having come before the Court, the Colllt makes the following findings:

1.

John Cornell died on August 20, 2012, at the age of 47 years. At the time
of his death, the decedent was domicHed in Minidoka County, State of·
Idaho.

0:RDER APPOINTMENTI:NT

PERSONAL REPRESENTAUVE ·~ 1

Creason, Moor~ Dokl..en & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Di-aw11:r 83S, Lewi$ti)p lD 83501
(:Z08)743-l5l6; J!'!l.X(:208)746-2231
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2.

No adjudication has been made of whether Decedent died intestate. No
Will has been admitted to probate.

3

The decedent was survived by the following persons:

Kareen Cornell
4.

Address

Relationship

P. 0. Box361
Heyburn, Idaho 83336

Spouse

· Movant' s Petition sets forth her priority as · surviving spouse to

appointment as personal representative.of the Estate.
WHEREFORE, PETITIONER REQUESTS that the Court issue an order
appointing Kareen Cornell Personal Representative of the Estate of John Cornell and
terminating the appointment of acting temporary personal representative, Margaret
Watkins.

DATED tbisZ·-Z. day of February, 2013.

STATE OF IDAHO

ORDER APPOrnThIBNTrnT
P'.ERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - 2

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Qejdl, l'LLC
P.O. Drawer S35, Lewiston ID 83501
(208)743-1516; Fax(208)146-2231
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Date: 5/14/2013

. Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County

Time: 11 :57 AM

ROA Report

.

Page 1 of 3

T-483 P0020/0022 F-403
User: JJENSEN

case: CV-2012-00004 39 current Judge: Randall W. Robinson
In The Matter Of The Estate Of John Henry Cornell Deceased

In The Matter Of The Estate Of John Henry Come II Deceased
Date

Code

User

11/13/2012

NCFE

JALlAIN

New Case Filed - Formal Estate

JALLAIN

Filing: A5 - Petition for formal probate Paid by: Randall W. Robinson
Aherin, Rice & Anegon Receipt number. 0003570
Dated: 11/13/2012 Amount $96.00 (Cashiers
Check) For: Watkins, Margaret (other party)

JALLAIN

Other party: Watkins, Margaret Appearance

APER

Judge
Randall W. Robinson

Randall W. Robinson

Darrel W. Aherin

11/15/2012

11/20/2012

PETN

JALLAIN

Petition for Formal Probate of Will and Formal
Appointment of Personal Representative (Idaho
Code 15-3-402)

AFFD

JALLAIN

AFFD

JALlAIN

Affidavit of Attesting Witness of Margaret Watkins Randall W. Robinson
,.
Affidavit of Attesting Witness of Lillian D Beckman Randall W. Robinson

ACAP

JALLAIN

Acceptance Of Appointment - Margaret Watkins

Randall W .. Robinson

PETN

JALLAIN

Petition for Appointment of Temporary Personal
Representative

Randalt W. Robinson

ACAP

JALlAIN

}:\cceptance Of Appointment as Temporary
Person.al Representative

Randall W. Robinson

JALLAIN

Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The.Same Randall W. Robinson
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by: ·
Aherin, Rice & Anegon Receipt number: 0003571
Dated: 11/13/2012 Amount: $4.00 (Cashiers
Check)

NOTC

JALLAIN

Notice of Petition and Hearing (IC 15-1-401)

Randall W. Robinson

HRSC

JALLAIN

Hearing Scheduled (Formal Probate~Appt of
Personal Representative 11/27/2012 12:30 PM)

Randall W. Robinson ·

ORDR

JALLAIN

Order of Appointment of Temporary Persoanl
Representative

Randall W. Robinson

MISC

JALLA!N

Temporary Letter - Temporary appointment of
Margaret Watkins as Temporary Personal Rep

Randall W. Robinson

NOTC

BARBIE

Corrected Notice of Petition and Hearing

11/27/2012

JALLAIN

JALLAJN

Randall W. Robinson

Randall W. Robinson
Filing: J1 Lr Probate, Demand for notice Paid by: Randall W. Robinson
Karin Seubert Receipt number: 0003701 Dated:
11/27/2012 Amount $9.00 (Cashiers Check) For.
Watkins, Margaret (other party)

Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Creason
Moore Dokken & Geidl, PLLC Receipt number:
. 0003702 Dated: 11/27/2012 Amount $66.00
(Cashiers Check) For: Cornell, John Henry
(subject)

Randall W. Robinson ·

DENO

JALLAIN

Demand For Notice

Randall W. Robinson

NOTC

JALLAIN

Notlce of Appearance - Theodore O Creason

Randall W. Robinson

OBJC

JALLAIN

Objection to Petition for Formal Probate of wm
and Formal Appointment of Personal
Representative

Randall W. Robinson
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Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County

Time: 11 :57 AM

User: JJENSEN

ROA Report

Page 2 of 3

Case: CV-2012-0000439 Current Judge: Randall W Robinson
111 The Matter Of The Estate Of John Henry Cornell Deceased

In The Matter Of The Estate Of John Henry Cornell Deceased

Date

Code

User

11/27/2012

CONT

KBROWNI NG

Hearing result for Formal Probate-Appt of
Personal Representative scheduled on
11/27/2012 12:30 PM: Continued

Randall W. Robinson

HRSC

KBROWNING

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
12/26/2012 08:30 AM)

Randall W. Robinson

APER

KBROWNI NG

Other party: Cornell, Toni Appearanc e Karin
Seubert

Randall W. Robinson

APER

KBROWNI NG

Other party: Cornell, Kareen Appearance
Theodore 0. Creason

Randall W. Robinson

KBROWNI NG

Judge

Notice Of Hearing

Randall W. Robinson

CMIN

KBROWNI NG

Court Minutes

Randall W. Robinson

PETN

JALU\IN

Petition for Formal Adjudication of Intestacy and
Formal Appointment of Personal Representative

Randall W. Robinson

MOTN

JALLAIN

Motion for Order Restraining Acting' Personal
Representative (IC15-3-401)

Randall W. Robinson

MEMO

JALLAIN

Memorandum in Support Re: Petition for Formal Randall W. Robinson
Adjudication of Intestacy and Formal Appointment
of Personal Repr~sentati"'.e

12/26/2012

HRHD

JALLAIN

Hearing result for Status Conferenc e schedu[ed
on 12/26/2012 08:30 AM:. Hearing Held- Off
Record

Randall W. Robinson

12/27/2012

HRSC

JALLAIN

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 02/06/2013
02:00 PM - 5:00 PM)

Randall W. Robinson

JALLAIN

Notice Of Hearing for Court Trial

Randall W. Robinson

12/19/2012

1/18/2013

LETI

JALLAJN

Amended Temporary Letters

Randall W. Robinson

2/4/2013

MOTN

BARBIE

Motion To.Mediate·

Randall W. Robinson

2/6/2013

HRHD

JALLAIN

Randall

2/12/2013

OROR

BARBIE

Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on
02/06/2013 02:00 PM: Hearing Held - issue to
be addressed at another hearing
Order Appointing Personal Representative

LTRA

BARBIE

Letters of Administration

2/13/2013

0BJC

JALLAIN

2/22/2013

HRSC

JALLAIN

2/26/2013

HRHD

w. Ropinson

Randall W. Robinson

Randall W. Robinson
Objection to Proposed Order Appointing Personal Randafl W. Robinson ·
Representative
Hearing Scheduled (Objection 02/26/2013 11:00 Randall W. Robinson
AM)

JALLAIN

Notice Of Hearing

Randall W. Robinson

JALLAIN

Hearing result for Objection scheduled on
02/26/2013 11:00 AM: Hearing Held

Randall W. Robinson
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Case: CV-2012-0000439 Current Judge: Randall W. Robinson
In The Matter Of The Estate Of John Henry Cornell Deceased

In The Matter Of The Estate Of John Henry Cornell Deceased

Date

Code

User

2/26/2013

CMIN

JALLAIN

Judge
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Objection
Hearing date: 2126/2013
Time: 11 :12 am

Randall W. Robinson

courtroom:
Court reporter: None
Minutes Cleric Jodie E. Altain
Tape Number:
Ted Creason
sam Creason
Karin Seubert
Darrel Aherin - telephonically
5/6/2013

LTST

JALLAIN

Letters Of Testamentary

Randall W. Robinson ·

NOCR

JALLAIN

Probate Notice To Creditors

Randatl W. Robinson

374

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THt
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

COURT MINUTES

CV-2012-0000277
The Matter of Michael S Cornell
Hearing type: Motion to Stay Proceedings
Hearing type: Motion Hearing
Hearing date: 05/17/2013
Time : 2:35 PM - 2:57 PM, 4:00 PM - 4:14 PM
Judge: Randall W. Robinson
Courtroom: 001
Court reporter: None
Minutes Clerk: Jodie
Tape Number: CD563-1
The Honorable Randall W. Robinson presiding.
Present in Court:
Samuel Creason, Karin Seubert,
2:35

Court - introduces all present. Explains Request for today's hearing, Motion for Stay of
Proceedings; Appeal - does not feel that Mr. Aherin has the S4B Certification needed
to Appeal.

2:37

Mr. Creason - explains reason to proceed with the TEDRA for Judge Griffin to review

2:38

Court- explains the Idaho State Rule 1-2208 which provides the Magistrate to handle
Estate Matters.

2:42

Mr. Creason - hopes to resolve all in one court with one Judge

375

2:43

Court- explains reason for leaving this case in Magistrate Court Idaho State Rule 12208 (2)

2:45

Ms . Seubert - Respectfully disagrees with Mr. (reason's reason for moving this case to
District Court. This is a classic case always assigned to Magistrate Court.
Time for Appeal is passed
Should consider taking care of all issues that have not been dealt with
Feels her client deserves some answers
Has filed an Objections Brief

2:48

Mr. Creason - does not have Brief in front of him
Requesting a Break to review the Brief that was faxed to his office this morning
Concerns about proper procedures for continuing

2:50

Court - Clarifies issues

2:51

Colloquy between Court and Counsel regarding clarifying the issues, Personal
Representative and Appeal

2:56

Court - Recess for Mr. Creason to review paperwork, will resume at 4:00 PM today

4:00

Court - Resumes
Mr. Creason -Apologizes for the Delay and gives reasons for:
TEDRA is to Consolidate
Appeal is in District Court
Address the Estate/Trust? Dismissal?
If Consolidated :
Grant Petition to Consolidate by District?
Stay in Magistrate Court- issues from Claims before John Cornell's death
New issues have come up and go to Appeal?

4:05

Colloquy between Court and Counsel regarding issues brought up by Mr. Creason

4:11

Court - Denies Motion for the Stay

4:13

Ms. Seubert - confirms schedule for June 4, 2013
3:00 PM with Hearing with District Court
4:00 PM Motion to Dismiss with Judge Robinson

4:14

Recess
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Karin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 854

1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813

IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 1HE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:

)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

THE REVOCABLE FAivllLY TRUST OF )
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. )
CORNELL.
)

NOTICE OF HEARING

)

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that KARIN R. SEUBERT of the firm of JONES,

BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C., attorney ofrecord for the Appellee, Toni Johnson, gives notice
that she will call on for hearing the undersigned's Motion to Augment Record, the 4th day of June,

20 13, at the hour of 3:00 p.m. or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard in the Courtroom of the
District Court at Clearwater County Courthouse, Orofino, Idaho, Honorable Michael Griffin
presiding.

DATED this

17 day ofMay, 2013.
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

Byd::~~
S.USERT
' KARIN R.
Attorney for Toni Johnson

NOTICE OF HEARING

'

'

r

-1-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document was,
this__ti day of May, 2013,

hand-delivered by providing a
copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;
mailed, postage pre-paid,
by first class mail; or
~ transmitted via facsimile
to:
Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice and Anegon
1212 Idaho St.

P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501
Theodore 0. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Gei~l, P.L.L.C.
1219 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

By~~~
' Karin Seubert

NOTICE OF HEARING

-2-
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LMAY 2 0 2013 _
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
IN THE MATT ER OF
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY
TRUST OF MICHA EL S. CORNELL
AN ARLIE M. CORN ELL

)

)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 2012-277
ORDER

)

Defendant.
___ ___ ___
___ __

)
)
)

Oral argument was heard on May 17, 2013 on the Motion of Kareen
Cornell to Stay Proceeding with Samuel Creason representing Kareen
Cornell,
Petitioner and Personal Representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornel
l, and
Karin Seubert representing the Respondent, Toni Johnson. After consid
ering the

V

Motion, the oral argument, and the file,
Karreen Cornell's Motion to Stay the Proceedings IS HEREBY DENIE
D on
the basis that this Court has original jurisdiction of the action to the exclus
ion of
any other actions that have subsequently been filed to the above entitled
action
and for such additional reasons as set forth on the record.
Dated this

7&1.. day of May, 2013.

Randall W Robinson, Magistrate Judge

ORDER-1
379

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct cofil' of the foregoing Order was
mailed, postage pre-paid, or delivered on the c2.0 day of May, 2013,
to:
Samuel Creaon
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Box 698
Lewiston, ID 83501
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Callery, PLLC
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501

CARRIE BIRD

By:

ORDER-2
380

C.'/o20lc1 · ;J..,f

. i~.*rt)

MAY 2 2 2013
Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC
1219 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-1516
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231
Attorneys for Personal Representative
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell

('

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWAT ER

In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABL E FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

- -- - - - - - - - - - -- - -

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277
AFFIDAVIT OF THEODORE 0.
CREASON CERTIFYIN G A PORTION
OF THE DEPOSITIO N OF TONI C.
JOHNSON AND EXHIBITS OF APRIL
22, 2013

)
) ss
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE )

STATE OF IDAHO

THEODORE 0. CREASON, comes now, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and
says:
1.

That he is the attorney of record for for Kareen Cornell, suriving spouse and
Personal Representative of the Estate of John H. Cornell.

2.

11
That on the 22 d day of April, 2013, Affiant took the deposition under oath of

Toni C. Johnson.

AFFIDAVIT OF THEODORE 0. CREASON CERTIFYING A
PORTION OF THE DEPOSITION OF TONI C. JOHNSON AND

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231

EXHIBITS OF APRIL 22, 2013 - 1
381

3.

That Exhibits A, B, C, D, and E attached hereto are portions of testimony and
exhibits to said deposition.

4.

These portions of the deposition transcript and exhibits are provided to the Court
in support of the Memorandum in Opposition Re: Motion to Dismiss filed
herewith.

~ o~~
heodore 0 . Creason, ISB#l563

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

2/'! f.ay, May, 2013.

CLAIRE A. BOYER
Notarv Public
State of Idaho
(SEAL)

Notary Public in and for sai tate,
residing at or employed in Lewiston.
My Commission Expires: (, /10/17

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21 st day of May, 2013, I filed the foregoing
AFFIDAVIT CERTIFYING A PORTION OF THE DEPOSITION OF TONI C.
JOHNSON AND EXHIBITS OF APRIL 22, 2013, with the Clerk of the Court, and delivered
via first claim mail to the following person:

Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C.
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501

Toeodore 0 . Creason, ISB #1563

AFFIDAVIT OF THEODORE 0. CREASON CERTIFYING A
PORTION OF THE DEPOSITION OF TONI C. JOHNSON AND

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231

EXHIBITS OF APRIL 22, 2013 - 2
382

Q.

Q.

Sure.
2

A.

I haven't seen this before.

Q.

When did you first become aware that you were

8

and Arlie M. Cornell?

10
11

(Shakes head negatively.

Q.

-- at that time?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

When did you first become aware that you were

I can 't recall right now.

6

Q.

Were your parents both living at the time

7

the Successor Trustee and not Co-Trustee of the Trust?

9

brother drove my dad down to Alison Brandt, and they

A.

A.

I can't recall.

Q.

Were you present - - this document - - let's

back up just a bit .

This document, Exhibit No. 6,

12

indicates that it was executed on the 6th of August,

13

2009.

14

A.

A.

that you became aware of that fact?

9

Were you involved in any discussions

about making a change in the Revocable Trust --

a Trustee of the Revocable Trust of Michael S . Cornell
5

Okay.

At that time your mother was deceased, am I

right?

I don't recall the date.

All I know is my

10

came back with a paper somewhat similar to this and

11

showed it to me.

12

recall the date.

That's when I knew, but I don't

i

13

Q.

That's when you knew what?

14

A.

That I had become the Successor of the

Trustee.

15

A.

Correct.

15

16

Q.

Okay, and at that time you were living with

16

Q.

Did you discuss that with John?

17

A.

Not especially .

18

Q.

When you say not especially, I ' m not sure

19

what you mean.

20

A.

I'm trying to be fair here.

21

Q.

I just want you to tell me -- answer the

17

your father, correct?
A.

18
19
20
21

Yes.

I was caregiving for him .

He was

dying.

Q.

Okay, and this document apparently was

notarized by Alison M. Brandt, am I right?

22

A.

Apparently so.

22

question.

23

Q.

And it purports to make a change to t he

23

fairness.

24
25

Do you understand that to be true?

Revocable Trust.
A.

Yes, sir.

You let somebody else worry about the

I don't recall.

24

A.

Okay.

25

Q.

Okay, you can give that to her, please.
K & K REPORTING ( 208) 7 43-1380

K & K REPORTING (208) 74 3- 1380
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1

1

is Exhibit No . 7.
A.

Okay .

Q.

Have you ever seen that document before?

I

stapled it together with No. 8.
A.

6
7

Thank you.

No problem .

I appreciat e that.

I have not seen this document before.
Do you know who Hurd Thornton is?

Q.

Okay.

9

A.

I've never heard of that person .

10

Q.

All right.

I'm going to show you -- before

Q.

Has anybody discussed with you, other than

2

Alison Brandt, what your duties and powers as Trustee,

3

Co- Trustee, or Successor Trustee for the Cornell
Revocable Trust would be?

apologize to you, too, because it looks like they
5

5

A.

I can't recall at this time .

6

Q.

Other than Ms. Seubert .

7

A.

Nobody -- well - - I don't recall.

8

Q.

Does Ms. Brandt no longer represent the

9

Trust?

10

A.

Absolutely not, sir .

Q.

Did you terminate her services?

11

we leave that topic were you aware back in 1996 that

11

12

you and your brother John were named as the

12

A.

I did, sir.

13

Co-Trustees, Co-Successor Trustees of your parents'

13

Q.

When did you terminate her services?

14

Trust?

14

A.

I don't recall, but I did send her a

15
16
17
18
19

I did not read it.

A.

I did not.

Q.

Did you know that you were named as a

Co-Trustee with your brother John?
A.

Well, I was under the impression that I was

in charge of everythi ng.

This

Something got changed

15

certified letter, return receipt, that I would no

16

longer need her.

17

let me rephrase that , please.

18

up with my brother's attorney, and at some point I

19

fired her, and I don't recall exactly when that was.

Q.

Shortly this was after sometime
She kept mucking things

Was this after your father had died?

20

somewhere along the line, and I don't know anything

20

21

more about it.

21

A.

Yes, sir.

22

Q.

Okay.

22

Q.

And who was your brother's attorney at that

23

A.

Okay.

23

24

Q.

Have you seen that document before?

24

A.

Mr. Aherin.

25

A.

25

Q.

And then I'm going to hand you Exhibit No . 9.

I've handed you No. 8 there.

have not.
K & K REPORTING
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A.

Okay.

Q.

Plays, okay.

Q.

A little earlier in the deposition, Ms.

A.

Plays, spotting scope.

Johnson, you referred to some list that was made out

3

shotguns.

5

multitude of electronic equipment; i.e, meters, etc,

6

and then he scratched something out.

7

equipment and tools, one camping lantern.

8

my brother wrote:

10

A.

Yes, sir, it is.

Q.

Okay.

A.

In parts it's mine, in parts it is my

Whose handwriting is that?

Q.

10

And when you say parts of it are your

A.

Yes, that is correct.

13

Q.

Okay.

12

Tell me, if you would, please, which

entrees are his and which are yours.

A.

15

Okay, to make this extremely clear, I wrote

16

down on the top items John wants and No. 1 was table

17

with basically antique gold claws.

18

it.

Then he initialed

The second was a matching

That's what he wanted.

There

19

desk, and he initialed that's what he wanted.

20

was one China closet that belonged to the Trust and one

21

that belonged to me.

22

that when the house sold.

23

says -- my brother wrote this:

24

s-t-o-1-e-s -- something LA sisters.

25

can't read the writing.
K

&

I recall that now.

He wanted

Q.

So, is that your handwriting, the last line,

13

A.

Yes, sir, it is.

14

Q.

Okay.

15

says 2/22/10?

16

A.

17

Q.

Was that the date that this list was written?

18

A.

Yes, sir, between he and I.

19

Q.

And who has the original of this list?

20

A.

Ms. Seubert does.

21

Q.

Okay.

Now, there is a date at the top.

You seem to indicate that some entrees

And then the next item it

22

or cross-outs or something were made after the time

If bar stoles,

23

that the list was made.

K REPORTING

I'm sorry.

I

A.

My brother, John Cornell.

25

Q.

And did he send those changes back to you or
K & K REPORTING (208) 743-1380

kkreport@wildblue.net

70

I had come home -- or I can't

exactly recall all the circumstances, but we had done

1

account, checking account, credit union, savings, that

2

was in the Wells Fargo.

3

everything that was in the Trust to the best of my
knowledge on these sheets of paper here.

the list because we were trying to figure out who

4

5

wanted what and at that time I came back later and he

5

6

made a little adjustment, and I didn't say anything.

6

Q.

7
8
9

Did he take certain items with him at that

time?
A.

Who made changes to it?

24

(208)743-1380

did he leave them with you or what?
No, sir.

So, was that a true and accurate inventory of

property that you considered to be in the Trust?

7

A.

The very best of my knowledge.

8

Q.

On the second to last page at the very bottom

9

I don't remember exactly the date, but he

Q.

And then I described

there is an entry that says promise to Margaret

10

Watkins.

11

A.

Yes.

contend that he injured you?

12

Q.

What was promised to Margaret Watkins?

13

A.

Yes, sir.

13

A.

She asked me at one point, you know, you

14

Q.

So the last time you saw John was somewhere

14

asked me if I wanted something, and she says, yes,

15

want the binding machine.

16

her.

10
11
12

15
16
17
18

took an entire car full of stuff with him.
Q.

Was this at or about the time that you

near 2/22/2010; is that right?
A.

Roughly.

Q.

Okay.

So, I agreed to give it to

17

Q.

Have you done that?

you recognize Exhibit No. 10?

18

A.

No, sir.

Q.

There's also just above that an entry that I

Showing you now Exhibit No. 10.

Do

It is still at the house.

19

A.

I do, sir.

19

20

Q.

And who wrote that out?

20

can't quite understand.

antique typewriter John took home.

It says something about
It belonged to

21

A.

I did.

21

22

Q.

What is that supposed to be?

22

Marlene aunt?

A.

In other words Alison Brandt told me to write

23

A.

Correct.

She

24

Q.

When did this typewriter get taken home?

25

A.

I believe he did that when we did the

23

It

Yes, sir.

69

A.

Other

Prior we initialed that,

says hope chest to John?

kkreport@wildblue.net

2

Underneath

but he hadn't written that down at that point.

11

brother's you are talking about John?

A lot of

Most there are a set of two.

stuff unusable by my sister.

12

3

And I wrote, John requested a

wrote that.

4

Is this the list you were referring to?

brother's.

14

John initialed it,

Then Toni to retain

Okay.

that had something to do with items of property in the
Trust.

11

then I initialed it.

24

down how much the house was for sale at that time.

25

asked what accounts do you have.
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3

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Now you have in front of you the dark

2

shotgun.

3

red spiral binder.
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

What is that?

A.

This is accounting for J anuary 2012 and April

5

And I just kept copies of all of

my related expenses.

9

it, and like I said, I would like to make sure that as
This is basically

I sold a

I've sold some of my own jewelry.

Q.

Do you have records of that?

A.

I believe I have records of the jewelry, but
It just gives the

it doesn't say what ' s sold or not.
items that I gave to them.

It is called t he Diamond

Shop, and for a percentage they take a percentage and

of 2012 I began spending all my own money on Trust and
8

r sold' some handguns.

Okay.

8

then when they sell your jewelry they give you the
money.
Q.

10

Okay.

I see..

I will ask any more about the

10

of 4/12 I was paying for everything.

11

it, and then again when I was still using Trust funds

11

12

put that information back.

Anything with a dot on it

12

A.

Okay.

13

meant it was Trust related.

13

Q.

But we will have this one marked as

14

Q.

Now, when you say you spent your own

I see.

14

15

money, I gather you mean on maintaining the Trust

15

16

property; is that right?

16

17
18
19

A.

Yes, sir .

17

Q.

When you say your own money are you talking

18

A.

Yes, sir .

21

Q.

Okay.

22

that you used?

23

A.

24

Was there any other assets of your own

Yes, sir .

I've sold some of my own

belongings .

25

Q.

Deposition Exhibit No . 16.
(Deposition Exhibit No . 16
was then marked for identification.)

And what was that?

(By Mr . Creason) We have the dark green

Q.

What is that?

spiral binder next .
A.

19

about the $10,000 your mother give you?

20

records of that.

There is a lot of personal information

Okay .

20

in here and -- okay, let me see .

21

so

22

Q.

Of 2009, correct?

23

A.

Yes.

Dad died in December

So, basically the only thing that would

24

be of interest, I believe, to you, sir, and, Mr.

25

Aherin, is this is in-part some of mine and some of the
K & K REPORTING
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49

1

Trust expenses, and at that time I hadn't written

1

sense of having those recopied; is that all right with

2

anything down on the back of the paper as I have with

2

everybody?

3

the other ones to document other funds I had spent .

3

Q.

I see.

5

A.

It's right here, this one right here

6

(indicating.)

6

MR . CREASON:

8

5

Q.

A.

was then marked for identification.)
MR . CREASON:

Inside Deposition 17 there is also

(By Mr. Creason) Are any of those active

records, Ms . Johnson?

In other words , do you make

I can't recall right now at this time exactly

the date that I stopped recording, but I do have

(Deposition Exhibit No. 17
10

That's fine .
(Nods head affirmatively.)

daily entrees on either of these, 14, 15 , 16, or 17?

Have this marked as Deposition

Exhibit 17 .

11

MS. SEUBERT:
MR. AHERIN:

In other words, I have recorded

10

information.

11

everything to the best of my knowledge up until like

12

some loose pieces of -- looks like perhaps an HVAC

12

4/2012, and then the rest of the information that was

13

invoice , just some mail and some invoices along with

13

in there, I believe.

What we' 11 do is have that -- I think what

14

Q.

Okay.

We' 11 have them returned to you as

14

some notes.

15

we' 11 do is ask the Reporter to make a precise

15

16

duplicate so that you can have your original records

16

A.

Thank you.

17

back.

17

Q.

And you have in front of you, then , also some

18

manila folders.

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

One of which I think has already been marked

Thank you.

18

A.

19

MR. CREASON :

20

And all of us can have a copy that

doesn't interrupt your bookkeeping, okay?
Thank you very much.

21

A.

22

MR. CREASON:

Do you have any obje ctions , Darrel ,

quickly as possible, then.

21

as Deposition Exhibit No. 13 and t hen what are the

22

other manila folders that you have?
A.

Okay.

Please excuse me for a moment.

23

or, Karin, to having us just have the Reporter take

23

24

care of the copying of this because there is a lot of

24

wrong papers inside.

25

blank pages in these spiral notebooks.

25

spoke of.

K & K REPORTING
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I don't see the

The

That was the exhibit that you

The other exhibit -- excuse me.

This was a
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EXHIBIT

I

-g
390

Q.

cas'iier's check made to Idaho State Tax Commission for
It was a cashier's check from Lewis Clark

my father.
3

Credit Union, and that's in that folder.
Going to have to ask you just a few questions

Q.

5

because now I think I'm beginning to understand your

6

filing system a little bit.

9

17
18

5

A.

On this one I don't recall.

Q.

Did you make the entries on these

Q.

And it might help us keep things straight.

8

recorded occurred?
A.

On what has been marked as Deposition Exhibit No. 13,
10

I'm not sure what you mean by the event

occurred.
Well, did you make these spreadsheets or have

-·-···---...Jiir.
_!:~.,

11

--·

13

A.

IIP, it's not.

17

be marked as Deposition Exhibit No. 18 is -- I'm going

Q.

I see.

18

to ask that the Reporter copy the folder label, as well

19

as the document inside.

20

an Idaho State Tax Commission check stub.

Accounting for 2009 and 10; is that ac_curill.1
A.

A.

Q.

12

I did, sir.

14

Okay, and is it CQlll!l~ to the best of your

15

Were there others of these

-

spreadshe~ts that have been lost, destrQYed, or

20

someplace else?
-x:··"No, sir.

_..,

..,..,.,,,_...

22

Q.

23

A.

~-~~~--

-

A.

Because I was under extreme duress to

22

~-!:

lost both-my

24

t h a t ~ ~ u s . t . . a t that ti.mil I

25

pare~~s.l:-Jiig_ the best I could at that tinJ.e.
K & K REPORTING

Yes, sir.

(Deposition Exhibit No. 18
was marked for identification.)
And the next one, which is going to

MR. CREASON:

21

Why is it not complete?

Okay.

Q.

them made back in 2010?

16

knowledge?

19
21

basis or what, on the spreadsheets?

spreadsheets at or near the time that the event

of it:

16

did you make these entrees on a monthly basis or daily

4

7

11

15

3

Okay, certainly.

the folder, that is, the manila folder, says at the top

14

Okay, and did you do these records at or

about the time that the entry was -- in other words,

A.

10
12
13

2

Q.

(By Mr. Creason) Now, what's the next one we

have, Ms. Johnson?
A.

23

Okay, this will be some of my attorney's fees

24

starting with 2010, and I don't have all of

25

Ms.

Seubert's billing with me.

kkreport@wildblue.net
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53

1

meeting with her.
3
4
5

8

Now, just so we are clear on this.

Okay.

When did you prepare those records?
This here, roughly 2010.

Uh-huh (affirmative.)

Q.

Your communications with Ms. Seubert are not

4
5

A.

Ms. Seubert's information is not in there.

6

Q.

All right.

7
Have this marked as 19.

(Deposition Exhibit No. 19
was then marked for identification.)

10
11

Q.

A.

A.

in here, correct?

Q.

(By Mr. Creason) In Exhibit 19, Ms. Johnson,

likes of that.

2
3

MR. CREASON:

This was from prior to

(208) 743-1380
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Q.

The document inside is simply

This letter that I

wrote about Ms. Brandt is 3/29/11.
MR. CREASON:

Okay, and that folder will be

Deposition Exhibit No. 20.
(Deposition Exhibit No. 20
was then marked for identification.)

8
9

Q.

(By Mr. Creason) And the next folder?

10

A.

Okay.

It is money I deposited into the
I believe it might be

11

checking, Wells Fargo checking.

12

some of the same information as far as money I
deposited, and it is on a little card.

12

there appears to be a couple of invoices from Clements,

13

Brown, McNichols with respect to the matter· of Cornell,

13

14

and it seems to reference the Trust.

To your knowledge

14

15

were all of the services by Clements, Brown & McNichols

15

16

that were provided to you provided in connection with

16

17

your duties as Trustee?

17

MR. CREASON:

Okay.

We' 11 ask Exhibit No. 21 be

marked.
(Deposition Exhibit No. 21
was then marked for identification.)
(By Mr. Creason) And on that folder,

18

A.

Yes, sir.

18

19

Q.

All right, and the next folder is what?

19

Ms. Johnson, you say money I deposited.

A.

Okay.

20

mean by that?

20

Please excuse me.

This is me

Q.

A.

Okay.

What do you

In other words, from myself, out of my

21

documenting information in regards to Alison Brandt.

21

22

This is a copy of some of the monies that I put into

22

funds into the regular checking account to pay for some
Trust items and for myself as well.

23

for the Trust and myself, and then there is an envelope

23

24

from Ms. Alison Brandt.

Then here are a rough draft of

24

25

you owe part of the accounting of the furniture and the

25

K & K REPORTING
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Q.

Okay.

Was this part of the $10,000 that your

mother had given you?
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Exhibit No. 21 -- 22, I'm sorry.

A.

No, sir.

2

Q.

Where did these monies come from?

3

A.

Okay.

The 73.70 I'm no\. sure.

sure.

5

supposed to have been paid to me.

My brother said, no

MR. CREASON:

Thank you.

5

MS. SEUBERT:

Do you mind if I just confer with

6

Toni for just a minute.

"~---------

7

MR. CREASON:

All right.

8

MS. SEUBERT:

I would just like to mention that

~ Why did you believe the death b e n e ~

9

His wife kept 500 of it,

It was sent to him.

6

problem.

7

and I got the other part.

8

that was.

10

was then marked for identification.)

My ~ did have a death benefit fund that was

4

9

(Deposition Exhibit No. 22

1400 I'm not

I don't remember how much

So, that's the best I can tell you on that.

-------r,
-· ·
you?
supposed to_~.::.._to

A: Because my dad said so, and, of course, when

11

H~ ne

he_

12

he was

13
14

said I~§.kg_~_t..§i_~~~n~~~~_!~~~t
it, dad~J,..~.=...il....d.i..!m..'..Lm.at)cer to me one way or_!~e

15

at.her. --Bllt-m~t.he:r:...agr.e.ruj to send me part

16

mane~

had problems doil}g_c;_<etl.fil.!L..jJJ.ing~ and

_':!_~

17

Q.

All right, and you have another folder there?

18

A.

Yes, sir.

And I don't know why I brought

as we are going through the records there was some of

10

Ms. Johnson's records that my office has that I used in

11

preparing her response to discovery.

12

statements were provided but didn't take the time to go

13

through and make copies of all the various invoices in

All the bank

I can have someone from my

14

the folders that were made.

15

office bring that over if you would like to go through

16

that as part of this deposition.
You know, I don't know that that is

17

MR. CREASON:

18

necessary at this point.

explain every invoice and so on, I think that if you

Rather than take the time to

19

this one.

It says December 31st, 2009, Lewis and Clark

19

20

Credit Union and there is one statement that says Lewis

20

just provide us copies that will suit my needs in

21

Clark Credit Union and on it I wrote, taxes and house

21

response to the discovery request.

22

insurance paid from this account.

23

receipt, and I don't recall what that is about, from

23

discovery response with copies of all the invoices that

24

Lewis and Clark Credit Union.

24

were not included in the bank statements already

25

provided.

25

MR. CREASON:

There is also a

Have this marked as Deposition

K & K REPORTING
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MR. CREASON:
Q.

3

Thank you.

(By Mr. Creason) Exhibit No. 22 is just a

couple of, looks like, a receipt from Lewis Clark

A.

1

2

Lewis Clark Credit Union, but it does indicate that

6

there it is at least partially a statement from Lewis

7

Clark Credit Union.

8

I did not see on the inventory of

assets Lewis Clark Credit Union account, Ms. Johnson.
Do you recall -- oh, I see.

3

Did you close 27 -- no, it

now, 27057 -

11

still has $8. 76 in it; is that correct?

12
13

yes, okay.

Q.

They, who is they?

A.

To be honest, I don't know.

All I know --

5

oh, excuse me, IBEW, I believe is an electrical fund or

6

something to that nature.

7
8

Is this the -- I see it

10

I think later they did end up sending me

something, but I can't recall for how much or when.

Credit Union and a notice of an annual meeting of the
5

So, we' 11 prepare supplemental

10
11

A.

I believe so.

12

Q.

To your knowledge, Ms. Johnson, were there

13

Q.

I can't swear to it.

Do you recall approximately how much that

was?
A.

I can't at this time.

Q.

Where did you deposit that money?

A.

I believe I deposited it in the Wells Fargo

checking account.
Q.

All right.

Did you have any other accounts

any other financial institutions in which your dad had

14

that you utilized or opened in order to deposit monies

15

accounts at the time of his death other than the Wells

15

that pertained to the Trust?

16

Fargo accounts and the Lewis Clark Credit Union

16

17

account?

17

there is -- it was like a savings.

18

A.

Not at all, to my knowledge.

18

be for me, but they used his name on it for tax

Q.

And other than the life insurance or the

14

19
20

death benefits that were at least referenced -A.

21

22

Part of it.

A.

The only account, and it is in my dad's name,

And I paid a bill on that, and

19

reporting purposes.

20

that is in your records.

21

Q.

I see.

It was supposed to

It was roughly $1,000.

22

A.

And that ' s it .

23

insurance or death benefits payable to your dad's

23

Q.

Got some additional documents that I'm going

24

beneficiaries or named beneficiary at the time of his

24

to ask you to identify for me.

25

death?

25

everybody else here knows exactly what this is and what

Q.

in Exhibit No. 21, were there other life

K
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i

th& genesis of it was, but I'm new to this case a
little bit by comparison so bear with me.

2

3

A.
Q.

Here is Deposition Exhibit No. 3.

5

A.

Okay.

Q.

And can you tell me have you ever seen that

6

Certainly.

3

before?
A.

I don't recall seeing it at all.

Q.

Okay.

A.

No, sir.

Q.

I'm going to show you now Deposition Exhibit

No. 4.
A.

Okay.

5

Q.

Have you seen that document before?

Thank you.

6

A.

No, sir.

7

Q.

Okay.

Do you understand that it is the

8

document that transferred Lots 35 and 36 Lake View
Edition from your parents to the Family Trust?

Were you aware of the fact that Lot 34

9

10

of the Lake View First Edition is part of that 15 acres

10

A.

I don't recall.

11

that you described to me a bit earlier?

11

Q.

Okay.

12
13

A.

I do know that the lots in the Trust are 34,

12

35, and 36.

14

Q.

Okay.

Were you aware that in 2002 Michael

13

A.

No, sir.

14

Q.

Did you do bookwork for your parents prior to

15

Stanley Cornell and Arlie Mary Cornell gave a gift deed

15

16

to your brother of Lot 34?

16

17

A.

Were you involved in their estate

planning back in 2005?

the time your mother died?
A.

I paid all their bills and everything that

I don't recall that right now.

17

needed to be taken care of, but I didn't do any
book-.,ork, per se.

18

Q.

Did you receive a like gift at that time?

18

19

A.

Absolutely not.

19

Q.

20

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

I wouldn't say.

Q.

Were you acquainted with the terms of the

Did you ever become aware of it prior

21

to the time that your parents died; that they had given

21

22

10 acres or -- excuse me, Lot 34 to John?

22

23

A.

I don't recall.

24

Q.

Did your parents ever give you any real

25

estate?
K

&
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I see.

Trust back in 2005?

23

A.

No, sir.

24

Q.

I see that this instrument that I have given

25

you is Deposition Exhibit No. 4, was notarized by

(208)743-1380
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Alison M. Brandt.

62

Is that the same person that you

indicated was remiss in advice that she gave to you?
3

A.

Correct, sir.

4

Q.

This may be simply typographical.

5

3

Q.

When did he tell you this?

A.

If I'm not mistaken I'm guessing -- I could

A.

Uh-huh (affirmative.)

6

Q.

But it appears to be notarized on March, 21st

7

dated and recorded in March of 2005.

8

Do you have any

knowledge of that discrepancy?

10

11

A.

I do not.

11

12

Q.

Okay.

12

13

5.

Let me show you Deposition Exhibit No.

Do you recognize that document?

Well, he told me that he wanted to get out of

the marriage.

5

day of March, 2004, and yet the instrument itself is
10

A.

2

I suspect

that it is.

6

(208)743-1380

kkreport@wildblue.net

be wrong -- I'm guessing 2 or 3 of 2010.
Q.

Okay.

This quitclaim deed was dated the 3rd

of January, 2007.
A.

Uh-huh (affirmative.)

Q.

Is that the time that you understood that he

wanted to get out of his marriage?
A.

Uhm, .I realize what you are saying, but I

don't recall at this time.

13 ~ a r e that_y-0ur_b,;ot~1:._~ money

14

A.

No, sir.

14 __.ta_pa~ taxes on Lot 34 after he quJ.!:.£!~.i.filfilLi,Uack

15

Q.

Were you aware there came a time when John

15

to the Trust?

16

A.

16

Cornell quitclaimed Lot 34 back to his parents'

17

Revocable Trust?

18

A.

Yes, sir.

19

Q.

Okay.

20
21

Are you aware of what the

circumstances were of that transfer?
A.

A couple of things.

One is he owed a lot of

22

money, and secondly that he was wanting out from his

23

wife and so he wanted, I guess, not for her to do

24

anything.

25

I can't recall that.

Q.

I don't know.
How did you come to gain that information?
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Instrument # 190928

CLEARWATER COUNTY. OROFINO. IDAHO

02:00:00 No. of Page.: 1
2002·11·18
Recorded £or: LINDA DAVIS • EMPIRE REAL TY
Fee:~
ROBIN CHRISTENSEN

DEED OF GIFT
This Deed of Gift is made this

C
:,mcil'

Ex-Officio Recorder Deputy
R8V--P-,V 10 ~ %

.ltfi_ day ofNovember, 2002, between

MICHAEL STANLEY CORNELL and ARLIE MARY CORNELL, husband and wife,
2

of Orofino, Idaho, the donors, and JOHN HENRY CORNELL, a single man, 4119

3

Eureka Ridge Road, Orofino, Idaho, the donee.
The donors, for and in consideration oflove and affection which the donors have

5
6

and bear unto the donee, their son, and for the purpose of making him a gift, do by these

7

presents give, grant, transfer and release unto the donee, the following described real

8

property, situated in the County of Clearwater, State ofldaho, to-wit:

9

Lot 34, Lakeview First Addition
according to the recorded plat thereof.

10

together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances

11
12

13

thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the same unto the donee, his heirs and assigns,

14

forever.
15

IN W1TNESS WHEREOF, the donors have executed this Deed of Gift the day
16
17

and year first above written.

18

19

20

22
23

STATE OF IDAHO

)
)

County of Clearwater

)

24
25

26
27
28

29
30

./£ft

day of November, 2002, before me a notary public in and for
On this
the State of Idaho, personally appeared MICHAEL STANLEY CORNELL and
ARLIE MARY CORNELL, husband and wife, known to me to be the persons
whose names are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me
that they executed the same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official
seal the day and year in this certificate first above written.

31
32

33
34

otary public in and for the
State ofldaho, residing at
,-Orofino, therein. My
O
commission expires: //-:.i /- :;>

--1 JOHN HENRY CORNELL
4 t 19 EUREKA RIDGE ROAD
OROFINO, ID 83544
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Cl

Instru ment # 204674

.18l

CLEARW ATER COUNTY , OROFINO, IOAHO
o.4:43:00 No. of .Pitges: 2
2007-01-09
Recorde d for : ALISON BRANOT

f;

, IVEREDD

MAlLEDO

C
R ~ To~*

~·~
ROBIN ~HRIST ENSEN
~H~Ex-Offk: IO Recorde r Deputy__.,_~JLLU,1........._-..c..__..,.:,,q,_

QUITCLAIM DE.ED
TIIIS INDENTURE, made this

3ctf

day o( )i_ KJUO

:'.:l ,20°', between JOHN

IENRY CORN ELL, a marrie d person dealing with his sole and separa

te property, P.O. Box

AEL STANLEY
61, Heyburn, Idaho 83336, hereinafter referred to as GRANTOR, and MICH
S. CORNELL AND
~ORNELL and ARLIB MARY CORNELL, as Trustees for the MICHAEL
referred to as
ill.LIE M. CORNELL REVOCABLE TRUST, dated November 1, 1996,
}RANTEE.
of Ten
WITNESSETH: That the GRANTOR, for and in consideration of the sum
valuable
uOLLARS lawful money of the United States of America, and other good and
of is hereby

;onsideration, to her in hand paid by the GRANTEE, the receipt where

LAIM
:1.cknowledged~ does by these presents remise, release and forever QUITC

unto the said

certain
GRANTEE, and to said GRANTEE'S heirs, successors and assigns all that

lot, piece, or

being on said
parcel ofland , including any after acquired title or interest, situate, lying, and
property, located in Clearwater County, Idaho, described as follows 1 to~wit:

f.
Lot 34, Lakeview First Addition, according to the recorded plat thereo
SUBJECT TO:

the
document recorded on the records of Clearwater County, State of Idaho, on
November 10, 1976, as Instrument No. 113412.

An Easement granted to the United States of America, as set forth in

An Easement for access and utilities as shown on the recorded plats of the abovedescribed property recorded on the records of Clearwater County, State of Idaho,
as Instrument No. 109374.
Restrictions and covenants as contained in Land Use Agreement recorded as
o.
Instru mentN o. 109375, records of Clearwater County, State ofldah
s of
An Easement granted to Clearwater Power Company recorded on the record
No.
ent
Instrum
Clearwater ColUlty, State of Idaho, on November 4, 1992, as
QUITCLAIM DEED

rt~ ', ~5

tEXHIBIT<
395

}\t>

,,§:'io lilis~Z <:

160985.
TOGETHER WITH all singular the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereto

belonging or in anywise appertaining, the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders,
rents, issues and profits thereof, including after acquired title or interest.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, all singular the said premises, together with appurtenances,
unto the GRANTEE, and to the heirs, successors, and assigns forever.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the GRANTOR has hereunto set his hand the day and year
first above written.

)

STATE OF IDAHO
County of rfJ'ltJ

jdJA .

3rd

) ss..

)

:san~ ,

20oV, before me, a notary public in and
day of
On this
for the State of Idaho, personally appearedJHN HENRY CORNELL, a married person dealing
with his sole and separate property, known or identified to me to be the person whose name is
subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set
day and year in this certificate first above written.

-

ial seal the

--

1

CHEYENNE 8. SUCHAN •
'
NOTARY PUBLIC
:
:
STATE OF IDAHO
....

-

~

......

QUITCLAIM DEED
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1

an swer t hat right now.

do~ ' t recall .
Q.

A.

Okay .

Q.

How was his health at that time?

Please excuse me, I'm thinking.

I'm still

6

10

escapes me right now.

5

Q.

How was John's health -

A.

His health .

Q.

-- at the time t hat he was living at home in

8

12

Q.

I would say okay .
Okay.

9
10

Clearwater County?
A.

Had he had any serious health problems

that you are aware of?

All right.

So , this was a f ter he was

A.

Yes , sir.

Q.

And when you say you found a document, is

that a medical record or something else?
A.

Sir, I believe, to best of my knowledge, it
It was something like this

11

was a medical record.

12

(indicating,) and it stated something to the fact of --

13

I believe he could only have a license for one year due
to his HIV, and he would have to be rechecked .
excuse me.

A.

Yes, sir.

14

15

Q.

When did he have serious health problems?

15

16

A.

It was very high blood pressure .

14

Q.

deceased; is that correct ?

more time .

11
13

Could you pl ease restate it one

was looking for information for this case,

and I fou nd a document that stated so , sir .

not over the death of my brother so I -- that question
5

How did you come t o know t hat he had HIV?

A.

Please

16

Q.

Do you still have a copy of that record?

17

working for Swift as a truck driver, and then I later

17

A.

Yes, sir , I do.

18

found information that he had HIV.

18

Q.

Would you -- did you bring it with you today?

19

A.

No , sir, I did not.

20

Q.

Would you provide a copy of that to your

19
20
21
22

Q.

Okay.

He was

Do you know did he discuss that with

you?
A.

He didn't personally, but he kept telling

me -- he says -- please excuse me .

I didn't understand

21

attorney and allow her to provide a copy of that to me?

22

A.

Absolutely, sir.

Q.

Now, I understand that for a time you worked

23

what he was talking about because he was a different

23

24

individual, and he'd say, well, I'm not going to live

24

for a credit union as a teller and in security, and you

25

long, something like that .

25

have some other college training and the like .
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18

17

A.

Will you excuse me, please, just a moment.

experience or training with acting as a Trustee, other

Q.

Sure.

than this Trust here?

A.

I can 't recall right now .

Q.

Okay .

Have you've had any

what I'm wanting to know is:
2
3

A.
5

9
10

I haven't had any training, and I had hired

an attorney prior to Ms. Seubert that was -- I'm trying
to think of t he proper term, and I don't want to sound

6

them to your counsel .

And she has probably seen them

least .

as Exhibit No . 1 to this deposition .
Q.

I see, and you hired a lawyer to help you

with your duties as a Trustee; is that correct?

Q. Okay.
A.

A.

Okay.

Q.

I'm going to ask you to look over it and tell

me whether or not you have seen that before.
Yes, sir .

How did you choose the lawyer?

12

A.

Okay .

Well, sir, my dad had used her before, and I

13

Q.

And did you see it at or about the time it

didn't know who else to go to.
Q.

10
11

Yes, sir.

A.

15

you and ask you about, and I have provided copies of
and perhaps you have, too, before, but this is marked

12

14

I have a few items that I want to show

5

negative, but she was extremely remiss, to say the

11
13

But

So, you retained a lawyer to serve as

Okay.

14
15

was mailed to your brother on April 26th of 2010?
A.

I don ' t recall exactly.

All I know is he

16

your counsel as Trustee for your parents' Family Trust ;

16

began harassi ng me on the phone to a very bad degree,

17

is that accurate?

17

and I wasn ' t sure what to do so I called the attorney .

18
19
20
21
22

A.

Please excuse me.

Could you please restate

18
19

the que stion again?

Q.

Was that the att orney that was representing

t he Trust?

20

A.

Yes, sir .

in carrying out your duties as Trustee for your

21

Q.

Is that t he attorney you referred to that

family's Trust; is that correct?

22

was -- I can't remember the word you described

remiss, I think, is the word you used?

Q.

So you retained this attorney to assist you

23

A.

Yes , sir.

23

24

Q.

Okay, and do you know approximately when you

24

A.

Ye s , sir .

25

Q.

All right.

25

retained that attorney for that purpose?
K & K REPORTING (208)743 - 1380
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Had Ms . Brandt been representing
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1
2
3
4
5
6

10
11

A.

All I recall is my dad had some work done by

discussing anything about distribution of anything.

No, sir.

This letter goes on to say in the next

Q.

paragraph:

Did you ever meet with Ms. Brandt and your

brother at the same time?
A.

2
3

her, and I just can't recall at this time.
Q.

She met with me, but I don't recall her

A.

thcl Trust for some period of time before this?

Ms. Johnson is fully aware that she has a

5

fiduciary obligation to the Estate.

6

what that says?

Do you understand

Q.

Do you recall the date your dad died?

7

A.

I believe I do.

A.

Yes, sir.

8

Q.

Okay, and did you represent to Ms. Brandt and

9

Q.

What was that?

A.

November 15th, 2009.

Q.

In this letter that you have in front of you
I met

subsequently, then, to your brother that you were fully

10

aware that you had a fiduciary obligation to the Trust

11

Estate?
I don't recall saying anything or speaking to

A.

12

12

there on Exhibit 1, the second paragraph says:

13

with your sister, Ms. Toni Johnson, regarding the

13

my brother about that.

14

distribution of the Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M.

14

ask the question again?

15

Cornell Revocable Trust before I received your message.

15

Q.

16

As you know Ms. Johnson is the Successor Trustee of

16

it that way --

Please excuse me.

Could you

Did you instruct Ms. Brandt -- let's just ask

17

A.

Uh-huh (affirmative.)

18

Q.

--

Uh-huh (affirmative.)

17

your parents' trust, and you and Ms. Johnson are the

18

sole beneficiaries.

19

yourself and Alison Brandt at some time prior to this

19

aware that you had a fiduciary obligation to the Trust

20

letter?

20

Estate?

Do you recall a meeting with

21

A.

I can't recall at this time.

22

Q.

Okay.

Is that statement accurate to the best

to advise your brother that you were fully

21

A.

I didn't ask her to say anything.

22

Q.

All right.

Did you represent to her that you

of your knowledge; that she had met with you regarding

23

were fully aware that you had a fiduciary obligation to

24

the distribution of a Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M.

24

the Trust Estate?

25

Cornell Revocable Trust?

25

23

K & K REPORTING

Those are her words, not mine.

A.
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22

21

1

A.

Yes, sir.

didn't know that you had a fiduciary obligation to the

2

Q.

Did you understand that you were authorized

Estate?

3

to use money from the Trust for these purposes listed

4

here?

Q.

2

A.
5

6

(208) 743-1380
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All right.

So, is it your testimony that you

No, I believe I had a fiduciary duty to

protect the home and everything I could.
Q.

Trustees must

Okay, and this goes on to say:

ensure that Trust assets are managed appropriately

5

A.

Yes, sir.

6

Q.

And how did you come to that understanding?

7

A.

Were you aware

8

I don't -- this was not said to me, but I did

10

8

while Trust administration takes place.

9

of that?

10

A.

Q.

9

And my brother said that I

11

the very best I could.

12

coul_~~~

.

Because it solely dealt with the Trust as far

--------------~----

as the __s~division_fees __ an~_l<~_fees and that.
All right.

Do you have any assets that are

your assets?
Yes, I do.

11

A.

12

Q.

Okay, and who manages those?

13

A.

14

Q. Do you have any documents that indicate j o
you your brother said anything with respect to how you

As far as what I have?

14

Q.

Yes.

15

might be able to use money from the Trust?

15

A.

They are just personal possessions in the

17

Q.

In the Trust home?

18

A.

Yes, sir.

Okay.

13

16
17

16

It was verbal.

A.

I do not, sir.

Q.

In this letter Ms. Brandt says to your
While

home.

18

brother, the last paragraph on the first page:

19

we wait for a buyer for the home there are many monthly

19

Q.

20

expenses associated with subdivision in which your

20

bank accounts?

21

parents' home is located that Ms. Johnson will need to

21

A.

I do, sir.

22

pay from the Trust bank account funds.

22

Q.

Okay, and who manages those?

23

further use the funds minimally to do any necessary

23

A.

I do, sir.

24

small repairs that the Realtor may suggest to improve

24

Q.

And where are they?

25

the home's sale potential.

25

A.

K & K REPORTING
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She will

Now, do you have your own separate

have one at American West Bank in Orofino,
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Idaho.
Q.

3

given to me because I wore out my car and took care of

2

them.

A.

It is just a checking account.

Q.

Okay.

And this was in the same checking account at

American West?
This

What's your personal net worth?

is not any Trust property at all; this is just your

5

A,

Yes, sir.

6

Q.

How much money was that?

personal net worth.
A.

She said to keep it for emergency uses only.
Q.

accounts?

5

6

And are these savings accounts or checking

1

I couldn't say right now right off the bat.
9

I don't know.

A.

$10,000.

Q.

This was given to you by your mother before

she died?

Do you have a rough estimate of

10

A.

Long, long before she died.

11

what your bank account, what the balance of your bank

11

Q.

Are there any other accounts other than your

12

account stands at right now?

12

10

Q.

13

A.

All right.

American West bank account?
I have a Hughes Aircraft Federal Credit

Probably $187 and change.

13

Union, and it is abbreviated -- excuse me, I can't say

A.

14

Q.

Do you add to that monthly?

14

15

A.

Not at this time, but I will be.

15

it right now.

16

Q.

Where will that come from?

16

roughly 5 to $7. 00 in either savings or checking.

17

A.

If everything goes correctly, SSI.

17

not sure, and there might be another $5.00.

18

Q.

Have you applied for SSI?

18

Q.

Anything else?

19

A.

It was applied for me.

19

A.

Just a few cents, maybe, in another account,

20

but that's it.

21

Q.

22

A.

Same, Hughes Aircraft Federal Credit Union.

I did.

23

Q.

Okay.

24

A.

I do.

25

Q.

What is it?

20

hospital.

21
22

I was in the

Q.

Did you deposit money regularly in your

checking account?

23

A.

24

Q.

Where did you receive income?

25

A.

Towards the end.

I had money that my mom had

K & K REPORTING
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And where is the other account?
Do you own a car?
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25

I have a 1987 Jeep Wrangler that is not

1

Q.

Do you own any other vehicles?

3

A.

My dad and I owned an Isuzu Trooper.

Q.

Now, are there any other personal assets that

you claim are your own, apart from any of the assets

working.

5

(208) 743-1380
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A.

that are in the Trust?
A.

On the

title it says Toni or Michael.

5

Q.

have several things in the home.
All right.

And they are furniture, is that

Furniture.

I can't think of the name of

accurate?

What year is that?

6

A.

2002.

7

Q.

Did you buy that with your own funds?

8

A.

The Isuzu or the Jeep?

10

Q.

The Isuzu.

10

11

A.

No, my father purchased it.

11

Q.

Do you have some art?

12

A.

That's a good question.

6,

Q.

7

8

Q.

12
13
15

A.

No, sir.

My dad knew he was dying, and he

Q.

Oh, so when he bought it -- when did he buy

it?

18
19

So, was your name on the title for

wanted to make sure I had a vehicle to drive.

16
17

Okay.

convenience?

14

A.

2002.

He knew I did the main driving for my

mom or he because his eyesight was not good.

20

Q.

I'm

All right.

Have you been on the title to

A.

them -- furniture.

have some TVs.

What do you call

-- some decorations, statutes, and at this moment I
can't think of anything else right now.
I purchased some

13

prints for my mother, and so I don't know who that

14

would belong to at this point.

15

myself.

But I don't own any art

Do you own any collectables yourself?

16

Q.

17

A.

I do.

18

Q.

What are they?

19

A.

LLadro mermaids.

20

Q.

Any other collectables?

21

that vehicle for all of the time that he owned it or

21

A.

I do, but I can't think right now about that.

22

was it just recently that he put your name on the

22

Q.

What's the value of the Lladro mermaids?

23

title?

23

A.

I'm guessing roughly around $1,000.

24

Q.

Do you have any antiques that are yours?

25

A.

24
25

A.

Not at the time that he purchased it, and I

can't recall when he put me on the title.
K
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don't own any antiques.
K

&

K REPORTING

Well, no, I take

(208) 743-1380

kkreport@wildblue.net

28

399

I do have a -- please excuse me.

that back.
2

trying to think of the name of it.

3

lounge.

that the Trust owns, on that real estate the house is

am

I do have a chaise

2

located, correct?

3

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And how many acres is that parcel?
On the house, the parcel for the house itself

Q.

When did you acquire that?

4

5

A.

Many, many years ago.

5

A.

6

Q.

So, any house or home furnishings that there

6

or cumulative?

are in the house other than the chaise lounge and the

7

8

Lladro mermaids are properties that belonged to the

8

9

Trust; is that correct?

Q.

All of the :real estate that's being held in

the name of the Trust.
A.

Okay, that would be 15 acres.

Q.

Okay.

Do you claim to own any part of that

10

A.

Please restate the question again.

10

11

Q.

So, in the house you have certain personal

11

as your own personal property; that is, your own

12

individual property apart from the Trust?

The Lladro mermaids and the

12

items that you have named:

13

chaise lounge.

14

property that's in the house is property of the Trust;

14

15

is that correct?

15

A.

16
17
18
19

I own some other things, I can't think of at

this time, but the rest of it is the Trust, yes.
Q.

Okay.

Do you receive any disability payments

of any kind-at this time?

20

A.

Not at this time.

21

Q.

All right.

22
24

It is in the works.

Are you represented by legal

counsel in your efforts to get Social Security?

23

A.

I received a letter from Social

No, I'm not.

Security.

25

Q.

Now, this real estate

All right.

I see.

K & K REPORTING

A.

13

And other than that, all of the

16

Are you asking if -- please excuse me.

Q.

In any of that 15 acres do you claim any of

that as your individual property apart from the Trust?

17

A.

No, sir.

18

Q.

Okay.

To your knowledge is the 15 acres the

19

only real estate that the Trust owns in Clearwater

20

County?

21

A.

Yes, sir.

22

Q.

Okay.

All :right.

attention just briefly again to Exhibit No. 1 on the

24

second page.
A.

25

Okay.
K
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Q.

3

The top of the page there Ms. Brandt says:

1

-----~--~---

---

liquidate the assets of the Trust and disburse the

correct?

to liquidate the assets from John?
A.

A.

Do you recall feeling any pressure

Please excuse me, I'm thinking.

5

I wouldn't

6

No, sir.

That is not correct.

what legal· is, is legal is.

And I realize

My brother and I sat down

and made ~ - t h e !ll_ing;-~d.

He told m~-;-

you_c_an_k~ep the money, you can keep the house, which I

I was being extremely

say that I felt pressure.

------------

harassed via telephone, and I was bodily injured as
9

far as John was concerned he wanted the Trust
liquidated right away after your parents died; is that

6
7

30

Currently Ms. Johnson feels pressure from you to
money immediately.

5

I just wanted to call your

23

kkreport@wild.blue.net

2

Can

you restate that one more time?

well by him.

~ ~ h - ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ . . , ___!M,_I_

9

10

Q.

Did you tell Ms. Brandt about that?

10

11

A.

Yes, sir, I did.

11

12

Q, ~fill_Jomething,.here about.,_QJ]LJ.Q

don't recall anything about the mon!,y3ssue _at this

~
Q.

12

Ms.

Okay.

The last paragraph there says:

Johnson would prefer that your communications be

13

circumstances---at--.t-M-s-..t.ime. Ms. JohnsoIL.cannot--£ul-fill

13

through me, so if you would like to be updated on

14

her fiducia:ry._.o~_g~tion as Successor_ Tr.'!Ei!a.e and

14

progress please do not hesitate to write to me and

15

liquidate the assets as you wis1!_,.._lfu_a_L.cir.l:J!.~tances

15

advise me of such.

16

is she talking ai;;~t, do yo;;:now?

16

17
18

·A.

· - ~ , okay.

19
20

:_ci,~ t ~call aj;_jllis__tima._ ,C_airi__yc>lljl!i~se

point out which paragraph that is?
It is the second sentence here on

A.

Okay, sure.

I appreciate that, sir.

Q.

Does that accurately state your wishes?

18

A.

Yes, sir.

19

Q.

Did you ever have any communications directly

Thank

with John after that?
A.

At that time she, Alison Brandt, told Joh1f-·.

They are not things -- I just

23

that if he continued to contact me because he harassed/'
me so badly that she would have to get a restraining

24

order on him, and he just would call and scream and

25

yell and stuff like that.

23

because she stated them.

24

can't answer anymore on that.

I don't recall that.

: , ~ t any d o ~ m i n d that as
K & K REPORTING
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21
22

you.

Q.

17

She stated some things just

22

25

Yes, sir, I do.

20

the paragraph there.

21

Do you see that sentence?

A.

K & K REPORTING
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1

cc:-.versation with him about what he did to me as far as

2

injuring my body.
Okay.

After this letter --

3

Q.

4

A.

Yes, sir.

5

Q.

--

something that John did?
2

A.

Yes, sir.

3

Q.

Was there anybody present at the time when

this occurred?

sometime after she said, you just talk to

me, did you have any further conversations with your

5

A.

No, sir.

6

Q.

To your knowledge, did your brother John ever

communicate directly to Alison Brandt concerning

brother?

10
11

A.

I can't recall at this time.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

A.

She never gave me anything in those regards.

A.

The last time I saw him was the day that he

1O

Q.

Okay.

Did you ever see him again?

injured me.

12

Q.

Which was what day?

13

A.

It was -- please excuse me.

14

February or March of 2010, approximately.

15
16

I believe

Q.

Did this injury require any medical

attention?

information he wanted to pass onto you?
Go to Exhibit No. 2 .

We will give

11

Exhibit No. 1 to Kristi and let her try to keep track

12

of that.

13

A.

Certainly.

14

Q.

And I 'm going to ask you to read that.

15

It

isn't the world's best copy.

16

A.

Okay.

17

A.

No, sir.

17

Q.

But if you' 11 take a look there and tell me

18

Q.

Did you report this injury to the police?

18

A.

No, sir, but I did put him on report to a

19

whether or not you've seen that before.

19

A.

Okay.

20

neighbor of mine that is a reserve deputy for

20

Q.

All right.

21

Clearwater County Sheriff.

21

22

Q.

Who was that?

22

23

A.

Gary, G-a-r-y, Tragesser, T-r-a-g-e-s-s-e-r.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

Was this the same encounter, that is,

the one where you claim your body was injured by
K & K REPORTING

I don't recall seeing this.
It says -- you'll see there on

the second page at the bottom it says CC:
Please excuse me.

23

Q.

Do you see that, where it says CC:

24

A.

I do.

25

Q.

Are you saying that you've never seen this
K & K REPORTING
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before, to your knowledge?
A.

I have not.

In fact, she has had the wrong

3

address to send to me in the past, and she's never been

4

one to send me things that I should have.

5

point she didn't respond to me for three, four months.

Q.

Okay.

11

~/-:::-and MsA.. Brant's fee?
I also paid for myself for my expenses as
well.

At some

Well, let's talk about the substance,

U

subject matter of this, to see if you have any

7

recollection of some of the events that are referenced

8

here.
10

(208)743-1380
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1

Client?

A.

A.

Okay.

Q.

This is under date of December 2nd, 2010, and

Q.

Did you tell Ms. Brandt that?

A.

Oh, yes, sir.

aware of that .
Q.

In fact, my brother was fully

He agreed to it.

Is it a true statement that the main asset of

the Trust was the Cornells' home?

9

A.

Yes, sir.

10

Q.

And was it also true that the house was

11

listed through the Real Estaters at $445, 000?

12

on the fourth paragraph in her letter Ms. Brandt

12

13

addresses to Darrel Aherin.

Ms. Johnson has

13

14

not disposed of any assets other than she has used some

14

15

monies in the Trust to pay expenses associated with the

15

16

real property and my fee.

16

A.

I can't recall.

17

is the Cornell home which is listed with the Real

17

Q.

How much money had you paid from the Trust

18

She says:

The main asset in the Trust

18

Estaters through Mike Harrington, Realtor.

19

sure what is next there.

20

Do you see that?

21

A.

Yes, sir.

22

Q.

All right.

I'm not

The list price is $445,000.

A.

I believe, sir, according to my Realtor it

was listed at $450,000 originally.
Q.

Okay.

How much money had you taken from the

Estate for your own expenses at that point?

for Ms. Brandt's fee?

19

A.

20

$17 5.

I believe one was initial was between 150 and

The second one was $1500, but the retainer was

21

used up by my sibling and his attorney.

' at
Is it a true statement that

22

I can't recall exactly how much over it went, but

23

the time of the letter of December 2nd, 2010 you had

23

roughly that amount of money.

24

not disposed of any of the assets of'the Trust except

24

25

for to pay expenses associated with the real property

25

K
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Q.

And it went

You've provided some Answers to

Interrogatories in request for production.
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2
3

signed those with your lawyer, in which you provided

1

some bank accounts that were bank accounts of the
Trust.

2

5

3

some of your accounting records and the records that

Uh-huh (affirmative.)

4

you've provided to me in relation to the question that

Q.

And it also provided some copies of checks

5

I asked you about the payment or the retainer for

that were issued from those bank accounts, and those

6

Alison Brandt.

were also a debit card, apparently, and so there are

7

information that will help us understand how she was
paid and how much she was paid from the Trust?

certain things listed as to where those monies were
10
11

9

A.

Yes, sir.

Uh-huh (affirmative.)

10

Q.

Okay, and where did you look to find this

Q.

I couldn't find, and maybe it was just that

11

wasn't patient enough, but I couldn't find where this

12

13

money came from that went to pay Alison Brandt.

13

14

A.

Okay.

That would have been a cashier's

Q.

Okay.

15

So, it wouldn't be reflected in the

materials that you've provided to me?

18

A.

It would not, however -- I don't think I

I do, sir.

18

that, please.

19

A.

20

Q.

Yes.

A.

Right here (indicating.)

MS. SEUBERT:

Can we go off the record?

21

MR. CREASON:

Sure.

22

Let's just take a little

break.

Do you have that piece of paper with

All right.

21
23

Okay.

A.

brought them.

It

Q.

you?
Q.

would be on this summary.

Excuse me, Karin.

That was on a previous accounting that I

16

20
22

A.

wrote down information on a piece of paper.

17

19

No -- I paid with cashier's checks.

record?

14

check, two of them, from Wells Fargo Bank.

16

Were you able to locate some

A.

12

17

(By Mr. Creason) During our break,

A.

paid out?

15

Q.

Ms. Johnson, you've had a chance to go back through

23

Would you let me take a look at

May I go ahead and point it out to you?

Q. Okay. You've pointed out to me an entry on
a, looks like, a work paper, accounting spreadsheet, a

24

(Recess at 10:08 a.m.)

24

cashier's check number 0585904902 Alison Brandt,

25

(Reconvened at 10: 10 a .m.)

25

Attorney $125, and then in the column marked utilities
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it says 5/ 4/10.
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Then the very next entry, that says

2

5/4/10 it says Alison Brandt, $1,500.

3

entries you are referring to?

Are those the

1
2

A.

Okay, I'd be happy to.

Please excuse me for

a moment.
Sure.

3

Q.

A.

Yes, sir.

4

A.

There you are.

Q.

Okay, and can you find on the materials you

5

Q.

All right.

provided to me, that is, the Wells Fargo checking

6

A.

Yes, sir.

7

account statements, or the bank statements, where that

7

Q.

They look like spreadsheets.

8

money is drawn out of the Wells Fargo account?

8

A.

I can't at this moment, but I believe my
1

10 · attorney, Karin Seubert, is looking for that

10

11

11

12

information.
MR. AHERIN:

If she looks for that information

13

those worksheets we were just looking at, can we have

14

your office make a copy?

15

MR. CREASON:

16

12

You've handed me four sheets.

Is that what

you would call these?
A.

I believe so, sir.

Q.

All right.

Tell me what those are.

Are

those your records?
A.

Yes, sir.

I haven't seen them.

I haven't either.

We will get

copies of the worksheets, yeah.

17

A.

Thank you.

18

Q.

(By Mr. Creason) It always pleases me to ask

I can't locate it at this time.

19

a bank teller to understand a bank statement and have

20

them do what you' re doing right now.

21

A.

Yes, sir.

22

Q.

If you will please give me the folder you

Yes, sir.

23

have and tell me a little bit about those records that

24

you just -- you've showed me a page of it.

25

like worksheets, spreadsheets.
K & K REPORTING
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ALISON M. BRANDT
LAW ....................................................................................................................
EY AT ....................
ATTORN
....................
....................
320 Michigan Avenue
P.O. Box 2482
Orofino, Idaho 83544
Phone(208 )476-7212
Fax (208) 476-4642

April 26, 2010
JolmCome 1l
339 W. Highway 30

Burley, Idaho 83318
Re: Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell Revocable Trust
Dear Jobn:
Please accept my condolences on the loss of your father. He was a very kind man and I am sure
he will be greatly missed.
I met with your sister, Ms. Toni Jobnson, regarding the distribution of the Michael S. Cornell and
Arlie.M. Cornell Revocable Trust before I received your message. As you know, Ms. Jobnson is
the Successor Trustee of your parents' trust and you and Ms. Johnson are the sole beneficiaries.
Ms. Johnson is fully aware that she has a fiduciary obligation to the trust estate. Trustees must
ensure that trust assets are managed appropriately while trust administration takes place. This
means that assets cannot be wasted, trust debts must be paid, and assets will be distributed to the
beneficiaries as practicably as possible considering all circumstances.
....

.

.·

...~

...

.

....

-

.

-·.·-··

'

it is my understanding· that the main asset of your parents' trust is the real property and that this
real property will need to be sold. The real estate market from a seller's standpoint in Orofino js
not good. There was a time when homes such a~ your parents' were s~lling for very high prices
but that is no longer the case.

In any event, Ms. Johnson will be speaking with a realtor and pJacing the home on the market.
l anticipate that a sale, for a reasonable price, will not occur quickly. Hopefully, I am wrong.
While we wait for a buyer for the home there are many monthly expenses associated with the
subdivision in which your parents' home is located that Ms. Johnson will need to pay from the
trust bank account funds. She will further use the funds minimally to do any necessary small
repairs that the realtor may suggest to improve the home's sale potential.
Page J of2
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of the trust and disperse
Curren tly, Ms. Johnso n feels pressu re from you to liquidate the assets
n cannot fulfill her
the money immed iately. Due to circums.tances at this time, Ms. Johnso
you wish. Undue pressure
fiduci ary obliga tion as Succe ssor Truste e and liquida te the assets as
may cause Ms. Johnson to
and profan ity from you will only further strain your relationship and
on your part.
seek a restrai ning order from the court to stop any and all harassment
get the trust assets distributed
Please be advise d that Ms. Jolms on is doing everyt hing she can to
as set forth in the Idaho
as quickl y as possible, aUwit hin her responsibilities and obligations
Statute s.
so if you would like to be
Ms. Johnso n would prefer that your comm unicat ion be. through me,
me of such. I can let
update d on her progre ss please do not hesitate to write to me and advise
home. if there are offer.<: on
you know what price the realtor sugges ts to place on your parent s'
pay the real property
the home, and how trust assets, if any, are being distributed to help
expen ses, etc.
Sincer ely,

Alison Brand t
Cc: Ms. Toni Johnso n

Page 2 of2
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2

was on that.
Q.

Q.

I don't recall what the date

deciding who wanted what.

Okay.

So, that was perhaps in the carload of

things?

posed to you in the last couple hours you've told me

3

successively that you don't believe you had seen any of

4

these documents before.
A.

5

A.

Yes .

Q.

Did you part on good terms back in February

Now , I t hin k in answering questions that I 've

Is that still your testimon y?

The only one rig ht now that I recall seeing ,

I think -- I believe this is the one that I saw
(handing paper to Mr. Creason.)

of 2010?
A.

Uhm, I really can't say one way or the other .

Q.

Okay.

We don't have an Exhibit No. 11, but

Q.

You believe you saw No . 6?

A.

Yes, sir .

Q.

Is that the one you thought was your in

10

I ' ve already premarked this as No . 12, so I' 11 show you

10

11

Exhibit No. 12 and ask you if you've seen that document

11

brother's hand or your dad's hand when they came back

12

before?

12

from Alison Brandt's?

13

A.

14
15
16

Okay.

I don't recall seeing this .

Q.

Do you know what that is?

A.

It says on here:

Revocable Family Trust of

Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell.

13

A.

That is correct .

14

Q.

And that ' s No. 6, okay .

So, would it be fair

15

to say that you did not and have not until today seen

16

the documents that empower you to act as a Trustee for

17

Q.

Is that the Trust which you are the Trustee?

17

the Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and

18

A.

Uhm, I don't know, unless it says on here

18

Arlie M. Cornell?

19

directly.

20
21

Q.

19

A.

I don't recall seeing those documents .

20

Q.

Did your parents have a Will, to your

Exhibit No . 6 that is there by the Reporter.

21

Thank you .

22

A.

22
23
24

All I can say is I haven't seen it before.
Why don ' t you look at it in connection with

Q.

Okay .

Why don't you also look at No. 8 right along

side that and look at No . 7 as well .
A.

25

Thank you .

23

·-

knowledge?
A.

where t ~ h ~

24

Q.

Would they be in the house?

25

A.

If they are there they would be.
kkreport@wildblue . net
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Q.

3

Okay.

2

words,

3

- - -- -----have you gone through there and looked at them?

A..~ a n e s t
5

A.

5

substantial

ca.L.dmm....and

Well, initially what happened -- I don't know

really how to expl ain it.

Could you repeat the

question again, please?

is a Jat of junk as :fM_g_s

just old receipts and stuff
seeij anythin

10

disability for Social Security benefits?

Have you inventoried_the private

papers of 1our parents that ar~ in the house; in other
jt

(208 )743-1 380

K & K REPORTING
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If so, I don't know

I believe they did.

6

Q.

My understanding is there is a pending claim

for Social Security Disability that you made?
Right, right , right.

gone·-~ ~ a p e r .
Q. Is there a safe or some other place where

A.
Q.

I think you called it SSI?

they kept important papers?

A.

Correct .

Q.

Perhaps you mean something else .

A.

No , sir .

10

I don't

know.

11

Q.

Safe deposit box?

11

12

A.

No, sir.

12

A.

Okay.

13

Q.

Did your parents or someone on their behalf

13

Q.

But what causes you to believe that you may

14

share with you where they kept their important papers?

15

A.

No, sir.

16

Q.

Okay .

14

be entitled to those benefits?

A.

15

Okay.

At the time that it was applied for me
I had a duodenal ulcer that was

16

I was extremely ill.

papers and if you have some doubt about their

17

large, and it perforated my bowel and blew out my

18

importance; in fact, if they are papers that pertain to

18

bowel.

19

your parents or your parents' property would you review

19

and numerous other things, and I've improved but --

20

t hem with your legal counsel?

20

Q.

When was that?

21

A.

That was January 20th of this year .

22

Q.

I see.

17

Would you do a thorough search of the

May I write that down, please.

21

A.

Sure.

22

Q.

Yeah.

23

MS . SEUBERT:

I will write it down .

Thank you .

24

A.

Okay .

25

Q.

(By Mr. Creason) What ' s the basis of your
K & K REPORTING
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23

And at that time I had congestive heart failure

So , it's just been in the last few

mont hs?

24

A.

Yes, sir.

25

Q.

Is the house currently listed?
K & K REPORTING
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REVOCABLE FAMILY
OF

TRUST

MI CH AE LS . CORNELL
AN D

ARLIE M. CORNELL
MI CH AE L S. · CO RN EL L and
wif e, res ide nts of the Sta teAR LIE M. CORNELL, hus ban d and
of Ca lifo rni a, Cou nty of Ora
des ire to set for th a Tru st
nge ,
pur pos es he rea fte r set for th. upo n the · con dit ion s and for the
Thi s Tru st wi ll be kno wn as
11
MIC HAE L S. COR NEL L
the
AND .AR LIE M.

.,Md v, l ; I 59 G·

11

COR NEL L REVOCABLE TRU ST
DAT ED

ARTICLE ONE
Se cti on 1.0 1

Tr ust Es tat e

All pro per ty her eaf ter tra nsf
err
the Tru ste e to be hel d pur sua ed or con vey ed to and rec eiv ed by
nt to the term s of thi s ins tru
is her ein cal led the
me nt
11
Tru st Est a:te " and sha ll be
adm ini s.te red , and dis trib ute d
hel
d,
by the Tru ste e as pro vid ed in
De cla rat ion of Tru st.
thi s
·

Se cti on 1.0 2

Me ani ng of Wo rds

a)

The ter m "Hu sba nd" sha ll mea n
MIC HA EL S. CORNELL;
b)
The ter m "W ifen sha ll mea n AR
LIE M. CORNELL;
c)
The ter m "Tr ust or" sha ll ref er
ind ivi dua lly and col lec tiv ely
to Hu sba nd and Wi fe.

Se cti on 1.0 3

Tr ust ee De sig na tio n

Hus ban d and Wi fe are her eby
des ign ate d as Co -Tr ust ees of
tru sts cre ate d by or to bi
all
cre ate d pu~ sua nt to thi s De cla
rat
ion
of Tru st.
Sho uld eit he r Hus ban d or Wif e
bec ome una ble bec aus e of
dea th, inc apa cit y or oth er cau
se,
to
ser
ve
as suc h a Co -Tr ust
or sho uld eit he r res ign as suc
h a Co -Tr ust ee, bef ore the nat ee,
ter mi nat ion of all tru sts pro
ura l
vid ed for in thi s De cla rat ion
, the
rem ain ing Co -Tr ust ee, Hu sba nd
or Wi fe,: sha ll the rea fte r ser
ve as
sol e Tr ~te e as pro vid ed in
thi s De cla rat ion . The term "Tr
ust ee"
as use d in thi s De cla rat ion
sha ll ref er col lec tiv ely to Hus
ban d
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and Wife so long as they shall serve as such Co-T
rustee s and
there after to such of them as may serve as sole Trust
ee.
This
parag raph is subje ct to Secti on 9.01. '

Secti on 1. 04

Addi tions to Trust Prop ertie s

a)
At any time durin g the contin uance of any trust hereu
nder,
its Trust ees, in their sole discr etion after consi derat
ion of the
possi ble tax conse quenc es there of to all ·conce rned, is
autho rized
to recei ve addit ions of cash or other prope rtieg to
such trust ,
subje ct to any cond itions to which such Trust ees may
agree , from
any sourc e whats oever witho ut limit a(ion , wheth er by
gift, will,
or other wise.
Howe ver, the Trust ees shall accep t all asset s
which any perso n or perso ns.ma y -give, devis e, and/o r
beque ath by
last will and testam ent to·· any trust br trust s hereu
nder as well
as all asset s which 1iiay be trans ferre d to such trust
or trust s
pursu ant to the expre ss P.rov isions of'an y other trust
docum ent or
docum ents of any kind .·
b)
Furth ermor e, ~-t any time any perso n or perso ns may desig
nate
any trust hereu rider as the benef iciary , prima ry or conti
ngen t, of
any insur ance, pensi on I or other death benef it, relat
ing to the
life of anyon e (such desig natio n to be presum ed to
be revoc able
unles s it is expre ssly irrevo cable ) and, until
such bene fit
matur es by reaso n of death ,
the. Trust ees shall have no
respo nsibi lity whats oever with respe ct there to, it being
inten ded
that, unles s and until the trust which is the
desig nated
bene ficiar y of such death bene fit becom es the owner
of the
insur ance proce eds as actua lly becom e payab le by reaso
n of death .
c)
All addit ions, unles s speci fical ly desig nated to a
certa in
trust or trust s hereu nder or unles s there is only one
trust then
in exist ence hereu nder, shall be consid e_red as made
to the Trust
as herei nafte r ·defin ed.
Any addit ion, inclu ding any incom e
earne d there on prior to ·actu al recei pt 6£ the addit
ion by the
trust , shall be added to the corpu s of su.ch trust and
there after
held, manag ed, and distr ibute d by its Trust ees as a
part of the
corpu s to which the same is added .

Secti on 1.05

Sepa rate Prope rt;r to Rema in Sepa rate

All prope rty now or herea fter conve yed or trans ferre
d to the
Trust ee to be held by the Trust ee pursu ant to this
Decla ration
which was comm unity prope rty,
quasi- comm unity prope rty,
or
separ ate prope rty at the time of such conve yance
or trans fer,
shall remai n, respe ctive ly, comm unity prope rty, quasi
-comm unity
prope rty, or the separ ate prope rty of the Trw~ tor
trans ferri ng
such prope rty to the Trust ee.
When separ ate prope rty is held in the Trust , it may
be withd rawn
from the Trust on the sole signa ture of the Trust or
who put it in
the Trust .
This appli es to real prope rty, as well as perso nal
prope rty.
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Section 1.06

Amendment and Revocation

At any time during the joint lives of the Trustors, jointly as to
Community Property and individually as to his or her own separate
property, Trustors may, by a duly executed instrument;
a)
Amend
this
trust, agreement
provisions) in any manner and/or

(including

its

technical

Revoke this trust agreement in part or in whole, in which
latter event any and ·all trust properties shall forthwith revert
to such Trustor free of trust. · Such instrument of amendment or
revocation shall be effective immediately upon its proper
execution by Trustor(s), but until a copy has been received by a
trustee,
that . Trustee s_hall
not · incur any liability or
responsibility either (i). for failing: to act in accordance with
such instrument· or (ii) for acting in accordance with the
provisions of. this trust agreement; without regard to such
instrument.
b)

ARTICLE TWO
Section 2.01

Trust Income

During the joint lives of the Trustors, the Trustee shall ·at
least annually unless otherwise directed by · both Trustors in
writing, pay to or apply for the benefit of Husband and Wife, all
of the net income from the Trust Estate in the same proportion as
each of their respective interests in the Trust Estate.

Section 2.02

Protection
Incapacity

of

· Trustor

J.Il

Event

of

During the joint lives of the Trustors, should either Trustor
become incapacitated as defined in Section 2.03 below, the
Trustee may, in the Trustee 1 s discretion;
a)
Pay the entire net income of the 1Trust Estate in monthly or
other convenient installments to the remaining competent Trustor;
or
b)
Apply such portion of the net income, up to the whole
thereof, of the Trust Estate as the Trustee may deem in his
absolute discretion reasonable and proper for the benefit of the
Trustor so adjudged to be incompetent or unable to manage his or
her own affairs; or
c)
Declare void and without effect, any attempt by the Trustor
to exercise the reserved· rights of revocation,
amendment,
withdrawal of assets, control over·Trustees, etc., unless a court
of competent jurisdiction determines otherwise or Trustor 1 s
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disappearance constitutes incapacity.
During any period of.
either Trustor's incapacity,
this :Trust is irrevocable and
unamendable. · As Trustors do not intend that any taxable gift be
deemed made by reason of such irrevocability, it is expressly
provided that, notwithstanding the foregoing, Trustors shall at
all times have the power to appoint to any person, designated in
any way in this agreement as a vested or contingent beneficiary,
any and all assets contained in this trust at the time of
Trust or 1 s death, said power being exercisable, however, only by
specific reference to said power in Trust or's will duly provided
for probate.
Section 2.03

Incapacity

Tn the event that any Tr:ustee or any ,beneficiary hereunder comes
into possession of any of· the following:
aY
A court order 1 which such Trustee or beneficiary deems to be
jurisdictionally proper and still concurrently applicable,
holding a person to be legally incapacitated to act in his or her
own behalf or appointing a guardian tq act for him or her,. or
b)
Duly executed witnessed, acknowledged written certificates,
at least. one of which is then unrevoked 1 of two licensed
physictans (each of wh9m represents that he or she is certified
by a recognized medical board), each certifying that such
physician has examined a person and has concluded that 1 by reason
of· accident, or mental deterioration, · or similar cause, such
person had, at the date thereof, become incapacitated to act
rationally and prudently in his or her own financial best
interests 1 or
1

c)
Evidence which such Trustee or beneficiary deems to be
creditable and still· currently applicable that a person has
disappeared, · is unaccountably absent, or is being detained under
duress where· he or she is unable effectively and prudently to
look after his or her own interests.
Then, in that event and under those circurnstar1ces:

a)
Such person shall be deemed to have thereupon become
· incapacitated, as that. term is used in and for all of the
purposes of this instrument, and
b)
Such incapacity shall be deemed to continue until such court
order,
certificates,
and/or
circumstances
have
become
inapplicable or have been revoked/ and
c)
The named successor trustee shall immediately become the
Trustee, acting with all the rights and powers described herein.
Any physician 1 s aforesaid certificate may be revoked by a similar
certificate to the effect that such person is no longer thus
1ncapacitated, executed either by ( i) the original certifying
409

physician or (ii) two other licensed, board certified physicians.
No Trustee shall be under any duty to institute any inquiry into
a person 1 s possible incapacity, but the expense of any such
inquiry reasonably instituted may· be paid from .trust assets.
Payment for said inquiry refers both to a reasonable inquiry as
to the incapacity of such individual .·and to that inquiry as to
the revocation of such a Certificate.
Section 2. 04

Protection

in

the Event

of

Catastrophic

Illness
If both Trust ors are · living and a catastrophic illness. affects
.one of the Trustors, then the remaining Trustor may divide the
Trust assets ·in such a way as to qualify the infirm Trustor for
state assistance payments and may remove the infirm Trustor as a
Trustee of this ·Trust.
A catastrophic . illness is one which is
reasonably anticipated to extend for a period of six (6) months
or longer,. and which renders the affected Trustor incompetent or
in need of full time care.
If competent, a Trustor may make the
determination to divide the Trust Estate in accordance with these
provisions.
If the Trustor affected by the catastrophic illness
is not competent to manage his or her:affairs, then the division
shall be made by the person designated as the affected Trustor's
·attorney-in-fact in his or her durable power of attorney, or by a
court appointed con·servator of the affected Trustor.
From and after the division of the Trust assets, the share of the
Trust Estate set aside for each Trustor shall be his or her sole
and separate property for all purposes
and if that property
remains part of the Trust Estate, subject to the tEfrms and
conditions set forth within this trust agreement.
The Trustor
who is not · infirm may use assets of the infirm Trustor to
purchase an annuity or other assets which do not disqualify the
infirm Trustor from state assistance .
1

. Section 2 . 05

Principal Invasion

During the joint lives of the Trustors, should the net income of
the. Trust Estate be insufficient to provide for the care,
maintenance or support of. the Trust ors as herein defined, the
Trustee may, in the Trustee's absolute discretion, pay to or
apply for the benefit .of the Trustors/ or either .of them, or any
of their dependents, such amounts from the principal of the
Trust Estate as the Trustee may, .tn the Trustee's absolute
discretion, from. time to time deem necessary or advisable for
the care, maintenance or support of 'the Trustors.
As used in
. this section, the term 11 care, maintenance or support of the
Trustors" shall mean:
a)
The providing of proper care, maintenance and support for
the Trustors, or either of them, during any period of illness, or
other want or necessity;
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The maintenance of the Trustors, and each of them, in the
b)
manner of living to which they, and each of them, are accustomed
on the date of this Declarationi
The support and maintenance in the manner in which they are
c)
accustomed on the date of this Declaration whether adult or
minor, dependent on the Trust ors, or either of them, for such
support and maintenance; and
The education in the manner degired by the Trugtors of any
d)
person, whether adult or · minor, dependent on the Trust ors, or
·
either of them, for such education.

ARTICLE 'THREE
Section 3.01

Provisions After· First Death

leaving the other Trust or
On the death of either Trustor,
surviving him or her, the· then· Trustee shall collect all
insurance proceeds payable to the Trustee by reason of such
death, all bequests and devises distributable to the Trust Estate
under the terms of the Last Will and Testament of the deceased
Trustor and convey the assets according to the instructions set
The Trustee may use all income and principal for
forth herein.
the benefit of the surviving Trustor.
Section 3.02

Last Expenses

On the death of the first of the Trustors to die, the Trust shall
pay either from the income ·or principal of the Trust as the
Trustee in the Trustee's absolute discretion may determine, the
expenses of the deceased Truster's last illness, funeral, burial
and any inheritance, estate or death taxes that may be due by
reason of the deceased Trustor I s death, unless that Trustee in
his or her absolute . discretion determines that other adequate.
provisions . ha·ve been ·made :Eor the payment of such expenses and
taxes,
Section 3.'03

Surviving Spouse

The Trustee shall hold, administer and distribute all Trust
assets for the benefit of the surviving spouse, both as to income
and principal, unless otherwise herein·provided.

ARTICLE FOUR
Section 4.01

Second Death

On the death of the Trustor last to die, herein called "Surviving
the principal of the Trust and any accrued or
Trustor 11 ,
undistributed net income from the Trust shall go to the successor
411

Trustee and the Trustee shall apply and distribute the net income
and principal of the Trust Estate as set forth herein.

Section 4.02

Payment of the Second Death Expenses

On· the death of the surviving Trust or, the Trustee shall pay
either from the income or principal of the Trust or partly from
the income and partly from the principal of. the Trust, as the
Trustee in his or her absolute discretion may determine, the
expenses·of the Surviving Trustor's last illness, funeral, burial
and any inheritance, estate or death taxes that may be due b·y
reason of the inclusion of any portiori of the Trust Estate in the
Surviving Trustor' s estate for the · purposes o{ any such tax,
unless the Trustee in his or her absolute discretion determines
that other adequate provisions have b~en made for the payment of
'·
such expenses and taxes .

Section 4.03

Trust Income and Principal Distribution

On the death of the surviving Trustor ,: the Trust shall terminate
and the Trustee shall; as soon as reasonably possible 1 divide the
net income and principal remaining in· :the Trust into two {2) equal
shares and distribute them to the following beneficiaries:

TONIC. JOHNSON and JOHN H. CORNELL

If any child, for whom a share of the Trust Estate has been
a)
set aside, $hould die prior to the above distribution, then the
Trustee shall distribute all of such deceased child 1 s share of
the Trust Estate to his or her surviving issue in equal shares.
If any issue are minors, the funds from the Trust Estate shall be
held in a bank, savings and loan or money market fund and used
Any funds
for their . care, welJ are. and college · education.
is no
there
If
.ce1uc1..i.11.i.11::J shall be distributed at age 25.
the
of
share
survi vi·ng issue, then . all of the deceased child's
the
for
aside
set
Trust Estate· shall be added to the · shares
I
other living child, as hereinabove
benefit of the Trustors
provided, including proportionately both the distributed and the
undistributed portions of each such share, to be distributed as
an equal part of such other shares.
If all of the Trustors' beneficiaries outlined above should
b)
die prior to final distribution of the Trust Estate, all of the
Trust Estate not disposed of as hereinabove provided shall be
distributed one-half (1/2) to the persons who would then be the
husband's heirs and the other one-half (1/2) to the persons who
The identities and
would then be the heirs of the wife.
be determined in
to
heirs
aforesaid
the
of
shares
respective
of the State of
laws
succession
intestate
the
acc;rdance with
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California then ,in effect relating to.the succession of separate
If either of
property not acquired from a predeceased spouse.
the Trust ors have no such heirs, then all of the Trust estate
shall be distributed to the aforesaid heirs of the other T:r'ustor~

Section 4.04

Trust Termination

Unless sooner term~nated as otherwise provided herein, all of the
trusts provided for herein shall terminate on the ~ of the
syrvivor of the Trustor.£ and their children living at the date
becomes
first
created hereunder
trusts
the
any of
that
irrevocable.

Section 4.05

Simultaneous Death

any
under
or
simultaneously
die
Trust ors
both
Should
circumstances rendering it difficult or impossible to determine
which Trustor predeceased the other, each Trustor shall, for the
purpose of disposing of his separate ·property be deemed to have
predeceased the other Trustor.

ARTICLE FIVE
Section. 5 . 01

N~_:_Inco~_Property

( C4':-4.---°cf _.,.~·....:_ck-c..,c-12_

During the lives of either of · the Trust ors, the Trustee i;z.-. ·'-~"' - ~
authorized to retain in the trusts provided for in this t_..._..~~ '-<"Declaration, for so long as the Trustee may deem advisable and in
the best interest of such trusts, any property received by the
Trustee from the Trustors, or either cf them, whether or not such
property is of the character permitted by law for the investment
After the death of the last Trustor to die, the
of trust funds.
Successor Trustee may retain any such property in the trust
provided for in this Declaration 9_nly SQ long_..~ c h property is
productive o.f ing.g.me, - (subject to Section 5.08 of Article 5
·
herein).
Section 5. 02

Trustee Powers

The Trustee shall, with respect to any and all property which
may at any time be held by the Truste·e in trust pursuant to this
whether such property constitutes principal or
Declaration
accumulated income of any trust provided for in this Declaration,
have power, exercisable in the Trustee's absolute discretion at
any time and from time to time on such terms and in such manner
as the Trustee may deem advisable to:
1

Sell, convey, exchange, convert, improve, repair, partition,
a)
divide, allot, subdivide, create restrictions, easements, or
other servitudes thereon, operate and control;
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Lease for terms within or beyond the term of any trust
b)
provided for.in.th is Declaratio n and for any purpose, including
exploratio n for and r.emoval of gas, oil. and other minerals; and
enter into any covenants and agreements relating to the property
so leased or any improveme nts which ·may then or thereafter be
erected on such property;
Encumber or hypotheca te for any trust purpose by mortgage 1
c)
deed of trust 1 pledge or otherwise;
Carry insurance 0£ such kinds and in such amounts at the
d)
expense of the trusts provided for in this Declaratio n as the
Trustee may deem advisable ;
Commence or defend at the expense of any trust provided for
e)
in this Declaratio n such litigation with respect to any such
trust or any property of the Trust :Estate as Trustee may deem
advisable and employ, . for reasonable compensati on payable by any
such trust, such counsel as the Trustee.sh all deem advisable for
that purpose;
So long as the original trustee or trustees are managing the
f)
Trust, they may invest and reinvest in common or preferred
stocks, securities , investmen t trusts, bonds. and other property,
real · or personal,· foreign or domestic, including any undivided
interest in any one or more common trust funds, whether or not
such investmen ts be of the character permissibl e for investmen ts
by fiduciarie s under any applicable law, and without regard to
the effect any such investmen t may have upon the diversific ation
Trustees ·are specifical ly authorized to invest
of investmen ts.
in Mutual Funds, Limited Partnersh ips, option accounts (covered
or not),· including, but not limited to, currency, Index, Stocks,
traded on the
Commoditi es> Precious Metals, etc.,
Futures,
Chicago Board of Trade or ·.other nationally recognized Boards of
Trustees· ·expr~ssly :have the authority to trade on margin.
Trade_
Vote, by proxy or otherwise , in such manner as Trustee may
g)
determine ·to be: in t:he best interests· of the trust provided for
in this Declaratio n, any securiLie s having voting rights held by
the Trustee pursuant to this Declaratio n;
Pay any assessmen ts or other charges levied on any stock or
h)
other security held by the· Trustee 'in .trust pursuant to this
Declaratio n;
Exercise or not exercise, as Trustee. may deem best, any
i)
subscripti on, conversio n or other rights or options which may at
any time attach, belong or be given instrument s held by it in
trust pursuant to this Declaratio n;
Participa te in any plans or proceeding s for the foreclosu re,
merger or liquidatio n of any
consolida tion,
reorganiz ation,
has issued securities held by
that
ion
corporatio n or organizat
to be held by Trustee in
securities
the- Trustee, or will issue

j)
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trust pursuant to the terms of this Declaration, to deposit
securities with and transfer title or securities on such terms as
Trustee may· deem in . the best . interest of the trusts to any
protective or other committee established to further or defeat
any such pian or proceeding;
·
k)
Enforce any mortgage or deed of trust or pledge held by
Trustee in trust pursuant to this Declaration and at any sale
under any such mortgage, deed of trust or pledge, to bid and
purchase ·at the expense of any trust provided for. in thig
Declaration, any property subject to such security instrument;

1)

Compro~ise, submit to arbitration, release with or without
consideration and otherwise adjust any claims in favor of or
against any trust provided for in this Declaration;
m)
Distribute gifts of up to $10,000.00 per year per donee out
of principal or interest or in any proportion of the two that the
Trustee 1 in his sole discretion, deems advisable;
n)
Invest in and guarantee a business or · Trustee of the Trust
capitalizing on the business venture;

o)
Subject
Declaration
obligations,
exercise all
or exercised

to any limitations expressly set forth in this
and faithful performance of Trustee 1 s fiduciary
to do all such acts take all such proceedings, and
such rights and privileges as could be done, taken
by an absolute owner of the trust propertyi and.
1

p)
So long as both of the original Trustees are serving as
Trustees hereunder, either of them shall have the power to bind
the trust in any and all ·transactions, including, but not limited
to
(1)
collecting receipts;
(2)
paying disbursements;
{3)
securing assets; (4) writing checks and making withdrawals from
bank accounts; (.5) purchasing, selling and pledging securities
and other property/ and ( 6) exercising: any power conferred on the
Trustees pursuant to the terms. ·of thi~ Declaration of Trust, and
the action of either original Trustee may be relied upon by third
parties dealing with those Trustees or either of them.
!

q)
The trustee' is empowered to buy~ sell, trade and deal in
options, precious metals, stocks, bol)ds and securities of all
nature
(including
"short II
sales
and
speculative
option
transactions
i.e. uncovered puts and calls, option spreads,
option straddles,·. and option combinations) and commodities of
every nature,
and
contracts
for . the
future
deli very
of
commodities of every nature on margin and otherwise; and for such
purpose to maintain and. operate margin and commodity accounts
with brokers; and in connection therewith to borrow money and to
pledge any and all stocks, bonds, securities, commodities and
contracts for the future delivery theieof, held or purchased by
the trustee, with such brokers as securities for loans and
advances made to the trustee.
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The successor trustee has the authority to enter the safe
r)
deposit box in Trustors 1 names, individually or as Trustees of
the Trust, and remove the contents thereof.
Section 5.03

Power to Borrow

The Trustee shall have the power to borrow money for any trust
purpose (including from the probate :estate for the purpose of
paying taxes) on such terms and conditions as the Trustee may
deem proper from any pergon, firm or corporation, including the
power to borrow money on behalf of one trust from any other trust
provided for in this Declaration, and to obligate the trusts, or
any of them, provided for in this Declaration to repay such
borrowed money.

Section 5.04 Power To Loan to Trusts
The Trustee is authorized to loan or advance Trustee's own funds
to any trust provided for in this Declaration for any trust
purpose and to charge for such loan or advance the rate of
interest that Trustee, at the time such.--lo.an or advance is made,
would have charged had such loan-or-- advance been made to a person
not connected with such trusts having a net worth equal to the
'Any such loan or advance,
value of the principal of such trust.
together with the interest accruing on such loan or advance,
shall be a first lien against the principal of the Trust to which
such loan or advance is made and shall be repaid from the income
or principal of such trust as in the discretion of the Trustee
its
and
trust
such
of
interest
best
the
for
appears
beneficiaries.

Section 5.05
The Trustee is
property from and
Estate with or
representative of

Section 5.06

Purchase of Securities
authorized to purchase securities or other
to make loans and advancements from the Probate
without security to the executor or other
the estate of either'. Trustor ..

Manner of Holding Title

The Trustee may hold securities or other property held by Trustee
in trust pursuant to this Declaration in Trustee's name as
Trustee under this Declaration, in Trustee I s own name without a
designation showing it to be Trustee under this Declaration, in
the name of Trustee I s nominee, or the Trustee may hold such
securities unregistered in such condition that ownership will
pass by delivery.

Section 5.07

Expense and Proceeds Allocation

Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Declaration,
the Trustee shall allocate all receipts and expenditures received
416

or incurred by Trustee in administering the trusts provided for
in this Declaration to the income or principal of each such trust
in the manner provicted in this Declaration to the income or
principal of each such trust in the manner provided by the
Revised Uniform Principle and Inqome Act in effect on the date of
this Declaration in the State of California.

Section 5.08

TrustorsT Residence

death of the first Trustor to die, the Trustee is
authorized to retain in any trust or ·trusts provided for in this
Declaration for the personal use of. the Surviving Trustor any
property occupied by the Trustors as their principle place of
residence_ at the time of death of the first Trustor to die for so
long ·as the Surviving Trustor may desire to occupy such residence
During such retention, the Trustee shall pay,· from
property.
either the income or principal of the trust provided for in this
Declaration as the Trustee may deem in the best interests of such
trusts and their. bene_ficiaries, all taxes and assessments levied
or assessed against s.uch property and. all costs of· keeping such
Surviving
property properly insured, maintained· and repaired.
On written
Trustor shall not be obligated for payment of rent.
request of the Surviving Trustor, the Trustee may sell . such
property and replace _it with other property, to be retained in
trust in the same manner as the repl.a-ced residence property,
suitable in the Trustee's judgment as a residence for the
Surviving Trustor.
After the

ARTICLE SIX
Section. 6.01

Coordination with Trustor's Probate Estate

At any time during the continu~nce of the original trust
a)
hereunder and after the first Trustor's death, its Trustees m0 y
as a
distribute to the deceased Trustoi 1 s probate estate,
beneficiary of such trust, cash and/or. other property out of any
assets then held by such trust, · including any which are
classified as postdeath trust income, to whatever extent such
deem
in their sole and uncontrolled discretion,
Trustees,
beneficiaries
s
Trustor'
of
interest
best
the
in
·advisable
generally.
To relieve Trustor I s probate estate from the burden of
b)
inheritance, succession, or other
any estate,
paying them,
1
similar death taxes which may be imposed as a result of Trustor s
death, as well as funeral, last illness, and administrative
and other proper charges against Trustor's
debts,
expense,
estate, may at any time be paid out· of any assets then held by
the original trust hereunder, including.any which are classified
as nostdeath trust income, to whatever extent the Trustees of the
their sole and uncontrolled
in
Trust hereunder,
original
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discretion, deem advisable and in
Trustor 1 s beneficiaries generally .

the

best

interest

of

the

All other provisions ·hereof to tht:: contrary notwithstanding,
. c)
as
any : restricted proceeds,
circumstances shall
· under no
(i)
_indirectly
or
be either di~ectly
hereinafter defined,
distributed to or for the benefit of Trusto:r 1 s executors or
Trustor's probate estate or (ii) used to pay any obligations of
Trustor's estate. The term 11 restricted proceeds 11 means:

retirement
individual
plans 1
qualified
All
1)
accounts, or similar benefits which are received or receivable by
any Trustee hereunder which, if · paid solely · to a beneficiary
of the T:tustor' s estate, would be
"other than the .executor
excluded from Trustor I s gross estate · for · federal estate tax
purposes under Section 2039 of the · :Internal Revenue Code in
effect at Trustor's death; and
11

All proceeds of insurance on Trustor 1 s life whicti;
2)
if paid to a beneficiary other than Trustor 1 s estate, would be
exempt £rom inheritance or similar death taxes under applicable
state death tax laws.
However, the term 11 restricted proceeds" shall not include any
qualified plan or similar death benefits which would not in fact
be excluded from Trustor' s gross estate under the applicable
subsection. of Section 2039 even though such benefits were
receivable by a beneficiary other than Trustor' s executor nor
shall it include any life insurance proceeds which would be
subject to no greater state or federal death tax should this
-restriction not exist.

Section 6.02

Direction to Minimize Taxes

-In the administration of the trust hereunder, its fiduciaries
shall exercise all tax related elections, options, and choices
which they have, in· such manner as they in their sole but
reasonable judgment (where appropriate, receiving advice of tax
counsel), believe will achieve the :bverall minimum in total
combined present and reasonably anti9ipated (but appropria'tely
future administrative expenses and taxes of all
discounted)
kinds, upon not only such trust, but also its beneficiaries, the
other trusts hereunder and their beneficiaries and Trustor 1 s
Without limitation on the generality of the
probate estate.
foregoing direction (which shall to that extent supersede the
usual fiduciary duty of impartiality), such fiduciaries shall not
be accountable to· any person interested in any trust or in
Trustor 1 s estate for the manner in which they shall carry out
this direction-to minimize overall taxes and expenses (including
any decision they may make not to incur the expense of detailed
analysis of alternative choices) and, even though their decisions
regard may result in increased tax or decreased
in this
distribution to a trust, to the estate, or to one or more
beneficiaries, · there shall in no e·vent be any compensation
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readjustm ents or reimbursem ents between any of the trusts
hereunder or any of the trust or estate accounts or beneficia ries
by reason of the manner in which the 'fiduciarie s thus carry out
said direction .

ARTICLE SEVEN
Section 7.01

Incontes tability

The beneficia l provisions of this instrument (an<l of Trust or's
Last Will and Testament) are intended to be in lieu of any other
claims, or interest of ·whatsoeve r natureJ whether
rights,
statutory or otherwise, except bona fide pre-death debts, which
any beneficia ry hereunder may have against or in Trustor's estate
Accordingl y, if any
or the propertie s. in trust hereunder .
(except a legally
claim
beneficia ry hereunder asserts any
enforceab le debt), ·statutory election, · or other right or interest
against or in Trustor 1 s estate, Trustor 1 s Will, or any propertie s
of this Trust, other than pursuant tc:i the express terms hereof or
or
of said Will, or directly or indirectly contests, disputes
calls into question, before any court, the validity of any
provisions of .this instrumen t or of said Will, then:
1

Such beneficia ry shall thereby absolutely forfeit any and
a)
all beneficia ry interests of whatsoeve r kind and nature which
such beneficia ry might otherwise have under this instrumen t and
the interests of the other beneficia ries shall be proportio nately
increased and/or advanced;
All of the provisions of this instrumen t, to the extent that
b)
they confer any benefits, powers, or right . whatsoever upon such
claiming, electing, or contesting beneficiar y, shall thereupon
become absolutel y void and revoked; and
Such claiming, electing, or contesting beneficiar y, if then
c)
acting as a Trustee hereunder, shall automatica lly cease to be a
Trustee and shall thereafte r be ineligible either to
remove or become a Trustee hereunder .
The foregoing shall not be construed, however, to limit the
appearance of any beneficiar y as a witness in any proceedin g
involving this instrumen t or said Will nor to limit any
beneficia ry's appearance in any capacity in any proceeding solely
for the constructi on of either of said documents.
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ARTICLE EIGHT
Section 8. 01

-

on
Income;
Ac.crued ·
Beneficial In.terest

Termination

of

Whenever the right of any beneficiary to payments from the net
income or principal of any trust provided for in this Declaration
shall terminate either by reason of death or other cause, any
accrued net income from such trust undistributed by the Trustee
on.the date of such termination shall be held, administered and
distributed by the Trustee in the sam~ manner as if such income
had accrued and been received by the Trustee after -the date such
trust
such
from
payments
receive
to
right
beneficiary's
terminated.

Section 8.02

Periodic Accountings

reasonable
to · pay himself
entitled
be
shall
Trustee
A
compensation from time to. time without prior court order and
shall be reimbursed for all out-of-pocket expenses incurred in
·
administering the Trust .
During the lifetime of either Trustor 1 the Trustees shall account
only to the Settlors or the survivor of. them, and their written
approval shall be final and conclusive in respect to transactions
disclosed in the account as to all beneficiaries of the trust,
After·. the deaths
including unborn and contingent beneficiaries .
accounting from
an
render
shall
Trustees
the
Trustors,
both
of
after any
annually
than
frequently
less
not
but
time
time to
created
trust
any
of
transactions
the
garding
prior accounting·re
'
in this instrument.
Acc~~tings shall be made by delivering a .written accounting to
each beneficiary entitled to current income distribution, or if
there are no current income beneficiaries ; to each beneficiary
entitled to current distribution out ~f income or principal in
If. any person entitled to receive an
the Trustees' discretion·.
under a disability, the accounting
is
or
minor
a
is
accounting
or the guardian of his person
parents
his
shall be delivered to
or conservator of his person
guardian
if he is a minor or to the
if he is under any other disability. · Unless any beneficiary,
including parents, guardians or conservators of beneficiaries ,
shall deliver a written objection to the Trustees within sixty
( 6 O) days after receipt of the Trustees' account, the account
shall be final and conclusive in respect to the transactisms
disclosed in the account as to all benef itiaries of the trust
After
beneficiaries .
unascertained
and
unborn
including
settlement of the account by agreement of the parties objecting
to it or by the expiration of the sixty (60) day period, the
Trustees shall no longer be liable to any beneficiary of the
in
including unborn and unascertained beneficiaries ,
trust
the
for
except
account,
the
in
disclosed
transactions
to
respe~t
Trustees' intentional wrongdoing or fraud.
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Section 8.03

Spendthr ift Provision

Except as ot_herwise expressly provided in this Declaratio n no
· beneficiar y of any trust provided for in this Declaratio n shall
have any right, · power or authority . to alienate
encumber or
hypotheca te his or her interest in the principal o"r income of
such trus·t · iii ·-any----man ner, nor shall such interest of any
beneficia ry be subject to cla~ms of his. o:i: he:r:__ ~r-~ditors or
liable.
attachmen t, execution or- other process of law.
1

1

to

Section· 8.04

Distribut ion ·in Kind or Cash

On any di vision of the assets of the Trust Estate into shares or
partial shares · and on any final or partial distributi on of the
assets of the Trust Estate or any trust provided for · in this
Declaratio n,·· the Trustee, in its absolute discretion , may divide
and distribute such assets in kind, may divide or distribute
undivided interests of .such assets I OT may sell all or any part
of such assets : and make- division or distributi on in cash or
partly in casb and partly ·1n kind.
The decision of the Trustee,
either prior to or on any division or distributi on of such
assets~ as to what constitut es·a proper division of such assets
of the Trust Estate or any trust provided for in this Deylaratio n
shall be binding on all persons in any manner interested in any
trust provided for in this Declaratio n.

Section 8.05

Definitio n of Children

The .terms "child 11 and

childrenJ1 as used in this Trust shall mean
the lawful issue of the Trustors or either of them and include
children legally adopted by the Trustors or either of them.
11

ARTICLE NINE
Section 9.01
follovJing
succession :

The

,._.,.-:II

W-1...l....L

Trustees
act

as

Trustees

in the

following

order of

FIRST:
The undersign ed MICHAEL S. CORNELL, Husband and
ARLIE M.· CORNELL, Wife, together as co-trustee s.
1

SECOND:

At the death or incapacity of the last survivor of the
undersigne d, TONIC. JOHNSON and JOHN H. CORNELL shall act as CoTrustees.
THIRD:
A trustee chosen by the majority of beneficia ries, with
a parent or legal guardian voting for minor beneficia ries;
provided, however, that the issue of any deceased child shall
have collectiv ely only one vote.
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ARTICLE TEN
Section 10.01 Perpetuities Savings Clause
In any event and anything to the contrary herein contained
notwithstanding, · the trusts c·reated in this agreement shall
terminate upon the day_ next preceding the expiration of twentyone (2l) years after the death of the undersigned and their issue
In the event these trusts shall not have previously
now living.
terminated in accordance with the terms provided for in this
paragraph, the Trustee shall distribu'te the Trust Estate as it
shall then be constituted, . together w{th any net income, to the
beneficiaries then entitled to the income from the Trust Estate
in the same ; · proportions in which they. are entitled to such
income.

ARTICLE ELEVEN
Section 11_01 Governing Law
I't is not . intended that the laws of · only one particular state
shall necessarily govern all questions pertaining to all of the
trusts hereunder. Rather;
The validity of the trust hereunder, as well as that
a)
validity of the particular provisions of that trust, shall be
governed by the laws of whatever state having any sufficient
connection with such trust will support_ such validity.
The meaning and effect of the terms of this trust instrument
b)
and of any other trust instrument :related hereto shall be
governed by the laws · of the state in . which the initial trust
under that trust instrument was created, that is, California in
the case of this instrument, and such other state as may be
designated in the governing-instrument of any trust receiving an
·
appointment hereunder.
The administration of the trust hereunder shall be governed
c)
by · the laws of the state in which that trust is then being
administered (based· on the location of the principal office of
the Trustee then having custody of that Trust•s principal assets
exclusive
have
shall
state I s. courts
which
records) ,
and
respect
with
trust
the
of
administration
that
over
j·urisdiction
in that
administered
to any period during which it was thus being
state.
The foregoing shall apply even though the situs of some trust
assets or the home of the Trustor, a trustee, or beneficiary may
at some time.or times be elsewhere.
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Sectio n 11.02 Inval idity of Any Provis ion
Should any provis ion of this Decla ration be or become invali
d or
unenf orceab le, the remain ing provis ions of this Decla ration
shall
be and contin ue to be fully effec. tive.

Sectio n 11.03 Succe ssor Trust ees
Any succes sor Truste e taking office pursua nt to Articl e Nine
of
this Decla ration shall forthw ith succee d to all title of the
prior Truste e and· shall have all the ,power , rights , discre
tions
and obliga tions confe rred ori such Truste e by this Decla ration
.

1..
We, and each of us_; have read the forego ing Decla ration of
Trust;
. The forego ing Decla ration of Trust correc tly states the
terms and condit i'oris. under which the T:rust Estate is to be
held,
manag ed, admin istere d and dispos ed of by the Truste e;
2.
We, and each of us,
partic ulars; and

approv e such.D eclara tion of Trust in all

3 .
As the Truste e named in such Decla ration of Trust, we and
each of usf approv e and accep t the trusts provid ed for in
such
Decla ration .

EXECUTED ON THIS
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STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
COUNTY OF (J rP"Y"-fr.

II--

)SS

)

-9 G ,

hl~- ~,.J,~
;;ok

ON
1
.BEFORE
ME,
·
PERSONALLY
APPEARED MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORN.ELL _){_ PERSONALL
Y
TO ME OR
PROVED TO ME ON THE BASIS OF SATISFACT ORY EVIDENCE TO BE THE PERSONS
WHOSE
NAMES ARE SUBSCRIBE D TO THE WITHIN INSTRUMENT, AND ACKNOwtEDGED
THAT THEY EXECUTED·
THE SAME IN THEIR AUTHORIZED CAPACITI ES, AND THAT BY THEIR SIGNATURES ON THE
INSTRUMENT THE PERSONS, OR. THE ENTITY UPON BEHALF OF WHICH
THE PERSONS ACTED,
EXECUTED THE INSTRUME NT.
WITNESS MY HAND AND OFFICIAL SEAL.

NOTARY PUBLIC

.r

424

.rgo?
ion?

md

ce

ms

st?
l?
,d.

get

ps.
15

16

BY MR . CREASON:
Q.

Have you made any other plans or do you have

17

any other commitments from anyone to assist you with

18

your cash needs in taking care of this Trust property

19

if this house continues to languish on the market?

20

21

A.

Yes, s i r .

I do have an aunt that is willing

to assist me to some degree with that.

22

Q.

And who is that?

23

A.

Marlene Cunningham.

24

Q.

And where does she reside?

25

A.

Las Vegas, Nevada .
K & K REPORTING (208)743-1380

kkreport@wildblue . net
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20?3
Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC
1219 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-1516
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231
Attorneys for Personal Representative
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

- - -- - - - -- -- - - -- - )

I.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On March 6, 2013 , the Estate of John Henry Cornell petitioned this Court to supervise
adminstration of The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M . Cornell and
order distribution of the Trust res. The Estate seeks (1) the return ofreal property placed by John
Cornell in the Trust for safekeeping; and (2) the turnover of property which vested in John
Cornell years before his death but was wrongly withheld from him. In order to receive the full
amount actually due to John through distribution, the Estate also seeks a judgment against the
trustee, Toni C. Johnson, for damage caused to the Trust res by her improper conduct. In other
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RE: MOTION TO DISMISS - 1

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
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(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231
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words, not only does the Estate raise claims against the Trust for actions of the trustee, which
John held at the time of his death, but the Estate also seeks the return of property, which
belonged to John at the time of his death.
Ms. Johnson's motion to dismiss raises before this court the issue of whether an estate
may pursue the property interests of the decedent where the decedent failed to recover the
property due him during his lifetime. The Court should deny Ms. Johnson's motion because
(1) the nature of Ms. Johnson's appearance and legal representation in this matter creates a
genuine issue of material fact; 1 (2) the Estate is not precluded from pursuing its claims through
the law of the case doctrine; (3) actions seeking to adjudicate property rights and order proper
distribution of the subject property survive the death of the property owner; and (4) even if the
Estate's claims do not survive at law, equity demands that Ms. Johnson not be allowed to retain
her ill gotten gains which she acquired through refusing to engage in proper conduct.
II.

FACTS & PROCEDURE

Michael and Arlie Cornell established The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell
and Arlie M. Cornell on November 1, 1996. The Trust appointed Toni Johnson and John Cornell
to serve as successor co-trustees upon the death of the surviving Trustor. Arlie Cornell died on
November 9, 2008. After her death, the Trust instrument was changed by Michael Cornell on
August 6, 2009, removing John Cornell as an appointed successor trustee. Michael Cornell died
on December 15, 2009.

1

As set forth in greater detail herein, the Estate maintains that this is an issue of both form and substance. At the
Court's May 17 hearing, Ms. Johnson's attorney made the statement that she only represented Ms. Johnson, and not
the Trust.
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John Cornell filed a Petition regarding the Trust on July 11, 2012. John died on August
20, 2012. Ms. Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 17, 2012, arguing that the claims
in John's petition abated upon his death. Ms. Johnson also argued that because John died, there
existed no legitimate party in interest unless and until the Estate was substituted into the action
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(l).

For reasons beyond Kareen Cornell's

control, John's attorney continued to prosecute the petition in John's name, personally. In late
November 2012, Ms. Cornell appeared before this Court and notified the Court that she objected
to any other person acting on behalf of her late husband. While this Court invited Ms. Cornell to
submit briefing on John's petition, it did not bring her or the Estate into the litigation. Thus, Ms.
Cornell's briefing was, in effect, amici briefing. On February 15, 2013, this Court issued a
Memorandum Opinion. In that opinion, the Court dismissed the petition filed by John Cornell.
The Court expressly invited Ms. Cornell to file claims on behalf of the Estate.
Ms. Cornell responded to the Court's invitation by filing the Estate's Petition on February
28, 2013. The Estate's petition seeks supervised administration and court ordered distribution of
the Trust. The Estate's Petition alleges that Ms. Johnson (1) failed to act in conformity with the
terms of the Trust; (2) breached her fiduciary duties when acting in her capacity as Trustee;
(3) engaged in equitable conversion of the property belonging to John by refusing to distribute
the property in accordance with the dictates of the Trust document and her fiduciary duty; and
(4) was unjustly enriched by (a) misusing Trust assets for personal desires, and (b) refusing to
comply with the terms of the Trust and her fiduciary duties in order to effect a distribution in her
favor.
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The Estate deposed Ms. Johnson on April 22, 2013. At her deposition, Ms. Johnson
revealed that she holds in her possession personal and real property belonging to the Trust. See
A.ff. of Theodore 0. Creason, Exh. A, p. 71 1.17 - p.72 1.7. Ms. Johnson also disclosed, through

testimony and records provided at deposition, that she has commingled cash assets of the Trust
with her own cash assets and with cash assets, she received from Kareen and John Cornell. See
A.ff. of Theodore 0. Creason, Exh. B, pp. 49-63. Ms. Johnson stated that she has spent all of the

cash assets she comingled with cash belonging to the Trust for her living expenses and expenses
incurred maintaining and paying taxes on the Trust property. See A.ff. of Theodore 0. Creason,
Exh. B, pp. 51-63.

When asked to explain by what right she expended Trust assets and

commingled Trust assets and the Cornells' assets with her own, Ms. Johnson testified that she
received oral permission from John Cornell to take such actions and to live in the Trust's
residential property without paying rent. When Ms. Johnson was confronted about the Trust's
terms prohibiting commingling of assets or retaining non-income producing property upon death
of the surviving Trustor, Ms. Johnson responded that she had her brother's permission and
acquiescence to proceed this way. 2 See A.ff. of Theodore 0. Creason, Exh. C, p. 2311.10-16.
On May 7, 2013, Ms. Johnson filed her motion to dismiss the Estate's Petition. In her
Memorandum in Support of that motion, Ms. Johnson claims that the Estate's Petition should be
dismissed, as a matter of law, by arguing that (1) this Court's February 15, 2013 Memorandum

2

Ms. Johnson's testimony creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding her conpliance with the Trust document
Her testimony makes it abundantly clear that she did not believe she was bound by the provision and limitations
contained in the trust document. In fact, she denies having seen the entire trust document until the time of the
deposition. Johnson Depa. p. 73 II 9-19. There are a host of yet unanswered questions about the manner in which
Ms. Johnson managed her parents' affairs after their deaths. Ms. Johnson testified that she believes that her father
had a will when he died, and that it may be at the house. She has promised to find it and deliver it to Ms. Seubert,
but so far, she has not done so. See Ajf. of Theodore 0. Creason, Exh. D, pp. 74-75.
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Opinion binds the Estate; (2) the facts alleged due not support a cause of action for constructive
trust; (3) all breach fiduciary duty claims abate upon death; (4) the claims of breach of contract
and unjust emichment are actually breach of fiduciary duty claims, which abate; (5) the claim for
conversation abates upon death; and (6) the Trust cannot hold a creditor's claim against Ms.
Johnson because the Estate cannot establish a valid claim as against Ms. Johnson.
On May 17, this Court held a hearing on the Estate's motion to stay the proceedings until
the district court ruled on a recently filed Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act petition.
While the Court denied the Estate's motion, a statement was made by opposing counsel that
bears significant relevance to the current motion. Opposing counsel stated that she has been
representing Ms. Johnson, personally, and has never considered herself the attorney on behalf of
the Trust. As set forth below, Ms. Johnson's motion to dismiss should be denied because this
creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding the Trust's position and the nature of Ms.
Johnson's appearance and the arguments of counsel.

III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Standard of Review
Summary judgment is only appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. P.
56( c). 3 If reasonable persons could reach different findings or draw conflicting inferences from
the evidence when all facts are liberally construed in favor of the Estate, the Court must deny Ms.

3

Contrary to the assertion made in Ms. Johnson's brief, the Estate has not stipulated to treat Ms. Johnson's motion as
a motion for summary judgment. Therefore, implicit in Ms. Johnson's filing is a request that the court onvert the
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Johnson's motion. See Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co., Inc., 135 Idaho 80, 83, 14 P.3d 1074,
1077 (Ct. App. 2000); Coonse ex rel. Coonse v. Boise Sch. Dist., 132 Idaho 803, 805, 979 P.2d
1161, 1163 (1999). Ms. Johnson carries the burden of establishing entitlement to summary
judgment.
B.

The nature of Ms. Johnson's appearance and legal representation in this matter
creates genuine issue of material fact

The Court has been presented with evidence in the form of a statement on the record that
creates a reasonable inference that Ms. Johnson has been pursuing this matter solely in her
personal capacity. At the May 17 hearing, Ms. Johnson's attorney expressly stated on the record
that she has only ever represented Ms. Johnson in her personal capacity and did not consider
herself as attorney for the Trust.

The scope of her attorney's representation is an issue of

historical fact that cannot later be characterized based upon singularity of interest or desire to
avoid challenges to procedural missteps. This disclosure creates genuine issues of fact regarding
(1) whether Ms. Johnson may pursue a motion to dismiss in her personal capacity; (2) whether
the Trust has appeared and provided its position as to the issues raised in the Estate's Petition,
and (3) whether the actions taken and discovery provided by Ms. Johnson have any binding effect
as against the Trust. The resolution of these facts is material to disposition of this matter.
Therefore, Ms. Johnson's motion should be denied.
The Estate's Petition seeks supervised administration of the Trust and Court ordered
distribution. The Estate is a party to this action as a Petitioner claiming that the decedent was
deprived of his property right, which vested at the time of the death of Michael Cornell, or
motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment, which the court must first do if it considers factual allegations
outside the pleadings. Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 796 P.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1990).
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shortly thereafter. The Estate also seeks an order of restitution to the Trust for those damages
incurred by it because of Ms. Johnson's inequitable conduct.
Ms. Johnson's personal interest in this litigation is that of a beneficiary of the Trust. Ms.
Johnson has not sought joinder under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to be recognized as a
party. The fact that Ms. Johnson has only been appearing in her personal capacity means that the
Court has not been provided with an appearance by the Trust and statement of the Trust's
position. Part of the basis for Ms. Johnson's request for summary judgment is her claim that
John's interests in the property would not vest until distribution. While that may be the position
of a beneficiary seeking a greater distribution of the Trust res, the Court should demand input
from the Trustee-acting in her fiduciary capacity as trustee-before granting Ms. Johnson's
request for summary judgment.
Ms. Johnson's pursuit of this motion in her personal capacity is also inconsistent with her
proposed interpretation of the Trust document. Ms. Johnson claims that all interests in the Trust
res remain contingent until distribution. She further claims that no distribution has been effected
in law or in fact.

Therefore, she remains a contingent beneficiary to this day (under her

reasoning). A contingent beneficiary is not a real party in interest, such that he or she may
participate in actions involving the Trust. Carl H Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133
Idaho 866, 870, 993 P.2d 1197, 1201 (1999).

Thus, under Ms. Johnson's proposed

interpretation, she lacks standing to oppose supervised administration and Court ordered
distribution of the Trust.
The scope of representation of Ms. Johnson's counsel also creates genuine issues of
material fact regarding the position of the Trust and the nature of disclosures made by Ms.
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Johnson in this litigation. If the Trust has not appeared and has not retained counsel, then this
failure is yet another grounds for instituting supervised administration and distribution of the
Trust. When acting as a Trustee, Ms. Johnson holds a duty to each beneficiary to protect the
Trust res, even if that protection is against her own actions. The Estate is now left to question
whether the discovery produced and arguments propounded in this action are from a source
acting in her capacity has Trustee or from an individual pursuing her personal interests. Because
this question has been raised by Ms. Johnson at so late a date, her motion for summary judgment
should be denied.
C.

The Estate is not precluded from pursuing its claims through the law of the case
doctrine
Ms. Johnson argues that the Estate should be precluded from litigating its claims based

upon the Court's ruling against Margaret Watkins. Ms. Johnson cites the law of the case doctrine
as the sole supporting legal authority for her argument. The law of the case doctrine does not
apply to the Estate's Petition.
The rule of the case doctrine applies where a case has left the jurisdiction of one court and
proceeded on to another court acting in its appellate capacity. See Swanson v. Swanson, 134
Idaho 512, 516, 5 P.3d 973, 977 (2000). The doctrine holds that once an appellate court has
ruled on an issue, that ruling becomes the law of the case for all subsequent proceedings in the
case. Id. It also holds that where a party fails to appeal an appealable ruling, the issue may not
be reopened upon remand. Id.
Here, the claims of the Estate set forth in its Petition have not left the jurisdiction of this
Court. The language and the nature of this Court's Memorandum Opinion against Ms. Watkins
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make clear that it was not issuing judgment as against the Estate. Instead, the Court invited the
Estate to file a petition raising its claims against the Trust. Further, the Court could not have
issued a judgment as against the Estate at that time, because the Estate was not a party to this
litigation until it filed its Petition. Ms. Johnson continues to maintain that the Estate and Ms.
Watkins are somehow the same party; they quite simply are not. The existence of a party is
established by appearance and procedure, not by similarity of interests. While the Estate shares
Ms. Johnson's dismay regarding the continued pursuit of "John Cornell's claims" by a person
having no rightful authority to pursue those claims, the Estate cannot be bound by rulings against
that person. The law of the case doctrine does not apply to the Estate's Petition.
D.

A genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the Trust held property of
John Cornell in a constructive trust at the time of his death

Ms. Johnson argues that the doctrine of constructive trust is inapplicable because the
Trust, not Ms. Johnson, holds legal title to disputed property.

Ms. Johnson's argument

misunderstands the nature of the Estate's Petition. The Petition does not allege that Ms. Johnson
holds title the disputed property, but rather that Ms. Johnson engaged in inequitable conduct by
retaining legal title in the name of the Trust.

The doctrine of constructive trust holds that

property may actually belong to another in a quasi-trust relationship in certain circumstances.
The Estate's Petition alleges that the property due John under the Trust actually belonged to him
in constructive trust at the time of his death.
"When property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title
may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee."
TRUST, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), trust (internal quotation marks and citation
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omitted); see also Hanger v. Hess, 49 Idaho 325, 328, 288 P. 160, 161 (1930). The doctrine of
constructive trust is a description of the nature by which a wrongdoer holds the property of
another; the court deems that property as already belonging to the injured party at some earlier
point in time. This doctrine rests upon "the fundamental rule of equity that equity regards that as
done which ought to be done." See First Sec. Bank of Idaho, Nat. Ass 'n v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654,
657,429 P.2d 386, 389 (1967) (discussing basis of doctrine of equitable conversion).
In this case, Ms. Johnson ought to have distributed the Trust res as soon as reasonably
practicable when the Trust automatically terminated upon the death of Michael Cornell. See
Trust 4.03. The undisputed extended period of time between the death of Michael Cornell and
the death of John Cornell, taken by itself, creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether a constructive trust arose. In its February 15 Memorandum, this Court found that Ms.
Johnson "lived rent free in the home that is included in the trust and apparently paid all her living
expenses from trust funds." At her deposition, Ms. Johnson testified that she comingled cash
assets of the Trust with her own cash.

Her records produced at deposition show that she

comingled cash she received from John and Kareen with Trust cash assets. She testified that she
has spent all the Trust's cash assets including the comingled funds on upkeep and taxes and on
personal expenses. She has testified that she is making arrangements to borrow money from a
relative to provide cash to live on. See Ajf. a/Theodore 0. Creason, Exh. E, p. 92 11. 15-25. In
short, it appears that Ms. Johnson within a very short time after her father's death was treating
Trust property as though it was her own. (See Ajf. of Theodore 0. Creason, Exh. B). Because
John Cornell was entitled to distribution long before his death, and because Ms. Johnson
deprived him of his property through inequitable conduct, the fundamental rule of equity governs
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in this case: the Court should treat the Trust property as properly distributed to John long before
his death. Therefore, the manner in which Ms. Johnson has retained that property is not through
the terms of the Trust but through the doctrine of constructive trust.
While evidence of Ms. Johnson's malfeasance supports a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty, it also supports a claim in equity that the property due to John was being held in
constructive trust. By establishing that property being held in the name of the Trust was being
held in constructive trust for John, the Estate can establish a property interest that existed at the
time of death. A constructive trust has no terms other than that the property is due to the proper
party. A claim for return of property survives the death of the decedent and passes to his
personal representative. See 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 56. See Henshaw
v. Miller, 58 U.S. 212 (1854) (cause for taking of chattels survives). Therefore, the Estate's

claim of constructive trust should not be dismissed.
E.

The breach of contract claim is distinct from a breach of fiduciary duty claim

Ms. Johnson argues that the Estate's breach of contract claim should be interpreted as a
breach of fiduciary claim and deemed abated consistent with the reasoning of the Court in its
February 15 Memorandum. A breach of contract claim is distinct from a breach of fiduciary duty
claim. A breach of contract claim focuses on the trustee's failure to adhere to the terms of the
trust document; a breach of fiduciary duty claim focuses on the trustee's failure to act in
accordance with the standard of conduct required of the trustee under statutory and common law.
"A trust is not itself a separate legal entity that can own property; rather, it is a
relationship having certain attributes." In re Thompson, 454 B.R. 486, 492 (Bankr. D. Idaho
2011 ). "A trust creates a fiduciary relationship in which the trustee is the holder of legal title to
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the property subject to the beneficial interest of the beneficiary." DBSIITRI V v. Bender, 130
Idaho 796, 808, 948 P .2d 151, 163 (1997). The scope and nature of that relationship is defined
by the terms of the trust, i.e. the contract. A trustee's fiduciary duties and contractual duties are
intertwined, yet distinguishable. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 2 defines a trust as
... a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising from a manifestation
of intention to create that relationship and subjecting the person who holds title to
the property to duties to deal with it for the benefit of ... one or more persons, at
least one of whom is not the sole trustee.
The relationship between beneficiary and trustee is contractual in nature, having a standard of
contractual dealing on the part of the truste.e as that of a fiduciary. To argue that no contractual
claim may lie against the trustee is to argue that the terms of the trust document have no
substance.
The contractual relationship established by the Trust document contains the following
terms:
4.03 & 4.04:

5.01:
8.02:

The Trust terminates automatically upon the death of the surviving Trustor
and the successor Trustee is to distribute the property "as soon as
reasonably possible."
The only property which may be retained in the Trust after the death of the
surviving Trustor is property productive of income.
The successor Trustee shall render an accounting from time to time.

The Estate alleges that Ms. Johnson breached these contractual provisions through her conduct.
At deposition, Ms. Johnson conceded that she had not seen the trust instrument before the
deposition. Rather, her position seems to be that despite her dispute with her brother, she had an
oral agreement with him that she would live in the house rent free while she tried to sell it; that
she would use the Trusts' cash for her living expenses; and that she would divide the proceeds
with John when the house and real property sold. If that is the version of the facts the Court
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accepts, then Ms. Johnson has not been following the terms of the Trust, rather the terms of the
oral contract with John. In that scenario, the Trust res devolved to John Cornell and Ms. Johnson
by intestate succession (or Will if one if one is found) upon the death of Michael Cornell, subject
to administration.

I.C. §15-3-101.

There are, of course, legal and evidentiary hurdles Ms.

Johnson will have to overcome to succeed on this theory, but the point is she was bound to act in
a contractual relationship with John with the terms of that contract either being the Trust or the
oral agreement.
F.

The Estate's claims for breach of fiduciary duty did not abate upon John's death

The common law governs the issue of survivability of an action upon death of the injured
party in all actions where the injured party's cause of action arose prior to July 1, 2010. See
Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 619 (2012).

Johnson's argument on survival under the

common law relies upon the analysis in Bishop. The Bishop Court set forth the general rule
regarding survival of claims at common law: "Under the common law, claims arising out of
contracts generally survive the death of the claimant, while those sounding in pure tort abate."
Id. This case, however, does not fall under that general rule. The cause of action before the
Bishop Court sounded in "pure tort" as it was for attorney malpractice and the contract between

the attorney and his client provided no terms additional to those required of an attorney through
his or her rules of professional responsibility. The cause of action did not involve a claim to
property held in trust by another.
While the Bishop Court identified the general rule, the common law is more nuanced in
cases involving property. In such cases, the survival of an action depends upon the nature of the
interest affected.
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At common law survivable actions are those in which the wrong complained of
affects primarily property and property rights, and in which any injury to the
person is incidental, while nonsurvivable actions are those in which the injury
complained of is to the person and any effect on property or property rights is
incidental. . . .
. . . The general rule is that, in addition to the causes of action arising out of
contract recognized at common law, causes of action arising from torts to real and
personal property survive and pass to the personal representative of the decedent,
while purely personal torts do not survive in the absence of statutory provision.
1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 51. Thus, in cases where the injured party
alleged an injury to his property-such as the existence or amount of his interest in a trust-the
claim survives. See Henshaw v. Miller, 58 U.S. 212 (1854) (cause for taking of chattels
survives). See also, Barnes v. Barnes, 135 Idaho 103, 105, 15 P.3d 816, 818 (2000) (holding that
issues regarding property survive).
The survivability of this action is further supported by the fact that it arises pursuant to a
remedial statute and that it is equitable in nature. The petition seeks recovery based upon a
trustee's breach. A cause of action which is founded under Idaho Code§§ 15-7-101 through 157-601. "A cause of action that is founded on a remedial statute ... survives the death of the party
possessing the cause of action." 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 59. Further,
the causes of action pled here are equitable in nature.
The principle that a cause of action expires with the death or disability of a party
generally does not apply to suits in equity; equitable remedies exist to the same
extent in favor of and against executors and administrators as they do against the
decedent, as long as the court can continue to grant effective relief in spite of the
death. One of the main reasons for this stance for suits in equity is that such suits
primarily pertain to property rights.
1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 60 (footnotes omitted).

Thus, under the

common law, the causes of action pled in this case survive John's death.
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Idaho Code § 5-327(2) governs the issue of survivability of an action upon death of the
injured party in all actions where the injured party's cause of action arose after July 1, 2010.
While the causes of action in this case survive John's death under the common law (as set forth
above), the Idaho legislature made survival explicit in its enactment of section 5-327(2):
A cause of action for personal injury or property damage caused by the wrongful
act or negligence of another shall not abate upon the death of the injured person
from causes not related to the wrongful act or negligence. Provided however, that
the damages that may be recovered in such action are expressly limited to those
for: (i) medical expenses actually incurred, (ii) other out-of-pocket expenses
actually incurred, and (iii) loss of earnings actually suffered, prior to the death of
such injured person and as a result of the wrongful act or negligence. Such action
shall be commenced or, if already commenced at the time of the death of the
injured person, shall be thereafter prosecuted by the personal representative of the
estate of the deceased person or, if there be no personal representative appointed,
then by those persons who would be entitled to succeed to the property of the
deceased person according to the provisions of section 5-311(2)(a), Idaho Code.
The facts pled in the Estate's Petition give rise to an action for the damage caused by Ms.
Johnson's improper conduct. The alleged damage is diminution of the Trust res; a diminution in
the value of the property interest John held in the Trust res.
Both the common law and Idaho Code § 5-327 support a ruling that the causes of action
set forth in the Estate's Petition survive the death of John. If the deceased held a property
interest at the time of death, that interest falls into the estate, where it is later distributed to the
beneficiaries. The alleged wrongdoer does not get to convert the deceased's property to her own
simply because the deceased did not survive to the point of judgment. The Estate asks this Court
to reject Johnson's proposed interpretations would result in an unjust and inequitable conclusion.
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F.

The Estate's claims of conversion did not abate upon John's death
Ms. Johnson's argues that the Estate's claim of conversion abated upon John's death. In

essence, she argues that a wrongdoer may retain the property of a decedent so long as the
decedent is not able to recover the property prior to death.
First, John held a vested property interest in the Trust res at the time of his death. The
terms of the Trust are that "[o]n the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trust shall terminate and
the Trustee shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and principal remaining
in the Trust into two (2) equal shares and distribute them .... " Trust, 4.03 (emphasis added);
see also 4.04. The Trust terminated automatically upon the death of Michael Cornell. Thus, the

only action appropriate by Ms. Johnson was to transfer the property that now belonged to John
from the Trust to John. Instead of delivering John's property to him, she withheld it. The Estate
seeks a turnover of John's property on John's behalf.
Second, John held an interest in that part of the Trust res which was placed in the Trust
by him in the form of Lot 34. This is property that John transferred to the Trust for convenience
because it was contiguous to his parents' home. Ms. Johnson's records show that John and
Kareen continued to send cash for some period of time after Michael's death to cover the
property taxes and other expenses associated with that lot. See A.ff of Theodore 0. Creason, Exh.
B.

A claim for return of property survives the death of the decedent and passes to his
personal representative. See 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 56. See Henshaw
v. Miller, 58 U.S. 212 (1854) (cause for taking of chattels survives). Therefore, the Estate's

claim of conversion should not be dismissed.
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G.

The Estate's claims of unjust enrichment did not abate upon John's death
Ms. Johnson seeks dismissal of the Estate's unjust enrichment claim based upon the

arguments set forth by her regarding breach of contract and her attempted characterization of the
unjust enrichment claim as a breach of fiduciary duty claim. First, while a cause of action for
unjust enrichment has similar facts to a breach of contract cause of action, they are two distinct
theories for relief.

Breach of contract sounds in law. Unjust enrichment sounds in equity.

"Unjust enrichment occurs where [offending party] receives a benefit which would be inequitable
to retain without compensating the [injured party] to the extent that retention is unjust."
Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 557, 165 P.3d 261, 271 (2007). The damages

available to the claimant on an unjust enrichment claim is the value of the amount by which the
offending party was unjustly enriched. Barry v. Pac. W Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 834, 103
P.3d 440, 447 (2004). Like constructive trust, unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine that
seeks to return to the injured party those amounts which were due to him or her in equity;
amounts which equity deems property of the injured party. If the Estate prevails on its unjust
enrichment claim, it will have established that John held an equitable interest in property prior to
his death. The Estate holds the right and statutory duty to recover that property of the decedent
and distribute it in probate. See Idaho Code§ 15-3-709. The claim for unjust enrichment should
not be dismissed.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Estate has raised several claims in law and equity seeking recovery of that property in
which John Cornell held an interest at the time of his death; property which Ms. Johnson
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withheld from him through her improper conduct. Ms. Johnson's motion to dismiss should be
denied.

DATED this 21st day of May, 2013.
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC
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Attorneys for Surviving Spouse, Kareen Cornell

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21st day of May, 2013, I filed the foregoing
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION RE: MOTION TO DISMISS with the Clerk of the Court, and
provided a paper copy to the following persons:

Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C.
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501

X

FIRST-CLASS MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
FAX TRANSMISSION

L~~ -,__

Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
RE: MOTION TO DISMISS - 18

Creason, Moo1·e, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231
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Karin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CAI.LERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Bo:;,;. 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813
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1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATE R

In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMil.Y TRUST OF
MICHAELS. CORNEIL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF
RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

-----------~--)
COMES NOW Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attomey of record, Karin
Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., hereby submits this Reply Brief in support of the
pending Motion to Dismiss, which is set for hearing on June 4, 2013.

This Reply Brief does not restate the procedural and factual background of the

case and

applicable law previously submitted. Instead, it is limited in scope to the points raised by the

Memorandum. in Opposition re: Motion to Dismiss dated May 21, 2013.
I.
A.

ARGUMENT

No issues of material fact related to Ms. Johnson's appearance and counsel preclude
dismissal.
The Estate raises a variety of questions relating to whether Respondent's involvement in

this case has been in her personal capacity or capacity as trustee. To be clear, Respondent has
participated ·in th.is action in her personal capacity and as trustee. The undersigned attorney

represents Respondent in both capacities, just as counsel for Mrs. Cornell represents Mrs. Cornell
in her capacity as surviving spouse and her capacity as personal representative of her deceased ·
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husband's estate (see Petition by Kareen Cornell as Personal Representative of the Estate of

John Henry Cornell and as Surviving Spouse of John Henry Cornell. deceased benefidqry of
the Revocable Family Tru~ of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell for Supervised
Administration and Court Ordered Distribution dated February 26, 2013 (emphasis added)).

Any inaccurate or hastily made comment by this attorney at the hearing of May 17, 2013 on Mrs.
Cornell's Motion to Stay Proceedings was in error and is hereby retracted with apologies for any
unintended confusion that may have been caused.
This dual capacity is appropriate and consistent with Respondent's positions throughout
this action because the ex.press terms of the trust provide that, upon Mr. Cornell's death with no

surviving issue, Respondent becomes the sole surviving beneficiary. See Trust at§ 4.03(a). The
Granters intent in this regard is unequivocal and clear: that the Trust assets be distributed. to

lineal descendants of the Granters. Respondent, as trustee, is obligated to uphold the terms of the
Trust and to defend the Trust against attempts to break its tenns. This obligation continues
despite any mistakes that may have been made by the Trustee.
To that end, Respondenfs personal interests and interests as Trustee are identical and the

concerns raised by Mrs. Cornell do not raise genuine and material questions of fact.

B.

The Court's Memorandum Opinion is binding upon the Estate.

Mrs. Cornell characterizes this Court's Memorandum Opinion as being against Margaret
Watkins and contends that the Estate was not a parti to the case until l\1rs. Cornell filed her
Petition in February 2013. Respondent respectfully disagrees.
The Petition at issue in this Court's Memorandum Opinion of February 2013 was filed by

John H. Cornell during his lifetime. Only the Estate is the successor in interest to John H.
Cornell.

Toe acts of Margaret Watkins, while acting as the Estate's temporary personal

representative, are binding upon the Estate and current personal representative :tvlrs. Cornell.
Mrs. Cornell's states "For reasons beyond Kareen Comelrs control, John's attorney

continued to prosecute the petition in John's name, personally. In late November 2012, Ms ..
Cornell appeared before this Court and notified the Court that she objected to any other person
acting on behalf of her late husband_ vVhile this Court invited Ms. Cornell to submit briefing on

John's petition, it did not bring her or the Estate into the litigation." Memorandum in Opposition

re: Motion to Dismiss at 3.
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If Mrs. Cornell believed that Margaret Watkins was not properly representing the
interests of the · Estate during the time that Ms_ Watkins served as temporary personal
representative, then it was not ''beyond Kareen Cornell's control" to file a· motion seeking the
removal of Ms. Watkins as temporary per~onal representative for cause. which would have
severely limited Ms. Watkins' functions. See I.C. § 15-3-61l(a). No such action was taken and
no good cause has been shown to permit the Estate to re·ligitate the issues previously decided.
That being said, this Court's Memorandum Opinion remains well-based in fact and law
such that it is largely an academic exercise to debate whether dismissal is warranted due to the
binding nature of the Memorandum Opinion or whether dismissal is war.ranted because the law
remains the same, as discussed herein.

No genuine fact has been shown to change the

application oflaw to the essentially identical facts alleged. Dismissal remains appropriate.

C.

The causes of action in this proceeding do not survive Mr. John Cornell's death.
The balance of the claims raised by :Mrs .. Cornell are either identical to. or variations upon

the issues previously addressed by the Court: that the Estate's claims for constructive trust (see
PP- 8-11), breach of contract (see pp. 11-13), breach of fiduciary duty (see pp. 13-15), conversion
(see p. 16), and unjust enrichment (see p. 17) are not abated by the death of John H. Cornell.
Each is discussed below.
1. The Estate's constructive trust claim is an abated claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

As for the Estate's claim under the doctrine of constructive trust, the Estate criticizes
Respondent's analysis that because Toni Johnson did not hold title to the Trust assets, then ·a
claim for constructive trust does not arise.
First, this argument is flawed because a review of Idaho case law rmds that application of
the doctrine of constructive trust has been limited to the improper acquisition of property, :not the
retention of property as the Estate suggests. See Witt v. Jones. 111 Idaho 165, 168, 722 P.2d 474,

477 (1986) (citing Davenport v. Burke, 30 Idaho 559, 167 P. 481 (1917)); Snider v. Arnold, 153
Idaho 641, 289 P.3d 43 (2012) (citing Davenport, 30 Idaho at 608, 167 P. at 483).
Further, the Estate fails to distinguish Respondent's actions from a breach of her fiduciary
duty, which is a tort abated by John's death. See infra

9I I(C)(3). The Estate has presented no

facts or argument to support a distinct analysis except for the argument that constructive trust
arises in equity, not in law.
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The Estate asserts that "(t]he undisputed extended period of time between the death of

Michael Com~ll and the death of John Cornell, taken by itself, creates a genuine issue of material
fact regarding whether a constructive trust arose." Memorandum in Opposition re:· Motion to
Dismiss at 10. Said determination is a question of law, not one of fact as there is no dispute that

Michael Cornell died on December 15, 2009 and John Cornell on August 20, 2012.
Respondent's actions as Trustee during this time period are also not in dispute as Respondent
does not dispute that she failed to distribute Trust assets during this time period, that she was illadvised as·to her responsibilities, and made mistakes accordingly in terms of administration of
Estate funds and lack of accounting. See Aff. of Theodore 0. Creason generally. There are
simply no material facts of genuine dispute that preclude dismissal as a matter of law and the
Estate has failed to support how its interpretation of the doctrine of constructive trust is in
conformance with existing Idaho law or supported by the facts of this case.
Instead, the Estate asserts that its claim for constructive trust is a claim for return of
property, which survives the death of the decedent and passes to the decedent's personal
representative. In support of this position it cites to a non-binding treatise and the U.S. Supreme
Court case of Henshaw v_ Miller, 58 U.S. 212 (1854).

The Estate's reliance is misplaced,

however, because the Henshaw case interpreted the then Virginia statute which provided that
''Executors shall have an action of trespass for a wrong done to the testator," which the Court
interpreted to amend the common law to allow claims for trespass and talcing of chattel. Id. a.t
221-22. Said decision does not stand for the broader application of the doctrine of constructive
trust that the Estate suggests. Instead, the common law and Idaho Code Section 5-327 apply.
For these reasons and the reasons previously briefed, the Estate's claim for constructive
trust should be dismissed.
2.

The Estate's breach of contract claim is an abated claim for breach of

fiduciary duty.
The Court's prior conclusion and reasoning reniains accurate: "the duties John asserts

Toni breaches arise irrespective of contract. The duties are grounded in state law regardless of
what the contract states. . . . The alleged wrongful acts of Toni are all ·breaches of fiduciary duties
under state law that for purposes of abatement are in the nature of torts .... John makes no claim
against Toni and the administration of the estate of their parents that survives his death under the
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common law or under Idaho Code § 5-327.'' Memorandum Opinion at 9, 10, 17. See also infra 'I[

I(C)(3).
Whether Respondent had fully reviewed or understood the Trust document is irrelevant.

Whether Respondent acted in practical terms based on an oral conversation with her brother is
irrelevant. Respondent does not contend that ignorance of the Trust's provisions relieve her from
responsibility or that the beneficiaries had the authority to modify the Trust's terms. It is the
Estate that raises that theory, although provides no legal authority to support the proposition that
the beneficiaries to a trust may amend its terms through contract or factual basis as to what said
alleged contract's terms were or consideration given that makes this alleged contract now
enforceable against Respondent. For these reasons, the Estate's allegations in this regard do not
preclude dismissal.

Instead. the Trust document is not a contract, thus no breach of contract claim can arise
from it. The existence of a 'Written document (the Trust Agreement) does not establish a
contractual relationship between Respondent and the Estate (or its predecessors), nor does it
establish a potential claim by the Estate against Respondent grounded in contract. Instead, said·
relationship is fiduciary in nature.
For these reasons and the reasons previously briefed and incorporated by reference herein,
the Estate's claim for breach of contract must be dismissed.
3.

Toe Estate's claim for breach of fiduciary duty is abated.

Respondent disagrees with the Estate's analysis that torts involving property do not abate.

A claim for breach of fiduciary duty sounds in tort. See Jones v. Kootenai County Title

Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 607, 612, 873 P.2d 861, 866 (Idaho 1994) ("A contract may ....create a state
of things which furnishes the occasion for a tort l'f the relation of the plaintiff and the defendants
is such that a duty to take due care arises therefrom irrespective of contract and the defendant is

negligent, then the action is one of tort.")
The Idaho Supreme Court recently discussed Idaho abatement law as follows:
The abatement rule holds that in the absence of a legislative enactment addressing
the survivability of a claim, the common law rules govern. Under the common
law, claims arising out of contracts generally survive the death of the claimant,
while those sounding in pure tort abate.
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The scope of an attorney's contractual duty to a client is defined by the
purposes for which the attorney is retained. Breach of an. attorney's duty is
negligence in tort. The contract basis of legal malpractice actions is the failure to
perform obligations specified in the written contract. Thus, under the abatement
rule, breach of duty is an action in tort, uot contract; that is, unless an auomey
foolhardily contracts with his client guaranteeing a specific outcome in the
litigation or provides for a higher standard of care in the contract, he is held to the
standard of care expected of an attorney. Breach of that duty is a tort.
. . . [T]he contours of the duties owed by an attorney to his or her client are
defmed by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. If an attomey and client
want to provide for a higher standard of care, they may do so by ex.press language
in the contract. Here, the standard of care in the contract is essentially the same as
in any attorney-client relationship. Because this claim sounds in tort, it abated
upon [the client's] death.

Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 620-21, 272 P.3d 1247, 1251-52 (2012) (citations omitted).
Similar to the attorney-client relationship at issue in Bishop, the contours of the duties
owed by a trustee to trust beneficiaries are defined by the Vniform Probate Code and Principal
and Income Act. Here, the Trust contains no greater requirements than are set forth in said
statutes. Therefore. the analysis of Idaho Code Section 5-327(2), and the common law rule of
abatement prior to its amendment, applies.
Because a breach of fiduciary duty

arises in tort, it abates upon the injured person's death

under the common law. As such, the Estate's breach of fiduciary duty claim is abated unless

a

statute precludes dismissal.
The statutory section that governs the survivability of negligence claims is Idaho' Code
Section 5-327(2), which was amended in 2010 with the amendment taldng effect on July 1, 2010.
First, in its form prior to July l, 2010, Idaho Code Section 5-327 provided that claims for
personal injury or property damage survived only the death of the wrongdoer. The later was not
retroactive, thus applied until July 1, 2010. See Bishop, 152 Idaho at 620, 272 P.3d at 1251.

Applymg the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Estate as successor in
interest to John H. Cornell is the injured party. As such, the Estate's claims that may have arisen
prior to July 1, 2010 were extinguished by John ComelPs death and must be dismissed.
Second, Idaho Code 5-327(2) as amended and in effect on and after July 1. 2010 provides
that claims for personal injury or property damage survive the .death of the injured person, but
that recoverable damages are e~pressly limited to medical expenses, other out-of-pocket

RESPONSE BRIEF

-6-

449

05-28-'13 14:35 FROM-JB

~ ~

2087469553

T-508 P0008/0012 F-440

expenses. and lost earnings prior to death.
The tort of breach of fiduciary duty is neither an "action for personal injury" nor an action

for "'property damage" as it does not involve tangible property that was allegedly damaged as is
the common and ordinary meaning of the phrase "property damage." As such, this ,action falls
outside of the amended Idaho Code Section 5-327(2), the general common law rule applies, and
any claim for breach of fiduciary duty was extinguished by John Cornell's death.
Further, even if the Court concludes that the Estate's claim is one for "property damage,"
no genuine issue of material fact exists that the Estate does not seek damages recoverable under
the statute. The Estate clearly admits that it seeks "(1) the return of real property placed by John
Cornell in the Trust for safekeeping; and (2) the turn.over of property which vested in

Cornell years before his death but was wrongful withheld from him."

John

Memorandum in

Opposition re: Motion to Dismiss at 1. Said relief does not include medical expenses, out-ofpocket expenses or lost wages. As snch, the Estate's claim is outside of the scope of Idaho Code
Section 5-327(2), is abated by John H. Cornell's death, and must be dismissed.
4.

The Estate's conversion claim is abated.

In its opposition brief, the Estate does not dispute that conversion is an intentional tort.
See Brooks v. Gigray Ranches, Inc., 128 Idaho 72, 77,910 P.2d 744, 749 (1996). As such, the
same analysis as the Estate's claim of breach of fiduciary duty applies, the conversion claim is
abated and must be dismissed.
The Estate discusses two points in the conversion section of its opposition brief: that John
.Cornell held a vested property interest in the Trust res at his death, and that John held an interest
in the real property that he had conveyed to the Trust.

Memorandum in Opposition re:

Memorandum to Dismiss at 16. Although it does not articulate it as such, Respondent concludes
th.at the Estate in this regard actually refers to the doctrine of equitable conversion, not only the
intentional tort of conversion.
A review of Idaho case law finds no cases discussing the doctrine of equitable conversion
outside of the context of disputed real estate transactions, and none in the trust context as the
Estate proposes. The Idaho Supreme Court has discussed said doctrine as follows:
The doctrine of equitable conversion is a fiction resting upon the fundamental rule
of equity that equity regards ·that as done which out to be done. · Under the
doctrine, an equitable conversion takes place when a contract for the sale of real
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property becomes binding on the parties. The purchaser is then treated in equity
as having an interei.;t in ~ealty, and the vendor an interest in personalty, that is. the
right tq receive the purchase money. Th.us, wheu equitable conversion applies, the
contract purchaser is deemed the equitable owner of the realty, and assumes the
risk of loss on the property.... The doctrine of equitable conversion applies only
if nothing in the contract states otherwise. Thus,· equitable conversion does not
apply if the effect would be to shift the risk of loss to a buyer contrary to the terms
of the parties' agreement.

Holscher v. James, 124 Idaho 443, 446, 860 P.2d 646, 649 (1993) (citations omitted).
First, the Estate does not explain how its position that the decedent held a vested interest
in the Trust at the time of his death supports a claim for equitable conversion. It provides no
Idaho authority to support its position that a claim for retu:m of property survives the death of the
decedent and passes

to the decedent's pers~nal representative, but instead cites to a non-binding

treatise and the U.S. Supreme Court case of Henshaw v. Miller, 58 U.S. 212 (1854), which, as
discussed supra, concerned a Virginia statute interpreted as having amended the common law to
allow claims for trespass and taking of chattel. Id. at 221-22. Said decision does not stand for a
broadened application of equitable conversion.
Further, the Estate's position in this regard contradicts the express language of the Trust:
t.i1~t all net income and principal remaming in the Trust vest in the surviving beneficiary should
one beneficiary die prior to distribution leaving no issue. Trust at§ 4.03(a) (attached to Petition).

If the decedent beneficiary's interest vested upon the Grantors; death, then the Trust language
making survival until distribution a requirement would have no effect. It is the intention of the
grantor which must be given effect when a reviewing court interprets a trust. Hedrick v. West

One Bank, Idaho, N.A, 123 Idaho 803, 805, 853 P.2d 548, 551 (1993) (interpreting a will). · Here,
the grantors' intent was clear: that the Trust be distributed to the lineal descendants of Michael and
Arlie Cornell. Trust at§ 4.03(a) (attached to Petition). This clear and unambiguous intent cannot
be reconciled with the position that John Cornell held a vested interest in the Trust res upon the
Grantors' deaths. For these reasons, the Estate's claim of equitable conversion related to the
Trust generally must be dismissed.
Second, the Estate does not explain how its position that John Cornell's conveyance of
real property supports a claim for equitable conversion. John Cornell conveyed said disputed
property by quitclaim deed on January 3, 2007 retaining no interest of any kind. See Ajf. of
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Theodore 0. Creason at Em. 5 to Exh. B. The Estate provides no deposition testimony, sworn
statements or admissions to support the factual conclusion that said property had been
"transferred. to the Trust for convenience beeause it was contiguous to his parents' home."

Memorandum in Opposition re: Motion to Dismiss at 16. The Estate further asserts, without
supporting affidavit, deposition testimony or admissions, that funds sent voluntarily by the
decedent were to cover property taxes and expenses related to said lot. See Memorandum in
Opposition re: Motion to Dismiss at 16 (citingAff. of Theodore 0. Creason, Exh. B). 1
Although the Estate is entitled to all reasonable inferences, it cannot rest upon the mere
allegations,. but instead must set forth specific facts supported by the pleadings, deposition
testimony, affidavits or admissions on file showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Shere v.
Pocatello School Dist. No. 25, 143 Idaho 486, 489-90, 148 P.3d 1232, 1235-36 (2006); Summer
v. Cambridge Joint School Dist. No., 432, 139 Idaho 953, 955, 88 P.3d 772, 774 (2004)'. Here,
no such showing has been made to support its claim that the Estate holds a vested property
interest in the real property that he conveyed to the Trust by Quitclaim Deed in 2007, or that
funds were sent specifically to cover property taxes and related expenses. For these reasons, the
Estate's claim of equitable conversion related to the real property previously conveyed by John
Cornell should be dismissed.
5.

The Estate's lllljust enriclunent claim is an abated breach of fiduciary duty claim-

The Estate contends that "[u]njust enrichment occurs where offending party receives a
benefit which would be inequitable to retain without compensating the injured party to the extent
that retention is unjust." Memorandum in Opposition re: }(lotion to Dismiss at 17 (citation
omitted).
The Idaho Supreme Court has discussed the equitable doctrine of unjust enrich.n:i,ent as
follows:
The two theories, quantum meruit and unjust enrichment, are simply different
l

Tue underlined portion of the deposition testimony at p. 57 states:
Q. Where did these monies come from?
A. Okay. The 73_70 rrn not swe. 14000 I'm not sure_ My dad djd have a death benefit fund that vvas
supposed to have been paid to rne_ My brother said, no problem. It was ~nt to him. His wife kept 500 of it, and I
got the other part. I don't remember liow much that was. So, that's tbe best l can tell you on that.
Q. Why did you believe the death benefit was supposed to go to you?
A Because my dad said so, and, of course, when he was ill he b.ad problems doiflg certain thmgs, and he
said I made a mistake. I said, oh, don't worry about it, dad, because ;it didn't matter to me one way or the other. But
my brother agreed to send me part of the money back.
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measures of recovery as equitable remedies. The doctrine of quantum meruit
permits recovery, on the basis of an implied promise to pay, of the reasonable
value of the services rendered or the materials provided. Unjust enrichment, as a
fictional promise or obligation implied by law, allows recovery where the
defendant has received a benefit from the plaintiff that would be inequitable for
the defendant to retain without compensating the plaintiff for the value of the
benefit.
Neither of these two theories allows recovery by a subcontractor who lacks a
contractual relationship directly with a property owner. . . . In the present case,
the plaintiff subcontractors, who did not have express contracts directly with
NWP, were limited to recovery upon their claims under the mechanic's lien
statute. Absent that right of recovery, they have no cause of action directly against
NWP for alleged unjust enrichment.
Great Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754, 767~68, 979 P.2d 627,

640-41 (1999) (citations omitted).
Here, John Cornell, during his lifetime, had a potential cause of action directly against
Respondent in 'her capacity as Trustee for breach of fiduciary duty that was extinguished by his
death. See supra <_i[I(C)(3). The relationship between trustee and beneficiary is fiduciary in
nature, not contractual. See supra 9[ I(C)(l). As such, no claim for unjust enrichment can arise
from it.
For these reasons, the Estate's claim for unjust enrichment must be dismissed.

II.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Respondent Toni Jol;inson respectfully requests that her Motion

to Dimiss be granted and that the subject Petition be dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 28th day of May, 2013.

JONES, BROWER & CAILERY, P.L.L.C.
By
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREB Y CERTIFY that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S
REPLY BRIF,F RE: MOTION TO DISMISS was,
this 28th day of May, 2013, transmitted via
facsimile to:

Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice and Anegon
1212 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501
Theodo re 0. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, P.L.L.C.
1219 Idaho St
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

By

~
Karin Seubert
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Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183
CREASO N, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC
1219 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-1516
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231
Attorneys for Personal Representa1ive
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell

IN THE DISTRIC T COI:RT OF THE SECOND JUDICL.\L DISTRIC T
OF THE STATE OF IDAH0 1 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARW ATER
In the \,fatter of:
THE REVOCA BLE FA.MIL Y TRUST OF
MICHAE L S. CORNEL L AND ARLIE M.
CORNEL L.
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)

Case No. CV 2012-002 77

)
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)

THE ESTATE OF JOHN CORNEL L'S
MOTION TO DISQI:ALIFY THE LAW
FIRM OF JONES, BROWE R &
CALLER Y1 PLLC

----------------)
COMES NOW the Estate of John Cornell and moves this Court for an order
disqualifying the Trust's attorneys, Karin R. Seubert and the law firm of Jones, Brower &

Callery, PLLC, from further representation of the Trust i.n this case due to a conflict in interest.
This motion is based upon I.R.P.C. l.7(a) and the memoran dum in support of this motion.
DATED this _U_ day of June, 2013.

THE ESTATE OF JOHN CORNELL 'S MOTION
TO DISQUALIFY THE LAW Fffi.!.'VJ. OF .TONES,
BROWER & CALLERY, PLLC - l

Cre2son, :\1oore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewistoo, JD B3501
(208) 743-15 16; Fax: (208) 746-2231

455

Jun 03 13 03:38p

Creason, Moore & Dokken

208-7 46-2231

p.3

CERTIFICATE OF SERV ICE
I HERE BY CERT IFY that on this'l J day of June, 2013,
I filed the foregoing MOTION TO
DISQ UALI FY THE LAW FIRM OF JOl\"ES, BROW ER
& CALL ERY, PLLC \Vith the Clerk of the
Court, and provid ed a copy to the foIIow ing persons:
Darrel W. Aherin
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1212 Idaho Street
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Theodor e 0. Creason, ISB #1563
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183
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1219 Idaho Street
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Telephone: (208) 743-151 6
Facsimil e: (208) 746-2231
Attomey s for Personal Represe ntative
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell
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IN THE DISTRI CT COURT OF THE SECO~ D JUDICI AL DISTRI CT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO , IN AND FOR THE COWIT Y OF CLEAR WATER
In the Matter of:
THE REVOC ABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHA EL S. CORNE LL AND ARLIE M.
CORNE LL.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00 277

MEMO RANDU M IN SUPPO RT OF THE
ESTAT E OF JOHN CORNE LL'S
MOTIO N TO DISQUA LIFY THE LAW
FIRM OF JONES , BRO,VE R &
CALLERY, PLLC

- - -- - - -- -- - - - - -- )

COMES NOW the Estate of John Cornell ("the Estate") and submits it Memora ndum
in
Support of Motion to DisquaHfy the law firm of Jones, Brower & Callery, PLLC C'J,
B & C")
as attorneys for The Revocab le Family Trust Of Michael S. Cornell And Arlie M. Cornell
('<the
Trust").

I. FACTS & PROCE DURE
The genesis of this petition is the alleged imprope r conduct of Ms. Toni Johnson
, while
serving as trustee of the Trust, which has damaged the Trust res and has deprive.d the
Estate of
its property interests. This Court has been supervis ing the administ ration of the Trust, through
this cause number, since the filing of a previous petition by John Henry Cornell on
July 11,
2012. On May 17, 2013, Ms. Seubert stated for the record 'just to be clear" that J,
B & Chas
:vtEMOR ANDUM L~ SUPPOR T OF THE ESTATE OF
JOHN CORNEL L'S MOTION TO DTSQUALIFY THE
LAW FIRM OF JOI\ES, BROWE R & CALLER Y, PLLC - 1

Creason, Moore, Dokkco & Gddl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, uwision, 11) 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fu: (208) 746-2231
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only ever acted as attorneys on behalf of Ms. Johnson, personally; not as the Trust's attorneys.
A review of the language in the pleadings filed in this matter supports that claim.
Throughout this litigation, Ms. Johnson has taken the position that all claims that she
damaged the Trust res, and thereby the beneficiaries, should be dismissed because (I) the
entirety of the trust res should be distributed to her, and (2) any claims for damages abated upon
the death of the only other beneficiary, John CorneU. In response to Ms. Seubert's clarifying
remark, the Estate argued-in its memorandu m in opposition to her motion

to

dismiss-th at if

J, B & C represented :Ms. Johnson and not the Trust, then the motion to dismiss should be

denied and inquiry into the Trust's position should commence. Two days before the hearing on
its Motion to Dismiss, J, B & C wrote in its reply brief that it has actually represented both Ms.
Johnson and the Trust the entire time.

II. ANALYSIS
An irreconcilable conflict of interest exists between the interests of the Trust and those
of Ms. Johnson, which preclude J, B & C from representing both clients under I.RP .C. 1. 7(a).
In order to represent both parties, the Court must find that the Trust's interests allow for an
interpretation that eliminates the Trust's power to protect itself, and rewards Ms. Johnson for
improper conduct by distributing the entirety of the Trust res to her. This is an interpretation
that conflicts ,..ith the plain language of the Trust document, the clear intent of the trustors, and
the principles of equity.

Recognizing this conflict provides context for Ms. Seubert's

volunteered clarification during the May 17 hearing, and evidences J, B & C's inability to
represent both parties.
A. Standard of Review
The decision to grant or deny a motion to disqualify counsel is ,vithin the discretion of
the trial court. Weaver v. 1.'vfillard, 120 Idaho 692, 892 P.2d 110 (Ct.App. 1991); Crown v.

Hawkins Co., Ltd., 128 Idaho 114, 910 P.2d 786 (Ct.App. 1996). The moving party has the
burden of establishing grounds for disqualification. The goal of the court should be to shape a
remedy which ·will assure fairness to the parties and the integrity of the judicial process.
\vbenever possible, courts should endeavor to reach a solution that is least burdensome to the
client. Weaver, 120 Idaho at 697. Vvnen a motion to disqualif'.y is filed by an opposing party, it
should be viewed with caution. Foster v. Traul, 145 Idaho 24, 32, 175 P .3d 186, 194 (2007).
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE ESTATE OF
JOHN CORNELL'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE
LAW FIRM OF JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, PLLC · 2

Creason, ::Vloore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC

P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231

458

Creason, Moore & Dokken

Jun 03 13 03:39p

208-746-2231

p.6

B. A Conflict of Interest Exists Under Idaho Rule of Professio nal Conduct Ruic 1.7.
As a general rule, a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a
concurrent conflict of interest. I.RP. C. 1. 7. Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 provides as
follows:

(a)

Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representa tion involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurren t conflict of
mterest exists if:
(1)

The representation of one client will be directly adverse to another dient;
or

(2)

There is a significant risk that the representa tion of one or more clients
will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another
client, a former client, or a third person or by the personal interests of the
la'-"yer, including family and domestic relationships.

LR.P.C. 1.7(a)(l) & (2).

Loyalty and independent judgment are "essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to
a client." I.R.P.C. 1.7 Comment [IJ. Concurrent cont1icts of interest "can arise from the
lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or from the lawyer's
ovVIl interests." Id Loyalty to a current. client prohibits "undertaking representation directly
adverse to that client ,:vithout that client's informed consent." Id at Comment [6]. Thus, absent
consent, a "1av.'Yer may not act as an advocate in one matter against a person the la""yer
represents in some other matter, even when the matters are wholly unrelated ." Id.
Accepting as true the statement of J, B & C in its Reply Brief on the Motion to Dismiss
regarding representation of the Trust, J, B & C holds a duty to provide loyal and independent
judgment to the Trust.

In Idaho, a Trust does not have interests separate from that of its
beneficiaries. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a trustee cannot represent a trust in a pro

se capacity, and must employ a lawyer for that purpose, because "'[t]he trustee would be
representing the interests of others, i.e. the beneficiaries, and therefore ,vould be engaged in the

unauthorized practice of law." Indian Springs, LLC v. Indian Springs Land, LLC, 147 Idaho
737, 745, 215 P.3d 457,465 (2009). The Court has also held that in limited circumstances, an
attorney has a duty to the beneficiaries under a testamentary instrument. Harrigfeld v. Hancock,
140 Idaho 134, l39, 90 P.3d, 884, 889 (2004) ("An attorney preparing testamentary instruments
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE ESTATE OF
JOHN CORNELL'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE
LAW FlRM OF JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, PLLC - 3
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owes a duty to the beneficiaries named or identified therein to prepare such instruments, and if
requested by the testator to have them properly execute~ so to effectuate the testator's intent as
expressed in the testamentar y instrument."). 'w'hile no authority appears to exist directly on
point in Idaho, there is case law from foreign jurisdiction s that establish a duty between the
attorney for the trust and the trust beneficiaries. "An attorney who acts as counsel for a trustee
provides advice and guidance as to how that trustee may and must act to fulfill ms obligations to
all beneficiaries. It follows that when an attorney undertakes a relationship as an advisor to a
trustee, he in reality also assumes a relationship 1,vith the beneficiary akin to that between trustee
and beneficiary." .Morales v. Field, Degoff, Huppert and Mcgowan, 99 Cal.App. 3d, 307, 316
(Ct.App. 1st Div. 3).
Ms. Seubert's statement at the May 17 hearing made clear that the position espoused in
the filings was Ms. Johnson's personal position, not that of the Trust. After being presented
with the consequences of that limited representation, J, B & C now takes the position that it can
and always has represented Ms. Johnson, personally, and the Trust. Here, Ms. Johnson's
position is that any damage done

to

the Trust res should be ignored under the doctrine of

abatement.

She argues that this proposition is true, regardless of whether she engaged in
improper conduct while acting as trustee. This is, quite simply, not a position that the Trust can
or should take.

The Trust would be arguing for an interpretation of law and equity that
frustrates the plain language of the Trust and the clear intent of the trustors to effect an equal
distribution between children. The Trust would be arguing for an interpretation of lavv and
equity that does not allow the Trust to recover for its damages. J, B & Chas an actual existing
conflict of interest between representin g Ms. Johnson and the Trust, of which the Estate is a
bene.ficiary.

Ill CONCLUSION
The Estate requests that the Court order J,B & C be disqualified as attorneys for the
Trust.
DATED thisu.J_ day of June, 2013.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIF Y that on this MJday of June, 2013, I filed the foregoing MEMOR
ANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN CORNELL'S MOTIO N TO DISQUA
LIFY THE
LAW FIR1\'.1 OF JONES, BROWE R & CALLERY, PLLC with the Clerk of the Court,
and provided a
copy to the following persons:
Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice & Anegon
1212 idaho Street
P. 0. Drawer 698
Lewiston , ID 83501
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Calleiy, P.L.L.C.
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501

--

X

--

X
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

Co.v'r ,e.. 1)1 rd_,

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWAl_ER

~~r~ _

. ~ ,·' Jly
COURT MINUTES

CV-2012-0000277
The Matter of Michael S Cornell
Hearing type: Motion to Dismiss
Hearing type: Motion Hearing
Hearing date: 06/04/2013
Time: 4:11 PM - 5:01 PM
Judge: Randall W. Robinson
Courtroom: 002
Court reporter: None
Minutes Clerk: Jodie
Tape Number: CV473-2
4:11

The Honorable Randall W . Robinson presiding.
Present in Court:
SamuelCreason, Karin Seubert, Darrel Aherin

4:12

Ms. Seubert - Explains and Clarifies Issues

4:19

Mr. Creason - Response to issues of Trust; Representation Issue; Counsel for the
The Trust?

4:25

Colloquy between Court and Counsel

4:57

Mr. Creason and Ms. Seubert - Rest

4:57

Court - Explains and is Appreciative of each Attorney and their Briefings
- All are Legitimate legal issues - possible Compromise by the parties
- Will issue a Written Decision as soon as possible

462

4:59

Mr. Creason - submitte d an order in the Probate case, CV2012-439
'Amended Order Appointi ng Personal Representative of the Estate of
John Henry Cornell' clarifying language of the original order
Court -Approv es and signs the Amended Order

5:01

Court is in Recess
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BY_ _ _ __ -b."1:,,,,,.--- - --

Karin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277
ORDER AUGMENTING RECORD

This matter having been called for hearing on June 4, 2013 on Appellee's Motion to

Augment Record; the parties having appeared by and through their attorneys of record; the Court
having considered the oral argument presented and record of the case; and good cause shown, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that the clerk's record is hereby augmented to include the following
documents from the collateral matter In the Matter of the Estate of John H Cornell, deceased,
Clearwater County Case No. CV 2012-00439, certified copies of which are on file with this Court:
1.

Order of Appointment of Temporary Personal Representative entered November 15,
2012;

2.

Order Appointing Personal Representative entered February 12, 2013; and

3.

Registry of Action as of May 7, 2013.

ORDER AUGMENTING RECORD

-1464

DATED this ~

day ofJune, 2013 .

JUDGE MICHAE:r(J. G
(

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing . . ORDER
AUGMENTING RECORD was, this~
day of
June, 2013,

J
./

hand-delivered by providing a
copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;
mailed, postage pre-paid,
by first class mail; or
transmitted via facsimile

to:
Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice and Anegon
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
Theodore 0. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

LJu·

_liJl.

By~_Cl~er~
k o~
~~
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Jl :N 1 I\ 2013
Clerk Dist. Court
Clearwater Coun , Ida.ho

Theodore 0. Creason, lSI3 #1563
Samud T. Creason ISL3 ff.8183
CRF/\SON , MOORL, DOKKEN & GEJDL, PLLC
1').19 Idaho Street

P_O_ Drawer 835
Lewiston, lD 8350 l
Telephone: (208) 743-1516
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231
A I 1'nrncys lcir Personal Representative
Of Eslate of John I [enry Cornell

IN THF.. DISTRICT COURT OF THI!: SECOND JUDICIAL DLSTRICT
OF THE STATl,.: OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR TllB COUNTY OF CLEARWA TER
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

()I,'

)
)
)

MlCIIAEL S. CORN!~!.!. AND ARLIE M.

)

CORNELL

CORNELL.

)
)
)

RE: APPRAL OF MARGAR ET
WATKINS

l n the Matter o l':
THE REVOC/\l.3 LE FAMILY TRUST

---

BRIEF OF ESTATI~ OF JOHN H.

)

COMES NOW Kureen Cornell, Personal Repre~entativc of the Estate of Joh11 Henry
Cornell, hy and through her attorney of record, Theodore 0. Creason of Creason, Moore, Dokken

& Geidl , PLLC. and l'ilcs this Brief in response:: to the 13ricf of Margaret Watkins ir1 support of
her ~ppeal.
Mwg,m::l Watkin:; app,;;:;il:, the February 15 , 2013 .Judgment of thEc! Magistrate Court

dismissing all claims pursued on behall' of John Cornell, in bis name only, by Margarel Watkins.
Ms. Watkins served her May 13, 2013 Brie[- in Support of Appeal upon the attorney of record for

the .Estate of John l knry Cornell, Theodore 0. Creason. Though the Magistrate Court solicited
URrnF OF ESTATE
RE: WATKINS' Al'l'EAL-

C,·,·ason, Moore, D"kkc'll & {.,(ei<ll, !'Ll.C
l'.0 . nrnwi,r X35. Lcwi>tu,1 , Ill 835111
{208) 74J, I5 Ir,; ~'ax: (203) 746-:?23 I
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input from the EsLuLc's attorney prior to issuing its judgment, the EsLuLc was not a party to the
appealed action ut the time

or the grant of judgn1enL

Ms. Wat.kins chose to pursue this matter

without substituting the Estate into the action pun;uartt to ldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1 ).
Funhcr, t.be Magistral;.; Court Jiu 11ot treat the E:-;U.1tc as a party Lo that action. R.uther, the court

invited the Estate lo tile iLs own petition for any dain1s held against. THF. REVOCABI ,F:
1:/\MiL Y TRUST 01" MICHA FL S. CORNELL AND J\RLJE M. CORNELL, which the
Magistrate Court would consider under the san1e cause number, While the Estal<:: recognizes that

it may encounter some of Lhe :-;amc legal re<l:i(ll1ing appealed in this matter-and the Estate
rt::1.:ug11i:1.i.cs that it nrny ch;;ilkngc that rca::soning thrnugh its own appeal at a l'ulun,: date-the

Estate declines any invitation to participate in this appeul as a pseudo-party <-md, thereby, waive
its right lo u $epnratc and distinct judicial process.
The Estate limits its brief i11 this matter (o the pm·posc of clarilyi11g its position, or \:;Lek
thereor, in this appGal.

DATED this l 0th day of June, 2013.

CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & CElDL, PLLC

o~dJ ,~.t= =

111eodore 0. C1·cason, 1SB #1563
Attorneys for P.R. of Estat<::, Kareen Cornell

13RIEF 01" ESTA'l'E
LU:: WATKINS' APl'EAL- 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

l l-lERCl3Y Cl:RTIFY that on this 10th day of June, 2013, t riled the foregoing BRIEF OF
ESTATE OF JOHN l-1. CORNELL RE: APPL:i\L OF MARGARET WATKINS with the Clerk of
the Court, and provided a paper copy to the following persons'.

Karin Seubert
.10111::s, 131vw1;;1 &. C,1lkfy, P.L.L.C.
1304 Idaho Slr\:ld

P.O. Box 85,,1
Lewiston, JD 8350 I
Darrel W. Ahedn
Aherin, Rice & Ancgon
1212 Idaho Stn.:c:(
P .0. Draw<.lr 698

FIRST-(] .ASS MAIL
HAND

om JVERED

OV£RN1GHT MAIL
FAX TRANSMISSION

FIRST-CLASS MAIi.

HAND DEl.lVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
FAX TRANSMISSION

Lewiston, ID 83 50 J

IJlW!F OF F.ST ATE
lH~: WATKINS' APPEAL - 3

Crc,lS<ll), i\foor,·., Dokken & Geidl, l'LLC
1'.0. l)r;1WN' 8JS, l.~wiston, II) 83:iUI

(208) 743-1516: Fa<: (20N) 74<i-22:31
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Karin Seubert .
JONES; BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
20sn43-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813
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IN TIIB DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND TIJDICIAL DISTRICT OF Tiffi
STATE OP IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CIEARWAIB R
In the Matter of:

)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

MICHAELS. CORNEIL AND ARLIE M.

)

CORNELL.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO APPEAL

)

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF

COMES NOW Appellee Toni C. Johnson. by and through her attorney of record, Karin

Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., hereby submits this Brief in Opposition to Appeal.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Comell established the Revocable Family Trust of
Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell on November l, 1996. See Exhibit A to Affidavit of

Karin Seubert dated September 14, 2012 (hereinafter "Trust"). Through said trust, Mr. and :Mrs.
Cornell named their two children. Toni C. Johnson and John H. Cornell, as the beneficiaries of
the trust upon Mr. and Mrs. Cornell's deaths. Id. at§ 4.03. Arlie M. Cornell died on November
9, 2008 and Michael S. Cornell died on December 15, 2009.

See Petition for Supervised

Administration and Removal of Trustee. (][ 2.
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-1 -

469

06-10-'13 15:19 FROM-JB & C

2087469553

T-538 P0003/0009 F-509

On July 11, 2012. John H. Comell initiated this proceeding. Petition for Supervised

Administration and Removal of Trustee. John H. Cornell died on August 20, 2011 leaving no
issue. Affidavit of Karin Seubert at 'J[ 2.
Respondent Toni C. Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 17, 2012 seeking to
dismiss the Petition for Supervised Admini.stration- and Removal of Trustee on the basis that the
claims of John H. Cornell were extinguished by his death.
On November 15, 2012, in the probate action concerning the Estate of John H. Cornell,

deceased, Margaret Watkins was appointed as Temporary Personal Representative of the Estate

of John H. Cornell, deceased. See Order of Appointment of Temporary Personal Representative,
Clearwater County Case No. CV 2012-00439 dated November 15, 2012.
On February 12, 2013, in the probate action concerning the Estate of John H. Cornell,

deceased, Kareen Cornell was appointed as personal representative of the Estate of John H.
Comell, deceased, thereby terminating the prior temporary appointment of Margaret Watlcins .
.See Amended Order Appointing Personal Representative, Clearwater County Case No. CV 2012-

00439, dated June 4, 2013.
On February 15, 2013, the Magistrate Court entered its Memorandum Opinion and

Judgment for Dismissal, which dismissed the Petition for Supervised Administration and
Removal of Trustee on the basis that the claims raised in said Petition were extinguished by the
death of John H. Cornell. Margaret Watkins filed her Notice of Appeal on March 26, 2013.
Toni C. Johnson requests that this Court affirm the decision of the Magistrate Court on
the grounds that, first, Margaret Watkins lacks standing to appeal said Judgment for Dismissal,
and, second, that no reversible error has occuued because said Judgment is well based in fact and

in law.
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO APPEAL
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ARGUMENT

Margaret Watkins has no standing to appeal the ruling of the Magistrate Court.
Under Idaho law,
Standing is a preliminary question to be determined by this Court before reaching
the merits of the case. The· doctrine of standing focuses on the party 'seeking relief
and not the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated. To s,atisfy the
requirement of standing, litigants generally must allege or demonstrate an injmy
in fact and a substantial lili:el:ihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or
redress the claimed injury. The alleged injury must be to the litigant whose
standing is at issue.

Abolafia v. Reeves, Idaho Suprerne Court Case No. 38189-2010, 277 P.3d 345 (April 26, 2012)
(quoting Troutner v. Kempthome, 142 Idaho 389, 392, 128 P.3d 926, 929 (2006); Young v. City

of Ketcham, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002); Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116

Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 75?; 763 (1989)).
In her Notice of Appeal, Margaret Watldns states:
Margaret Watkins, an interested person, has a .right to appeal because she was
appointed temporary personal representative and defended Toni Johnson's Motion
for Summary Judgment. The Estate has a right to appeal to the District Judge
Division of the District Court in the County of Clearwater the [Judgment for
Dismissal] pursuant to Section 17-207 (7) of the Idaho Code.

Notice of Appeal at'][ 2. She assens in her supporting brief that "[t)his appeal is made by one of
the beneficiaries of the trust, John Camell." Brief in Support of Appeal at 1. This assertion is
not supported by the record of the case.
The termination of Margaret Watkins• appointment as temporary personal representative
of the Estate of John H. Cornell, deceased, became effective February 12, 2013. Amended Order

Appointing Personal Representative, Clearwater County Case No. CV 2012-00439, dated June 4,
2013- The subject Judgment for Dismissal was entered on February 15, 2013. Said Notice of
Appeal was dated March 25, 2013. Id.

BRIEF IN OPPOSffiON TO APPEAL
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Termination of appointment of a personal representative ends the right and power
pertaining to the office of personal representative and terminates the personal representative's
authority to represent the estate in t:tny pending or future proceeding. LC. § 15-3-608.

Here,

Margaret Watkins' authority related to the Estate of John H. Cornell terminated as of February
12, 2013. Whether the Estate had a right to appeal has no bearing on Margaret Watkins' standing
to pursue an appeal because her authority related to the Estate had been extinguished. Therefore,
when Margaret Watkins filed her Notice of Appeal on March 25, 2013, she had no authority to
act on behalf of the Estate or John H. Cornell personally, thus she could not have been making
this appeal on behalf of "one of the beneficiaries of the trust, John Cornell," as she asserts in said

Notice.
Because she had no authority to act on behalf of the Estate, then Margaret Watkins must
allege or demonstrate an injury in fact to her individually and a substantial likelihood that the
judicial relief requested will prevent the claimed injury to her individually.

See Abolafia v.

Reeves, Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 38189-2010, 277 P.3d 345 (April 26, 2012) (quoting
Troutner v. Kempthome. 142 Idaho 389, 392> 128 P.3d 926, 929 (2006); Young v. City of
Ketcham, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002); Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho·
635, 641, 778 P.2d 757; 763 (1989)) .. The record of the case reflects that Margaret Watkins has
no such injury that would grant her standing to pursue an appeal.

In her Notice of Appeal, Ms. Watkins refers to herself as "an interested person." The
term ''interested person" includes "heirs, devisees, children, spouses, c:reditors, beneficiaries, and
any others having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent~
ward; or protected person which may be affected by the proceeding." l.C. § 15-1-201(25). Ms.
Watkins is not a beneficiary of the subject Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and
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Arlie M. Cornell, and has asserted no property right in or claim agamst the Trust in her individual
capacity. See Affidavit of Karin Seubert dated September 14, 2012 at E:ili. A and B; Registry of

Action, In the Matter of the Estate of John H. Cornell, deceased, dated May 14, 2013. She has
not filed a creditor's claim iri the estate of John H. Corn.ell, so the Court cannot conclude that she
is a creditor for purposes of the Estate of Jolm H. Cornell. See Registry of Action, In the Manet

of the Estate of John H. Cornell, deceased, dated May 14, 2013. Even if Ms. Watkins were a
creditor of the Estate of John H. Cornell, deceased, she would not be a party aggrieved by the
subject Judgment for Dismissal because only the Estate, through the authorized personal
representative, has authority to prosecute claims against Toni Jobnson in her personal capacity or
~

her capacity as trustee of the Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M.

Corn.ell. 1 LC. § 15-3-715(22).

For these reasons, Margaret Watkins' appeal should be dismissed for lack of standing.

2.

No reversible error has been shown.
Before the Magistrate Court, Margaret Watkins, as then personal representative of the

Estate of John R Cornell, argued that John H. Cornell's Petition set forth both claims for breach
of fiduciary duty and for breach of trust, arguing _that said breach of trust claim sounds in
contract. Response to Motion to Dismiss at 8-10.

Margaret Watkins now argues that the

Magistrate Court committed reversible error when it failed to recognize a potential breach of
contract claim. Brief in Support of Appeal at 2-4.
First, said argument is not preserved on appeal because Margaret Watkins failed to raise it

1

It is Respondent's posftion that, after her appointtnent, current personal representative Kareen Cornell had the
authority to appeal said Judgment for Dismissal on behalf of the Estate, thus pending the outcome of Margaret
Watkins' appeal, the Estate is bound by said decision. The Estate takes the position that it is not a party to this
appeal, nor bound by the Judgment for Dismissal. See Brief of Estate ofJohn H. Cornell re: Appeal of Margaret
Watkins dated June 10, 2013.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO APPEAL

-5-

473

06-10-'13 15:20 FROM-JB & C

2087469553

T-538 P0007/0009 F-509

. before the Magistrate Court. Bannore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 343, 179 P.3d 303, 306 (2008)
(citations omitted).
Second, to the extent Appellant is now merely interchanging the descriptor of "breach of
contract" for "breach of trust," Margaret Watkins provides no case law to support the conclusion
that a breach of trust claim arises in contract_ Before the Magistrate Court, Margaret Watkins
cited to Cruzen v. Boise City, 58 Idaho 406, 74 P.2d 1037 (1937), to support her argument that a
breach of trust arises in contract. Response to Motion to Dismiss at 8. However, said case
involved a dispute over liability a municipal corporation owes to bondholders for a deficiency in
the collection of assessments due to embezzlement by the city clerk of the levied special
assessments.

Id. at 408, 74 P.2d at 1039.

The Cruzen Court held that the subject bonds

constituted an enforceable contract between the city and its bondholders and was not time barred.

Id. at 415-417, 74 P.2d at 1046-48 (declining to consider whether statute concerning safekeeping
of money by a county or the statute of limitations for breach of contract was implicated).
The relationship between a bondholder and municipal corporation issuing bonds clearly
conforms with the general requirements of an enforceable contract: offer, acceptance> meeting of
the minds 1 and consideration. Thompson v. Pike, 122 Idaho 690, 838 P.2d 293 (1992); Haener v.

Adam Co. Highway Dist., 108 Idaho 170, 697 P.2d 1184 (1985); Gyurkey v. Bahler, 103 Idaho
663,651 P.2d 928 (19$2); Vance v. Connell, 96 Idaho 417,529 P.2d 1289 (1974).
No such contractual relationship between the successor trustee and beneficiary of a trust
exists. The existence and involvement of a written document does not establish a contracrual
relationship nor a potential claim against Toni Johnson grounded in contract.
Instead, similar to the attorney-client relationship at issue in Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho
616, 272 P.3d 1247 (2012), the duties owed by a trustee to trustee beneficiaries are defined by
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statute. The trust docum ents at issue contain no greater requirements
than are set forth in the

Uniform Probat e Code and Principal and Income Act. See Affida vit
of Karin Seuber t dated
Septem ber 14, 2012 at E:ili. A and B. The standard of care in the

trust document is essentially

the same as in any trustee-beneficiary relationship. Id. As such,
a claim for breach of said
standard of care is a tort, and does not sound in contra ct as Marga ret
Watkins suggests. See Id. at
620, 272 P.3d at 1251. See also Joties v. KootenaJ County Title
Ins. Co., .125 Idaho 607, 614,
873 P.2d 861, 868 (1994) ("a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is
a negligence action in which
the duty to act is created by the relationship betwee n the parties .'')

Last, Margaret Watkm s did not raise in her Brief in Support of
Appea l the issue of
whethe r the Magistrate Court properly applied Idaho Code Sectio
n 5-327 in its Judgment for

Dismissal> therefore it is not subject to review by the Distric t Court and
is not addressed in this
response brief. See State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 159, 657
P.2d 17, 23 (1983) ("The
Suprem e Court will not review an issue that was not raised or argued

in the briefs.")

For these reasons, Margaret Watkin s' appeal should · be dismis
sed for failure to
demonstrate reversible error.

III.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Appell ee Toni Johnso n respec tfully reques
ts that the District
Court dismiss the appeal of Margaret Watkins based upon lack of standin
g and due to her failure
to demonstrate reversible error. Appellant Toni Johnso n respectfully
requests an award of costs

and attome y fees agains t Margaret Watkins pursuant to Idaho Code
Section 12-121 on the basis
that the appeal was brough t and pursue d frivolously, unreasonably and
without foundation.
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JD day of June, 2013.
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P .L.L.C.
·By

~
~
Karin Seubert
Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I .HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and
correct

copy

of

the

foregoing

OPPOSITION TO APPEAL was, this

BRIEF IN
J!l day of

June, 2013,

hand-delivered by providing a
copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;
mailed, postage pre-paid,
. / by first class mail; or
_v_ transmitted via facsimile
to:

Darrel W. Aherin
Aherln, Rice and Anegon
1212 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501
Theodore 0. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, P .L.L.C.
1219 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

By

~£ 1W
Karin Seubert

BRIEF IN OPPOSITTON TO APPEAL

-8-

476

Karin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

SECOND ORDER AUGMENTING
RECORD

The Appellant Margaret Watkins, by and through her attorney of record, Darrel Aherin of
Aherin, Rice and Anegon, the Appellee Toni Johnson, by and through her attorney of record, Karin
Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C. , and the Estate of John H. Cornell, by and through
its attorney, Samuel Creason of Creason, Moore, Dokken and Geidl, P.L.L.C., having stipulated on
the record in open court on June 4, 2013 before the Honorable Randall W. Robinson to
augmentation of the clerk's record as set forth below, and good cause shown, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that the clerk's record is hereby augmented to include the Amended Order Appointing
Personal Representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell entered on June 4, 2013 in the collateral
matter In the Matter of the Estate of John H Cornell, deceased, Clearwater County Case No. CV
2012-00439, a certified copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

SECOND ORDER AUGMENTING RECORD -1477

DATED this

// t1<.- day of June, 2013.

CERTIFICAT E OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing SECOND ORDER
AUGMENTING RECORD was, this //-IJ day of
June, 2013,

V

hand-delivere d by providing a
copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;
mailed, postage pre-paid,
by first class mail; or
transmitted via facsimile

to:
Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice and Anegon
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
Theodore O. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501
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Dokk en
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AMPM~

JUN o 4 20 '!'~Theod ore 0. Creason, ISB #1563
Samu el T. Creas on, ISB #8183

Clerk Dist. Court
Clearwater Coun , Idaho

CREASON, MOORE, DOK.KEN & GEIDL, PLLC

l 21 9 Idaho Street
P .0. Draw er 835
Lewiston, ID 8350 l
Telep hone: (208) 743-15 I 6
Facsi mile: (208) 746-223 I
Attor ney for Surv~ ving Spous e
Of John Herny Cornell

IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF l'HE SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO; IN ANO FOR THE COUNTY OF
CLEARWATER

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF

JOHN HENR Y CORN ELL,
Decea sed.

Case No. CV 2012-439

AMENDED ORDER APPOINTING
PERSONAL REPRESENTA'rIVE
OF THE ESTA TE OF JOHN

HENRY CORNELL

The pet11ioner K.areen ComeH for an adjud icatio n uf
intestacy and detern1ination

of hein, havin g come befor e the Co1..1.1i on Febru ary
6, 2013, the Court make s the
following findings:
1. John Cornell died on Augu st 20, 2012, at the after
of 47 years. At the tin1e of
his death , the deced ent was domic iled in Minidoka Count
y, State of ldaho.

ORDE R APPOINTING P:ERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN

HENRY CORNELL -- 1

Creason 1 Moore, Dokken 4'?., Geidl, PLLC
r_Q, Drawer 835, l.,.1.:wistot1 ID 83501
(208)743-1516; l<'ai(208)74<i--2231

479

Jun 04 13 03: 16p

Cre aso n,

Mo ore ,

~

Dok ken

(20 8J

746 -22 31

p.3

2. No adju dica tion has been mad e of
whe ther Decl;'.dent died intestu.te. No
Wil l
has been admitted to prob ate.
3. The dece dent was surv ived by the
following persons:

Kareen Cor nell

Add ress

Rcla tion shig

P.O . Bu;,;. 361

Spouse

Heybllln, ldah o 833 36

4. Mov ant' s Peti tion sets forth her prio
rity as surviving spouse to appo intm ent
as
pers ona l repr esen tativ e of the Estate.
WHERE.FORE, IT IS HER EBY ORD
ERED that Kareen Cor nell is appointe
d
Pers onal Rep rese ntat ive of the Esta
te of John Ht:nry Cor nell and tenn
inat es the
app oint men t of Mru:garet Wat kins as
acti ng temporary personal repr esen tativ
e effe ctiv e
Feb mar y 12, 201 3.

DATED tl1 is

_lf6h\ay of June, 2013 h •nl- f /P

{;,;.,, u

G"

/eb/./'7 }~ Z<>l3

, µ ; r ~--

RAN DAL L W. ROBINSON, Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDARD, IN AND FOR THE COUf\JTY OF C[cA~WATER
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
Case No. CV 2012-277
IN THE MATTER OF THE
MEMORANDUM OPINION
RE: KAREEN CORNELL
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL

This case involves the issue as to whether Kareen Cornell, the widow of John H.
Cornell, may pursue the claims of John H. Cornell against Toni Johnson for wrongfully
applying the proceeds of a trust to her personal needs rather than distributing John H.
Cornell's share to Kareen Connell.
Kareen Cornell, as personal representative of the Estate of John H. Cornell and
surviving spouse of John H. Cornell, filed a Petition for Supervised Administration and
Court Ordered Distribution ("Petition") of a trust created by the parents of John H.
Cornell and Toni Johnson. Toni Johnson, the sole trustee for the trust and a named
beneficiary of the trust, filed a Motion to Dismiss Kareen Cornell's Petition on the basis
that Kareen Cornell's claims against Toni Johnson, derived from John H. Cornell's
claims while alive, are abated with the death of John H. Cornell. The Motion to Dismiss,
the previous Judgment for Dismissal filed in this case regarding the Petition filed by
John H. Cornell, affidavits of the parties, the parties' Memoranda, the oral argument of
the parties, and the file have been carefully considered.
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I.

Statement of Facts.

On November 1, 1996, Michael Cornell and Arlie Cornell, husband and wife, and
parents to Toni Johnson and John H. Cornell, created a revocable family trust ("Trust") .
The Trust provides, "On the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trust shall terminate and
the Trustee shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and principal
remaining in the Trust into two (2) equal shares and distribute them to the following
beneficiaries: Toni C. Johnson and John H. Cornell." Trust§ 4.03.
On November 9, 2008, Arlie Cornell passed away. On August 6, 2009, Michael
Cornell signed the First Amendment of the Cornell Trust which named Toni Johnson
("Toni") as sole trustee/successor trustee instead of Toni and John H. Cornell ("John")
jointly serving in that capacity as provided for in the original Trust. On December 15,
2009, Michael Cornell, the last Trustor, passed away.
John was experiencing serious health and financial problems at the time his
father, Michael Cornell, passed away. John failed to obtain necessary medical care
because of his lack of finances. John contacted his sister, Toni, regarding the status of
the Trust following his father's death, but Toni refused to speak to him. John wrote
several letters and made several phone calls to the attorney for the estate requesting
information as to the status of the Trust without a response from the attorney. In his
third letter to the attorney dated September 17, 2010, John wrote, "Is it fair that Toni has
a place to live and I do not have a place to live. Why should I incur living expenses and
she is in complete control of everything, living off the money in the trust and living free in
my parent's house which is also my house?"
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In the nearly two (2) years from the last trustor's death through John's death,
Toni failed to distribute any part of the Trust to John even while she lived rent free in the
home that is included in the Trust. Toni used funds from the Trust for her personal
benefit. Toni has not distributed any of the funds from the Trust other than for her own
use.
John received $3000 as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy on his father's
life. Upon Toni's demand that he turn the money over to her, he sent a check for $2500
to Toni and retained $500 for living expenses.
On July 11, 2012, John filed a Petition for Supervised Administration and
Removal of Trustee alleging breach of Toni's fiduciary duty to settle and distribute the
Trust, Toni's mismanagement of the estate by paying her own personal expenses while
failing to pay John his one-half share of the estate, and Toni's failure to provide an
inventory of the assets.
On August 20, 2012, John committed suicide. In the case of death of one of the
beneficiaries, the Trust provides at 4.03(a),
If any child, for whom a share of the Trust Estate has been set aside,
should die prior to the above distribution, then the Trustee shall distribute
all of such deceased child's share of the Trust Estate to his or her
surviving issue in equal shares . . . If there is no surviving issue,, then all
of the deceased child's share of the Trust Estate shall be added to the
shares set aside for the benefit of the Trustors' other living child .... "
John's wife, Kareen Cornell, survives him. However, John left no issue. Thus,
the Trust proceeds, in the absence of any distribution prior to John's death, will go in its
entirety to Toni.
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II.

Proceedings to date.

On July 11, 2011, John H. Cornell filed a Petition for Supervised Administration
and Removal of Trustee regarding the Trust through his attorney, Darrell Aherin. On
August 11, 2011, John died leaving his wife, Kareen, and no issue.
On September 17, 2012, Toni filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the basis
that John's claims of Toni's malfeasance in administering the Trust were extinguished
by his death. Karen Seubert submitted briefing for Toni and Darrell Aherin submitted
briefing for the deceased John and John's aunt, Margaret Watkins, who was appointed
as the temporary personal representative for John's estate.
The hearing on the Motion to Dismiss was originally scheduled for November 27,
2012. John's widow, Kareen Cornell, made her first appearance in this case on that
date with Theodore Creason appearing for her. At Kareen Cornell's request, the
hearing was continued. Oral argument was conducted on January 8, 2013 on Toni's
Motion to Dismiss John's Petition with Ms. Seubert and Mr. Aherin presenting argument.
Mr. Creason failed to appear due to a misunderstanding regarding the hearing. Another
hearing was conducted on February 6, 2013 at which Ms. Seubert appeared for Toni,
Mr. Aherin appeared for John and Margret Watkins, and Mr. Creason appeared for
Kareen Connell. Briefing was provided by Mr. Creason and Ms. Seubert prior to the
hearing in addition to the briefs that has been previously submitted by Ms. Seubert and
Mr. Aherin.
Ms. Seubert sought dismissal of Mr. Aherin's Petition on the basis of abatement
of John's claims upon his death and that no substitution had been filed for John upon
his death. This Court on the basis of solely the abatement issue dismissed John's
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Petition. On February 9, 2013, this Court orally announced its decision granting Toni's
Motion to Dismiss and then issued on February 15, 2013, Judgment for Dismissal and a
supporting Memorandum Opinion. Kareen was given twenty (20) days to submit a
Petition and make claims against Toni if she wished to proceed further in this case.
On February 26, 2012, Kareen Connell, as the newly appointed personal
representative of the Estate of John H. Cornell and as John's surviving spouse, filed a
Petition for Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution. The Petition
alleges that Ton i's misuse of the Trust funds constitutes conversion and violates
additional equitable principles. The Petition alleges that Kareen is entitled in equity as a
constructive trust to the one-half share of the Trust John would have received had he
survived.
On March 4, 2013, Toni filed her Motion to Dismiss Kareen's Petition. On May 7,
2013, Toni filed her Memorandum of Law in Support of her second Motion to Dismiss.
On May 22, 2013, Samuel Creason filed his Memorandum in Opposition and on May
28, 2013, Ms. Seubert filed her Reply Brief. Oral argument was conducted on June 4,
2013 with Samuel Creason representing Kareen and Toni represented by Karen
Seubert.
Ill. Legal Analysis.

A Standard.
Affidavits have been filed and considered. In considering matters outside the
pleadings on a motion to dismiss, such motion must be treated as a motion for summary
judgment. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Hellickson v Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 276, 769 P.2d 150, 153
(Ct. App. 1990).
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The standard for granting a motion for summary judgment has been often
repeated by the appellate courts.
All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving
party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are
to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119
Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991). Summary judgment is
appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360, 364
(1991 ).
Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 529, 887 P.2d 1034, 1036 (1994).

With respect to the abatement issue presented by Toni's Motion to Dismiss, there
is no genuine issue of any material fact. I find it appropriate to consider Toni's motion to
dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. Toni's Motion for Summary Judgment
raises two issues: (1) Do John's claims survive his death under the common law? (2) If
not, has the Idaho legislature abrogated the common law and provided for the
survivability of John's claims?
B. Discussion.
1.

Standing

Kareen argues that Toni lacks standing to make her arguments regarding the
Trust because she is a contingent beneficiary. The Supreme Court in Car/ H.
Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 870, 993 P.2d 1197, 1201

(1999) noted that a party to an action must actually benefit from the proceeding.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) provides that "[e]very action shall be
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." I.R.C.P. 17(a). A real
party in interest "is the person who will be entitled to the benefits of the
action if successful, one who is actually and substantially interested in the
subject matter." State, Dep't of Law Enforcement v. One 1990 Geo Metro,
126 Idaho 675, 680, 889 P.2d 109, 114 (Ct.App.1995) (quoting Carrington
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v. Crandall, 63 Idaho 651,658, 124 P.2d 914,917 (1942) (decision under
statutory precursor to I.R.C.P. 17(a))).
133 Idaho at 870,993 P.2d at 1201.
The Supreme Court in Christensen held that the prospect of the Plaintiffs, as
named beneficiaries under the trust, ever gaining any benefit from the trust was too
remote to justify designating the Plaintiffs as a real party in interest. "(T)he co-plaintiffs,
as children of Carl and Lenna, will have an interest in the assets of the Family Trust only
if (1) Carl and Lenna do not exhaust the trust corpus during their lifetimes, and (2) funds
remain after $100,000 is distributed to the Missionary Trust. Because the co-plaintiffs
have a mere expectancy, they will not be entitled to the benefits of a successful suit."
133 Idaho at 870, 993 P.2d at 1201. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the
Plaintiffs' case on the basis that they were not a real party in interest.
The facts of this case are substantially different than present in Christensen.
In this case, the granters are deceased. Toni is the only person who has had access to
the Trust and has used funds from the Trust. In fact, the gravamen of Kareen's petition
is that Toni has misapplied the Trust for her own benefit to the exclusion of her
deceased husband. If Kareen is granted the relief she seeks, Toni will be required to
disgorge money she has misused and perform an accounting for all property in the trust.
Kareen does not explain how Toni can be a real party in interest against whom relief is
sought, but that Toni is not a real party in interest when she interposes defenses.
There is no living beneficiary under the Trust other than Toni. Even though the
Trust has not been yet been officially distributed by court order, Toni has used the
proceeds as if the Trust disposition had been approved. She is the only person who is
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named as trustee and the only person alive who is identified as beneficiary. The only
contingency remaining is actually distributing the proceeds. Toni is clearly a real party
in interest. If she is successful in this case, the entire Trust will be hers to do with as
she wishes.
Kareen argues that inartful words by Toni's counsel that she does not represent
the Trust deprive Toni of the status of a real party in interest. To the contrary, Toni's
personal interest and the Trust coincide since Toni is the only beneficiary and trustee
still living.
There is no factual issue as to whether Toni is a real party in interest. Kareen's
argument is rejected.
2. Law of the Case.
Toni argues that this Court's previous Judgment with respect to the claims made
by Mr. Aherin on behalf of Margaret Watkins and John requires dismissal of Kareen's
Petition under the law of the case doctrine. The law of the case only applies to a
decision made by an appellate court. Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 516, 5
P.3d 973, 977 (2000). No appellate decision has been rendered on this case.
Therefore, Toni's argument is rejected.
Foreclosure of Kareen's ability to present arguments on her behalf would be
especially unfair in this case. On the one hand, Toni has argued and will presumably
argue at the appellate stage that any appeal taken by Margaret Watkins must be
dismissed because Margaret Watkins is not a real party in interest as no substitution
was ever filed for John following his death and Margaret Watkins is no longer personal
representative. Kareen as a nonparty was limited to making arguments with respect to
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the Petition filed by Mr. Aherin on behalf of her husband and pursued by Margaret
Watkins. Under these circumstances, Kareen, as John's deceased widow and personal
representative of John's estate, must be allowed to present her arguments to the Court
as a real party in interest.
This Court adheres to the reasons set forth in its Memorandum Opinion dated
February 15, 2013 dismissing the Petition filed by John H. Cornell. However, Kareen
makes new arguments why her Petition should withstand Toni's Motion to Dismiss.
It is important to note that Kareen derives all her claims from the wrongs she
alleges Toni committed against John. Toni asserts in her Motion that all the derivative
claims asserted by Kareen are abated by John's death.
3. Abatement.
Kareen in her Petition alleges that Toni violated her fiduciary duties as a trustee
to John under several provisions of the Trust Administration Act, Idaho Code § 7-301 et.
seq.

Petition at §§ 3.14, 3.15, 3.16, 3.17, 3.18, and 3.19. This argument has already

been considered in the original Memorandum Opinion. However, because the analysis
in finding the allegations of statutory violations to be abated are pivotal to addressing
Kareen's other arguments, this Court's discussion addressing this allegation when
dismissing John's Petition will be largely repeated here.
The Supreme Court recently considered in Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 272
P.3d 1247 (2012) when the claims of deceased individuals are abated or terminated.
The abatement rule holds that in the absence of a legislative enactment
addressing the survivability of a claim, the common law rules govern. See
I.C. § 73-116 ("The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant
to, or inconsistent with, the constitution or laws of the United States, in all
cases not provided for in these compiled laws, is the rule of decision in all
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courts of this state."); see also Evans v. Twin Falls Cnty., 118 Idaho 210,
215, 796 P.2d 87, 92 (1990). Under the common law, claims arising out of
contracts generally survive the death of the claimant, while those sounding
in pure tort abate. See Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667, 674-79, 34 P.2d
957, 960-61 (1934); Kloepferv. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 417-18, 184 P. 477,
477 (1919).
Id. at 619-620.
Thus, in order for John's claims to survive his death, his claims must
sound in contract, and not in tort. The Bishop decision is instructive as to how to
analyze whether a case sounds in contract or tort for purposes of abatement of
the claim. The Bishop case involved a legal malpractice claim. Although the
malpractice claim arose out of a contractual claim to perform legal services, the
Supreme Court held the claim to sound in tort for purposes of abatement.
As this Court previously recognized, "[l]egal malpractice actions are an
amalgam of tort and contract theories." See Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho
702, 706, 652 P.2d 650, 654 (1982). The tort basis of legal malpractice
actions flows from the elements of legal malpractice: "(a) the existence of
an attorney-client relationship; (b) the existence of a duty on the part of the
lawyer; (c) failure to perform the duty; and (d) the negligence of the lawyer
must have been a proximate cause of the damage to the client. ... " Id.
(quoting Sherry v. Diercks, 29 Wash.App. 433, 437, 628 P.2d 1336, 1338
(1981)). "The scope of an attorney's contractual duty to a client is defined
by the purposes for which the attorney is retained." Johnson, 103 Idaho at
704, 652 P.2d at 652; Fuller, 119 Idaho at 425, 807 P.2d at 643 (holding
that the tort of legal malpractice is also a breach of the attorney-client
relationship). Breach of an attorney's duty in negligence is a tort. See
Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 136, 90 P.3d 884, 886 (2004);
Johnson, 103 Idaho at 704, 706-07, 652 P.2d at 652, 654-55. The
contract basis of legal malpractice actions is the failure to perform
obligations directly specified in the written contract. See Johnson, 103
Idaho at 704, 706-07, 652 P.2d at 652, 654-55 (holding that a breach of
contract claim would arise if the attorney did not do what he promised to
do in the contract, e.g., failing to draw up a contract of sale). Thus, under
the abatement rule, breach of duty is an action in tort, not contract; that is,
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unless an attorney foolhardily contracts with his client guaranteeing a
specific outcome in the litigation or provides for a higher standard of care
in the contract, he is held to the standard of care expected of an attorney.
Breach of that duty is a tort.
Id. at 620.

The Idaho Supreme Court's analysis of whether legal malpractice claims
are abated is very clearly applicable to this case. This case is a mixed tort and
contract case. This case also involves torts arising from a contractual
agreement. A tort basis for John's claims against Toni exists just as they were
found to exist with respect to the legal malpractice claim in Bishop: (a) The
existence of a fiduciary relationship is established by Toni being appointed as
and acting as a trustee (b) Toni, the trustee, has duties to act in a particular
fashion; (c) the alleged failure to meet those duties; (d) the failure of Toni to
perform her duties was the proximate cause of John not receiving his share of
the Trust during his lifetime.
In Bishop, the Court held that
the contours of the duties owed by an attorney to his or her client are
defined by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. If an attorney and
client want to provide for a higher standard of care, they may do so by
express language in the contract. Here, the standard of care in the
contract is essentially the same as in any attorney-client relationship.
Because this claim sounds in tort, it abated upon Patricia Shelton's death.
Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho at 620,272 P.3d at 1251.

Similarly, in this case, the contours of the duties owed by the trustee to the
beneficiary are defined by sources outside the contract: Chapter 7 of the Uniform
Probate Code, Idaho Code§ 15-7-101 et seq., and the Uniform Principal and Trust Act
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at Idaho Code§ 68-10-101 et seq. Violation of these fiduciary duties arising under
statute is a tort. Therefore, Kareen's claims of malfeasance by Toni arising from
violations of statutes are dismissed as they are abated.
Kareen argues that her husband's interest in the Trust arose immediately upon
the grantors' death and therefore is not extinguished by his death. Kareen relies upon §
4.03 of the Trust which provides in relevant part, "On the death of the surviving Trustor,
the Trust shall terminate and the Trustee shall, as soon as reasonably as possible,
divide the net income and principal remaining in the Trust into two (2) equal shares and
distribute them to the following beneficiaries: Toni C. Johnson and John H. Cornell."
Kareen ignores§ 4.03(a) of the Trust immediately following which ties entitlement to the
recipient being alive at the time of distribution and not the death of the last trustor.
If any child, for whom a share of the Trust Estate has been set aside
should die prior to the above distribution, then the Trustee shall distribute
all of such deceased child's share to the Trust Estate to his or her
surviving issue in equal shares .... If there is no surviving issue , then all of
the deceased child's share of the Trust Estate shall be added to the
shares set aside for the benefit of the Trustor's other living child, as
hereinafter provided including both of the distributed and the undistributed
portions of each such share, to be distributed as an equal part of such
other shares.
Kareen fails to point to any state law overriding the express terms of the Trust.
Even if Kareen was able to point to a state statute, she does not explain how that
would prevent abatement of the claims Kareen claims on behalf of her deceased
husband.
Kareen argues that Toni's failure to turn John's share of the Trust over to him
creates a constructive trust over the property that Toni wrongly withheld from John.
There are several problems with Kareen's argument.
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The doctrine of constructive trust is a legal fiction created in the absence of a
legal trust.
Constructive trusts are created by courts of equity whenever title to
property is found in one who in fairness ought not to be allowed to retain it.
The defendant is treated as if he or she had been an express trustee from
the date of the wrongful holding and is required to reconvey the property
to the plaintiff. G.G. Bogert & G.T. Bogert, The Law of Trusts & Trustees§
471 (1978).
Klein v. Shaw, 109 Idaho 237, 240, 706 P.2d 1348, 1351 (Ct. App. 1985).
As this case already addresses a legal trust, there is no necessity to resort to the
legal fiction of a constructive trust. Toni's failure to timely provide John his share of the
estate is already covered by the Uniform Probate Code. The contours of the duties
imposed by the Probate Code supplant equitable considerations.
Second, the circumstances necessitating creation of a constructive trust squarely
meets the definition of a tort. The definition of a tort is "(a) civil wrong, other than
breach of contract, for which a remedy may be obtained, usu. in the form of damages; a
breach of a duty that the law imposes on persons who stand in a particular relation to
one another." TORT, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). Kareen requests a
constructive trust to address the civil wrong, the breach of duties Toni owed to John. As
a cause of action sounding clearly in tort, Kareen's request for a constructive trust must
be rejected as abated. Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho at 619-620, 272 P.3d at 12491250.
Kareen argues that her breach of contract claim must be viewed as separate
from the breach of fiduciary claim and, as a contract claim, survives John's death. The
Supreme Court in Bishop addressed the same claim. In the absence of finding that a
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higher duty of care is provided for under the Trust agreement than provided under the
statute, Bishop requires abatement of Kareen's claim. Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho at
620,272 P.3d at 1251. Kareen fails to point out any way in which the Trust instrument
imposes any duties upon Toni that are not also imposed by the Probate Code. This
Court stands by its more detailed analysis when addressing John's claims that the Trust
instrument gives no higher duty of care than the duty imposed by the Probate Code.
Memorandum Opinion dated February 15, 2013 at 6-8.
Kareen also argues that enforcement of the terms of an oral contractual
agreement between John and Toni survives John's death. Kareen argues that a factual
issue exists as to an oral agreement that Toni could live in the home that is part of the
Trust rent free while she tried to sell it, that she could use the Trust to help pay for her
living expenses and that she would divide the proceeds with John when the house and
real property sold. Even accepting these facts as true, they do not provide any greater
protection for John than already provided under the Trust or state law. Simply stating
that proceeds of the estate will be divided equally between the parties merely reinforces
the fiduciary duties under the Probate Code and the Trust to ensure John receives his
share of the Trust.
Besides, it is not the specific terms of the Trust that govern whether or not
Kareen's claims are abated, but rather whether the failure to carry out the terms violates
state law in the form of the Probate Code. The Supreme Court's analysis in Bishop
makes clear that merely changing the terms of the underlying agreement is irrelevant to
whether the case is abated unless a higher standard of care is provided for in cases, as
here, involving a mixed tort and contract. Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho at 620, 272 P.3d
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at 1251. No higher standard of care is set forth in the oral agreement. Therefore,
Kareen's reliance on the oral and written Trust terms defeating abatement of her claims
is rejected.
This result is further supported by Jones v. Runft, Leroy, Coffin & Matthews,

Chartered, 125 Idaho 607,612,873 P.2d 861,866 (1994). The Court observed, '"A
contract may ... create a state of things which furnishes the occasion for a tort. If the
relation of the plaintiff and the defendants is such that a duty to take due care arises
therefrom irrespective of contract and the defendant is negligent, then the action is one
of tort." Jones, 125 Idaho at 612, 873 at 866. As stated above, the duties Kareen
asserts Toni breaches arise irrespective of contract. The duties are grounded in the
failure to abide by the fiduciary duties imposed by state law regardless of what the
contract states.
Kareen seeks to distinguish Bishop by relying on several Am.Jur. cites. Kareen
argues that the survival of an action depends on the nature of the interest affected.
Because property of the Trust is involved, as opposed to physical injury, the claim
cannot be abated. 1 Am.Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival§ 51. Kareen also
argues that the claims under the Probate Code survive because "(a) cause of action
that is founded on a remedial statute survives the death of the party possessing the
cause of action." 1 Am.Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival§ 59. Finally, Kareen,
citing to 1 Am.Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival§§ 56 and 60, argues that her
equitable claims of conversion and unjust enrichment survive because claims in equity
are not abated.
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These arguments were addressed in the Memorandum Opinion dated February
15, 2013 filed in this case. While Kareen correctly sets forth these principles, she
provides no explanation as to how they are consistent with Bishop. The Supreme Court
in Bishop did not examine whether the claims were equitable or torts done to persons or
to property in determining whether the joint contract and tort action survives the death of
the party. Nor did the Supreme Court analyze whether the rules of professional conduct
are remedial in nature for purposes of surviving the party's death. As Kareen's claims
are in the nature of torts, Kareen's claims are abated by John's death. Therefore,
Kareen's arguments are rejected.
Kareen also cites Henshaw v. Miller, 58 US 212 ( 1854) in support of her
argument. Henshaw involved the interpretation of Virginia statutes in determining
whether a claim against the estate was abated. The United State Supreme Court held
the claim against an executor for a wrong the deceased allegedly committed against the
plaintiff was abated. Henshaw offers to assistance to Kareen.
Kareen also argues that she is entitled to pursue return of Lot 34 which adjoins
the real property of John's parents, the trustors. Kareen argues that John transferred
the property to the Trust for convenience because it was contiguous to the parents'
property and that John continued to pay taxes and other expenses on the property after
it was quitclaimed. Memorandum in Opposition re Motion to Dismiss at 16. In order for
Kareen's argument to be considered, there must be specific facts presented by affidavit
or deposition supporting the argument.
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who must then
come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of
material fact. Id. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment "may
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not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but
the party's response ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 56(e). Such evidence may consist of
affidavits or depositions, but "the Court will consider only that material ...
which is based upon personal knowledge and which would be admissible
at trial." Harris v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 297-98,
847 P.2d 1156, 1158-59 (1992).
Sherer v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. No. 25, 143 Idaho 486, 489-90, 148 P.3d 1232, 1235-36

(2006).
The property in question was transferred to the Trust on January 3, 2007.
Affidavit of Theodore 0. Creason at Exhibit 5 to Exhibit B. However, there are no
specific facts in the record to support the allegations regarding the purpose of the
transfer nor that payments were made by John on the property after transfer. The only
mention of the property by sworn testimony consists of Toni testifying she had no
recollection of John paying money on the property and (2) the implication Toni drew
from her brother's circumstances that he may have transferred the property to avoid
creditors and any claim by his estranged wife. Affidavit of Theodore 0. Creason at 63 II.
19-24 and at 64 II. 13-16.
Kareen made no claim in her Petition regarding Lot 34 other than including in the
statement of facts that John had deposited Lot 34, which adjoins his parents' property,
by quitclaim deed into the Trust. Petition at§ 3.8. Nor did Kareen provide specific facts
by affidavit or deposition to show that Lot 34 should be treated any different than the
other property that is part of the Trust. Toni met her burden in establishing that there is
no material issue of fact as to abatement of the claims surrounding the Trust. Kareen's
argument must be rejected in the absence of specific facts showing why Lot 34 should
be treated differently than the rest of the property held in the Trust.
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Kareen argues that the legislature's enactment of Idaho Code § 5-327 abrogates
abatement of her claim concerning the diminution of the value of the property interest
_ John held in-the-proper:ty comprising-the Trust. Tbis claim has already been addressed
in the Memorandum Opinion dated February 15, 2013 at 13-17. The diminution of
John's interest in the Trust does not come within any of the listed three types of
damages - medical expenses, out of pocket expenses nor lost wages- that a claim such
as Kareen's can recover upon, even though otherwise abated. Kareen makes no new
argument as to why this analysis is in error. I adhere to my analysis stated in the
original Memorandum Opinion and reject Kareen's argument again.
Ill. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and there
being no material facts in dispute, the Motion to Dismiss filed by Toni C. Johnson of the
Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee, converted into a Motion
for Summary Judgment by the filing of Affidavits, shall be granted and the Petition for
Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution will be dismissed as Kareen's
claims set forth in her Petition do not survive John's death under common law, state law
or the Trust.
Dated this

_1L day of June, 2013.

Mt~

Randall W Robinson, Magistrate
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FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF THE

Case No. CV 2012-277

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL

JUDGMENT FOR DISMISSAL

Based upon Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as set forth in the
Memorandum Opinion Re: Kareen Cornell filed in this case on June 21, 2013, and good
cause appearing thereby, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
That, there being no genuine issue of material fact, the Motion to Dismiss filed by
Toni C. Johnson of the Petition for Supervised Administration and Court Ordered
Distribution filed by Kareen Cornell, converted into a Motion for Summary Judgment by
the filing of Affidavits, IS HEREBY GRANTED and the Petition for Supervised
Administration and Court Ordered Distribution is HEREBY DISMISSED.
Dated this

1d.._ day of June, 2013.
I

Randall W Robinson, Magistrate
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Darrel W. Aherin
1212 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698
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ISB# 1534
Attorney for Margaret Watkins

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF JDAHO, fN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of;

NO. CV 2012-00277

THE REVOCABLE F'AMIL Y TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL,

APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF

COMES NOW Darrel W. Aherin of Aherin, Rice & Anegon, on behalf of Margaret
Watkins, and provides Appellant's Reply Briefto Brief in Opposition to Appeal of Toni C.
Johnson and the Brief of" Estate of John H. Cornell Re: Appeal of Margaret Watkins.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 15, 2012 Margaret Watkins was appointed Temporary Personal
Representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell in Clearwater County Case No. CV 2012439. Toni C. Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss John Cornell's Petition for Supervised
Administration and Removal of Trustee claiming John Cornell's right to one-half of the Trust did
not survive his death. To protect the rights and interests of John Cornell, Margaret Watkins, the
aunt of John Cornell imd Toni Johnson, protected John Cornell's rights. Since the Court
considered the issue during the time Margaret Watkins was the Temporary Personal
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Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
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Repre1;:;entative, $he has continued to protect John Cornell's rights that occurred during the time
she was the Temporary Personal Representative.

Toni C. Johnson's Motion to Dismiss was made on the argument that John Cornell's right
to one-half of the Trust, as set forth in the written Trust, sounded in tort and, therefore, died
when he died.
Toni C. Johnson has added another argument to try to deprive her brother, John Cornell,
of his one-half of the Trust. Toni Johnson says Margaret Watkins is no longer the Temporary

Personal Representative so she should not be able to proceed. Clearly, Toni Johnson will use
any procedural or other argument she can to accomplish her goal of refusing to do what was

required of her as trustee so she individually can obtain her brother's one-half interest in the
Trust.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
This case is very straightforward. The Trust created by Michael C. Cornell and Arlie M.

Cornell, parents of Toni Johnson and John Cornell, has been intentionally breached by one
beneficiary, Toni C. Johnson, so the other beneficiary gets nothing. The beneficiary/trustee who
has intentionally breached the Trust now says she gets the entire Trust because a personal injury
tort claim dies when the beneficiary dies. In Toni C. Johnson's Brief in Opposition to Appeal,
the trustee wants this Court to not allow John Cornell to have the right to appeal. Margaret
Watkins, as Temporary Personal Representative , was the person who has put forward John

Cornell's claim that he was entitled to one-half of the Trust created by his pa.rents, which he was
to receive when his parents died. Margaret Watkins protected John Cornell's rights and

continues to preserve John Cornell's right to one-half of the Trust. The Court proceedings in this
Trust case started when John Comell was alive. Toni Johnson, within less than 30 days after her
brother's death, filed a Motion to Dismiss his claim for one-half of the Trust he was entitled to.
Margaret Watkins protected John Cornell's right to one-half of the Trust by contesting Toni C.
Johnson's Motion to rnsmiss. Margaret Watkins continues to protect John Cornell's rights to
one-half of the Trust.
Toni C. Johnson has clearly not followed the Trust requirements to distribute one-half of
the Trust to her brother. John Cornell's request in this case was to receive his property created

by the Trust. This case is not a tort action. John Cornell was not seeking tort damages. He
sought his property he was entitled to pursuant to a Trost created by his parents. A breach of the
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duty to distribute property pursuant to a written document is now being claimed by the breaching
party to be a tort claim and the property of Jolm Cornell should go to the person who breached
the Trust.

CONCLUSION
To allow a person to obtain property by intentionally not transferring the property as soon
as possible as required by a written document means the law must 100 percent ignore the

requirements in the written document and substitute a theory that wrongdoing will be allowed to
benefit the wrongdoer.
DATED this /

r...J-

:.---- day ofJuly, 2013.
AHERJN, RICE & ANEGON

By£},~!,).~
Darrel W. Aherin
Attorney for Appellant
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Case No. CV 2012-00277
NOTICE OF APPEAL
I.R.C.P. 83
Category L(2)
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TO: TONIC. JOHNSON, AND HER ATTORNEY, KARIN SEUBERT, JONES, BROWER, &
CALLERY, P.L.L.C., 1304 IDAHO STREET, P.O. BOX 854, LEWISTON, ID 83501
EMAIL: KRSEUBERT@LEWISTON.COM
AND
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The Estate of John Hemy Cornell, acting through its personal representative,

Kareen Cornell, (hereinafter the "Estate") files this appeal from the Magistrate Court in and for
the County of Clearwater.
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2.

The Estate appeals to the District Court in and for the County of Clearwater.

3.

The Estate appeals the Magistrate Court's dismissal of the Estate's Petition for

Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution. The Court's dismissal is set forth in
its June 21, 2013 JUDGMENT FOR DISMISSAL and MEMORAND UM OPINION RE:
KAREEN CORNELL upon which the judgment was based.

4.

The appeal is taken upon matters of both law and fact.

5.

The proceedings of the hearings were recorded or reported by the method of

electronic recordings and are in the possession of the Clearwater County Clerk located in
Orofino, Idaho. No records of the proceedings are being requested.

6.

The statement of issues on appeal that the Estate intends to assert are as follows:

Issue 1.

Whether the Court erred in finding that in the absence of any distribution prior to
John Cornell's death, the entirety of the Trust res should be distributed to Toni
Johnson.

Issue 2.

Whether the Court erred in finding that all of the Estate's claims were based upon
wrongs committed by Toni C. Johnson against John Henry Cornell, personally.

Issue 3.

Whether the Court erred in finding that claims for breach of a trustee's fiduciary
duty abate upon death.

Issue 4.

Whether the Court erred in finding that tort claims alleging injury to property
abate upon death.

Issue 5.

Whether the Court erred in finding that the doctrine of constructive trust was
inapplicable.

Issue 6.

Whether the Court erred in finding that the Estate's conversion claims abated
upon death.

Issue 7.

Whether the Court erred in finding that the Estate's unjust enrichment claims
abated upon death.
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Issue 8.

Whether the Court erred in finding that claims in equity could be re-characterized
as claims at law, which abate upon death.

Issue 9.

Whether the Court erred in finding that claims for breach of contract could be re-- ~
characterized as tort claims, which abate upon death.

Issue 10.

Whether the Court erred in interpreting Idaho Code§ 5-327 in such a manner that
claims for injury to property abate unless the injury results in medical expenses,
out of pocket expense or lost wages.

7.

The above list of issues is not exhaustive and the Estate may assert other issues on

appeal thereafter discovered by the Estate.
DATED this 151 day of July, 2013 .
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

Samuel T. Creason, ISB #8183
Attorney for Personal Representative
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of July, 20T3, I caused a copy of theforegoing
NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served by the method indicated below and addressed to the
following:
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C.
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
Fax: 208-746-9553
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MAIL
- - - OVERNIGHT
- - - FAX TRANSMISSION

---

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston ID 83501
(208)743-1516; Fax(208)746-2231
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAlt ~ s'lfRICT O&cldaf
, STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATE~e,rr ft
)

In the Matter of:

CASE NO. CV~ 12-277

p
~·~r)

(sP

)
)
)
)

M.

Clerk

Deputy

)

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY
TRUST OF MICHAEL S.
CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

,_ ;/

CLERK'S TRANSMITTAL OF COURT
FILE AND CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL
TO DISTRICT COURT

)

___________ )
TO: The District Court of the Second Judicial District, in and for the County of Clearwater.
Transmitted is the case file in the above captioned case.
APPEAL FROM:

Magistrate Division

ORDER OR JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM:

APPEALED BY:

Personal Representative

NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED:
APPEAL FEE PAID:

July 2, 2013

_Yes

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:

Theodore 0. Creason

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT:
OTHER ATTORNEYS:

3

DATED this _

Judgment For Dismissal and
Memorandum Opinion RE:
Kareen Cornell dated June 21,
2013

Karin Seubert

None

c:\day of July, 2013.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Clerk's Transmittal
of Court File and Certificate of Appe I to rnstrict Couct was hand-delivered, faxed or
mailed , postage pre-paid, on the 3
day of July, 2013, to:
Theodore 0 . Creason ,
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501

CARRIE BIRD
Clerk of the District Court
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Karin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813

2un

'
Clerk Dist. Court
Clear.,•,t3r Coun , Idaho

J

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Nez Perce

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES

)
: ss
)

KARIN SEUBERT, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That I am an attorney duly admitted to practice law before the Courts of the State of
Idaho. The firm of Jones, Brower and Callery has been retained by Toni Johnson to defend
against the Petition by Kareen Cornell as Personal Representative of the Estate of John Henry

Cornell and as Surviving Spouse of John Henry Cornell, deceased beneficiary of the Revocable
Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M Cornell for Supervised Administration and Court
Ordered Distribution filed on February 26, 2013.

I am well informed as to the costs,

disbursements and attorney fees of Toni Johnson in defending against said Petition; that to the
best of my knowledge and belief, the items in Exhibits A and B to this Affidavit are correct and
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
AND ATTORNEY FEES

l..D ./

or

1
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that the said disbursements have been necessarily incurred in this action and are being claimed in
compliance with Rule 54(d) and 54(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. I make this
Affidavit on behalf of Toni Johnson and in support of the Memorandum of Costs and Attorney
Fees and, in particular, in support of a request for costs in the sum of$277.15 and for attorney's
fees in the sum of $7,875.00, for a total of Eight Thousand One Hundred Fifty Two and 15/100
Dollars ($8,152.15).
To date either I have performed the following professional services in connection with
said Petition by Kareen Cornell as Personal Representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell
and as Surviving Spouse ofJohn Henry Cornell, deceased beneficiary of the Revocable Family Trust
of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M Cornell for Supervised Administration and Court Ordered
Distribution:

See Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part hereof.
That the attorney time of the office for Karin Seubert was charged at the rate of $150.00
per hour. Said rate is within the rates prevailing in the Second Judicial District for the State of
Idaho.
In my opm10n, based upon the appropriate factors to be considered by the Court,
confirmation of $7,875.00 to Toni Johnson for attorney fees necessarily expended in the good
faith defense of this action is reasonable. Specifically, Toni Johnson is the prevailing party as a
full dismissal of the opposing party's claims was obtained. Defense of this action involved
matters of law that were novel and required extensive time, research and consideration in order
to adequately represent the interests of Toni Johnson. Further, the time limitations imposed by
the circumstances of the case required extraordinary attention by the undersigned attorney,
including that required by the pending appeal, which are not reflected in the attorney fee amount
sought herein. Further, the circumstances of the case are such make it undesirable.
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
AND ATTORNEY FEES

2
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Said figure specifically excludes amounts incurred for the probate of the estate of John
Henry Cornell, deceased, or in defending against the appeal being pursued by Margaret Watkins,
or in defending against the Petition filed by John Cornell during his lifetime.
Additionally, to date, this firm has advanced the following costs for a filing fee in
connection with the defense of said Petition by Kareen Cornell as Personal Representative of the

Estate ofJohn Henry Cornell and as Surviving Spouse of John Henry Cornell, deceased beneficiary
of the Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M Cornell for Supervised
Administration and Court Ordered Distribution:
See Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof.
In my opinion, based on the appropriate factors to be considered by the Court, an award
of Two Hundred Seventy Seven and 15/100 ($217.50) to Toni Johnson for costs necessarily
expended in the good faith defense of this action is reasonable. Said cost was incurred for one
copy of the deposition of Toni Johnson and is allowed as a matter of right pursuant to I.R.C.P.
54( d)(l )(C)(l 0).
DATED this 2nd day of July, 2013.

JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

~-~ ~------".'-----r~

By _ _
KARIN SEUBERT

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2nd day of July, 2013.

Notary Public in and for the State ofldaho
Residing at Lewiston, Idaho.
My commission expires ,,,.J/o t.,(!y.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY
FEES was, this 2nd day of July, 2013, hand-delivered
by providing a copy to Valley Messenger Service
addressed to:
Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice and Anegon
1212 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501
Theodore 0 . Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl
1219 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

By

r(U,w_~
KARIN SEUB RT

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
AND ATTORNEY FEES

4
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EXHIBIT A: Attorney Fees
Date
2/26/2013
2/28/2013
2/28/2013
3/1/2013
3/12/2013
3/13/2013
3/13/2013
3/20/2013
3/27/2013
4/2/2013
4/8/2013
4/9/2013
4/10/2013
4/11/2013
4/15/2013
4/22/2013
4/23/2013
5/6/2013
5/7/2013
5/15/2013
5/15/2013
5/16/2013
5/17/2013
5/20/2013
5/22/2013
5/24/2013
5/28/2013
5/29/2013
6/4/2013
6/25/2013
7/2/2013

Service Provided
Hearing on motion for consolidation.
Telephone conference with client.
Motion for protective order and related documents
and correspondence; research.
Motion to dismiss.
Telephone conference with Creason.
Telephone conference with Court.
Hearing preparation; participated in hearing on
Motion for protective order (telephonic).
Telephone conference to client. Confirming letter.
Telephone conference with client.
Conference with client re: discovery response.
Prepared draft discovery response.
Prepared inventory, accounting; further work on
discovery response.
Further work on inventory, accounting, discovery
response.
Conference with client to review draft discovery
response, inventory, accounting.
Conference with Creason. Finalized discovery
response.
Deposition of Toni Johnson.
Telephone conference with client.
Memo. in support of motion to dismiss; research.
Memo. in support of motion to dismiss; research.
Reviewed Estate's motion to stay proceeding and
related filings; research.
Telephone conference with Creason.
Research; objection for motion for stay.
Participated in hearing on motion for stay.
Conference with Creason.
Reviewed response brief; research.
Research; reply brief.
Reply brief.
Telephone conference with client.
Hearing preparation; travel to/from Orofino;
attended hearing on motion to dismiss.
Reviewed memorandum opinion; letter to client.
Prepared memorandum of costs and attorney fees
and related documents.

Time
1.00
0.50
2.00

Fee
$150.00
$75.00
$300.00

1.00
0.50
0.25
1.50

$150.00
$75.00
$37.50
$225.00

1.00
0.25
5.00
1.00
2.00

$150.00
$37.50
$750.00
$150.00
$300.00

6.00

$900.00

0.50

$75.00

No charge
4.00
No charge
4.00
3.00
1.00

$600.00

0.25
2.00
1.50
0.50
1.00
4.00
3.00
0.25
4.00

$37.50
$300.00
$225.00
$75.00
$150.00
$600.00
$450.00
$37.50
$600.00

0.50
1.00

$75.00
$150.00

TOTAL

$7,875.00

$600.00
$450.00
$150.00

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
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EXHIBIT B: Costs
Cost Incurred

Amount

One copy of deposition of Toni Johnson

$277.15

7

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
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FIL~11 ~.
JUL O5 2013

.

Karin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 854
1304 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813

k Dist Court
Clearw3ter Coun . Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

)

)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

)
)
)

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES

COMES NOW Karin Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., on behalf of the
Respondent Toni Johnson, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 15-8-208 and Rule 54(d), 54(e)(l)
and 54( e )(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, submit the following items of costs to which
the Court may order to be awarded to Respondent Toni Johnson and against the Estate of John H.
Cornell, deceased, as follows:
Costs (deposition copy, I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(I0))

$277.15

Reasonable attorney fees to be
fixed by the Court as set out in
the Affidavit for Attorney Fees
filed herewith (specifically does
not include costs related to
probate of Estate of John Cornell
or appeal being pursued by Margaret Watkins).

$7,875.00

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
AND ATTORNEY FEES

1
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DATED this 2nd day of July, 2013.
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

KARIN SEUBERT being first duly sworn and on oath, deposes and says:
That she is the attorney for Respondent Toni Johnson and as such is well informed as to
the costs, disbursements and attorney fees of Toni Johnson; that to the best of her knowledge and
belief, the items in the Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees are correct and that the said
disbursements have been necessarily incurred in said action and are being claimed in compliance
with Rule 54(d) and 54(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this 2nd day ofJuly, 2013.
L,.,....---

,,,_

( __!;tr>

1(. >c" ·i,

KJ\RIN SEUBERT
)
: ss.
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE. )
STATE OF IDAHO,

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 2nd day of July, 2013.

NOTARY PUB).,IC for State ofldaho
Residing at ltbi,{ (/VJ?
My Commission Expires: 0-3/1Jtt/1y

(SEAL)

MEMORAND UM OF COSTS
AND ATTORNEY FEES
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct
copy· of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
AND ATTORNEY FEES was, this 2nd day of July,
2013.
hand-delivered by providing a
copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;
mailed, postage pre-paid,
by first class mail; or
transmitted via facsimile
transmitted via e-mail
to:
Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice and Anegon
1212 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501
Theodore 0. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl
1219 Idaho St.
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

By

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
AND ATTORNEY FEES

3
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Creason,

~

Moore,

Dokken

Theodore 0 . Creason, ISB it 1563
Samuel r. Creason 1SB #8183
CREASON , MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC
1219 ldaho Street

P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 8350 !
Telephone: (208) 743-1516
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231
Atttwncys for Person;.il Representat ive
Of Estate of John Hc11ry Cornell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAi. Of STRICT
OF THE ST ATE OF lDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWA TER

ln the Matter of:

THE REVOCAB LE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

)
)

MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES (l.R.C.P. 54(d)(6))

)

____ )

COMES NOW Kareen Camell, Personal Representat ive of the Estate of John Henry
Cornell, by and through her attomey of record, Samuel T . Creason of Creason, Moore, Dukkt:n &

neidl, Pl .l .C:, and hereby moves this Court

t()

disal!ow all or part of the costs and attorney fees

set forth i11 Toni Johnson's Memorandu m of Costs and Attorney Fees. Movant basis this rn<.)tion

upo11 the authorities and arguments set forth in the Memorandu m in Suppo1t filed herewith.
DATED this 9th day of July, 2013.
, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

Atton1eys for Personal Rcprni:icl1tativc

MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY
FEES (1.R.C.l'. 54(d)(6)) - l

Cr~.1,011, Moore, Dokken & Ccii.11, PLLC
P.O. Duwer 835, Lewis-ton, ll) 83501
(l08) 743- 151\\; F;i~, (203) 740-2231
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Creason,

Moore,

&

Dokken

(208]

746-2231
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CERTU'ICATE OF SERVlCE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of July, 2013, I filed the foregoing MOTION
TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES (l.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) with the Clerk of the
Court (via facsimile to (208) 476-9315), and also delivered a COJ>Y via facsimile to the
following persons at the fi.lx. numbers desi1:,111ated below:
DaiTcl W. Aherin

Karin Seubert

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
1212 ldaho Street
P. 0. Drawer 698
J.,ewisto11, ID 83501
Ftu:: 208-716-3650

Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C.
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 8350 I
Fax: 208-746-9S53

MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY
FEES

(J.n.c.r. 54(d)(6)) - 2

Cre,1,011, MoOI''-\ 0Qkk1t11 &

Cd,H, l'LLC

1•.o. Or,m~,r 835, l.owi~t(111, 10 8.'.\501
(:Z.03) 743•1 :\16; Fa,:

(2\111)

7ol6-Z2:I I
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Jul

OS

13

12: 16p

Creason,

Moore,

Dokken

&

Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183
CREASON , MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC
12 I 9 Idaho Street
P.O . Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (2.UX) '/4J-l '.:> 16
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231
Att.nrneys for Personal Representative
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell

IN THE DISTRlCT COllRl' OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE ST ATE OF lDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 01'' CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAELS . CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No . CV 20 I 2-00277
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

RE: MOTION TO DISALLOW
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
(I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6))

- - - -- -- - - - - - - - - - - ' - - - )
Kareen Cornell, Personal Representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell (hereinafter,
''F\tate") objects to Johnson' s memorandum of costs and attorney fees on the grounds that the
fees should not be awarded. Toni Johnson brings her claim for attorney fees pursuant to Idaho
Code § 15-8-208. Section l 5-8-208 provides that the court "rnuy, in its discreti<)n, order costs,
including rensonable attorney's foes .... " The Court should disallow Johnson's motion for fees

because an award be inequitable given that Johnson has admitted that she engaged in the
breaches of fiducimy duty alleged in the Estate's Petiti(m.

M EMORANDUM IN SUPPORT RI~: MOTION TO
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
(I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) • I

Cr~:a.i;:c,n, Moore., Dokken & CcidJ, PLLC'

r.o. Dr.,w~r 835, l..i,,wiston, ID

83501
(108) 743• l S 16; F'ax: (208) 74(,-22.1 I
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Jul

os 13 12: 16p

Creason,

Moore,

~

Dokken

[208J

746-2231

p.6

ANALYSIS
Johnson raises Idaho Code § I 5~8~208 as the statutory grounds upon which she claims
attorney fees.

Section l 5-8-208 places determinations regarding an award of fees within the

sound discretion of the district court. "That section allows c<.mrts to award foes in case$ govemed
by the Trust and Estate Dis.pule Resolution Act whe.r'I doing so would be eq11iti1hlc." Ranncr Uji?

Ins. Co_ v. Mark Wallace DLrson lrrevocahle Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 133, 206 P.3d 481,497
(2009). Because an award in favor of Ms. Johnson would be inequitable, this Court should deny
her moti<)n.
The Estate's Petition raised several causes of action based upon alleged facts that Johnson
damaged th,~ Trusj 1·es ami John Cornell by her inequitable behavior.

One of the da:rnages

suffered by John Co111ell was that Johnson's conduct essentially deprived him of the inheritance
his parents intended to provide him. Johnson did 11ot dispute that she engaged in this behavior.
In fact, Johnson's counsel conceded-and the Court fi.mn<l-that Johnson had engaged in many

of the breaches alleged in the Estate's Petition.

Ralht:r, Juhm;un pr1;:vailed on the iss1.,c of

abatement of those causes of action upon the demise of John Cornell. Awarding attomey foes
against the Estate of John Cornell to a person who admittedly engaged in the conduct giving rise
to the plcd causes of action-and injuring John Cornell-would be inequitable.
Further, the grounds upon which judgment was granted are not so clear that the Petition
umld be characterized as in.;J.ppropriatdy filed. This Cou1i has noted at

01111

argument that the

issues upon which judgment was granted are in an unsettled area of Idaho law. This Court also
stated that the issues may need to be raised all the way to the Idaho Supreme Cou1t before any

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT RE: MOTION TU
DISALLOW COSTS ANO ATTORNEY FEES
(l.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) - 2

c,·c;,:~nn.7 J\.tourc, Ookktn & Gddl, PLl..C

P.0- D.-awer 8]5, Lcwlstoll, ID S350 I
(20S) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231
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Crea5on,

Moore,

~

Dokken

(2081

746-2231

p.7

dear resolution in this matter. Judgment on such an unsettled area oflaw, where the wrongdoing
has been conceded, doe$ not support an award of attorney fees against the successor in interest to
the injured party.

CON CL UM UN
Johnson ask!i this Court to onier a niscretionary award of fees pursuant to ldaho Cc.1de

§ 15-8-208. The Court should decline to grant Johnson's request because doing so would not be
equitable.
DATED this 9th day of July, 2013.
CRt:ASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

M.EMURANUl)M IN SUPPORT RE; MOTION l"O
DlSALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEl:!:S
(l.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) - 3

Ct'C\:tt.:on, Moore, Dukki2'n. & G~idl, Pl .I .f'

P.O. Drawer 835, Lcwi$(Okl, JD 8351.11
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-:2231
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~
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746-2231
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY i.hat on this 9th day of July, 2013, l filed the foregoing
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT RE;
ATTORNEY J?EES (I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) with the Clerk of the Cou1t (via facsimile to (208) 4769315), and also delivered a copy via facsimile to the following persons al the fax numbers
designated below:

Dan·cl W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice & Anegon
1212 Idah(1 Stn::et
P_ O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, 1D 83501

Fax: 208-746-3650

MEMUl{ANDUM IN SUPf'OH.T RE: MOTJON TO
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
(I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) - 4

Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Callc1·y, P .LL.C.
i 304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box. 854
Lewiston, lD 83501
Fax: 208-746-.9553

,<:. G's'i<:11, PLL<':
l'.0. Ura"·cr 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
{20!!) 743-1516; f,m (208) 746•2231

CrCBson, Muorll', D-Okk•m

525

AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON
Darrel W. Aherin
1212 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698
(208) 746-3646
ISB# 1534
Attorney for Margaret Watkins

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:

NO. CV 2012-00277

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL,

MOTION TO MEDIATE

COMES NOW Darrel W. Aherin of Aherin, Rice & Anegon, on behalf of Margaret
Watkins, and hereby requests that the Court set the above case for mediation. This motion is
made pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(k)(A). Mediation was suggested by Judge Randall Robinson as a
means of reaching a resolution in this case and In the Matter of the Estate of John Henry Cornell,
Clearwater County Case No . CV 2012-439.
The undersigned requests that the Honorable Jay Gaskill be appointed as mediator and a
mediation be conducted in Lewiston, Idaho.

If the matters are set for mediation, the undersigned, on behalf of Margaret Watkins, will
agree to stay the current appeal in this matter pending the outcome of the mediation.
Oral argument is requested.

MOTION TO MEDIA TE -- 1
N:\Cornell , John\Pleadings\Motion to Mediate.docx ser
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DATED this

~

ay of July, 2013 .
AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON

By ~ J.ak
Darrel W. Aherin
Attorney for Margaret Watkins

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

rf'.,. . -

day of July, 2013, I caused
I, DARREL·W. AHERIN, hereby certify that on the
to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed to the
following:
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC.
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501

D U.S. Mail
D J-Iand Delivery
lef" Facsimile 746-9553
D Federal Express

Theodore O. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

D U.S. Mail
D _J fand Delivery
~ Facsimile 746-2231

~ ;j-~
DARREL W. AHERIN

MOTION TO MEDIATE-- 2
N :\Comell , John\Pleadings\Motion to Mediate.docx ser
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AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON
Darrel W. Aherin
1212 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698
(208) 746-3646
ISB# 1534
Attorneys for Margaret Watkins

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:
NO. CV 2012-00277
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL,

TO:

NOTICE OF TELEPHONIC HEARING

TONIC. JOHNSON:
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTE that on Tuesday, July 30, 2013, at the hour of 1 :45

p.m. (Pacific), or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, at the courtroom of the above
entitled court, in Orofino, County of Clearwater, Idaho, the court will call on for telephonic
hearing the Motion to Mediate filed herewith.
DATED this ~

day of July, 2013.

AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON

"

()

'

By &d J-~
Darrel W. Aherin
Attorney for Margaret Watkins

NOTICE OF TELEPHONIC HEARING -- 1
N:\Come ll , John\Pleadings\Notice of Telephonic Hearing.docx-cae

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
Lewiston, Idaho

528

7 /Jcl-/d{oJ j

FILED
B_Y_

/ /J · l '"-" r:..

__:c____,

'\ 0"1

AT /

OROrlNO IOAt,u •

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
)
)
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF }
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. )
)
CORNELL,
)
In the Matter of:

CASE NO. CV2012-277

ORDER FOR TRANSCRIPT
ON APPEAL

WHEREAS, a Notice of Appeal to the. District Court has been filed in the above
matter and the Court being fully advised;
IT IS HEREBY DETERMINED AND ORDERED AS FOLLOWS :
1.
2.

3.

Said appeal involves both questions of fact and questions of law;
A transcript of the Motion Hearing held June 4, 2013 before the Magistrate's
Division is required for the processing of the appeal; The appellant shall pay the
District Court the estimate transcript fees of $200.00 within fourteen (14) days of
the date of this order in accordance with I.R.C.P. 83 (k); and there will be no
extensions granted. Fai.lure to pay will result in a dismissal of this matter.
Upon payment of the estimated transcript fees , the transcriber shall prepare a
transcript as proved in Rule 83(k).
DATED this /Z,-day of July, 2013.

NLJ1'.

Michael J. Griffin,,./
District Judge

ORDER FOR TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL - 1

529

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the fpregoing ORDER FOR TRANSCRIPT ON
APPEAL was mailed, postage prepaid this /;).Jli day of July, 2013, to the following :
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C
P.O. Box854
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice and Anegon
P.0. Drawer 698
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Theodore 0 . Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl
P. 0 . Drawer 835
Lewiston , Idaho 83501

CARRIE BIRD, Clerk of Court

Dep~ r

By: {]~
\

\

I.,

r,'

ORDER FOR TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL - 2
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AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON
Darrel W. Aherin
1212 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698
(208) 746-3646
ISB# 1534
Attorney for Margaret Watkins

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:

NO. CV 2012-00277

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL,

MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES CLAIMED BY TONI C.
JOHNSON AGAINST THE TRUST

COMES NOW Darrel W. Aherin of Aherin, Rice & Anegon, on behalf of Margaret
Watkins and moves the Court pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6) for an order disallowing the costs and
attorney fees sought in the Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees dated July 2, 2013, filed by
Toni C. Johnson and Affidavit in Support of Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees.
Under the terms of The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M.
Cornell, dated November 1, 1996, hereinafter "The Trust," Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M.
Cornell, or the survivor between them, were Co-Trustees. The Trust further provided that upon
the death or incapacity of the last survivor of the initial trustees, Toni C. Johnson and John H.
Cornell would act as successor trustees. This could not be modified after Arlie M. Cornell died.
After the death of Arlie M. Cornell, Michael S. Cornell illegally modified The Trust to
appoint Toni C. Johnson as sole successor trustee upon his death or incapacity, and John H.
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES CLAIMED BY TONI C.
JOHNSON AGAINST THE TRUST -- I

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
Lewiston, Idaho

N:\Come ll , John\Pleadings\Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees.docx ser
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Cornell as trustee in the event Toni C. Johnson could not act. Section 1.06 of The Trust provides
that amendments to The Trust could be made "during the joint lives of the Trustors" (emphasis
added).
Toni C. Johnson has been serving as sole successor trustee since the death of Michael S.
Cornell on December 15, 2009 in violation of the trust.
No inventory of the assets in The Trust at the time of the death of Michael S. Cornell has
been provided by Toni Johnson.
The Trust, Section 4.03 provides as follows:
On the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trust shall tenninate and the Trustee
shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and principal
remaining in the Trust into two (2) equal shares and distribute them to the
following beneficiaries: TONI C. JOHNSON AND JOHN H. CORNELL.
Toni C. Johnson is asking this court to continue rewarding her for intentionally breaching
the trust because the trust terminated on December 15, 2009. Toni C. Johnson should pay the
attorney fees personally because had she distributed the assets timely, the claimed attorney fees
and costs would not have been incurred.
The main asset of The Trust is the house and real property. Toni C. Johnson has been
residing in the house since Michael S. Cornell's death on December 15, 2009. The property
remains in the name of The Trust and was not distributed to the two beneficiaries "as soon as

reasonably possible". Toni C. Johnson has paid no rent during her tenancy of the premises.
Toni C. Johnson has mismanaged the Trust in that she has used a substantial amount of
the monies available to pay both expenses of maintaining the real property, where she has
resided for three years and to pay her personal expenses. No money was distributed to John
Henry Cornell.
Toni C. Johnson has breached her fiduciary duty to settle and distribute the Trust in
accordance with the terms of the Trust. The actions and mismanagement of The Revocable
Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell by Toni C. Johnson are the sole cause
of this action.
The Trust should not be responsible for Toni C. Johnson's attorney fees or costs.
Oral argument is requested.
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES CLAIMED BY TONI C.
JOHNSON AGAINST THE TRUST -- 2

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
Lewiston, Idaho
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DATEDthis

/ 2.-1'-dayofJuly,2013.
AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON

By

t/_Q~J .cL

Darrel

w. Aherin

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, DARREL W. AHERIN, hereby certify that on the / 2-~ day of July, 2013, I caused
to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed to the
following:
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC.,
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
Theodore O. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

~
D
D
D

.S.Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile 746-9553
Federal Express

G"'u.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Facsimile 746-2231

DARREL W. AHERIN

MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES CLAIMED BY TONIC.
JOHNSON AGAINST THE TRUST -- 3

Aherin, Rice & Anegon
Attorneys at Law
Lewiston, Idaho

N :\Cornell, John\Pleadings\Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees.docx ser
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SECOND TJ>ICIALDISTRICT COURT, STATE
IDAHO
IN 1. ~D FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWA .. .Kl~ ;. 1
1
150 MICIDGAN A VE
OROFINO, IDAHO 83544
-

/.,,

-..-rd-\
L .·

\ ~l-~7] __pJ.Jlq ~~
'

In The Matter Of

)
)
)
)
)

Michael S. Cornell, etal.

l1

ryl)

_ _J

;

~i ·I< D:st. Cm..r,

Case No: CV-201 2~6000277
NOTICE OF HEARING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:

Motion
Judge:
Courtroom:

Tuesday, September 03, 2013
Randall W. Robinson
Magistrate Courtroom

10:00 AM

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and on file in
this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on July 25th, 2013.
KARIN SEUBERT
P.O. BOX 854
LEWISTON ID 83501
){_ Mailed

Hand Delivered

Faxed

THEODORE 0 . CREASON
P.O. DRAWER 835
LEWISTON ID 83501
::i_ Mailed

Hand Delivered

Faxed

DARREL W.AHERIN
P.O. BOX 698 1212 IDAHO ST.
LEWISTON ID 83501-0698
.Y_ Mailed

Hand Delivered

Faxed

c~

Dated: July 25,th, 20,:t::f :e,0
Carrie Birq:
\'
Clerk :Of_l('he Dis~ct Court
By:

6~\~ :
Deput?fe

DOC22cv 7/96
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

IN THE MATTER OF
MICHAELS. CORNELL, et al,

)
)

CASE NO. CV2012-277

)
)
)
)

COURT MINUTES

Michael J. Griffin, District Judge Presiding
Darrel Aherin, Attorney
Karin Seubert, Attorney
Theodore Creason, Attorney
Christy L. Gering, Deputy Court Clerk
Date: 07/30/2013 Tape: CD577-1 Time: 1:50 p.m.
Subject of Proceeding: Telephonic Motion Hearing
MINUTE ENTRY:
1:50 Honorable Michael J. Griffin presiding. Court gives introductions. Parties present
by phone: Darrel Aherin, Attorney; Karin Seubert, Attorney; Theodore Creason,
Attorney. Court advises this is the time set for a motion hearing. Court inquires of
counsel their thoughts as to mediation.
1:51

Mr. Creason speaks and does not feel mediation would be beneficial with Ms.
Watkins.

1:52

Ms. Seubert is not opposed to mediation but does not feel it would be productive to
mediate with Ms. Watkins.

1:52

Mr. Aherin speaks and argues his motion to mediate.

1:55

Colloquy with Court and counsel regarding

2:00

Court speaks and inquires of counsel regarding mediation as to Ms. Watkins.

2:00

Ms. Seubert speaks and does not see Ms. Watkins interest to this case.

Christy Gering
Deputy Clerk
Court Minutes - 1
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IN THE MATTER OF MICHAELS. CORNELL
CASE NO. CV2012-277
2:01

Mr. Aherin speaks.

2:03

Court inquires if Mr. Creason and Ms. Seubert are adamantly opposed or
somewhat opposed to the mediation with all three parties at the table.

2:04

Mr. Creason responds.

2:04

Ms. Seubert responds.

2:05

Mr. Aherin responds.

2:07

Court denies the motion for mediation. Court further speaks regarding the appeal
and advises once the transcript is prepared, a briefing schedule and will be set.

2:09

Court in recess.

Court Minutes - 2
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13
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Cr ea5on,

04: 13p

Dokken

~

Moore,

Theodore 0. Creason, IS!i #1563
Samuel T. Creason !Sl3 HS183
CREASON , MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC
1219 Tc..lahi, S ln.;el
P .O . Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 8350 l
Telephone: (208) 743- 15 I 6
Facsimile: (208 ) 746-2231
Attorneys for Pen;onal Representative
Of Estale of John 1-lemy Cornell
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF lDAl-IO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
)

I11 L1 1e 1\,tattcr of:

)

Case No. CV 2012 00277

~

NOTICE OF HEARING

)

THE REVOCABLE FAMlL Y TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

)

)

RE: MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS
AND ATTORNEY FEES
(I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6))

N n1iu~

is hereby given that the undersigned will call on for hearing Motion to Disallow

Costs and Attorney Fees (I.R.C.P . 549(d)(6)) claimed hy Toni C. Johnson against the Trust on

Tuesday, Septemhcr 3) 2013, at 10:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard in the
courtroom al the Clearwater County Courthouse, Orofino, Idaho.
11
DATED thi~ I J t day of Augu:,t, 2013.

CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC
I

~

.

/

.

~

~ ~ & ? ~ ---

Theodore 0. Creason, JSB # 1563
Attorney ror Pcti,ioner Kareen Curndl
NOTICf, OF HEAIUNG - I

Crc:1su11, Moore, Dokkcu &. Geidl, l'LLC
l'.0. 0rawc,· 835, Lewi ston lD 8.3501
(Z08)743-J :516; F:,x(;208)74(i-2231
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Creason,

Moore,

~

(2081

Dokken

746-2231

p.4

CERTIFlCA TE OF MAILING
I Hl2RbBY CERTIFY that on this 13lli day of August, 2013, a copy of the foregoing
NOTlCE OF HEARING RE: MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
(l.K.C.[>. 54(<.l.)(6)) W(.LS served by the n1ethod indicated below and addressed to the following:

FIRST-CLASS MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAlL

Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Callery, PLLP
1304 Idaho Street
P. o. Box 854
Lewiston, Tdaho 83501

Darrel W. Aherin
Aherin, Rice & Ancgon
1212 Idaho StTcct
P. 0. Drawer 698
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

+-

FAX TRANSM.ISSI ON

(208)1~ '"'l Y'll · '1a $'$',!
FIRST-CLASS MAIL

HAND DELIVERED
OVERNlGHT MAIL

. ....:f:: FAX TRANSMISSION
(208)344 H:lft

I

"-"""1 l.O

(_4.ft,J;;·e

'>U $1.J

~-~-r~---·

Theodore 0. Ctcason, 1SB ff 1563

NOTICF. OF HF.ARINC - 2

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
J?.O. Dra~·ier 835, Lewiston ID $3501
('.W8)743·15Hi; Fax(208)746-2231

538

c.__v_d<._6_'d.- .-- J.._· ,_ _7 _
, mABff:ie No. _
SECONr TDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE
3 ..:Z o1.3_
Filed
IN Ai,D FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWA ... ~R

9/ I

)
)
)
)
)

IN THE MATTER OF
MICHAELS . CORNELL, ETAL.

at ;O .3 oo'clock'
e_<lh'"f e.

z/:

M

""81 r£{_

7 ----~C-ler1c~/02""'7..,.
u0'"0""
Case No: CV-20 12-m
COURT MINUTES

By~~~-----=_.9t.~t~

o€"puty

Randall W. Robinson
Presiding Judge:
Court Clerk:
Tape/Disk
Tuesday, September 03, 2013 at 10:00 AM
Plaintiff's Counsel:
Defendant's Counsel:
Court Hearing Type: Motion
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRIC
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARW

n_n 2013 ]

Giork Dist. C urt
learwater Coun , Idaho
/I I

MAGISTRATE DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF THE
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL

AM

Case No. CV 2012-277
MEMORANDUM OPINION RE
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

The issue addressed is whether to grant Toni Johnson attorney fees and costs
against the estate of John H. Cornell as requested by the Memorandum of Costs and
Attorney Fees filed on July 5, 2013. Darrell Aherin Esq., appearing on behalf of the
deceased John H. Cornell, filed an objection and memorandum in opposition to the
request as did Samuel Creason, who appeared on behalf of Kareen Cornell, the
personal representative of the estate of John H. Cornell. Oral argument was heard on
September 4, 2013, Karen Seubert presenting argument on behalf of Ms. Johnson and
Mr. Aherin and Mr. Creason presenting argument as well.
On February 15, 2013, this Court dismissed the claims of the deceased John H.
Cornell and on June 21, 2013 dismissed the claims of Karen Cornell. As the prevailing
party, Ms. Johnson seeks attorney fees and the costs of a deposition pursuant to Idaho
Code § 15-8-208. Idaho Code § 15-8-208 provides: "Either the district court or the court
on appeal may, in its discretion, order costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to be
awarded to any party (a) from any party to the proceedings."
Ms. Seubert conceded at oral argument, and I so find, that the arguments made
by Mr. Aherin and Mr. Creason were not made frivolously, unreasonably, or without
MEMORANDUM OPINION-1
RE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
541

foundation. The arguments that were made were cogent and reasoned and excellent in
shedding light on an abstruse area of the law. Therefore, the issue is whether this
Court should exercise its discretion to award attorney fees and costs in favor of Toni
Johnson against the Estate of John H. Cornell.
The Idaho Supreme Court has observed that Idaho Code § 15-8-208 "allows
courts to award fees in cases governed by the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act
when doing so would be equitable." Banner Life Insurance v. Dixson Irrevocable Trust,
147 Idaho 117, 133, 206 P.3d 481 (2009). Under the circumstances of this case, it
would be inequitable and inappropriate to award attorney fees to Ms. Johnson against
the estate of John H. Cornell.
The dismissals were not based upon the merits of the claims made on behalf of
the deceased John H. Cornell and his estate, but rather upon the abatement of Mr.
Cornell's claims against Ms. Johnson upon Mr. Cornell's death. The facts are more fully
set forth in the Memorandum Opinions. Ms. Johnson and Mr. Cornell are siblings and
were named as recipients of a trust established by their parents.
Following the death of the last surviving parent, Ms. Johnson was required under
state law and the terms of the trust to distribute the assets of the trust as expeditiously
as possible to herself and Mr. Cornell. In the nearly two (2) years from the last truster's
death through Mr. Cornell's death, Ms. Johnson failed to distribute any part of the Trust
to Mr. Cornell. Mr. Cornell waited in vain for funds from the trust to pay for necessary
medical care that he could not obtain without money from the trust. Mr. Cornell
contacted Ms. Johnson and her attorney, a different attorney than her present attorney,

MEMORANDUM OPINION-2
RE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
542

several times for accountings and for word on the status of the trust. He never received
a response.
Ms. Johnson used funds from the trust for her personal expenses while Mr.
Cornell was making his requests for information regarding distribution of the trust. Ms.
Johnson lived rent free in the home that is included in the Trust. Ms. Johnson entirely
thwarted the intentions of her parents in establishing the trust for her brother to receive
half the estate. Ms. Johnson dishonored the trust her father placed in her when he
named her as the sole person responsible for distribution of the trust. Ms. Johnson
acted inappropriately in bestowing the proceeds of the trust upon herself and not share
one cent with her brother.
Ms. Johnson egregiously wronged her brother during his lifetime. Now she
wishes to continue wronging her brother after his death by not only keeping the assets
that were intended for Mr. Cornell, but also raiding his estate for her attorney fees.
Certainly, this is not the result that the parents of Mr. Cornell and Ms. Johnson intended
when they created the trust.
The law of abatement is an unsettled area of law. The issue of abatement only
arose after Mr. Cornell filed his action against Ms. Johnson for her mismanagement of
the estate. Although the arguments of Mr. Cornell and his estate were rejected, the
arguments were soundly based. The inequitable conduct of Ms. Johnson justified the
vigorous arguments made on behalf of Mr. Cornell. I, therefore, reject Ms. Johnson's
request for attorney fees from the Estate of John H. Cornell.
Ms. Johnson also requests that she be awarded $277.15 for the costs of
obtaining a copy of her deposition. Ms. Johnson asserts she is entitled to the award as
MEMORANDUM OPINION-3
RE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
543

a prevailing party pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(C)(10). Rule
54(d)(1) provides, "Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs shall be allowed
as a matter of right of the prevailing party or parties unless otherwise ordered by the
court." (emphasis added). Rule 54(d)(1)(C)(10) relied upon by Ms. Johnson provides,
"When costs are awarded to a party, such party shall be entitled to the following costs,
actually paid, as a matter of right: ... (10) Charges for one (1) copy of any deposition
taken by any of the parties to the action in preparation for trial of the action." (emphasis
added).
The decision whether to grant costs is a matter of discretion. It would be
inequitable to award Ms. Johnson her costs for the same reason it is inequitable to
award her attorney fees from the Estate of John H. Cornell.
CONCLUSION
Toni Johnson's request for an award of attorney fees and the cost of a deposition
from the estate of John H. Cornell is denied for the reasons set forth above.

Dated this

M

day of September, 2013 .

Randall W Robinson, Magistrate

MEMORANDUM OPINION-4
RE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct cop~ of the foregoing Judgment of
Dismissal was mailed postage pre-paid, on the Y
day of
() cm kn'I b -tY2013, to:
Samuel Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl
P.O . Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

Darrell Aherin
Aherin, Rice & Anegon
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501

Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower, and Callery, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
CARRIE BIRD
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRIC
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEAR

ti 2fll3

Clerk Dist. C urt
TEBearwaterCoun , Idaho

MAGISTRATE DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF THE
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL

Case No. CV 2012-277
ORDER RE ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS

Based upon Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as set forth in the
Memorandum Opinion Re Attorney Fees and Costs, the Memorandum of Costs and
Attorney Fees filed on July 5, 2013 is HEREBY DENIED.
Dated this

kL

~~:Ia[

day of September, 2013.

Randall W Ro6Tr,;on, Magistrate

ORDER RE ATTORNEY FEES-1
AND COSTS
546

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Fees

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Re Attorney
and Costs was mailed postage pre-paid, on the
1 t-'1. day of
2013 , to:

c'S~~kmtgv

,

Samuel Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

Darrell Aherin
Aherin, Rice & Anegon
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501

Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower, and Callery, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501

CARRIE BIRD

ORDER RE ATTORNEY FEES-2
AND COSTS
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AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON
Darrel W . Aherin
1212 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 698
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698
(208) 746-3646
ISB# 1534
Attorney for Margaret Watkins

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:

NO. CV 2012-00277

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL,

MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD

COMES NOW the appellant, Margaret Watkins, by and through her attorney of record,
Darrel W. Aherin of Aherin, Rice & Anegon, and moves the Court for an order augmenting the
clerk's record to add the following documents:
1.

Memorai'l.dum Opinion Re Attorney Fees and Costs entered September 6, 2013

(copy attached hereto as Exhibit A); and
2.

Order Re Attorney Fees and Costs entered September 6, 2013 (copy attached

hereto as Exhibit B).
The specific grounds for this request are that said documents support the appellant's Brief
in Support of Appeal and Appellant Reply Brief and are necessary in order to allow the District
Court to be fully advised.

MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD -- 1
N:\Comell, John\Pleadings\Motion to Augment Record.docx-- !gs
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DATED this /

~

Z

day of September, 2013 .
AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON

J)aJ_;)

By

uL

Darrel W. Aherin, Attorney for
Appellant, Margaret Watkins

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, DARREL W. AHERIN, hereby certify that on the / 2-~day of September, 2013, I
caused to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed
to the following:
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC.,
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
Theodore O. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

l!YiJ.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D
D

Facsimile
Federal Express

@rU.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Facsimile
D Federal Express

iLJJJ aL

DARREL W. AHERIN

MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD -- 2
N: \Comell, John\Pleadings\Motion to Augment Record.docx-- lgs
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MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL

Case No. CV 2012-277
MEMORANDUM OPINION RE
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

The issue addressed is whether to grant Toni Johnson attorney fees and costs
against the estate of John H. Cornell as requested by the Memorandum of Costs and
Attorney Fees filed on July 5, 2013. Darrell Aherin Esq. , appearing on behalf of the
deceased John H. Cornell, filed an objection and memorandum in opposition to the
request as did Samuel Creason, who appeared on behalf of Kareen Cornell, the
personal representative of the estate of John H. Cornell. Oral argument was heard on
September 4, 2013, Karen Seubert presenting argument on behalf of Ms. Johnson and
Mr. Aherin and Mr. Creason presenting argument as well.
On February 15, 2013, this Court dismissed the claims of the deceased John H.
Cornell and on June 21, 2013 dismissed the claims of Karen Cornell. As the prevailing
party, Ms. Johnson seeks attorney fees and the costs of a deposition pursuant to Idaho
Code § 15-8-208. Idaho Code § 15-8-208 provides: "Either the district court or the court
on appeal may, in its discretion, order costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to be
awarded to any party (a) from any party to the proceedings."
Ms. Seubert conceded at oral argument, and I so find, that the arguments made
by Mr. Aherin and Mr. Creason were not made frivolously, unreasonably, or without
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foundation. The arguments that were made were cogent and reasoned and excellent in
shedding light on an abstruse area of the law. Therefore, the issue is whether this
Court should exercise its discretion to award attorney fees and costs in favor of Toni
Johnson against the Estate of John H. Cornell.
The Idaho Supreme Court has observed that Idaho Code § 15-8-208 "allows
courts to award fees in cases governed by the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act
when doing so would be equitable ." Banner Life Insurance v. Dixson Irrevocable Trust,
147 Idaho 117, 133, 206 P.3d 481 (2009). Under the circumstances of this case, it
would be inequitable and inappropriate to award attorney fees to Ms. Johnson against
the estate of John H. Cornell.
The dismissals were not based upon the merits of the claims made on behalf of
the deceased John H. Cornell and his estate, but rather upon the abatement of Mr.
Cornell's claims against Ms. Johnson upon Mr. Cornell's death. The facts are more fully
set forth in the Memorandum Opinions. Ms. Johnson and Mr. Cornell are siblings and
were named as recipients of a trust established by their parents.
Following the death of the last surviving parent, Ms. Johnson was required under
state law and the terms of the trust to distribute the assets of the trust as expeditiously
as possible to herself and Mr. Cornell. In the nearly two (2) years from the last trustor's
death through Mr. Cornell's death, Ms. Johnson failed to distribute any part of the Trust
to Mr. Cornell. Mr. Cornell waited in vain for funds from the trust to pay for necessary
medical care that he could not obtain without money from the trust. Mr. Cornell
contacted Ms. Johnson and her attorney, a different attorney than her present attorney,
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several times for accountings and for word on the status of the trust. He never received
a response .
Ms. Johnson used funds from the trust for her personal expenses while Mr.
Cornell was making his requests for information regarding distribution of the trust. Ms.
Johnson lived rent free in the home that is included in the Trust. Ms. Johnson entirely
thwarted the intentions of her parents in establishing the trust for her brother to receive
half the estate. Ms. Johnson dishonored the trust her father placed in her when he
named her as the sole person responsible for distribution of the trust. Ms. Johnson
acted inappropriately in bestowing the proceeds of the trust upon herself and not share
one cent with her brother.
Ms. Johnson egregiously wronged her brother during his lifetime. Now she
wishes to continue wronging her brother after his death by not only keeping the assets
that were intended for Mr. Cornell, but also raiding his estate for her attorney fees .
Certainly, this is not the result that the parents of Mr. Cornell and Ms. Johnson intended
when they created the trust.
The law of abatement is an unsettled area of law. The issue of abatement only
arose after Mr. Cornell filed his action against Ms. Johnson for her mismanagement of
the estate. Although the arguments of Mr. Cornell and his estate were rejected, the
arguments were soundly based. The inequitable conduct of Ms. Johnson justified the
vigorous arguments made on behalf of Mr. Cornell. I, therefore, reject Ms. Johnson's
request for attorney fees from the Estate of John H. Cornell.
Ms . Johnson also requests that she be awarded $277.15 for the costs of
obtaining a copy of her deposition. Ms. Johnson asserts she is entitled to the award as
MEMORANDUM OPI NION-3
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a prevailing party pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(C)(10). Rule
54(d)(1) provides, "Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs shall be allowed
as a matter of right of the prevailing party or parties unless otherwise ordered by the
court." (emphasis added). Rule 54(d)(1)(C)(10) relied upon by Ms. Johnson provides,
"When costs are awarded to a party, such party shall be entitled to the following costs,

actually paid, as a matter of right: ... (10) Charges for one (1) copy of any deposition
taken by any of the parties to the action in preparation for trial of the action." (emphasis
added).
The decision whether to grant costs is a matter of discretion. It would be
inequitable to award Ms. Johnson her costs for the same reason it is inequitable to
award her attorney fees from the Estate of John H. Cornell.
CONCLUSION
Toni Johnson's request for an award of attorney fees and the cost of a deposition
from the estate of John H. Cornell is denied for the reasons set forth above.

Dated this

Ii/, day of September, 2013.

Randall W Robinson, Magistrate
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MAGISTRATE DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF THE

Case No. CV 2012-277

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL

ORDER RE ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS

Based upon Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as set forth in the
Memorandum Opinion Re Attorney Fees and Costs, the Memorandum of Costs and
Attorney Fees filed on July 5, 2013 is HEREBY DENIED.
Dated this

uL

day of September, 2013.

Randall W Robinson, Magistrate
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MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD

COMES NOW Kareen Cornell, acting on behalf of the Estate of John Cornell as its duly
appointed Personal Representative, by and through its attorney of record, Samuel T. Creason of
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC, and moves the Court for an order augmenting the
clerk' s record to add the foll owing documents:
1.

The Magistrate Court's September 6, 2013 Memorandum Opinion re Attorney

Fees and Costs (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A); and
2.

The Magistrate Court's September 6, 2013 Order re Attorney Fees and Costs (a

copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B).
Movant requests such an order on the grounds that the memorandum and order attached
hereto are properly part of the Clerk' s record pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 83(11),
as those filings are part of the official magistrate court file.
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Case No. CV 2012-277

MEMORANDUM OPINION RE
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

The issue addressed is whether to grant Toni Johnson attorney fees and costs
against the estate of John H. Cornell as requested by the Memorandum of Costs and
Attorney Fees filed on July 5, 2013. Darrell Aherin Esq., appearing on behalf of the
deceased John H. Cornell, filed an objection and memorandum in opposition to the
request as did Samuel Creason, who appeared on behalf of Kareen Cornell, the
personal representative of the estate of John H. Cornell. Oral argument was heard on
September 4, 2013, Karen Seubert presenting argument on behalf of Ms. Johnson and
Mr. Aherin and Mr. Creason presenting argument as well.
On February 15, 2013, this Court dismissed the claims of the deceased John H.
Cornell and on June 21, 2013 dismissed the claims of Karen Cornell. As the prevailing
party, Ms. Johnson seeks attorney fees and the costs of a deposition pursuant to Idaho
Code § 15-8-208. Idaho Code § 15-8-208 provides: "Either the district court or the court
on appeal may, in its discretion, order costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to be
awarded to any party (a) from any party to the proceedings."
Ms. Seubert conceded at oral argument, and I so find, that the arguments made

by Mr. Aherin and Mr. Creason were not made frivolously, unreasonably, or without
MEMORANDUM OPINION-1
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foundation. The arguments that were made were cogent and reasoned and excellent in
shedding light on an abstruse area of the law. Therefore, the issue is whether this
Court should exercise its discretion to award attorney fees and costs in favor of Toni
Johnson against the Estate of John H. Cornell.
The Idaho Supreme Court has observed that Idaho Code § 15-8-208 "allows
courts to award fees in cases governed by the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act
when doing so would be equitable." Banner Life Insurance v. Dixson Irrevocable Trust,
147 Idaho 117, 133, 206 P.3d 481 (2009). Under the circumstances of this case, it
would be inequitable and inappropriate to award attorney fees to Ms. Johnson against
the estate of John H. Cornell.
The dismissals were not based upon the merits of the claims made on behalf of
the deceased John H. Cornell and his estate, but rather upon the abatement of Mr.
Cornell's claims against Ms. Johnson upon Mr. Cornell's death. The facts are more fully
set forth in the Memorandum Opinions. Ms. Johnson and Mr. Cornell are siblings and
were named as recipients of a trust established by their parents.
Following the death of the last surviving parent, Ms. Johnson was required under
state law and the terms of the trust to distribute the assets of the trust as expeditiously
as possible to herself and Mr. Cornell. In the nearly two (2) years from the last trustor's
death through Mr. Cornell's death, Ms. Johnson failed to distribute any part of the Trust
to Mr. Cornell. Mr. Cornell waited in vain for funds from the trust to pay for necessary
medical care that he could not obtain without money from the trust. Mr. Cornell
contacted Ms. Johnson and her attorney, a different attorney than her present attorney,
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several times for accountings and for word on the status of the trust. He never received
a response.
Ms. Johnson used funds from the trust for her personal expenses while Mr.
Cornell was making his requests for information regarding distribution of the trust. Ms.
Johnson lived rent free in the home that is included in the Trust. Ms. Johnson entirely
thwarted the intentions of her parents in establishing the trust for her brother to receive
half the estate. Ms. Johnson dishonored the trust her father placed in her when he
named her as the sole person responsible for distribution of the trust. Ms. Johnson
acted inappropriately in bestowing the proceeds of the trust upon herself and not share
one cent with her brother.
Ms. Johnson egregiously wronged her brother during his lifetime. Now she
wishes to continue wronging her brother after his death by not only keeping the assets
that were intended for Mr. Cornell, but also raiding his estate for her attorney fees.
Certainly, this is not the result that the parents of Mr. Cornell and Ms. Johnson intended
when they created the trust.
The law of abatement is an unsettled area of law. The issue of abatement only
arose after Mr. Cornell filed his action against Ms. Johnson for her mismanagement of
the estate. Although the arguments of Mr. Cornell and his estate were rejected, the
arguments were soundly based. The inequitable conduct of Ms. Johnson justified the
vigorous arguments made on behalf of Mr. Cornell. I, therefore, reject Ms. Johnson's
request for attorney fees from the Estate of John H. Cornell.
Ms. Johnson also requests that she be awarded $277.15 for the costs of
obtaining

a copy of her deposition. Ms. Johnson asserts she is entitled to the award as
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a prevailing party pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(C)(10). Rule
54(d)(1) provides, "Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs shall be allowed
as a matter of right of the prevailing party or parties unless otherwise ordered by the

court." (emphasis added). Rule 54(d)(1)(C)(10) relied upon by Ms. Johnson provides,
"When costs are awarded to a party, such party shall be entitled to the following costs,
actually paid, as a matter of right: ... (10) Charges for one (1) copy of any deposition
taken by any of the parties to the action in preparation for trial of the action." {emphasis
added).
The decision whether to grant costs is a matter of discretion. It would be
inequitable to award Ms. Johnson her costs for the same reason it is inequitable to
award her attorney fees from the Estate of John H. Cornell.
CONCLUSION
Toni Johnson's request for an award of attorney fees and the cost of a deposition
from the estate of John H. Cornell is denied for the reasons set forth above.

Dated this

/J, day of September, 2013.

IJttJrL

Randall W Robinson, Magistrate
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IN THE MATIER OF THE
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
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Case No. CV 2012-277
ORDER RE ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS

Based upon Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as set forth in the
Memorandum Opinion Re Attorney Fees and Costs, the Memorandum of Costs and
Attorney Fees filed on July 5, 2013 is HEREBY DENIED.
Dated this

6-r;L day of September, 2013.
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NOTICE OF HEARING
RE: MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD

Notice is hereby given that the undersigned will call on for hearing Motion to Augment
Record on Tuesday, November 5, 2013, at 10:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be
heard in the courtroom at the Clearwater County Comihouse, Orofino, Idaho.
111
DATED this 25 day of September, 2013 .

CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

muel T. Creason, ISB
Attorney for Petitioner Kareen Cornell
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· NOTICE OF NO OBJECTION

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her
attorney of record, Karin Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., has no objection to the

Motion to Augment Record dated September 25, 2013 filed by Kareen Cornell, acting on behalf of
the Estate of John Cornell, which is set for hearing on November 5, 2013 at 10:30 a.m., and further
has no objection to the Motion to Augment Record dated September 12, 2013 filed by Margaret
Watkins.
DATED this

_lL_ day of October, 2013.
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

Karin Seubert
Attorney for Respondent
NOTICE OF NO OBJECTION
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This case is about the actions of Toni C. Johnson while she served as the successor
trustee of The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell ("Trust").
Ms. Johnson concedes that during the over two and a half years that she served as successor
trustee, she repeatedly made improper use of the Trust res for her own benefit.

She also

concedes that during that time she engaged in inequitable conduct in order to deprive her brother,
John Cornell-a co-beneficiary-of his interest in the Trust res. Now, she argues that because
John Cornell died before he could stop her from continuing in this line of conduct, any claims he
held abated and there exists no judicial recourse for the heirs of John Cornell. The question
before the Court is whether the Estate of John Cornell may pursue recovery of John Cornell's

II

interest in the Trust res.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case
The Estate of John Henry Cornell comes before this Court on appeal from dismissal of its
petition for supervised administration and court ordered distribution of The Revocable Family
Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M Cornell. The magistrate court dismissed the Petition on

the grounds that the Estate's claims did not survive the death of John Henry Cornell. Petitioner
appeals.
B. Course of Proceedings
This matter comes before the Court after the conclusion of a highly irregular course of
proceedings before the magistrate court. The case identified by case number CV 2012-277 was
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initiated through a Petition filed by John Henry Cornell on July 11, 2012. John Cornell died
from an apparent suicide on August 20, 2012.

Ms. Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss on

September 17, 2012, arguing that the claims in John Cornell's petition abated upon his death.
Ms. Johnson also argued that because John died, there existed no legitimate party in interest
unless and until the Estate was substituted into the action pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 25(a)(l).
For reasons beyond Kareen Cornell's control, John Cornell's -attorney continued to
prosecute the petition in John Cornell's name, personally. In late November 2012, Ms. Cornell
appeared before the Court and notified the Court that she objected to any other person acting on
behalf of her late husband. While the magistrate court invited Ms. Cornell to submit briefing on

r

pending action, it did not bring her or the Estate into the litigation. Thus, Ms. Cornell's briefing
was, in effect, amici briefing. On February 15, 2013, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion.

I

In that opinion, the Court dismissed the petition filed by John Cornell, personally. However, the
Court expressly invited Ms. Cornell to file claims on behalf of the Estate.
Ms. Cornell responded to the Court's invitation by filing the Estate's Petition on February
28, 2013. While many of the Estate's claims were identical to those raised by John Cornell in his
August 2012 petition, the Estate also raised additional claims. The Estate's Petition alleged that
Ms. Johnson (1) failed to act in conformity with the terms of the Trust; (2) breached her fiduciary
duties when acting in her capacity as Trustee; (3) engaged in equitable conversion of the
property belonging to John Cornell by refusing to distribute the property; and (4) was unjustly
enriched by (a) misusing Trust assets for personal desires, and (b) refusing to comply with the

-2-

574

--__..

1

I
terms of the Trust and her fiduciary duties in order to effect a distribution in her favor. The
Estate sought supervised administration, court ordered distribution of the Trust, and a judgment
against Ms. Johnson for injuries caused to the Trust. The Petition set forth the following legal
and equitable causes of action: (A) breach of fiduciary duty; (B) constructive trust; (C) breach of
contract; (TI) conversion; and (E) unjust enrichment.
No Answer has ever been filed to those allegations. Instead, Ms. Johnson filed a Motion
to Dismiss the Estate's Petition on March 1. Ms. Johnson argued that the petition should be
dismissed because (1) the Estate was bound by the Court's February 15 memorandum opinion,
and (2) the Estate's Petition either failed to state a cause of action or stated causes of action
which abated upon the death of John Cornell. Ms. Johnson based her abatement arguments on
\

the same theory that the magistrate court adopted in dismissing Mr. Cornell's claims.
The magistrate court granted Ms. Johnson's motion on June 21. In its memorandum
opinion, the court concluded that (A) all claims for breach of fiduciary duty abated, at common
law and under Idaho statute, upon death; (B) the doctrine of constructive trust was inapplicable
and an action under that doctrine was in tort, which abated upon death; (C) the claims for breach
of contract were co-extensive with the statutory duties of a trustee and, therefore, were breach of
fiduciary duty claims which abated upon death; (D) claims for equitable conversion sounded in
tort and, therefore, abated upon death; and (E) claims for unjust enrichment sounded in tort and,
therefore, abated upon death.

The magistrate court based its ruling upon the following

conclusions of law: (1) the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion of Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616,
619 (2012) stands for the proposition that all claims sounding in tort abate at common law upon
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the death of the claimant; and (2) the Idaho legislature did not abrogate that rule with the
amendment of Idaho Code § 5-327, except for claims for recovery of medical expenses, out of
pocket expenses, and lost wages. As set forth herein, the court's conclusions are erroneous.
C. Statement of Facts

Michael and Arlie Cornell established The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell
and Arlie M. Cornell ("Trust") on November 1, 1996. The Trust was established to provide for
Michael and Arlie during their lifetimes, with the remainder to be distributed to their two
children: Toni Johnson and John Cornell. Arlie Cornell died on November 9, 2008. Michael
Cornell died on December 15, 2009. Ms. Johnson has been the sole Trustee since that time.
As a successor trustee, Ms. Johnson was to have a very limited role. Ms. Johnson's sole

t

duty as trustee was to distribute the trust assets. Over the months and years following Michael
Cornell's death, Ms. Johnson failed to distribute the Trust. Instead, she "egregiously wronged

I

her brother during his lifetime. Mem. Op. re Attorney Fees and Costs 3. "Ms. Johnson acted
inappropriately in bestowing the proceeds of the trust upon herself and not shar[ing] one cent
with her brother." Id.

She refused to distribute the Trust, despite John Cornell's repeated

objections and pleas that she do so, in part, so that he could "pay for necessary medical care that
he could not obtain without money from the trust." Id. at 2. John Cornell was never able to
compel distribution before his death on August 20, 2012.
Ms. Johnson's discovery responses in this case substantiate the concerns and frustrations
that Mr. Cornell raised in the over two and one-half years between the surviving trustor's death
and Mr. Cornell's death. At her deposition, Ms. Johnson admitted that she routinely makes
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personal use of the real and personal property of the Trust. She lives rent-free in the home that is
included in the Trust. She has commingled cash assets of the Trust with her own cash assets.
She has depleted the cash assets of the Trust, with not only expenses of the Trust but also her
personal expenses. To date, the only distributions that Ms. Johnson has made are the unreported
distributions made through her personal use of the Trust res.
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

I

1-

1.
The issue before the Court is the survival of causes of actions regarding (a) proper
administration of the Trust, and (b) proper distribution of assets to which the Trust is title owner.
Under its terms, the Trust was to terminate upon the death of the surviving trustor-.in this case,
December 15, 2009. As successor Trustee, Toni Johnson was to distribute the Trust res "as soon
as reasonably possible." Ms. Johnson concedes that she acted inequitably: she mismanaged the
Trust, she commingled assets, she used Trust funds for personal use, and she refused to distribute
the Trust res, despite John Cornell's demands. John Cornell died in August 2012. May the
Estate of John Cornell pursue not only his interests in the remaining Trust property, but also
claims for the diminution of that property through mismanagement by Toni Cornell?

1

ARGUMENT

The Estate's Petition raises claims against Ms. Johnson based upon conduct occurring
since December 15, 2009, the date she accepted appointment as successor trustee of the Trust.
The law governing survival of actions upon the death of the injured party was changed on July 1,
2010, when the amended Idaho Code § 5-327 became effective. Prior to that point in time,
issues of survival upon the death of the injured party were governed by the common law. Thus,
this case requires the Court to determine whether the Estate's claims survive at common law and
under section 5-327.

The magistrate court granted Ms. Johnson's motion to dismiss on the

grounds that (1) under the common law, all causes of action sounding in tort abate upon the
death of the injured party; and (2) under Idaho Code § 5-327(2), all causes of action sounding in
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tort are limited, upon the death of the injured party, to recovery for damages not sought in the
Estate's petition.
A.

Standard of Review

The magistrate court dismissed this action on a summary judgment standard, because it
considered affidavits filed by the parties. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c).
exercises de nova review over a grant of summary judgment

An appellate Court

Constr. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v.

Assurance Co. ofAm., 135 Idaho 680, 682, 23 P.3d 142, 144 (2001).
Summary judgment is only appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. P.
56(c). When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court "liberally

i

construes the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all
reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor." Constr. Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 135 Idaho

I

at 682, 23 P.3d at 144. If, as the result of such a liberal construction, the Court finds that
reasonable persons could reach different findings or draw conflicting inferences from the
evidence, the Court must deny the motion. Thus, Ms. Johnson carries the burden of proving that
reasonable persons could not draw conflicting inference from the evidence, when the record is
construed in a light most favorable to the Estate.

B.

The Estate's Causes of Action Did Not Abate at Common Law.
1. The Estate's Tort Claims Did Not Abate

I
I

The Estate's tort claims did not abate at common law, because the claims seek damages
for the deprivation and diminution of a property interest. The magistrate court ruled that, at
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Icommon law, every cause of action sounding in tort abates upon the death of the injured party.
The court based its ruling entirely on the Idaho Supreme Court case of Bishop v. Owens, 152
Idaho 616, 272 P.3d 1247 (2012). The magistrate court found the following language from
Bishop dispositive in this case:

"Under the common law, claims arising out of contracts

generally survive the death of the claimant, while those sounding in pure tort abate." Id. at 619,
272 P.3d at 1250. The magistrate court's broad application of Bishop is in error. The Bishop
Court identified the general rule regarding abatement of tort claims at common law. Id. While
· that general rule is certainly applicable to this case, it is not dispositive. The Bishop Court was
not presented with facts that required it to analyze some of the more nuanced applications of the
abatement doctrine. The magistrate court erred in applying the general rule of Bishop to this
case because (a) the Estate's tort claims seek redress for injury done to the decedent's property
interests; (b) the Estate's tort claims are founded upon a remedial statute; and (c) the Estate's tort
claims are not legal claims but rather claims in equity.

As set forth below, each of these

distinctions dictates a finding that the Estate's tort claims survived the death of John Cornell.
The Bishop Opinion does not-either by its facts or by its language-set precedent
regarding abatement of causes of action Estate's claims. The Bishop Court was presented with
facts far different from this case. First, the decedent in Bishop brought a legal malpractice claim,
alleging that her former attorney injured her by failing to properly advise her about the
consequences of a negotiated settlement with respect to subrogated interests. Id. at 618, 272
P.3d at 1249. Here, the Estate claims that the defendant injured John Cornell by depriving him
his property (which she still retains) and, at the same time, diminishing the value of that
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prope1iy. Second, the decedent in Bishop did not rely upon a statute or equitable doctrine to
identify a unique duty or standard of care; she relied upon a legal representation agreement
which applied the same standard to which all Idaho attorneys are held, the Idaho Rules of
Professional Responsibility. Id. at 620, 272 P.3d at 1251. Here, the Estate has raised tort claims
based upon the remedial statutes set forth in the Idaho Code which govern the conduct of
trustees, and based upon equitable doctrines. Third, the decedent in Bishop sought an award of
money damages, not relief in the form of restoration and distribution of certain identified assets
to which she believed she was entitled. Id. at 619, 272 P.3d at 1250. Here, the Estate seeks
restoration and distribution of certain assets-the Trust res. These three factual distinctions
explain why the Bishop Court had no need to proceed beyond a recitation of the general rule and

r- .

evidence why the magistrate court erred in giving Bishop such a broad interpretation.
The language of the Bishop Opinion does not support the magistrate court's interpretation
of the Bishop language as universal. The Bishop Opinion cites Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415,
184 P. 477 (1919) as support for its general rule. Kloepfer makes express that which Bishop
assumes: "As a general rule, in the absence of a statute providing otherwise, causes of action ex
contractu survive, while causes ex delicto do not.

However, there are well-recognized

exceptions to both branches of the rule." Id. (emphasis added).

These well-recognized

exceptions mandate survival of the Estate's claims.
Subsequent Supreme Court case law also conflicts with the magistrate court's
interpretation. Based on Bishop, the magistrate court ruled that "in order for John's claims to
survive his death, his claims must sound in contract, and not in tort." ~Memorandum Op. re:
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Kareen Cornell 10. In the January 2013 case of St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'! Med. Ctr. v.
Luciani, the Supreme Court considered whether a given tort claim could be assigned after the

death of the injured party, particularly in light of its opinion in Bishop. 154 Idaho 37,293 P.3d
661, 667 (2013). The Court affirmed the rule from MacLoed v. Stelle, where it held that "'if [a
tort claim] survives, it may be assigned; if not, it may not,' [the Court] also held that an 'injury
[that] lessens the estate of the injured party does survive, and that is assignable." Luciani, 154
Idaho at_, 293 P.3d at 667 (quoting MacLoed, 43 Idaho 64, 75, 249 P. 254, 257 (1926)).
Thus, even as recent as January 2013, the Idaho Supreme Court assumed that certain tort claims
survive the death of the injured party, even after Bishop.
a.

1i

I_

The Estate's tort claims did not abate because the claims seek redress
for injury to property.

One of the well-recognized exceptions to the rule of abatement of tort claims is that tort
claims survive where they are actions for recovery or protection of a property interest.
The general rule is that, in addition to the causes of action arising out of contract
recognized at common law, causes of action arising from torts to real and personal
property survive and pass to the personal representative of the decedent, while
purely personal torts do not survive in the absence of statutory provision.
1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 51. Thus, in cases where the injured party

alleged an injury to his property-such as the existence or amount of his interest in a trust-the
claim survives. See Barnes v. Barnes, 135 Idaho 103, 105, 15 P.3d 816, 818 (2000) (holding that
while a divorce proceeding abates upon death, "[i]f property issues are involved, the action
continues solely to resolve those issues").
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Here, there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Cornell held a vested
property interest in the Trust res at the time of his death. Upon accepting appointment as
successor trustee, Ms. Johnson's obligations to the Trust and Mr. Cornell (as the beneficiary)
were clear.
On the death of the surviving Truster, the Trust shall terminate and the
Trustee shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and
principal remaining in the Trust into two (2) equal shares and distribute
them to the following beneficiaries: TONI C. JOHNSON and JOHN H.
CORNELL.
Trust§ 4.03. However, the very next provision of the Trust gives rise to much of the confusion

in this matter. The Trust proceeds to set forth the terms for distribution in the event that one or
both of the Trustors' children should die.
1- -

If any child ... should die prior to the above distribution, then the Trustee

shall distribute all of such deceased child's share to his or her surviving
issue in equal shares. . . . If there is no surviving issue, then all of the
deceased child's share of the Trust Estate shall be added to the shares set
aside for the ... other living child .... "
Trust§ 4.03(a). Ms. Johnson argued that because John Cornell died before he could compel her

to distribute the Trust res, any interest he held in the Trust died with him; thus, she should
receive the entirety of the Trust res. The Estate maintains that John Cornell's interest in the
Trust res vested upon the death of Michael Cornell. The Estate also argues that even if John
Cornell's interest did not vest upon the death of Michael Cornell, it vested at the point in time
where equity would presume proper distribution because "equity regards that as done which
ought to be done." See First Sec. Bank of Idaho, Nat. Ass 'n v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 657, 429
P.2d 386, 389 (1967).
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The magistrate court ruled that because John Cornell died prior to distribution, he could
not have obtained a vested interest in the Trust res. 1 See Memorandum Op. re: Kareen Cornell
12. The magistrate court did not provide any discussion or analysis regarding ambiguity within
the document or the intent of the Trustors. The magistrate court did not provide any discussion
or analysis regarding the Estate's arguments that, at the very latest, John Cornell's interest vested
under equity. These omissions are of particular import because the magistrate court later found
that Ms. Johnson acted against the intent of the Trustors. See Memorandum Op. re: Attorney

Fees and Costs 3. Therefore, the magistrate erred when it ruled that, as a matter of law, John
Cornell did not hold a vested interest.

b.

l

The Estate's tort claims did not abate because the claims are founded
upon a remedial statute.

The survivability of this action is further supported by the fact that the claims arise
pursuant to a remedial statute. In Bishop, the decedent merely relied on a common law duty.
Here, the Estate seeks recovery based, in part, upon a trustee's breach of fiduciary duty, as
defined in Idaho Code§§ 15-7-101 through 15-7-601. "A cause of action that is founded on a
remedial statute ... survives the death of the party possessing the cause of action." 1 Am. Jur.
2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 59.

Therefore, the Estate's breach of fiduciary duty

claims did not abate.

1

The magistrate court was not explicit about why it rejected the Estate's arguments regarding
continuing jurisdiction over administration of the Trust. It appears, however, that the magistrate
court rejected that argument based upon the court's finding that Toni Johnson was the only
remaining entity with an interest in the Trust.
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I
c.

The Estate's tort claims did not abate because the claims are not legal
claims, but claims in equity.

Finally, the survivability of this action is further supported by the fact that it seeks
recovery through equitable causes of action. In Bishop, the only cause of action was the legal
theory of malpractice. Here, the Estate has raised several equitable doctrines entitling it to relief.
"In equity, abatement signifies a present, temporary suspension of further proceedings in a suit

because of want of proper parties. It is an interruption or suspension of a suit, the equivalent of a
stay of proceedings, and the suit may be revived and proceed to its regular determination." 1

I

Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § l (footnotes omitted).

The principle that a cause of action expires with the death or disability of a party
generally does not apply to suits in equity; equitable remedies exist to the same
extent in favor of and against executors and administrators as they do against
the decedent, as long as the court can continue to grant effective relief in spite of
the death. One of the main reasons for this stance for suits in equity is that
such suits primarily pertain to property rights.

I

[-

1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 60 (footnotes omitted) (emphases added).2
The magistrate court erred in ruling that the claims of conversion, constructive trust, and unjust
enrichment abated under Bishop. See A1emorandum Op. re: Kareen Cornell 13-15.
Conversion. The Estate seeks recovery under the equitable doctrine of conversion. "The
act of wrongfully and permanently depriving someone of his property establishes conversion."
In re Pangburn, 154 Idaho 233, 296 P.3d 1080, 1085 (2013). These are the exact elements
2

See also Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchants Ass'n, 128 F.2d 645,649 (4th Cir. 1942);
Glojek v. Glojek, 254 Wis. 109, 115, 35 N.W.2d 203,206 (1948); Hughey v. Mooney, 282 S.C.
597, 602, 320 S.E.2d 475, 477 (Ct. App. 1984); Miller v. Hayman, 766 So. 2d 1116, 1118 n.1
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
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alleged by the Estate. As set forth above, a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding
whether John Cornell held a vested interest in the Trust res at the time of his death. "At common
law, the right to bring an action for the conversion of goods in the lifetime of the decedent owner
generally survived to the personal representative .... " 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and

Revival§ 76. The consequence of the magistrate's ruling evidences the reason for the equitable
exception to the rule of abatement: if the Estate's claims did not survive John Cornell's death,
then Ms. Johnson will be allowed to enjoy property which she did not own, and which she now
possess only as a result of her inequitable conduct. Such a result is patently inequitable. The
Estate's claims for redress through the doctrine of conversion did not abate.
Constructive Trust.
\~

The Estate seeks recovery under the the equitable doctrine of

constructive trust. It is "the fundamental rule of equity that equity regards that as done which
ought to be done." See First Sec. Bank of Idaho, 91 Idaho at 657, 429 P.2d at 389 (discussing
basis of doctrine of equitable conversion). Ms. Johnson ought to have distributed the Trust res
long before the death of John Cornell. It is undisputed that Ms. Johnson engaged in inequitable
conduct by retaining legal title to the assets of the Trust in the name of the Trust. "When
property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in
good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee." TRUST,
Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), trust (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see

also Hanger v. Hess, 49 Idaho 325, 328, 288 P. 160, 161 (1930). The doctrine of constructive
trust is a description of the nature by which a wrongdoer holds the property of another; the court
deems that property as already belonging to the injured party at some earlier point in time.
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The court's ruling regarding abatement is erroneous. While the Idaho Supreme Court has
not expressly addressed the issue of survival of constructive trust claims at common law, it
presumed their survival in Brasch v. Brasch, 55 Idaho 777, 47 P.2d 676, 678 (1935). The
Estate's claims for redress through the doctrine of constructive trust did not abate.
The magistrate court also supported its grant of summary judgment against this claim by
ruling that a constructive trust could not have arisen in this case as a matter of law: "As this case
already addresses a legal trust, there is no necessity to resort to the legal fiction of a constructive
trust." A!emorandum Op. re: Kareen Cornell 13. The Estate is unaware of any authority argued
by the parties (or otherwise existing at law or in equity) supporting a finding that the doctrine of
constructive trust is unavailable in cases involving express trusts.

1-

l

The constructive trust in

which the Trust held John Cornell's property is distinct from the actual trust arrangement that
existed prior to the constructive trust arising. The doctrine of constructive trust is particularly
applicable to the facts of this case. Ms. Johnson ought to have distributed the Trust res as soon
as reasonably practicable when the Trust automatically terminated upon the death of Michael
Cornell. Ms. Johnson acted inequitably by retaining the Trust res in name of the Trust, while
using it for her own benefit.

Reasonable persons could reach different findings or draw

conflicting inferences from the evidence with respect to whether a constructive trust arose based
upon (i) the extended period of time between the death of Michael Cornell and the death of John
Cornell; and (ii) the undisputed inequitable conduct by Ms. Johnson. Therefore, the magistrate
court erred in granting summary judgment on this claim.
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Unjust Enrichment. The Estate seeks recovery under the equitable doctrine of unjust

emichment. "Unjust emichment occurs where [offending party] receives a benefit which would
be inequitable to retain without compensating the [injured party] to the extent that retention is
unjust." Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 557, 165 P.3d 261, 271 (2007). The
damages available to the claimant on an unjust enrichment claim is the value of the amount by
which the offending party was unjustly enriched. Barry v. Pac. W Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827,
834, 103 P.3d 440, 447 (2004).

Like constructive trust, unjust emichment is an equitable

doctrine that seeks to return to the injured party those amounts which were due to him or her in
equity; amounts which equity deems property of the injured party. If the Estate prevails on its
unjust emichment claim, it will have established that John Cornell held an equitable interest in

t

property prior to his death. The Estate has a statutory duty to recover property of the decedent
and distribute it in probate. See Idaho Code § 15-3-709. The Estate's claims for redress through

I

the doctrine of unjust emichment did not abate.
2. The Estate's Breach of Contract Claims Did Not Abate

As with the tort claims, the magistrate court relied exclusively on Bishop to support its
ruling of abatement of the contract claims. The court interpreted Bishop as standing for the
proposition that where the duties placed upon the defendant could be found at law, all contract
claims should be re-characterized as tort claims. Memorandum Op. re: Kareen Cornell 13-14.
The magistrate court found that the Estate failed "to point out any way in which the Trust
instrument imposes any duties upon Toni [Johnson] that are not also imposed by the Probate
Code." Id. As a result, the magistrate court held the contract claims were actually tort claims
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and, therefore, abated upon the death of John Cornell. The court ruling was erroneous because
(a) the analysis in Bishop was in response to a relationship that was not contractual in nature; and
(b) the Estate's contract claims identify contractual duties which do not exist at law.
The magistrate court's reliance upon Bishop to re-characterize the Estate's contract
claims was in error. In Bishop, the question before the court was whether the decedent could
pursue a legal malpractice action through breach of contract claims. Bishop, 152 Idaho at 620,
272 P.3d at 1251.

The plaintiffs theory in Bishop was that it could either sue for legal

malpractice, which sounded in pure tort, or for breach of the legal representation agreement,
which sounded in contract. Id. The Bishop Court actually held this theory correct. See id. The
reason the contract claims failed in Bishop is that the plaintiff had not alleged breach of a

I-

specific term within the contract, but instead alleged breach of the term referencing the common
law duties owed by every attorney to that attorney's clients. Id. at 621, 272 P.3d at 1252.

The

Bishop Court explained that if such a provision were enough to transform the pure tort action of
legal malpractice into a breach of contract action, there would exist "a per se breach of contract
action in every legal malpractice action." Id. The relationship between attorney and client is not
contractual in nature. Id. at 620, 272 P.3d at 1251. The Estate's action is far different than that
in Bishop.
The relationship between a trustee and a beneficiary is contractual in nature. "A trust is
not itself a separate legal entity that can own property; rather, it is a relationship having certain
attributes." In re Thompson, 454 B.R. 486, 492 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011). "A trust creates a

I

fiduciary relationship in which the trustee is the holder of legal title to the property subject to the

I
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beneficial interest of the beneficiary." DBSIITRI Vv. Bender, 130 Idaho 796,808,948 P.2d 151,
163 (1997). The scope and nature of that relationship is defined by the terms of the trust, i.e. the
contract. A trustee's fiduciary duties and contractual duties are intertwined, yet distinguishable.
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 2 defines a trust as
... a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising from a manifestation
of intention to create that relationship and subjecting the person who holds title to
the property to duties to deal with it for the benefit of ... one or more persons, at
least one of whom is not the sole trustee.
The Estate has identified specific provisions within the Trust document-the trust contractwhich Ms. Johnson breached.
4.03 & 4.04:

1-

5.01:

1

8.02:
l_

The Trust terminates automatically upon the death of the surviving Trustor
and the successor Trustee is to distribute the property "as soon as
reasonably possible."
The only property which may be retained in the Trust after the death of the
surviving Trustor is property productive of income.
The successor Trustee shall render an accounting from time to time.

The Estate alleges that Ms. Johnson breached these contractual provisions through her conduct.
These provisions set forth specific duties outside the general fiduciary duties found in the probate
code. There exist clear and distinct terms in the trust contract regarding conduct after the death
of Michael Cornell.

The Estate's allegation that Ms. Johnson breached those terms is far

different that a general allegation that she did not administer the trust expeditiously in
accordance with Idaho Code § 15-7-301. The Estate's allegation that Ms. Johnson breached the
trust contract by retaining non-income producing property in the Trust, identifies a duty that
cannot be found anywhere in statute. A breach of contract claim is distinct from a breach of
fiduciary duty claim. A breach of contract claim focuses on the trustee's failure to adhere to the
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terms of the trust document; a breach of fiduciary duty claim focuses on the trustee's failure to
act in accordance with the standard of conduct required of the trustee under statutory and
common law. To argue that no contractual claim may lie against the trustee is to argue that the
terms of the trust document have no substance.
C.

The Estate's Causes of Action Did Not Abate Under Idaho Code§ 5-327(2).

The magistrate court held that the Estate's causes of action arising after July 1, 2010
abated pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-327(2).

It based this holding on its interpretation of

subsection 5-327(2) as allowing survival in property damage cases only for recovery for medical
expenses, other out-of-pocket expenses, and loss of earnings. The court's error was the result of
construing the language of the statute in such a rigid manner as to produce an absurd result upon

t

application.
While the Estate's causes of action survived John Cornell's death under the common law,
the Idaho legislature made survival explicit in its enactment ofldaho Code § 5-327(2):
A cause of action for personal injury or property damage caused by the wrongful
act or negligence of another shall not abate upon the death of the injured person
from causes not related to the wrongful act or negligence. Provided however, that
the damages that may be recovered in such action are expressly limited to those
for: (i) medical expenses actually incurred, (ii) other out-of--pocket expenses
actually incurred, and (iii) loss of earnings actually suffered, prior to the death of
such injured person and as a result of the wrongful act or negligence. Such action
shall be commenced or, if already commenced at the time of the death of the
injured person, shall be thereafter prosecuted by the personal representative of the
estate of the deceased person or, if there be no personal representative appointed,
then by those persons who would be entitled to succeed to the property of the
deceased person according to the provisions of section 5-311(2)(a), Idaho Code.
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·The first sentence of subsection 327(2) states that tort causes of action for "personal injury or
property damage" do not abate upon the death of the injured party. The second sentence then
contains a proviso limiting recovery to medical expenses, other out-of-pocket expenses, and loss
of earnings. Because this proviso does not expressly limit itself to the antecedent of "personal
injury" claims, the magistrate court concluded that the proviso also applies to causes of action for
property damage.
The proper application of Idaho Code § 5-327(2) is revealed through the syntactic and
contextual canons of statutory interpretations.

The following principles of statutory

interpretation should be employed here:
1.
2.
3.
4.

the objective is to derive the intent of the legislature;
language should be interpreted in the context of the entire document;
language should be given its plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and
language is to be interpreted in accord with common sense and reason.

See State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P .3d 970, 973 (2011) and Smith v. Dep 't of
Employment, 100 Idaho 520,522,602 P.2d 18, 20 (1979). The issue before this Court is whether
the legislature intended the second-sentence proviso to apply to both personal injury actions and
property damage actions.
The subordinate clause at the end of the second sentence supports an interpretation which
limits the proviso to personal injury cases. The subordinate clause restricts recovery in the listed
areas to those damages which resulted from the wrongful act or negligence; and incurred "prior
to the death of the injured person." The limitation of damages to those incurred prior to the
death of the injured person evidences the legislature's intent to limit recovery in personal injury
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actions for economic harms suffered, excluding damages such as pain and suffering. A property
damage action, by its nature, seeks only recovery economic harm suffered.

I
[

Interpreting the listed areas of recovery in accord with common sense and reason, the
listed areas for recovery support an interpretation which limits the proviso to personal injury
cases. It is the rare property damage case where "medical expenses" are incurred. It is also rare
to have a property damage case where the plaintiff seeks "loss of earnings." Those two areas
are, however, common in personal injury actions. Not only do these areas of recovery counsel
against applying the proviso to the property damage case, they support allowing full recovery in
property damage cases. In. one sense, every property damage claim could be categorized as a
claim for recovery of out of pocket expenses.
The magistrate courts rigid interpretation of Idaho Code § 5-327(2) was in error. The
subsection, however, provides a sensible and reasonable result when interpreted through the
syntactic and contextual canons of statutory interpretations. The Estate asks this Court to reverse
the magistrate court's grant of summary judgment and rule that the second sentence proviso in
the subsection does not constitute a limitation on property damage actions.
CONCLUSION

Both the common law and Idaho Code § 5-327 support a ruling that the causes of action
set forth in the Estate's Petition survived the death of John Cornell. The Estate has raised several
claims in law and equity seeking recovery of that property in which John Cornell held an interest
at the time of his death. The property interests of a decedent do not die with that decedent.
Neither do the decedents. claims for damage to his property done by others. Both the property
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interests and the claims for property damage pass to his Estate, where the interests may be
pursued on behalf of the beneficiaries of the Estate. Ms. Johnson has conceded that she acted
inequitably. Neither law nor equity allows her to continue her inequitable conduct by now

I

depriving John Cornell's heirs of his property.

The Estate asks this Court to reverse the

magistrate court's ruling and remand the case for further proceedings.

I
DATED this~ay of October, 2013.
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

Samuel T. Creason, ISB #8183
Attorneys for Appellant

[ __
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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
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Cornell's Motion to Augment the Record.
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IN THE DISTFJCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.
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Case No. CV 2012-00277
STIPULATION TO AUGMENT

COMES NOW Margaret Watkins, by and through her attorney of record, Darrel Aherin of
A.herin, Rice and Anegon, Kareen Cornell, as personal representative of the Estate of John Cornell,
through the Estate's attorney ofrecord, Samuel Creason of Creason, Moore, Dokken and Geidl, and
Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attorney ofrecord, Karin Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery,
P.L.L.C., and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 6(e)(3) and 83(q), hereby stipulate and agree to entry of an order
augmenting the clerk's record to add the Memorandum Opinion re: Attorney Fees and Costs entered
by the Magistrate Court in this proceeding on September 6, 2013 , a copy of which is attached as
Exhibit A hereto, and the Order re: Attorney Fees and Costs entered by the Magistrate Court in this
proceeding on September 6, 2013 , a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B hereto. The paiiies
hereby waive hearing on the Motion to Augment Record dated September 25 , 2013 filed by Kareen
Cornell and on the Motion to Augment Record dated September 12, 2013 filed by Margaret Watkins,
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and agree to entry of the proposed Order filed herewith without further notice.
DATED this

3~
O day of October, 2013.
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day of October, 2013.
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRIC

FOR THE STATE OF lDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWA°[Egfi)arwaterCoun , Idaho
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
IN THE MATIER OF THE
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL

Case No. CV 2012-277
MEMORANDUM OPINION RE
ATIORNEY FEES AND COSTS

The issue addressed is whether to grant Toni Johnson attorney fees and costs
against the estate of John H. Cornell as requested by the Memorandum of Costs and
Attorney Fees filed on July 5, 2013. Darrell Aherin Esq., appearing on behalf of the
deceased John H. Cornell, filed an objection and memorandum in opposition to the
request as did Samuel Creason, who appeared on behalf of Kareen Cornell, the
personal representative of the estate of John H. Cornell. Oral argument was heard on
September 4, 2013, Karen Seubert presenting argument on behalf of Ms. Johnson and
Mr. Aherin and Mr. Creason presenting argument as well.
On February 15, 2013, this Court dismissed the claims of the deceased John H.
Cornell and on June 21, 2013 dismissed the claims of Karen Cornell. As the prevailing
party, Ms. Johnson seeks attorney fees and the costs of a deposition pursuant to Idaho
Code § 15-8-208. Idaho Code § 15-8-208 provides: "Either the district court or the court
on appeal may, in its discretion, order costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to be
awarded to any party (a) from any party to the proceedings."
Ms. Seubert conceded at oral argument, and I so find, that the arguments made
by Mr. Aherin and Mr. Creason were not made frivolously, unreasonably, or without
MEMORANDUM OPINION-1
RE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
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foundation. The arguments that were made were cogent and reasoned and excellent in
shedding light on an abstruse area of the law. Therefore, the issue is whether this
Court should exercise its discretion to award attorney fees and costs in favor of Toni
Johnson against the Estate of John H. Cornell.
The Idaho Supreme Court has observed that Idaho Code § 15-8-208 "allows
courts to award fees in cases governed by the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act
when doing so would be equitable." Banner Life Insurance v. Dixson Irrevocable Trust,
147 Idaho 117,133,206 P.3d 481 (2009). Under the circumstances of this case, it
would be inequitable and inappropriate to award attorney fees to Ms. Johnson against
the estate of John H. Cornell.
The dismissals were not based upon the merits of the claims made on behalf of
the deceased John H. Cornell and his estate, but rather upon the abatement of Mr.
Cornell's claims against Ms. Johnson upon Mr. Cornell's death. The facts are more fully
set forth in the Memorandum Opinions. Ms. Johnson and Mr. Cornell are siblings and
were named as recipients of a trust established by their parents.
Following the death of the last surviving parent, Ms. Johnson was required under
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as possible to herself and Mr. Cornell. In the nearly two (2) years from the last trustor's
death through Mr. Cornell's death, Ms. Johnson failed to distribute any part of the Trust
to Mr. Cornell. Mr. Cornell waited in vain for funds from the trust to pay for necessary
medical care that he could not obtain without money from the trust. Mr. Cornell
contacted Ms. Johnson and her attorney, a different attorney than her present attorney,

MEMORANDUM OPINION-2
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several times for accountings and for word on the status of the trust. He never received
a response.
Ms. Johnson used funds from the trust for her personal expenses while Mr.
Cornell was making his requests for information regarding distribution of the trust. Ms.
Johnson lived rent free in the home that is included in the Trust. Ms. Johnson entirely
thwarted the intentions of her parents in establishing the trust for her brother to receive
half the estate. Ms. Johnson dishonored the trust her father placed in her when he
named her as the sole person responsible for distribution of the trust. Ms. Johnson
acted inappropriately in bestowing the proceeds of the trust upon herself and not share
one cent with her brother.
Ms. Johnson egregiously wronged her brother during his lifetime. Now she
wishes to continue wronging her brother after his death by not only keeping the assets
that were intended for Mr. Cornell, but also raiding his estate for her attorney fees.
Certainly, this is not the result that the parents of Mr. Cornell and Ms. Johnson intended
when they created the trust.
The law of abatement is an unsettled area of law. The issue of abatement only
arose after Mr. Cornell filed his action against Ms. Johnson for her mismanagement of
the estate. Although the arguments of Mr. Cornell and his estate were rejected, the
arguments were soundly based. The inequitable conduct of Ms. Johnson justified the
vigorous arguments made on behalf of Mr. Cornell. I, therefore, reject Ms. Johnson's
request for attorney fees from the Estate of John H. Cornell.
Ms. Johnson also requests that she be awarded $277 .15 for the costs of

obtaining

a copy of her deposition. Ms. Johnson asserts she is entitled to the award as

MEMORANDUM OPINION-3
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a prevailing party pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(C)(10). Rule
54(d)(1) provides "Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs shall be allowed
1

as a matter of right of the prevailing party or parties unless otherwise ordered by the

court." (emphasis added). Rule 54(d)(1)(C)(10) relied upon by Ms. Johnson provides,
"When costs are awarded to a party, such party shall be entitled to the following costs,
actually paid, as a matter of right: ... (10) Charges for one (1) copy of any deposition
taken by any of the parties to the action in preparation for trial of the action." (emphasis
added).
The decision whether to grant costs is

a matter of discretion.

It would be

inequitable to award Ms. Johnson her costs for the same reason it is inequitable to
award her attorney fees from the Estate of John H. Cornell.
CONCLUSION

Toni Johnson's request for an award of attorney fees and the cost of a deposition
from the estate of John H. Cornell is denied for the reasons set forth above.

Dated this

hJ-, day of September, 2013.

14/l rL

Randall W Robinson Magistrate
1
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRI
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEAR
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
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THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
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Case No. CV 2012-277
ORDER RE ATIORN EY
FEES AND COSTS

Based upon Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as set forth in the
and
Memorandum Opinion Re Attorne y Fees and Costs, the Memor andum of Costs
Attorne y Fees filed on July 5, 2013 is HEREB Y DENIED.
Dated this
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I.

A.

STATEMENT OF CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE

This action involves a dispute over the administration of a trust.

One of the trust

beneficiaries, John Cornell, filed a petition seeking relief against his sister in her capacity as
trustee of the subject trust. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Cornell died. His Petition was dismissed after
Mr. Cornell's death. Subsequently, his estate filed a separate petition raising claims related to
the trust administration. The Magistrate Court dismissed the Estate's petition. The Estate now
appeals. The question before the Court is whether Mr. Cornell's death abates the Estate's claims
related to the trust.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Given the highly unusual posture of this proceeding, the factual background and course

t

of the proceedings overlap to such a degree that it is appropriate to discuss both together.
Background

I

L

Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell established the Revocable Family Trust of
Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell on November 1, 1996.
Administration and Court Ordered Distribution of Trust at

,r,r

Petition for Supervised

3.1, 3.4, Exh. A (said Exhibit

hereinafter referred to as "Trust"). Through said Trust, Mr. and Mrs. Cornell named their two
children, Toni C. Johnson and John H. Cornell, as the beneficiaries of the trust upon Mr. and
1

Mrs. Cornell's deaths. Id. at § 4.03 of Exh. A. On August 6, 2009, Michael S. Cornell as

I

l_

surviving grantor and trustee named Toni C. Johnson as sole trustee/successor trustee. Id. at
Exh. B.
Arlie M. Cornell died on November 9, 2008 and Michael S. Cornell died on December
15, 2009. Id. at ,r,r 3.4, 3.6.
1
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Litigation Concerning Cornell Revocable Living Trust
On July 11, 2012, John H. Cornell filed a Petition for Supervised Administration and

Removal of Trustee, which originally initiated this proceeding. Id. at lj[lj[ 2.3, 3.9.
John H. Cornell died on or around August 20, 2011 leaving no issue. Id. at lj[ 3.10.
Respondent Toni C. Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 17, 2012 seeking to
dismiss the Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee on the basis that the
claims of John H. Cornell were extinguished by his death.
Briefing in support of and in opposition to dismissal was submitted by Respondent
through counsel and Mr. Aherin for John Henry Cornell (and presumably for Margaret Watkins
who as of November 15, 2012 served as temporary personal representative of the Estate of John
Henry Cornell). Memorandum of Law filed November 1, 2012; Response to Respondent's

Motion to Dismiss filed November 15, 2012; Respondent's Reply Brief in Support of Motion to
Dismiss filed November 20, 2012. Said Motion was first called for hearing on November 27,
I_

2012, at which time it was continued to allow participation by Kareen Cornell.
Said Motion was called for hearing for a second time on January 8, 2013, at which time

I

Respondent through counsel and Mr. Aherin on behalf of John Henry Cornell (and presumably
Margaret Watkins who at that time served as temporary personal representative of the Estate of
John Henry Cornell) presented oral argument. Mr. Creason did not participate at that hearing on
Kareen Cornell's behalf due to what was later discovered to be a misunderstanding.
Subsequent briefing in support of and in opposition to dismissal was submitted by Ms.
Seubert for Respondent and Mr. Creason for Kareen Cornell. Memorandum re: Respondent's

Motion to Dismiss filed January 18, 2013; Respondent's Brief in Reply to Brief of Surviving
Spouse filed February 4, 2013.

2
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Said Motion was called for hearing for a third time on February 6, 2013, at which Ms.
Seubert for Respondent, Mr. Aherin for John Henry Cornell (and at that time Margaret Watkins
as temporary personal representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell), and Mr. Creason for
Kareen Cornell presented oral argument.
After considering the above-referenced briefing and oral argument presented, this Court
issued an oral ruling in open court on February 12, 2013 dismissing the Petition for Supervised
Administration and Removal of Trustee and granted the Estate twenty days in which to raise any

claims of the Estate. A written opinion and judgment followed. Id. at

,r 3 .11; Memorandum

Opinion and Judgment for Dismissal entered February 15, 2013.

Margaret Watkins, as a self-identified "interested person," has appealed said
Memorandum Opinion and Judgment for Dismissal. Said appeal remains pending before this

Court and the Court has indicated that oral argument on Ms. Watkins' appeal and the Estate's
appeal will be scheduled concurrently.
On February 26, 2013, Kareen Cornell as then personal representative of the Estate of
John H. Cornell and as his surviving spouse, filed a Petition for Supervised Administration and
Court Ordered Distribution.

I

I.

On March 4, 2013, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss. Briefing in support of and in
opposition to dismissal was submitted by counsel for Respondent and Mrs. Cornell.

Oral

argument was presented on June 4, 2013. The Magistrate Court issued its
Estate o(John H Cornell. deceased

John H. Cornell died on or around August 20, 2011 leaving no issue. Id. at ,r 3.10.
On November 15, 2012, in the probate action concerning the Estate of John H. Cornell,
deceased, Margaret Watkins was appointed as Temporary Personal Representative of the Estate

3
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of John H. Cornell, deceased. See Order ofAppointment of Temporary Personal Representative,
Clearwater County Case No. CV 2012-00439.
On February 12, 2013, in the probate action concerning the Estate of John H. Cornell,
deceased, Kareen Cornell was appointed as personal representative of the Estate of John H.
Cornell, deceased, thereby terminating the prior temporary appointment of Margaret Watkins.
See Order Appointing Personal Representative, Letters of Testamentary, Clearwater County
Case No. CV 2012-00439.

II.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Estate's claims against Respondent abated upon the death of John Cornell
based upon the application ofldaho Code § 5-327(2).

The Estate asserts that the Magistrate Court erred in dismissal of its tort claims in its
application of Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 272 P.3d 1247 (2012), to this case. Appellant's

i
L

Brief at 6-9. The Magistrate Court relied upon the Bishop decision to conclude that the general
rule requires that claims sounding in tort do not survive the claimant's death. Memorandum

Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 9-12.
The Idaho Supreme Court has discussed Idaho abatement law as follows:
The abatement rule holds that in the absence of a legislative enactment addressing
the survivability of a claim, the common law rules govern. Under the common
law, claims arising out of contracts generally survive the death of the claimant,
while those sounding in pure tort abate.
. . . The scope of an attorney's contractual duty to a client is defined by the
purposes for which the attorney is retained. Breach of an attorney's duty is
negligence in tort. The contract basis of legal malpractice actions is the failure to
perform obligations specified in the written contract. Thus, under the abatement
rule, breach of duty is an action in tort, not contract; that is, unless an attorney
foolhardily contracts with his client guaranteeing a specific outcome in the
litigation or provides for a higher standard of care in the contract, he is held to the
standard of care expected of an attorney. Breach of that duty is a tort.
. . . [T]he contours of the duties owed by an attorney to his or her client are
defined by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. If an attorney and client
4
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want to provide for a higher standard of care, they may do so by express language
in the contract. Here, the standard of care in the contract is essentially the same as
in any attorney-client relationship. Because this claim sounds in tort, it abated
upon [the client's] death. Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 620-21, 272 P.3d 1247, 1251-52 (2012) (citations omitted).

Similar to the attorney-client relationship at issue in Bishop, the contours of the duties
owed by a trustee to trust beneficiaries are defined by the Uniform Probate Code and Principal
and Income Act. Here, the Trust contains no greater requirements than are set forth in said
statutes. Therefore, the common law rule of abatement applies.
Because a breach of fiduciary duty arises in tort, it abates upon the injured person's death
under the common law. As such, the Estate's breach of fiduciary duty claim is abated unless a
_ statute precludes dismissal.
The statutory section that governs the survivability of negligence claims is Idaho Code
Section 5-327(2), which was amended in 2010 with the amendment taking effect on July 1, 2010.
The Magistrate Court correctly concluded that the Estate's claims are outside of the scope of
Idaho Code Section 5-327(2). See infra § II(H).

i
I

I_

As such, the Estate's negligence claims are abated by John H. Cornell's death and no
reversible error has been shown. The Magistrate Court's dismissal should be affirmed.

B.

There is no exception to the abatement rule for torts for injury to property.

The Estate argues that the Magistrate Court erred when it rejected its argument that an
exception to the general rule of abatement exists where damages are sought for injury to
property. Appellant's Brief at 9. This issue was raised below and addressed by in the Magistrate
Court's decision as follows:
Kareen seeks to distinguish Bishop by relying on several Am. Jur. Cites. Kareen
argues that the survival of an action depends on the nature of the interest affected.
Because property of the Trust is involved, as opposed to physical injury, the claim
cannot be abated. 1 Am.Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival and Revival § 51 ....
While Kareen correctly sets forth these principles, she provides no explanation as
to how they are consistent with Bishop. The Supreme Court in Bishop did not
examine whether the claims were equitable or torts done to persons or to property
in determining whether the joint contract and tort action survives the death of the
party. . . . As Kareen's claims are in the nature of torts, Kareen's claims are
abated by John's death. Therefore, Kareen' s arguments are rejected.

5
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Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 15-16.

The Estate argues that the purported exception to the general abatement rule for cases for
injury to property is "[o]ne of the well-recognized exceptions" under Idaho law. Appellant's
Brief at 9. In support of this "well-recognized exception," Mrs. Cornell cites to the Idaho cases

of Barnes v. Barnes, 135 Idaho 103, 15 P.3d 816 (2000), and First Sec. Bank of Idaho, Nat.
Assn 'n v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 429 P.2d 386 (1967). See Appellant's Brief at 9, 10. Said cases

do not stand for the proposition that such an exception has been recognized under Idaho law.
The Barnes case was a divorce action where the husband died during the pendency of an
appeal after entry of an interlocutory divorce.

There, the surviving wife sought to

"posthumously reunite the parties based on a procedural flaw in the motion for summary
judgment." Id. at 107, 15 P.3d at 820. The Barnes decision stands for the limited principle that
where a divorced spouse dies prior to resolution of the division of community property and

i

debts, the resolution of said division of property survives. Id. Said case does not discuss nor
recognize any exception to the abatement rule outside of a divorce proceeding.
The Rogers case was an interpleader action where a dispute arose between three creditors
over funds related to a contract dispute. 91 Idaho at 655, 429 P.2d at 387. The quote relied upon
by Appellant, "equity regards that as done which ought to be done," was part of a discussion of
the doctrine of equitable conversion. 91 Idaho at 657, 429 P.2d at 389; Appellant's Brief at 10.
Said case does not discuss nor recognize any exception to the abatement rule.
A review of Idaho case law fmds no other cases that recognize or create an exception to
the general abatement rule discussed in Bishop v. Owens. See infra Il(A).
For these reasons, no reversible error has been shown, and the Magistrate Court's
dismissal should be affirmed.

I
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C.

There is no exception to the abatement rule for claims based upon a remedial
statute.

The Estate argues that the Magistrate Court erred when it rejected its argument that an
exception to the general rule of abatement exists where damages are sought upon a remedial
statute. Appellant's Brief at 11. This issue was raised below and addressed by in the Magistrate
Court's decision as follows:·
Kareen seeks to distinguish Bishop by relying on several Am. Jur. Cites. . ..
Kareen also argues that the claims under the Probate Code survive because "(a)
cause of action that is founded on a remedial statute survives the death of the
party possessing the cause of action." 1 Am.Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and
·
Revival § 59.
While Kareen correctly sets forth these principles, she provides no explanation as
to how they are consistent with Bishop. The Supreme Court in Bishop did not
examine whether the claims were equitable or torts done to persons or to property
in determining whether the joint contract and tort action survives the death of the
party. Nor did the Supreme Court analyze whether the rules of professional
conduct are remedial in nature for for purposes of surviving the party's death. As
Kareen's claims are in the nature of torts, Kareen's claims are abated by John's
death. Therefore, Kareen's arguments are rejected.

i
i

i

L

Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 15-16.
Appellant cites to no case law or statutory authority in support of her position, but instead
relies upon a treatise, 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival and Revival § 59, without further
authority or relationship to Idaho law.
For these reasons, no reversible error has been shown, and the Magistrate Court's
dismissal should be affirmed.
D.

The Magistrate Court correctly considered and applied the law in rejecting the
Estate's conversion claim.

The Estate seeks recovery under the equitable doctrine of conversion. Appellant's Brief
at 12-13. The Magistrate Court rejected the Estate's conversion claim concluding that the
conversion claim are in the nature of torts, thus abated by Mr. Cornell's death. Memorandum

Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 15-16.

7
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Appellant cites to no case law or statutory authority in support of her position, but instead
relies upon a treatise, 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival and Revival § 59, without further
authority or relationship to Idaho law.
For these reasons, no reversible error has been shown, and the Magistrate Court's
dismissal should be affirmed.
E.

The Magistrate Court correctly considered and applied the law in rejecting the
Estate's constructive trust claim.

The Estate seeks recovery under the equitable doctrine of constructive trust. Appellant's
Brief at 13-14. The Magistrate Court rejected the Estate's constructive trust claim concluding

that the Idaho Probate Code supplants equitable considerations and that the circumstances
necessitating creation of a constructive trust meets the definition of a tort.

Memorandum

Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 12-13.

"A constructive trust arises where legal title to property has been obtained through actual
fraud, misrepresentations, concealments, taking advantage of one's necessities, or under
circumstances otherwise rendering it unconscionable for the holder of legal title to retain
beneficial interest in the property." Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165, 168, 722 P.2d 474,477 (1986)
(citing Davenport v. Burke, 30 Idaho 559, 167 P. 481 (1917)). A "constructive trust arises from
the legal title holder's wrongful actions and not from any intent to create a trust." Snider v.
Arnold, 153 Idaho 641, 289 P.3d 43 (2012) (citing Davenport v. Burke, 30 Idaho 599, 608, 167

P. 481,483 (1917)).
The Magistrate Court concluded that the Estate's constructive trust claim is a tort.
Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 12 (citing Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 619-20,

I

272 P.3d 1247, 1249-50 (2012)) ("Kareen requests a constructive trust to address the civil

l_
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wrong, the breach of duties Toni owed to John. As a cause of action sounding clearly in tort,
Kareen's request for a constructive trust must be rejected as abated.").
The Estate asserts that the Idaho decision of Brasch v. Brasch, 55 Idaho 777, 47 P .2d 67 6
(1935) holds that the survival of constructive trust claims is presumed.

The Brasch case

involved a dispute over whether a statute of limitations had run prior to a decedent's death. Id.
The Court concluded that the statute of limitations for the disputed claim had run during the
decedent's lifetime, therefore the plantiff s demand was barred by the statute of limitations. Id.
at 780, 47 P.2d at 679. The case discussed the probate statute then in effect, which read: "If a
person entitled to bring an action die before the expiration of the term limited for the
commencement thereof, and the cause of action survive, an action may be commenced by his
I

representatives, after the expiration of that time, and within one year from his death[.]" Id at

I

679, 47 P.2d at 678 (LC. A., sec. 5-231) (emphasis added). The statute in question recognizes
the question of abatement by conditioning the tolling of a statute of limitations only where "the
cause of action survive[ s]." It does not recognize a presumption, instead a condition precedent.
The Estate argues that "Ms. Johnson ought to have distributed the Trust res as soon as
reasonably practicable when the Trust automatically terminated upon the death of Michael
Cornell. Ms. Johnson acted inequitably by retaining the Trust res in the name of the Trust, while
using it for her own benefit." As the Magistrate Court previously concluded in its Memorandum
Opinion dated February 15, 2013, "[t]he constructive trust argument is indistinguishable from

[the Estate's] arguments regarding breaches of fiduciary duties."
The Estate has provided no authority or explanation to explain the distinction it is
asserting, nor to show reversible error in rejecting its constructive trust claim. Therefore, the
Magistrate Court's dismissal should be affirmed.

9
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The Magistrate Court correctly considered and applied the law in rejecting the
Estate's unjust enrichment claim.

F.

The Estate seeks recovery under the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment. Appellant's
Brief at 15. The Magistrate Court rejected the Estate's unjust enrichment claim concluding that

the unjust enrichment claim is in the nature of torts, thus abated by Mr. Cornell's death.
Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 15-16.

"Unjust enrichment, as a fictional promise or obligation implied by law, allows recovery
where the defendant has received a benefit from the plaintiff that would be inequitable for the
defendant to retain without compensating the plaintiff for the value of the benefit." Great Plains
Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 123 Idaho 754, 767, 979 P.2d 627, 640 (1999)

(citing Continental Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler Supply Co., 95 Idaho 739, 743, 518 P.2d
1012, 1205 (1974)). Unjust enrichment claims involve claims based on an implicit promise to
pay. Id., 979 P.2d at 640.
As with the conversion and constructive trust claim, Appellant cites to no controlling
authority to support its assertion the Bishop abatement rule does not apply to claims arising in
equity.

Appellant's Brief at 15.

Further, Appellant provides no explanation of how the

Magistrate Court erred in its conclusion that "[a]s Kareen's claims are in the nature of torts,
Kareen's claims are abated by John's death." Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 16.
For these reasons, no reversible error has been shown, and the Magistrate Court's
dismissal should be affirmed.
G.

The Magistrate Court correctly considered and applied the law in rejecting the
Estate's breach of contract claim.

The Estate argues that the Magistrate Court erred by relying upon Bishop "to recharacterize the Estate's contract claims[.]" Appellant's Brief at 15-16.

10
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IThe Magistrate Court discussed the Estate's breach of contract claim as follows:

I

Kareen argues that her breach of contract claim must be viewed as separate from
the breach of fiduciary claim and, as a contract claim, survives John's death. The
Supreme Court in Bishop addressed the same claim. In the absence of finding
that a higher duty of care is provided for under the Trust agreement than provided
under the statute, Bishop requires abatement ofKareen's claim. Bishop v. Owens,
152 Idaho at 620,272 P.3d at 1251. Kareen fails to point out any way in which
the Trust instrument imposes any duties upon Toni that are not also imposed by
the Probate Code. This Court stands by its more detailed analysis when
addressing John's claims that the Trust instrument gives no higher duty of care
than the duty imposed by the Probate Code. Memorandum Op. Feb. 15, 2013 at
6-8.
Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 13-14. In the earlier opinion referenced therein, the
Magistrate Court discussed the Bishop decision to conclude that like Bishop, this case is a mixed
tort and contract case involving torts arising from a contractual agreement.

Memorandum

Opinion Feb. 15, 2013 at 6. The Magistrate Court further concluded that the duties owed by the
trustee to a beneficiary are defined by the Uniform Probate Code and Uniform Principal and
Income Act. Id. at 7. Violation of these fiduciary duties arising under statute is a tort, not a
contract. Id.
Specifically, the Bishop Court analyzed the interplay of tort and contract theories in the
attorney-client context as follows:
[T]he contours of the duties owed by an attorney to his or her client are defined by
the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. If an attorney and client want to
provide for a higher standard of care, they may do so by express language in the
contract. Here, the standard of care in the contract is essentially the same as in
any attorney-client relationship. Because this claim sounds in tort, it abated upon
Patricia Shelton's death.
Although the medical malpractice cases on which Owens relies are governed by
specific statute, the fact that a proponent labels his or her action as sounding in
contract as well as malpractice does not make the underlying action contract. The
"theory" of relief sought is not different. A holding to the contrary would create a
per se breach of contract action in every legal malpractice action. Legal
malpractice has traditionally been treated as the proper claim where an attorney
breaches his or her duty, which arises from the attorney-client relationship.
As noted in the previous section, because the contingent fee agreement in this
matter contained no express language providing for a higher standard of care, the
duty owed by Owens is not defined by the contingent fee agreement. The
language in the contingent fee agreement that "attorneys shall represent Client in
11
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said manner and do all things necessary, appropriate, or advisable, in regard
thereto" is not materially different from the standard applied in the legal
malpractice claim. Thus, this action is really a malpractice claim disguised as a
contract claim. A person cannot change a tort action into a contract action simply
by labeling it as such. Hayward, 136 Idaho at 350, 33 P.3d at 824.

I

Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 620-21, 272 P.3d 1247, 1251-52 (2012)).
Here, like in Bishop, Appellant's breach of contract claim is really a breach of fiduciary
duty claim disguised or labelled as a contract claim. The subject trust contained no provisions
providing for a higher standard of care than established in the Uniform Probate Code.
Appellant cites to no authority to support its assertions that "a breach of contract claim is
distinct from a breach of fiduciary duty claim." Appellant's Brief at 17. Appellant further
asserts that "[t]o argue that no contractual claim may lie against the trustee is to is to argue that
the terms of the trust document have no substance." Id. at 18. The trust document has substance,
but it is the same substance as found in statute. As such, the Estate's breach of contract claim
abates.
For these reasons, no reversible error has been shown, and the Magistrate Court's
dismissal of the Estate's breach of contract claim should be affirmed.
H.
\_

The Magistrate Court correctly considered and applied LC. § 5-327(2)

The Estate argues that the Magistrate Court erred in its interpretation of Idaho Code
Section 5-327(2). Appellant's Brief at 18-20. The Estate contends that "the court's error was the
result of construing the language of the statute in such a rigid manner as to produce an absurd
result upon application." Id. at 18.

It is important to note that said statutory section was amended in 2010, where the Estate's
claims cover a time period relating back to December 15, 2009, which is the death of the last
grantor's death. In light of said amendment, a two-part analysis is needed to properly consider
the Estate's claims.
Prior to its amendment, which took effect on July 1, 2010, said statute read as follows:

I_

Causes of action arising out of injury to the person or property, or death, caused
by the wrongful act or negligence of another, except actions for slander or libel,
shall not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer, and each injured person or the
personal representative of each one meeting death, as above stated, shall have a
cause of action against the personal representative of the wrongdoer; provided,
however, the punitive damages or exemplary damages shall not be awarded nor
penalties adjudged in any such action; provided, however, that the injured person
12
623

IL

shall not recover judgment except upon some competent, satisfactory evidence
corroborating the testimony of said injured person regarding negligence and
proximate cause.
LC. § 5-327 (through July 1, 2010) (emphasis added).
In its prior form, the clear language of the statute reflects that survivability applied only
after the death of the wrongdoer, not the death of the injured party as the subsequent amendment
addressed. Because the amendment to Idaho Code Section 5-327(2) was not retroactive, said
amendment applied only to actions which arose on or after the statute's effective date. See
Bishop, 152 Idaho at 620, 272 P.3d at 1251. Therefore, the statute in its original form applies
from the death of Michael S. Cornell on December 15, 2009 until July 1, 2010. The Estate's
predecessor in interest, John Cornell, is the injured party and Toni Johnson the wrongdoer for
purposes of this appeal. Because the alleged "injured party" is the decedent as opposed to the

r

"wrongdoer," any claims of John Cornell that may have arisen between December 15, 2009 and

I

Court's dismissal as it relates to claims arising prior to July 1, 2010 should be affirmed.

July 1, 2010 abated upon his death. No reversible error has been shown, and the Magistrate

L."

The Estate's parsing of the current statute applies only to its claims that arose on or after
July 1, 2010. In its current form, Idaho Code§ 5-327(2) states in relevant part as follows:
A cause of action for personal injury or property damage caused by the wrongful
act or negligence of another shall not abate upon the death of the injured person
from causes not related to the wrongful act or negligence. Provided however, that
the damages that may be recovered in such action are expressly limited to those
for: (i) medical expenses actually incurred, (ii) other out-of-pocket expenses
actually incurred, and (iii) loss of earnings actually suffered, prior to the death of
such injured person as a result of the wrongful act or negligence.
The Estate argues that the limitation on recovery for medical expenses, other out-of-pocket
expenses, and loss of earnings applies only to personal injury cases, not cases involving property
I

[_

damages. Appellant's Brief at 18-20. Said interpretation does not employ the well-recognized
principles of statutory interpretation cited to by Appellant. See Appellant's Brief at 19 (citing
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011); Smith v. Dept. of Employment,
13
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100 Idaho 520, 522, 602 P.2d 18, 20 (1979)). Specifically, Appellant cites to no legislative
history that would support her conclusion. Appellant parses the second sentence of said statute

l

in an attempt to limit the statute's application to personal injury cases, thereby ignoring the
context of the entire document, which is clearly applicable to "a c;ause of action for personal
injury or property damage."

(emphasis added).

Appellant's interpretation relies upon

speculation and generalities (specifically that "medical expenses" rarely, in his opinion, are
incurred in property damage cases), in order to deviate from the plain and ordinary meaning of
"such action." Further, said limited interpretation, which rejects its application to property
damages cases despite their specific inclusion by reference, departs from common sense and
reading. The Estate cites to no case law supporting this interpretation of the statute. For these
reasons, no reversible error has been shown and the Magistrate Court's application of Idaho
Code 5-327(2) should be affirmed.
III.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Respondent respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Judgment
for Dismissal and Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell, both entered June 21, 2013.

i

DATED this 19th day of November, 2013.
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

~~*

KARIN SEUBERT

I
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This Court must determine whether, through the doctrine of abatement, Toni C. Johnson
can avoid repayment of her brother's estate, the Estate of John Cornell, for property losses from
admittedly improper conduct.
Johnson's arguments regarding common law abatement are based upon an expansive
interpretation of a single sentence in Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 619 (2012). Johnson
proposes an interpretation which would dictate that all claims which are torts-or which could be
re-characterized as torts-abate upon the death of the injured party, absent a statutory exception.
Johnson's interpretation conflicts with pre-Bishop and post-Bishop precedent, as well as the
language and facts from Bishop, itself.

:
i

The Court should reject Johnson's proposed

interpretation of Bishop. Without Johnson's proposed universal rule of abatement, the Court
must determine whether the Estate's claims fall within one of the exceptions to the general rule
that tort claims abate. The Estate's claims fall within three such exceptions: the exception for
claims seeking redress for injury to property; the exception for claims founded upon a remedial
statute; and the exception for claims that are not legal claims, but claims in equity.
Johnson's arguments regarding the Estate's breach of contract claims proposes a legal
analysis whereby the court must re-characterize every breach of contract claim into a tort claim if
the contract does not provide for a higher standard of care than established at law. Johnson's
analysis should be rejected, as it would create an unsubstantiated and unworkable standard which
would, in practical effect, eliminate nearly all breach of contract claims.
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Finally, Johnson's argument regarding statutory abatement under Idaho Code § 5-327(2)

r--

sets forth a proposed interpretation which conflicts with the intent of the legislature, as

I

determined by the language of the statute, common sense, and reason.
The Estate requests that this honorable Court reverse the judgment of the magistrate
court.

ARGUMENT
A.

The Estate's Tort Claims Did Not Abate at Common Law.

Johnson argues that Bishop established the following universal statements as a rule of
law: All claims which can be characterized as a tort claim abate at common law unless a

I

statutory exception exists. See Resp. Br. 5, ,2. Johnson's proposed rule of abatement would

r

prohibit the Estate from pursuing its claims against her for the property she wrongfully withheld

l
l

from her brother. Johnson's interpretation stretches Bishop far beyond the scope of its facts and
far beyond the Idaho Supreme Court's treatment of Bishop earlier this year in St. Luke's Magic
Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Luciani, 154 Idaho 37, 293 P.3d 661 (2013). 1 In Luciani, the Court
made clear that Bishop did not establish a universal statement of law, but rather re-iterated what
had long been the rule at common law in Idaho: exceptions exist to the general rule that tort
claims abate. See id. at 667.
The Bishop Opinion included a statement that "[u]nder the common law, claims arising
out of contracts generally survive the death of the claimant, while those sounding in pure tort

1

l

Because St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Luciani has not yet been published in the
Idaho Reporter, all pinpoint citations are made to the Pacific Reporter.
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abate." 152 Idaho 616, 619, 272 P.3d 1247, 1250 (2012). As set forth in the Estate's Opening
Brief, Johnson's interpretation of this sentence is erroneous. See App. Br., 7-9.

[

I

Johnson's

interpretation conflicts with (a) the language of the Bishop Opinion; (b) the Bishop Court's
citation to Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 184 P. 477 (1919) as authority; and (c) the post-

Bishop authority of Luciani.
The question before the Luciani Court was whether a legal malpractice claim could be
assigned as part of an asset and liability transfer from one entity to another. Id. at 663. The
Court's consideration of assignability included a discussion of its precedent on survival in

Bishop. Id. The issue of survival was raised by the defendants in Luciani, likely because "[t]he
assignability of a cause of action is ... intimately associated with, and in most cases held to
depend upon, the same principle as the survival of a cause of action. Thus, if it survives, it may
be assigned; if not, it may not." MacLeod v. Stelle, 43 Idaho 64, 249 P. 254, 257 (1926). The

Luciani defendants argued that Bishop stood for the proposition that all legal malpractice claims
abated at common law-just as Johnson argues here-and, therefore, that such claims are
unassignable. Luciani, 293 P.3d at 667. The Court rejected this reasoning.
The Supreme Court first made clear that Bishop did not stand for the proposition that all
legal malpractice claims sounded in pure tort. Id. The Court then made clear that Bishop did not

l

l:

stand for the proposition that every tort claim abated at common law.
The malpractice claim here sounds in tort and, therefore, the MacLeod case
provides some guidance. Although we stated that "if [a tort claim] survives, it
may be assigned; if not, it may not," we also held that an "injury [that] lessens the
estate of the injured party does survive, and that it is assignable." 43 Idaho at 75,
249 P. at 257. If personal injury claims that "diminish the estate [and are] an
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l

injury to property" may be assigned, it seems clear that personal injuries of the
type alleged here-malpractice leading to an alleged loss of millions of dollarsare precisely that. See id. The crux of St. Luke's lawsuit against Luciani is that the
alleged malpractice substantially impacted the value of the assets it acquired from
Magic Valley.

Id. (quoting Macleod v. Stelle, 43 Idaho 64, 249 P. 254, 257 (1926)) (alterations in original).
Thus, the Macleod Opinion is still good law in this jurisdiction with respect to the intimately
associated issues of assignability and survival.
Having established that the Bishop Opinion did not create a universal rule of abatement,
the question before this Court is whether the Estate's claims fall within any of the "well-

l

recognized exceptions" to the general rule that tort claims abate. See Kloepfer, 32 Idaho 415, 184

r

P. 477.

l

(2) the exception for claims founded upon a remedial statute, see App. Br. 11; and (3) the

The Estate's Opening Brief shows that its claims fall within three well-recognized

exceptions: (1) the exception for claims seeking redress for injury to property, see App. Br. 9-11;

exception for claims that are not legal claims, but claims in equity, see App. Br. 12-14.
(1) Tort claims seeking redress for injury to property are an exception to the general rule of
abatement.
The exception to abatement for claims seeking redress for injury to property is an
expressly identified exception in Luciani. 293 P.3d at 667 ("[an] injury that lessens the estate of
the injured party does survive"). In her brief, Johnson does not provide analysis of the Luciani
Opinion; instead, she argues that two other cited cases are inapposite. See Resp. Br. 6 (disputing

l
[

applicability of Barnes v. Barnes, 135 Idaho 103, 105, 15 P.3d 816, 818 (2000) & First Sec.

Bank of Idaho, Nat. Ass'n v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654,657,429 P.2d 386,389 (1967)).

-4-

633

The Estate directs this Court to Barnes as merely one example of Idaho courts' treatment

1·

,.

I

of a decedent's claims regarding property interests upon the decedent's death. Those claims do
not abate. The Estate directs this Court to Rogers as authority for the finding that, at the very
least, a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether John Cornell held a vested
property interest in the Trust res at the time of his death. By conceding inequitable conduct,
Johnson has conceded that John Cornell held an interest at the date of death; she merely argues
that her inequitable conduct succeeded in divesting him of that interest. Thus, Johnson has
conceded those facts necessary for the Estate to pursue its claim at trial.
The cases of Barnes and Rogers provide exemplary support for that which is explicitly
stated in Luciani, MacLeod, and Kloepfer: an estate may pursue the claims of the decedent
seeking redress for injury to property.
(2) Tort claims seeking redress based upon a remedial statute are an exception to the general
rule of abatement.
Johnson's argument regarding this exception presumes that Bishop established a
universal rule against survivability. Johnson then proposes an analysis whereby the Court must
find abatement absent the provision of Idaho case law directly overcoming that universal rule.
As set forth in the Estate's briefing, Bishop provides no such universal rule.

Where no

controlling authority exists, Idaho courts look to other jurisdictions and sources in determining
[.

whether an exception should be recognized in Idaho.2

The second edition of American

2

[

See St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'[ Med. Ctr. v. Luciani, 154 Idaho 37, 293 P.3d 661 (2013)
(looking to California, Nebraska, Indiana, Kansas, Virginia, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Michigan,
Minnesota, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Maine, ALR, and Am.Jur.2d); MacLeod v. Stelle, 43
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Jurisprudence sets forth the general rules of law for United States' jurisdictions based upon a
comprehensive review of case law. In fact, this same treatise was relied upon by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Luciani. 293 P .3d at 665 & 666. The Estate maintains that the magistrate
court's analysis was in error for the reasons set forth in the Estate's Opening brief.
(3) Tort claims based in equity and not in law do not abate.
With respect to the Estate's equitable claims, Johnson once again argues that this Court
must find that the Estate's claims abated absent controlling case law expressly providing for an
exception to the general rule in Bishop. This type of analysis runs contrary to the Idaho Supreme
Court's consideration of other jurisdictions and authorities when analyzing issues of assignment
and survival. 3 With respect to the Estate's arguments regarding the re-characterization of its

r
[_,

L
[

equitable claims as legal claims, Johnson provides no argument or analysis additional to that set
forth by the magistrate court. The Estate maintains that the magistrate court's analysis was in
error for the reasons set forth in the Estate's Opening brief.

Idaho 64, 249 P. 254, 255 (1926) (looking to California, New York, Wisconsin, Ohio, Kansas,
Montana, Connecticut, Alabama, Colorado, and multiple secondary sources); Kloepfer v. Forch,
32 Idaho 415, 184 P. 477 (1919) (looking to Virginia, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York,
Indiana, California, and Corpus Juris).
3
Johnson challenges the Estate's citation to Brasch v. Brasch, 55 Idaho 777, 47 P.2d 676 (1935)
as appearing to presume survival. The Estate provided this citation as a supplement to the
general rule of survival of equitable claims, as set forth in the second edition of American
Jurisprudence. The Estate still maintains that the Brasch Court appears to presume survival. In
Brasch, the Court considered whether an estate could pursue a constructive trust claim on behalf
of a decedent. Id. The Brasch Court held that the estate could not pursue the claims because the
statute of limitations ran prior to institution of the suit. Id. The Court made no mention of
abatement.
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The Estate's Complaint States Separate Contract Claims.

Johnson proposes an interpretation of Bishop that not only created a universal rule of
abatement, but that also dictates that all other claims-whether in tort or contract, whether in law
or equity-ought to be re-characterized and held abated.

The magistrate court erred in its

interpretation. In its Opening Brief, the Estate distinguished its contract claims from those found
in Bishop be setting forth the distinct factual scenarios, and identifying specific trust provisions
that required certain duties not identified in the Uniform Probate Code. Johnson argues that even
though the Estate has identified specific terms, it has still only made a tort claim because "no
provisions [of the trust] provid[e] for a higher standard of care than established in the Uniform
Probate Code." Resp. Br. 12, ifl.
Johnson reasons that where (1) the law presumes a standard of care, (2) the contract does
not provide a distinct standard of care, and (3) the cause of action alleges a breach of that
standard of care, then the claim is made in tort and not contract. If Johnson's proposed reasoning
were to prevail, a contract cause of action would rarely exist. The law presumes a standard of
care in every contract, whether it be a standard of good faith and fair dealing or a higher standard
based upon the relationship of the parties. Johnson's attempt to distinguish contract claims from
tort claims based upon the document's identification of a unique standard of care is
unsubstantiated and unworkable.

C.

The Estate's Causes of Action Did Not Abate Under Idaho Code§ 5-327(2).

The Estate was unable to identify Idaho case law addressing the application of the
language ofldaho Code§ 5-327(2) to claims of property damage. The Estate recognizes that the
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legislature's choice of arrangement and wording is inarticulate. The Court is left with the task of
deriving the intent of the legislature. In accomplishing its task, the Court must determine if
common sense and reason counsel a finding that the legislature intended to limit property
damage cases to recovery for "medical expenses," "other out-of-pocket expenses" and "loss of
earnings actually suffered" where those damages are incurred "prior to the death of such injured
period as a result of the wrongful act or negligence." For the reasons set forth in the Estate's
Opening brief, the Estate maintains that the legislature did not intend the second sentence to
function as a limitation on property damage claims.
CONCLUSION

The property interests of a decedent survive the decedent, they do not die and they do not
abate.

L

The magistrate court erred in its expansive reading of Bishop and erred in its rigid

interpretation of Idaho Code § 5-327(2). The Estate asks this Court to reverse the grant of
summary judgment.
DATED this 3rd day of December, 2013.
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

amuel T. Creason, ISB #8183
Attorneys for Appellant
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Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

IN THE MATTER OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL, et al,

)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV2012-277

COURT MINUTES

)
)
Michael J. Griffin, District Judge Presiding
Darrel Aherin, Attorney
Karin Seubert, Attorney
Theodore Creason, Attorney
Christy L. Gering, Deputy Court Clerk
Date: 02/18/2014 Tape: CD610-1 Time: 8:30 a.m.
Subject of Proceeding: Oral Argument on Appeal

----------------------------------------------------------------MINUTE ENTRY:
8:30

Honorable Michael J. Griffin presiding telephonically. Court gives introductions.
Parties present: Darrel Aherin, Attorney for; Karin Seubert, Attorney for; Theodore
Creason, Attorney for. Court advises this is the time set for oral argument. Court
apologizes and further advises it was his understanding this hearing would be
telephonic, so he set matters in another county and will not be here in person.
Court inquires if the Court Reporter is present. Clerk advises he is not.

8:30

In response to inquiry from the Court, Mr. Creason waives the Court Reporter.

8:30

In response to inquiry from the Court, Mr. Aherin waives the Court Reporter.

8:31

In response to inquiry from the Court, Ms. Seubert waives the Court Reporter.

8:31

Mr. Ted Creason advises he is covering for Sam Creason as his wife is giving birth
right now. Mr. Creason gives argument.

8:35

Mr. Aherin gives argument.

Christy Gering
Deputy Clerk
Court Minutes - 1
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IN THE MATTER OF MICHAELS. CORNELL
CASE NO. CV2012-277

8:38

Ms. Seubert gives argument.

8:43

Court questions Ms. Seubert.

8:45

Ms. Seubert responds.

8:46

Mr. Creason gives rebuttal argument.

8:47

Mr. Aherin gives rebuttal argument.

8:48

Ms. Seubert gives rebuttal argument.

8:50

Court thanks counsel for their time and will get a decision out soon.

8:50

Court in recess.

Approved:

~

Michaelriffin, District Judge

Court Minutes - 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNY OF CLEARWATER
)
)
)
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF )
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE
)
M. CORNELL.
)

IN THE MATTER OF:

CASE NO. CV 2012-277
ORDER REMANDING CASE

This matter is remanded to the Magistrate Court for further proceedings consistent with
this court's Order Re: Appeal filed contemporaneously.
Dated this - {-.day of April, 2014.

~ fl

District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNY OF CLEARWATER
)
)
)
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF )
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE
)
M.CORNELL.
)

IN THE MATTER OF:

CASE NO. CV 2012-277
ORDER RE: APPEAL

Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell, husband and wife, created a trust (Cornell
family trust) while living in California. They had two children, John Cornell and Toni Johnson,
both of whom survived their parents.
Arlie and Michael Cornell were originally co-trustees of their family trust. Arlie Cornell
died on November 9, 2008 .
On August 6, 2009 Toni Johnson was appointed sole trustee of the Cornell family trust.
Michael Cornell died on December 15, 2009.
The trust provided that the trustee would divide the trust property equally between Toni
Johnson and John Cornell as soon as reasonably possible after the death of both grantors. Toni
Johnson did not distribute any of the trust property to John Cornell, but did use some of the trust
property for her own benefit.
John Cornell filed a Petition for Supervised Administration of the Cornell family trust,
and removal of Toni Johnson as trustee on July 11, 2012.
John Cornell died on August 20, 2012.
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Margaret Watkins, a sister of Arlie Cornell, was appointed temporary personal
representative of John Cornell's estate (Clearwater County Case #CV12-439) on November 13,
2012.
Kareen Cornell, wife of John Cornell, was appointed personal representative of John
Cornell's estate on February 6, 2013. Margaret Watkins' appointment as personal representative
was terminated on February 12, 2013.
The Magistrate issued a summary judgment on February 15, 2013. That order dismissed
the petition for supervised administration of the Cornell family trust and petition for removal of
the trustee (the petition had been filed by John Cornell and pursued by Margaret Watson).
Kareen Cornell, on behalf of her husband's estate, filed a petition for supervised
administration of the Cornell family trust on February 26, 2013.
The Magistrate issued a summary judgment dismissing Kareen Cornell's petition on June
21, 2013.
Margaret Watson appealed the Magistrate's summary judgment on March 26, 2013.
On July 2, 2013 Kareen Cornell filed an appeal of the Magistrate's second summary
judgment.
APPELLATE ISSUES
Does Margaret Watson have standing to appeal?
Does Kareen Cornell have standing to appeal?
Did the Magistrate err is dismissing the petition to remove Toni Johnson as trustee
without addressing that issue?
Did the Magistrate err is determining that Toni Johnson's breach of fiduciary duty to
John Cornell was a tort which abated upon his death?
LEGAL STAND ARD
The court defers to the trial court's findings of fact if supported by substantial competent
evidence, but exercises free review of the law and its application to the facts.
DISCUSSION
Margaret Watson is no longer the personal representative of John Cornell's estate. She
has no standing to pursue any claims of John Cornell against Toni Johnson or claims John
Cornell may have against the Cornell family trust.
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Kareen Cornell, as the personal representative of John Cornell's estate, does have
standing to pursue claims against Toni Johnson and the Cornell family trust.
Kareen Cornell is permitted to appeal the Magistrate's decisions that fall within Idaho
Code 17-201.
The Magistrate correctly treated the two Petitions for supervised administration of the
Cornell family trust as motions for summary judgment since the court considered affidavits and
other evidence.
When the first petition for supervised administration was filed it included a petition to
remove Toni Johnson as trustee. Idaho Code 15-7-308 provides the grounds for removal of a
trustee. A trustee may be removed for specific acts of malfeasance. The court may initiate the
removal of the trustee on its own motion, or in response to a petition for removal.
When a petition for removal of a trustee is filed that issue must be addressed by the court
prior to any pending motion for supervised administration. In this case the Magistrate did not
discuss the petition to remove Toni Johnson as trustee in his opinion, but merely denied the
petition. This court is unable to determine if the Magistrate considered that motion or merely
failed to include his reasoning in his opinion. The findings of fact would seem to indicate
sufficient grounds for removing Toni Johnson as trustee, but that decision would be in the
discretion of the trier of fact. This court is unable to determine from the record if the Magistrate
recognized that issue as one of discretion, acted within the bounds of his discretion, and reached
his decision by reason.
For that reason the case shall be remanded to the trial court to address his reasons for
dismissing the petition for removal of Toni Johnson as trustee.
As a matter of guidance Idaho Code 5-327 does not apply to the facts as found by the
Magistrate in this case. There was no personal injury to John Cornell. None of the property that
should have been distributed to John Cornell was damaged. The breach of a fiduciary duty to
distribute property from a trust to the beneficiaries is not the same as damage to the items to be
distributed.
A trustee is liable under Idaho Code 15-7-306 for a variety of acts, including torts. That
liability is the same as the liability of a personal representative of an estate, see the comments to
Idaho Code 15-7-306 and Idaho Code 15-3-808.
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Dated this ~Lday of April, 2014.

/ ~~

Michael J. Griffin
District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
)

In the Matter of:

)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

~

MOTION TO REMOVE TRUSTEE

)

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

________ _____

)
)
)
)

COMES NOW Kareen Cornell, acting in her capacity as Personal Representative of the
Estate of John Henry Cornell, by and through her attorney, Samuel T. Creason of Creason,
Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC, and hereby moves this Court for an Order removing Toni
Johnson as trustee of The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell .

...

DATED this l_Z;___ day of May, 2014.
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

amuel T. Creason, ISB # 8183
Attorneys for Estate

MOTION TO REMOVE - 1

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston ID 83501
(208)743-1516; Fax(208)746-2231
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~
ay of May, 2014, a copy of the foregoing
MOTION TO REMOVE TRUSTEE was served by the method indicated below and addressed to
the following:
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC
Attorney at Law
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
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Case No. CV 2012-00277

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
RE: MOTION TO REMOVE TRUSTEE

)

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The Court must decide whether Toni Johnson engaged in conduct during her tenure as
successor trustee of The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell
("Trust") such that she should be removed. The Estate of John Cornell ("Estate") asks the Court
to order her removal based upon her well-established breaches of trust, failures in proper
administration, and acts frustrating the purpose of the trustors in forming the trust. The Estate
also moves the Court to restrain Ms. Johnson's actions during the pendency of the Court' s
consideration of this motion.
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II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case

This matter comes before the Court on remand from the District Court instructing the
Magistrate Court to determine whether Ms. Toni Johnson ought to be removed as trustee of the
Trust. The District Court also provided guidance on questions regarding the survival of actions
by the Estate and the availability of damages should the Estate prevail on its claims. The Estate
now brings before the Court the question of removal.
B. Course of Proceedings

The Estate filed a Petition for supervised administration of the Trust on February 28,
2013. The Estate's Petition alleged that Ms. Johnson: (1) failed to act in conformity with the
terms of the Trust; (2) breached her fiduciary duties when acting in her capacity as Trustee;
(3) engaged in equitable conversion of the property belonging to John Cornell by refusing to
distribute the property; and (4) was unjustly enriched by (a) misusing Trust assets for personal
desires, and (b) refusing to comply with the terms of the Trust and her fiduciary duties in order to
effect a distribution in her favor. The Estate sought supervised administration, court ordered
distribution of the Trust, and a judgment against Ms. Johnson for injuries caused to the Trust.
The Petition set forth the following legal and equitable causes of action: (A) breach of fiduciary
duty; (B) constructive trust; (C) breach of contract; (D) conversion; and (E) unjust enrichment.
No Answer has ever been filed to those allegations. Instead, Ms. Johnson filed a Motion
to Dismiss the Estate's Petition on March 1.

The Magistrate Court granted Ms. Johnson's

Motion on June 21. In its memorandum opinion, the Court concluded that: (A) all claims for
breach of fiduciary duty abated, at common law and under Idaho statute, upon death; (B) the
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doctrine of constructive trust was inapplicable and an action under that doctrine was in tort,
which abated upon death; (C) the claims for breach of contract were co-extensive with the
statutory duties of a trustee and, therefore, were breach of fiduciary duty claims which abated
upon death; (D) claims for equitable conversion sounded in tort and, therefore, abated upon
death; and (E) claims for unjust enrichment sounded in tort and, therefore, abated upon death.
The Magistrate Court based its ruling upon the following conclusions of law: (1) the Idaho
Supreme Court Opinion of Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 619 (2012) stands for the
proposition that all claims sounding in tort abate at common law upon the death of the claimant;
and (2) the Idaho Legislature did not abrogate that rule with the amendment of Idaho Code § 5327, except for claims for recovery of medical expenses, out of pocket expenses, and lost wages.
Appeal was taken to the District Court. On April 8, 2014, the District Court issued an
Order reversing the ruling of the Magistrate Court and remanding the case for further
proceedings. The District Court ruled that the Magistrate Court ought to have first ruled upon
the question of whether Ms. Johnson should be removed as trustee of the Trust before proceeding
to the arguments regarding limitation on damages and abatement. The District Court then went
on to rule that: (1) damages were not limited by law in this matter; and (2) the trustee could be
held liable in tort for injury to the property of John Cornell.

C. Statement of Facts 1
Michael and Arlie Cornell established the Trust on November 1, 1996. The Trust was
established to provide for Michael and Arlie during their lifetimes, with the remainder to be
1

All of the facts set forth herein have been established through prior pleadings on record with
the Court.
Instead of resubmit such evidence through subsequent affidavit, Petitioner
incorporates the submissions of record in this matter by reference.
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distributed to their two children: Toni Johnson and John Cornell.

Arlie Cornell died on

November 9, 2008. Michael Cornell died on December 15, 2009. Ms. Johnson has been the sole
trustee since that time.
As a successor trustee, Ms. Johnson was to have a very limited role. Ms. Johnson's sole
duty as trustee was to distribute the trust assets. Over the months and years following Michael
Cornell's death, Ms. Johnson failed to distribute the Trust. Instead, she "egregiously wronged
her brother during his lifetime." Mem. Opinion re Attorney Fees and Costs at 3. "Ms. Johnson
acted inappropriately in bestowing the proceeds of the trust upon herself and not shar[ing] one
cent with her brother." Id. She refused to distribute the Trust, despite John Cornell's repeated
objections and pleas that she do so, in part, so that he could "pay for necessary medical care that
he could not obtain without money from the trust." Id. at 2. John Cornell was never able to
compel distribution before his death on August 20, 2012.
Ms. Johnson's discovery responses in this case substantiate the concerns and frustrations
that Mr. Cornell raised in the over two and one-half years between the surviving trustor's death
and Mr. Cornell's death. At her deposition, Ms. Johnson admitted that she routinely makes
personal use of the real and personal property of the Trust. She lives rent-free in the home that is
included in the Trust. She has commingled cash assets of the Trust with her own cash assets.
She has depleted the cash assets of the Trust, with not only expenses of the Trust but also her
personal expenses. To date, the only distributions that Ms. Johnson has made are the unreported
distributions made through her personal use of the Trust res.
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III.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION

1.
As successor trustee, Toni Johnson was to distribute the Trust res "as soon as
reasonably possible." Ms. Johnson concedes that she acted inequitably: she mismanaged the
Trust, she commingled assets, she used Trust funds for personal use, and she refused to distribute
the Trust res, despite John Cornell's demands. John Cornell died in August 2012. Should Toni
Johnson be removed as trustee?

2.
Whether the Court ought to enter an order restraining Ms. Toni Johnson from
making any distribution of Trust assets pending a decision on this petition?
IV.
1.

ANALYSIS

The Court should remove Ms. Toni Johnson as trustee of the Trust.

The Idaho Uniform Probate Code sets forth the grounds upon which a court may remove
the trustee of a trust. Here, several grounds exist mandating the removal of Toni Johnson as
trustee of the Trust. Idaho Code§ 15-7-308(2) allows for removal of a trustee where "the trustee
has committed a material breach of trust;" "the trustee is unfit or unable to administer the trust;"
"removal of the trustee would substantially further the trustor's purpose in creating the trust;" or
other good cause supports removal. These four grounds each independently provide grounds for
removal.
Johnson should be removed because she has committed a material breach of trust. Ms.
Johnson had a duty to observe reasonably prudent standards for handling the trust assets and to
handle the funds for the benefit of the Trust's beneficiaries. Idaho Code § 15-7-302. Instead,
Ms. Johnson failed to keep proper accounts of the Trust and refused to provide information to
Mr. Cornell. See Idaho Code§ 15-7-303. Ms. Johnson commingled cash assets of the Trust with
her own cash assets and with cash assets. Ms. Johnson stated that she has spent all of the cash
assets of the Trust for her living expenses and expenses incurred maintaining and paying taxes on
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the Trust property. "Ms. Johnson egregiously wronged her brother during his lifetime." Mem.
Opinion re Atty. Fees. Despite Mr. Cornell's pleas, "Mr. Cornell waited in vain for funds from
the trust to pay for necessary medical care that he could not obtain without money from the
trust." Id.
Ms. Johnson has also shown herself unable or unfit to administer the trust. Idaho Code
§ 15-7-308(2)(b). "Following the death of the last surviving parent, Ms. Johnson was required
under state law and the terms of the trust to distribute the assets of the trust as expeditiously as
possible to herself and Mr. Cornell." Mem. Opinion re Atty. Fees. See Idaho Code§ 15-7-301 (a
trustee has a general duty "to administer the trust expeditiously for the benefit of the
beneficiaries"); Trust § 4.03 and 4.04.

Ms. Johnson has failed to make a single proper

distribution of the Trust in the 3.5 years she has served as trustee.
Ms. Johnson should be removed because doing so would substantially further the
trustor' s purpose. Idaho Code § 15-7-308(2)( e). "Ms. Johnson entirely thwarted the intentions
of her parents in establishing the trust for her brother to receive half the estate. Ms. Johnson
dishonored the trust her father placed in her when he named her as the sole person responsible for
distribution of the trust. Ms. Johnson acted inappropriately in bestowing the proceeds of the trust
upon herself and not share one cent with her brother." Instead, "Ms. Johnson used funds from
the trust for her personal expenses . . . . Ms. Johnson lived rent free in the home that is included
in the Trust." Mem. Opinion re Atty. Fees. Ms. Johnson has, and continues to, frustrate the clear
purpose of the trustors through her actions as trustee.
Other good cause exists for the removal of Ms. Johnson as trustee of the Trust. Idaho
Code § 15-7-908(2)(f). Ms. Johnson's intransigence during her tenure as trustee evidences her
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settled position of contempt for the interests of her brother as beneficiary of the Trust. The
breaches set forth herein are not isolated or innocent, but rather establish a pattern of
unwillingness to act in accordance with her duties as trustee.

Whether the Court ought to enter an order restraining Ms. Toni Johnson
2.
from making any distribution of Trust assets pending a decision on this petition?
The Court has authority to "order such appropriate relief as may be necessary to protect
the trust property or the interests of the beneficiaries" pending a determination on removal.
Idaho Code § 15-7-308(3). Given the malfeasance set forth herein, the Estate requests that the
Court enter an order restraining Ms. Toni Johnson from making any distribution of Trust assets
pending a ruling.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The record in this case has established the indisputable nature of Ms. Johnson' s
mishandling of the Trust. Based upon the authorities set forth herein, the Estate asks that the
Court remove Ms. Johnson from her position as trustee of the Trust.

DATED this ~

y of May, 2014.
OORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~
y of May, 2014, I filed the foregoing
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT RE: MOTION TO REMOVE TRUSTEE with the Clerk of the
Court, and provided a paper copy to the following persons:

Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C.
1304 Idaho Street
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NOTICE OF HEARING
RE: MOTION TO REMOVE
TRUSTEE

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned will call on for hearing the MOTION
TO REMOVE TRUSTEE before the Magistrate on Tuesday, May 27, 2014, at 3:00 p.m., or as
soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, in a courtroom of the Clearwater County Courthouse,
Orofino, Idaho.
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DATED this JCctay of May, 2014.
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

rnuel T. Creason, ISB # 8183
Attorneys for Estate
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Case No. CV 2012-00277

APPLICATION FOR APPOINTMENT
OFTRUSTEE
(Idaho Code § 15-7-403)

Applicant, Kareen Cornell, states and represents to the Court that:
(1)

Applicant's interest in this matter is that of Personal Representative of the Estate

of John Henry Cornell ("Estate"); the Estate claims a beneficiary interest in the Trust. Applicant
has priority as the only representative of a beneficiary interest other than:

NAME
Toni C. Johnson

RELATIONSHIP/PRIORITY
Current Trustee & Beneficiary

APPLICATION FOR APPOINTMENT- 1

ADDRESS
c/o Karin Seubert
Jones Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C.
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
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(2)

The Michael and Arlie Cornell established the Trust on November I, 1996. The

Trust was established to provide for Michael and Arlie during their lifetimes, with the remainder
to be distributed to their two children: Toni Johnson and John Cornell. Arlie Cornell died on
November 9, 2008. Michael Cornell died on December 15, 2009. Ms. Johnson has been the sole
Trustee since that time. The true state of assets and liabilities of the Trust are unknown at this

time as a result of administration by Ms. Johnson.
(3)

Applicant has filed a Motion to Remove the Trustee, concurrently herewith. The

existing trustee of the trust is:
NAME
Toni C. Johnson

(4)

ADDRESS
c/o Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & CalJery, P.L.L.C.
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501

Appointment is sought for:
NAME
Kareen Cornell

ADDRESS
P.O. Box 361
Heyburn, ID 83336

(5)

There exist no contingent beneficiaries for the trust.

(6)

A copy of the trust is in the possession of the Court.

(7)

After the exercise of reasonable diligence, the Applicant is unaware of any

instrument revoking the trust.
(8)

Termination of the appointment of the prior trustee is sought through pleadings

tiled concurrently herewith.

WHEREFORE, APPLICANT REQUESTS:
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I.

That Kareen Cornell be appointed trustee of the trust;

2.

That the Court recognize the acceptance of the duties of the office of trustee filed

herewith;
3.

That letters of trusteeship be issued.

DATED this

J~ay of May, 2014.
CREASON MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

VERIFICATION
STA TE OF IDAHO )
: ss.
County of

C. Pt S s I t4 )

Applicant, being sworn, says that the facts set forth in the foregoing application are true,
accurate, and complete to the best of applicant' s knowledge and belief.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this .11:.._ day of May 2014 .

.GA~ E. PRICE
(.')~ARV pUBUC
STATE OF IOAHO
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IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
)

)

In the Matter of:

Case No. CV 2012-00277

)

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF

)

ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT

MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

)
)

(Idaho Code§ 15-7-403)

)
)
)

----------------)

STATE OF IDAHO
.·'\

: ss .

County of _l;:,...=o..=S'--'~"-'i'"""q,.,.___
The undersigned hereby accepts appointment to the office of trustee of The Revocable
Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell and agrees to perform and discharge the
trust of that office. The undersigned hereby submits personally to the jurisdiction of this Court in

ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT- 1
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any proceeding relating to the trust that may be instituted by an interested person as defined by
the Idaho Unifonn Probate Code.
DATED this

l '- day of May, 2014.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

/2,., day of May, 2014.

A~~

~ r y Public for Idaho
Residing or employed at tJ(.A..,,.... fry_
My Appointment Expires: C::, -/-'/7
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1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on this \ 2 day of May, 2014, I filed the foregoing
ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT with the Clerk of the Court, and provided a paper copy to
the following persons:
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C.
13 04 Idaho Street
P.0.Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83S01
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NOTICE OF HEARING
RE: APPLICATION FOR
APPOINTMENT OF TRUSTEE
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned will call on for hearing the
APPLICATION FOR APPOINTMENT OF TRUSTEE before the Magistrate on Tuesday, May
27, 2014, at 3:00 p.m. , or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, in a courtroom of the
Clearwater County Courthouse, Orofino, Idaho .
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DATED this
. ~

"""

day of May, 2014.
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

eason, ISB # 8183
Attorneys for Estate
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this (Z,tf-day of May, 2014, a copy of the foregoing
NOTICE OF HEARING was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
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1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
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Karin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attomeys at Law
Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
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Idaho State Bar No. 7813

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:

)
Case No. CV 2012-00277

)

THEREVOCABlEFAMlL YTRUSTOF )
:tv1'.ICHAEL S. CORNEIL~ ARLIE M. )
CORNEIL.
)

_ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _)

OBJECTION TO MOTION TO
REMOVE TRUSTEE & APPLICATION
FOR APPOINTMENT OF TRUSTEE

)

COMES NOW Respondent Toni Johnson, by and through her attorney of record, Karin
Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., and objects to the Motion to Remove Trustee and
Application for Appointment of Trustee filed by Kareen Cornell, as Personal Representative of the

Estate of John Henry Cornell (the "Estate''), and set for hearing in this matter on May 27, 2014 at
3:00p.m.
The primary basis of this objection, as discussed further below, is that the Estate's requests
are outside the scope of the Magistrate Court's authority on remand.

As this Court is familiar, this proceeding involves two separate petitions, one filed by John
Cornell during his lifetime (Petition for Supetvised Administration and Removal of Trustee filed

July 11, 2012 ("First Petition")) and a second filed by the Estate (Petition for Supervised
Administration and Court Ordered Distribution dated February 26, 2013 (''Second Petition")). The

First Petition and Second Petition involve the same factual allegations, however only the First
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Petition sought the relief of removal of the. trustee. The Estate now seeks to expand the scope of its
Second Petition through the Motion to Remove Trustee and Application for Appointment of Trustee

to include removal of the trustee.
Respondent sought dismissal of both petitions based on the abatement of John Cornell's
claims upon his death, which this Magistrate Court granted. See Judgments of Dismissal dated
Febmary 25, 2013 and June 21, 2013. Margaret Watldns appealed the dismissal of the Frrst
Petition.

See Notice of Appeal dated March 25, 2013. The Estate expressly "decline[d] any

invitation to participate in [Watkins' appeal of the First Petition] as a pseudo-party and, thereby,

. waive its right to a separate and distinct judicial process." Brief of Estate re: Watkins' Appeal dated
June 10, 2013. The Estate appealed the dismissal of the Second Petition. See Notice of Appeal

dated July 1, 2013.

The District Court addressed both appeals concurrently, concluded that

Margaret Watkins lacked standing to pursue any claims of John Cornell, and remanded the case to

the Magistrate Court "to address [itsJ reasons for dismissing the petition for removal of Toni
Johnson as trustee." See Order RE: Appeal and Order Remanding Case filed April 8, 2014.
Subsequently, the Estate filed the subject Motion to Remove Trustee and Application for
Appointment of Trustee.

"Issues not raised below but raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered or
reviewed. The general rule is that, on remand, a trial court has authority to take actions it is

specifically directed to take, or those which are subsidiary to the actions directed by the appellate
court." Mountainview Landowners Coop. Assn., Inc. v. Cool, 142 Idaho 861, 866, 136 P.3d 332,
337 (2006) (quoting Whitted v. Canyon County Bd. of Comm'rs, 137 Idaho 118, 112, 44 P.3d 1173,
1177 (2002); State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883,886, 11 P.3d 1101, 1104 (2000)).

The Idaho Supreme Court addressed a similar procedural situation in Walters v. Industrial

Indemnity Co. of Idaho, 130 Idaho 836, 949 P.2d 223 (1997) ("Walters If'). In Walters 1, the Idaho
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 127 Idaho
933, 908 P.2d 1240. Subsequent to said decision, the claimant sought to amend his complaint to
raise constitution claims that had previously not been raised before the trial court and that the
appellate court had refused to consider in its Walters I decision. 130 Idaho at 837, 949 P.2d at 224.
In Walters II, the Court concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider a motion to
amend on remand. Id. at 837-38, 949 P.2d at 224-25 (quoting Mountain Home Lumber Co. v.
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Swartwout, 33 Idaho 737, 740-41, 197 P. 1027, .1028 (1921) ("The mandate of the reviewing court
is binding upon the lower court, and :must be strictly followed: Where the appellate court remands a
cause with directions to enter judgment for one of the parties, the judgment of.the appellate court is
a final judgment in the cause, and the entry thereof in the lower comt is a purely ministerial act...
A trial court has no authority to enter any judgment or order not in confonnity with the order of the
appellate court. That order is conclusive on the parties, and no judgment or order different from or
in addition to that directed by it can have any effect. No modification of the judgment so directed
can be made by the trial court, nor can any provision be ingrafted on or taken from it.").
Here, the District Court has empowered the Magistrate Court on remand to "address (its]
reasons for dismissing the petition for removal of Toni Johnson as trustee." See Order RE; Appeal
filed April 8, 2014. The only reasonable reading of said ruling is that it relates to the First Petition

only, since the Second Petition contained no such removal request, as supported by the Estate's
recognition of the same and request to seek such a4ditional relief. Because said relief is outside the
scope of the Second Petition, the Motion and Application before the Court essentially constitute
amendments to the Second Petition without leave of this Court as required by I.R.C.P. 15(a).
As was the procedural circumstances in the Walter proceeding discussed above, the
Magistrate Court lacks authority on remand to grant such leave to amend or to consider the
additional relief sought. As such, said Motion and Application should be denied.
Because the Estate did not appeal the dismissal of the First Petition and instead, the appeal
of its dismissal was pursued by a patty that the District Court concludes lacked standing, then the
dismissal of the First Petition cannot now at this late date be revived by the Estate, who expressly

declined to participate in the Watkins' appeal. See State v Tucker, 103 Idaho 885, 655 P.2d 92
(Ct.App. 1982) (holding that' the requirement of perfecting an appeal within the applicable time
period is jurisdictional; an appeal taken after expiration of the filing period will be dismissed). For
purposes of the appeal of the First Petition's dismissal, the Estate is not Margaret Watkins
successor. As such, the Estate has waived any and all potential arguments relative to the trustee's

removal as raised in the First Petition.
Respondent additionally notes that this Court expressly gave the Estate, through its then
newly appointed personal representative, twenty days from February 15, 2013 to file claims on
behalf of the Estate. See Merrwrandum Opinion and Judgment for Dismissal entered February 15,
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2013. Said time period expired on March 7, 2013. The Motion and Application now before the
Court were not filed until May 13, 2014, and are lllltimely based upon this Court's prior order.
Even if the Estate had timely raised or preserved the· removal issue, it lacks standing under
the statute to seek removal of the trustee. Section 15-7-308(1) of the Idaho Code rrovides as
follows:
A trustee may be removed in accordance with the terms of the trust or by the comt
on its own initiative or on petition of a rrustor, cotrustee, or beneficiary.

The Motion to Rem.ove Trustee fails to comply with said requirement, and as such1 should
be dismissed.

Said Motion is brought by Kareen Cornell, acting in her capacity as Personal

Representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell. It is not brought by the Court on its own
initiative. The Estate is neither a trustor nor cotrustee. The Estate is not a beneficiary of the Trust,

which expressly provides that all net 'income and principal remaining in the Trust Estate vest in
Respondent as the sole surviving beneficiary upon the death of John H. Cornell where John H.
Cornell leaves no surviving issue. See Trust at§ 4.03(a).
As such, the Estate now lacks standing to pursue a removal action. Similarly, even if the
removal action within the First Petition had been preserved, the Estate lacked standing to pursue
upon John Cornell's death. Any other conclusion would lead to ridiculous results where the
trustee sought to be removed is the sole surviving sole beneficiary.

As to the consideration of the removal action contained in the First Petition, the same
analysis applies. While John Cornell had standing to make such a request during his lifetime,
upon his death, said standing lapsed upon his death under the express terms of the Trust.
Because· John Cornell's claims against the trustee abated upon his death, no party retained
standing or a legitimate interest to pursue the trustee removal action, so good cause exists for its
dismissal as was implicit in this Court's original ruling.
For these reasons, Respondent requests that this Court deny the Estate's Motion to

Remove Trustee and Application for Appointment of Trustee and confirm its implicit denial of the
dismissal of the removal action contained in the First Petition.
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dayofMay,2014.

JONES, BROWER & CAI.LERY, P.L.L.C.

~&»Jtw=~-

By__,_.;:;:~~ Karin Seubert
.
Attorney for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO
MOTION TO REMOVE TRUSTEE AND
APPIJCATION FOR APPOINTMENT OF
TRUSTEE was, this
day of May, 2014,
transmitted via facsimile to:

«~

Samuel T. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl
1219 Idaho St.
Lewiston, ID 83501

By~& vlectKarin Seubert
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

IN THE MATTER OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL, et al,

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV2012-277

COURT MINUTES

Randall W. Robinson, Magistrate Judge Presiding
Karin Seubert, Attorney
Theodore Creason, Attorney
Lisa McMillan, Deputy Court Clerk
Date: 05/27/2014 Tape: CD481-2 Time: 3:16 p.m.
Subject of Proceeding: Matter Of Revocable Family Trust Hearing
MINUTE ENTRY:
3:16

Honorable Randall W. Robinson presiding. Court gives introductions. Parties
present Attorney; Karin Seubert, Attorney; Theodore Creason , . Court advises he
will be addressing the motion for the new trustee and the remand .

3:16

Court states he has read both parties excellent briefs and asks Mr. Creason if he's
had a chance to read Ms. Seubert's brief.

3: 17

Mr. Creason speaks and states he has read Ms. Seubert's brief, but doesn't feel
he's had enough time as he'd like or is entitled to.

3: 17

Court advises he will begin with the statute regarding the removal of trustee.
Statute 15-7-308

3: 18

Mr. Creason argues his motion.

3:20

Colloquy with Court and counsel regarding removal of Ms. Johnson.

3:23

Colloquy with Court and counsel regarding abatement.

3:28

Mr. Creason argues there is someone now who claims to be the sole beneficiary
but it's an argument.

3:29

Court states that Judge Griffin stated statute doesn't apply.
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3:30

Mr. Creason believes Court is misreading Judge Griffin's decision.

3:32

Court believes abatement does extinguish any remedy.

3:33

Mr. Creason argues the abatement issue was briefed and argued in front of the
District Court. If Judge Griffin wasn't over turning your decision on abatement why
would he remand at all.

3:33

Colloquy with Court and counsel regarding issue of appointment of trustee.

3:34

Mr. Creason states he is not removing his request. Asks the Court to enter a
temporary restraining order/injunction against the trustee and to grant two weeks to
do some research and re-brief it for another remand.

3:35

Colloquy with Court and counsel regarding a remand.

3:36

Court states when an appeal is filed a motion for stay could be granted.

3:37

Court states he's inclined to grant Mr. Creason the two weeks.

3:38

Colloquy with Court and counsel regarding probate.

3:38

Mr. Creason states the objection was untimely and should be stricken for time
factors. Also, states their Motion that's unopposed.

3:39

Court asks Mr. Creason if he would still like the two weeks.

3:39

Mr. Creason feels one week would be sufficient.

3:39

Ms. Seubert apologizes for not filing objection timely. She explains time factors
came from Mr. Creason and his client.

3:40

Ms. Seubert argues her objection.

3:42

Colloquy with Court and counsel regarding what remand asked Court to do.

3:46

Ms. Seubert would like to make clear for the record in terms of consideration for
this removal action that this case has never had an evidentiary hearing. She feels
the Court has only ever heard one side of the story during this entire case.
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3:48

Ms. Seubert argues her reading of Judge Griffin's decision is he has inadvertently
confused the removal of personal representative with the removal of a trustee and
that there is not an automatic stay in the removal of a trustee, only contained in the
removal of a personal representative.

3:48

Colloquy with Court and counsel regarding automatic stay in estates.

3:50

Ms. Seubert states she is reading from Idaho Code 15-3611 Part A which deals
with termination of appointment by removal with cause.

3:51

Mr. Creason doesn't feel the stay issue is effecting the Court proceedings today.
Mr. Creason feels the Court has authority under 15-7-308 sub. 3 to stay.

3:53

Mr. Creason states the heir can come in and motion for removal of PR.

3:53

Mr. Creason feels the Judge has said that Ms. Johnson can be held liable and that
the Judge has said that this Court should consider whether Ms. Johnson should be
removed and for the reasons in our briefing she should be removed.

3:54

Court is in recess.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
Case No. CV 2012-277
IN THE MATTER OF THE

MEMORANDUM OPINION
RE REMAND ORDER

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL

This case concerns a trust which identifies John Cornell and Toni Johnson as
beneficiaries. John Cornell died before his sister and trustee of the trust, Toni Johnson,
distributed John Cornell's share of the trust to him. Under the terms of the trust, Toni
Johnson is entitled to the entire trust as John Cornell passed away before he received
any part of the trust.
John Cornell's widow, Kareen Cornell, filed a petition for supervised
administration and court ordered distribution seeking relief against Toni Johnson based
upon claims personal to John Cornell for how Toni Johnson allegedly mishandled the
trust. The issue animating this case is whether John Cornell's claims against Toni
Johnson survive his death.
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HISTORY OF THE CASE
On July 11, 2012, this case was initiated by John Cornell as a Petition for
Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee. John Cornell died on August 20,
2012. Margaret Watkins, a relative of John Cornell, pursued the claims of John Cornell
set forth in his Petition after his death.
On September 14, 2012, Toni Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on
the grounds that the claims of John Cornell were abated upon the death of John
Cornell. This Motion was granted on February 15, 2013 based upon a Memorandum
Opinion filed on the same date.
On February 26, 2013, Kareen Cornell filed on behalf of the deceased John
Cornell a petition for supervised administration and court ordered distribution. On
March 14, 2013, Toni Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss based again upon abatement of
the claims of John Cornell upon his death. After considering the briefs and oral
arguments of the parties, this Court on June 21, 2013, granted the Motion to Dismiss
and dismissed the action based upon a Memorandum Opinion filed on the same date.
Timely appeals were taken by Kareen Cornell and Margaret Watkins. On April 8,
2014, the District Court remanded this case for this Court "to address his reasons for
dismissing the petition for removal of Toni Johnson." Order Re Appeal at 3. On May
13, 2014, Kareen Cornell, after the remand order, filed a Motion To Remove Trustee
and an Application for Appointment of Trustee seeking appointment of herself to serve
as trustee.
On May 27, 2014, oral argument was heard with regards to the remand order
and Kareen Cornell's motions. Kareen Seubert appeared on behalf of Toni Johnson
MEMORANDUM OPINION-2
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and Samuel Creason appeared on behalf of Kareen Cornell. This Memorandum
Opinion addresses the remand order and Kareen Cornell's Motions together.
DISCUSSION
The remand order specifically requests this Court to address the petition for
removal of Toni Johnson. Significantly, the request for removal of Toni Johnson as
trustee was only made in the original Petition filed by John Cornell and pursued after his
death by Margaret Watkins. The District Court found Margaret Watkins to not have any
standing to pursue the claims of John Cornell against Toni Johnson. Therefore, she
has nu standing to seek removal of Toni Johnson as trustee. Idaho Code§ 15-7308(1).
Kareen Cornell did not request removal of Toni Johnson until after the remand
order was filed. Therefore there was no party with standing who had requested removal
of Toni Johnson prior to the remand order. However, the merits of the request for
removal of the trustee as set forth in the remand order and the motions filed by Kareen
Cornell after the remand order will be addressed.
Idaho Code § 15-7-308( 1) sets forth the terms of when a trustee can be
removed: "A trustee may be removed in accordance with the terms of the trust or by the
court on its own initiative or on petition of a truster, cotrustee. or beneficiary."
Kareen Cornell is not a truster or a cotrustee. Nor is she a beneficiary as set
forth in this Court's prior opinion. Kareen Cornell's only claim to the trust is derivative
through her deceased husband for the wrongs Toni Johnson allegedly committed while
administering the estate. These derivative claims are abated by the death of John
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Cornell. Therefore, Kareen Cornell is not a beneficiary. Therefore, she has no standing
to request removal of Toni Johnson as the trustee.
The wrongs Toni Johnson is alleged to have committed are against John Cornell.
The claims of John Cornell, given the type of claims asserted, abated with his death. It
would be anomalous to remove the sole surviving beneficiary as the trustee. It would
make no sense to remove the sole beneficiary from handling the distribution of the
estate to herself.
The decision to remove a trustee is discretionary. It makes no sense to exercise
that discretion against the sole beneficiary under the circumstances of this case. No
allegation has been made that Toni Johnson is incapable of handling her own affairs.
Therefore, I deny Kareen Cornell's motion to remove Toni Johnson as the trustee.
Kareen Cornell's application for appointment of trustee is also denied for the
same reasons that her motion for removal of trustee is denied. Kareen Cornell has no
interest in the trust and could be expected based upon her claims to interfere with Toni
Johnson's rights as the sole beneficiary. Also, appointment of someone other than Toni
Johnson to serve as trustee would violate the terms of the trust. Revocable Family
Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell dated November 1, 1996 at§ 9.01 and
as amended on August 6, 2009, attached as Exhibits A and B to Affidavit of Karin
Seubert dated September 17, 2012.
The District Court also offers "(a)s a matter of guidance Idaho Code § 5-327 does
not apply to the facts as found by the Magistrate in this case." Order Re Appeal at 3.
Kareen Cornell argues that the District Court is thereby directing this Court to address
the merits of her claim irrespective of the abatement of John Cornell's claims. Kareen
MEMORANDUM OPINION-4
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Cornell's argument is rejected as it fails to recognize that the basis for the dismissal of
her claims rests upon the common law, not Idaho Code§ 5-237, and that this Court
agrees with the District Court's analysis of Idaho Code§ 5-237.
As to the merits, there is no question that the state legislature created a cause of
action against the trustee for wrongs committed by the trustee as alleged in this case.
There is no question that John Cornell if he was alive would have a cause of action
based upon the allegations of malfeasance committed by Toni Johnson.
However, the essence of the abatement doctrine is that it extinguishes causes of
action once the wronged individual dies. In this case, the alleged wronged individual,
John Cornell, died without having his claims resolved before his death. Under the
common law doctrine of abatement as set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Bishop

v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 272 P.3d 1247 (2012), this Court found that John Cornell's
actions abated with his death. Memorandum Opinion Re Kareen Cornell June 21, 2013
at 9-18 and Memorandum Opinion February 15, 2013 at 5-13.
The Supreme Court noted in Bishop, "The abatement rule holds that in the
absence of a legislative enactment addressing the survivability of a claim, the common
law rules govern." Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616,619,272 P.3d 1247, 1250 (2012).
The Supreme Court also noted that the Idaho state legislature in 2010 modified the
common law rule very narrowly at Idaho Code § 5-237 allowing some derivative actions
to proceed which would otherwise be abated under the common law. However, in

Bishop, the Supreme Court did not retroactively address the reach of the law.
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Thus, applying the District Court's guidance, Idaho Code § 5-237 does not apply.
Therefore, the common law as interpreted by the Idaho Supreme Court requires finding
the claims of John Cornell abate upon his death.
To make clear, Idaho Code§ 5-237 modifies the common law of abatement.
Idaho Code § 5-237 allows for some types of actions to proceed that would otherwise
be prohibited under the common law of abatement. The decision as to whether
abatement extinguishes a cause of action is a two-step process. First, are the claims
abated under the common law? Second, if abated under the common law, does Idaho
Code § 5-237 override the common law and allow for the derivative claim to proceed?
This Court applied the test adopted by the Supreme Court in Bishop and found
that Kareen Cornell's derivative claims based upon the alleged wrongs done to her
husband are abated under the common law. Kareen Cornell has provided no new
argument as to why this Court's analysis is incorrect nor does the District Court's
remand address the abatement of the claim under common law. Thus, this Court
adheres to its analysis provided in the two earlier Memorandum Opinions and finds that
Kareen Cornell's derivative claims are abated under the common law.
The District Court's guidance that Idaho Code § 5-237 does not apply to this
case is precisely the result also found by this Court. "Therefore, Idaho Code§ 5-237(2)
does not overrule the common law abatement of John [Cornell's] causes of action."
Memorandum Opinion February 15, 2013 at 17. As set forth in the earlier Memorandum

Opinions, the wrongs alleged to have been committed by Toni Johnson do not survive
under the common law of abatement nor do the alleged wrongs come within the ambit
of Idaho Code § 5-237 which supersedes the common law under very limited
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circumstances. Those limited circumstances are simply not present in this case.
Memorandum Opinion February 15, 2013 at 13-17. Thus, dismissal of Kareen Cornell's

Petition is appropriate.
Kareen Cornell makes two additional arguments in support of her Motions at the
hearing. Kareen Cornell argues that this Court should grant her motion to remove Toni
Johnson as trustee because Ms. Johnson never filed an objection to her motion until
four days before the hearing.

I reject Kareen Cornell's argument. The arguments have

been addressed several times during the course of this action. Kareen Cornell has not
shown any prejudice.
Kareen Cornell also asks for an order restraining Toni Johnson from taking
further action with respect to the trust. Idaho Code§ 15-7-308(3) provides, "Pending a
final decision on the petition to remove the trustee, the court may order such
appropriate relief as may be necessary to protect the trust property or the interests of
the beneficiaries." I do not choose to exercise my discretion to order a restraining order.
A final decision is made based upon this Memorandum Opinion to dismiss Kareen
Cornell's Petition. I do not find Kareen Cornell to be a beneficiary whose interest would
be protected by a restraining order. It has been more than two (2) years since this case
was initiated.
I do not find it appropriate to override the clear language of the trust granting Toni
Johnson the whole trust upon her brother's death. In any event, if this Court's decision
on abatement is incorrect and Ms. Kareen Cornell's arguments on the merits prevail on
appeal, Toni Johnson will be liable for any wrongs committed.
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CONCLUSION
In compliance with the remand order, the motion to remove Toni Johnson as the
trustee is denied for the reasons set forth in this Memorandum Opinion. Kareen
Cornell's motions filed after the remand order are also denied for the reasons set forth
in this Memorandum Opinion . The decision to dismiss Kareen Cornell's Petition is
reaffirmed.
Dated this i

fu ay of June, 2014.

MltL

ftandallWRobinson , Magistrate
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Mea orandum
}b- day of
Opinion Re Remand Order was mailed postage pre-paid, on the
, 2014, to:
:Si.,.11'.)L
Samuel Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl
P.O . Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower, and Callery, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501

Clerk of the
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FINAL JUD®MENT
RE REMAND ORDER

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL

Based upon Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law filed in the Memorandum
Opinion Re Remand Order in this Case on June 16, 2014, and good cause appearing
thereby, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
That consistent with the Remand Order of the District Court, the motion for
removal of the Trustee IS HEREBY DENIED for the reasons set forth in the
Memorandum Opinion;
That Kareen Cornell's Motion to Remove Trustee and Application for Removal of
Trustee filed after the Remand Order was entered ARE HEREBY DENIED;
That the Judgment for Dismissal filed in this case on June 21, 2013 is hereby
reaffirmed and Kareen Cornell's Petition for Supervised Administration and Court
Ordered Distribution IS HEREBY DISMISSED with prejudice.
Dated this

Jkf

day of June, 2014.

/]

~ SCAR D L~ )/!~

Randall W Robinson, Magistrat
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Final Judgment Re
Remand Order was mailed postage pre-paid, on the
day of
::!,AOe...
, 2014, to:

I(:,~

Samuel Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower, and Callery, P.L.L.C.
P.O . Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
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Karin Seubert

JONE S, BROW ER & CALL ERY, P.L.L.C.

Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston; ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho StateBarNo. 7813

ICT OF THE
IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTR
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)
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)
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In the Matter of:

Case No. CV 2012-00277
MOT ION TO CORR ECT CLltR lCAL
MISTAKES

attorney of record, Karin
COMES NOW Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her
P. 60(a). hereby moves this
Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., and pursuant to I.RC.
Idaho Code§ 5-237 (emphasis
Court for a court order confirming and clarifying that its citations to
entered on June 16, 2014
pages 5 and 6 of the Memorandum Opinion re: Remand Order
added ) on

Code § 5-327.
were clerical errors and that the intended. statutory citations are Idaho
DATED this

~0

day of June, 2014.

JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
By~~
Karin Seubert
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREB Y CERTI FY that a true and
· correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO

CORRECT CLERICAL MISTAKES was, this~O
day ofJune, 2014,

~ hand-delivered by providing a
copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;

mailed; postage pre-paid,
by first class mail; or
transmitted via facsimile
to:

Samuel Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, P.L.L.C.
1219 Idaho St

P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

MOTION TO CORRE CT
CLERICAL IvllSTAKES
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Katin Seubert
JONES, BROW ER & CALL ERY, P.L.L.C.
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· Attorneys ai Law·
Post Office Box 854
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1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813

ICT OF THE
IN THE DISTR ICT COUR T OF THE SECO ND JUDIC IAL DIS1R
ER
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN fY OF CLEA RWAT

In the Matter of:

)

THE REVO CABL E FAMIL Y TRUS T OF
MICHAEL S. CORN ELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

)

NOTICE OF HEAR ING

)
)
)

n, by and throug h
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Respo ndent Toni C. Johnso

, P.L.L. C. will call up for
her attorney of record , Karin Seuber t of Jones, Browe r and Callery
p.m. on July 7, 2014, before
hearing her Motion to Correct Clen'cal Mistakes at the hour of2:15
the Honor able Magist rate of the above Court.
DATE D this c2£) day ofJune , 2014.

JONES, BROWER & CALL ERY, P.L.L.C.

By~~
Karin. Seubert
Attorney for Respon dent

NOTIC E OF HEAR ING
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06-20-'14 12:16 FROM-JB & C

2087469553

T-087 P0005/0005 F-989

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a troe and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF

HEARING was, this ~ day of June, 2014,

~ hand-delivered by providmg a

copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;

mailed, postage pre-paid,
by first class mail; or
transmitted. via facsimile

to:
Samuel Creason
Creason. Moore, Dokken & Geidl, P.L.L.C.
1219 Idaho St

P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston. ID 83501
By

~~
Karin Seubert

NOTICE OF HEARING
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SECOND 'DICIAL DISTRIC T COURT, STATE r , IDAHO
IN & •D FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWA_._ .iR
)
)
)
)
)

IN THE MATTER OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL, ET AL.

Randall W. Robinson
Presiding Judge:
Court Clerk: Lisa McMillan
Tape/Disk
Monday, July 07, 2014 at 02:15 PM
Plaintiff's Counsel:
Defendan t's Counsel:
Court Hearing Type: Motion
FOOTAGE/TIME:

~:~ Honorable Randall W. Robinson presiding.
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Case No: CV-2012-0000277
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Karin Seubert
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 854
1104 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
208/743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 7813
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277
ORDER CLARIFYING CITATIONS

This matter having been called for hearing on July 7, 2014 on Respondent Toni C. Johnson's

. Motion to Correct Clerical Mistakes, and good cause shown, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND
CONFIRMED that all references to Idaho Code§ 5-237 contained in the Memorandum Opinion re:

Remand Order entered in this proceeding on June 16, 2014 were in error, and the intended statutory
citations are Idaho Code § 5-327.

Said Memorandum Opinion re: Remand Order is hereby

incorporated herein by reference and amended in accordance with this Order.
DATED this

-'7rf!

day ofJuly, 2014.

GE RANDALL W. ROBINSON

. ORDER CLARIFYING CITATIONS

-1693

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER
CLARIFYING CITATIONS was, this----'=l_ day of
July, 2014,

./

hand-delivered by providing a
copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;
mailed, postage pre-paid,
by first class mail; or
transmitted via facsimile

to:
Karin Seubert
· Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
Theodore 0 . Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

B~

[Y'cJY)
Clerk of Court

ORDER CLARIFYING CITATIONS

-2694

Fl,Lr:.-,
L- •.

Cl E~ !< r( 1~ Dl ~ 7'·~ DT COtJ"r RT
1

1

(' I

,... _ !
\

--

•,1

~

~

r ' ,,

..

rv·:
_,,.)

I ..

II

'

\I

1 I •
I

f

I

1

I. r

:

rv

Samuel T. Creason, ISBN: 8183
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC
1219 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743 -1516
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231
Attorneys for Personal Representativ e
of Estate of John Henry Cornell

'-'

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:
THE REVOCABL E FAMILY TRUST OF
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M.
CORNELL.

TO:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

NOTICE OF APPEAL
I.R.C.P. 83
Fee Category: L(2)
Filing Fee: $81.00

TONI C. JOHNSON, AND HER ATTORNEY, KARIN SEUBERT, JONES,
BROWER, & CALLERY, P.L.L.C., 1304 IDAHO STREET, P.O. BOX 854,
LEWISTON, ID 83501. EMAIL: KRSEUBERT @LEWISTON .COM

AND
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENT ITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The

Estate

of John

Henry

Cornell,

acting

through

its personal

representative , Kareen Cornell, (hereinafter the "Estate") files this appeal from the
Magistrate Court in and for the County of Clearwater.
2.

The Estate appeals to the District Court in and for the County of Clearwater.

NOTICE OF APPEAL- 1

695
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231

3.

The Estate appeals the Magistrate Court's denial of the Estate's Motion to

Remove Trustee and Application for Removal of Trustee and dismissal of the Estate's
Petition for Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution.

The Court' s

denial and dismissal are set forth in its June 16, 2014, FINAL JUDGMENT RE:
REMAND ORDER and MEMORANDUM OPINION RE:

REMAND ORDER upon

which the judgment was based.
4.

The appeal is taken upon matters of law.

5.

The proceedings of the hearings were recorded or reported by the method of

in
electronic recordings and are in the possession of the Clearwater County Clerk located
Orofino, Idaho.

The Estate requests that the Court order that no transcript need be

prepared pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 83U)(2) .
6.

The statement of issues on appeal that the Estate intends to assert are as

follows:
Whether the Court erred in finding that any claims to the Trust res by,
through, or on behalf of John Henry Cornell abated upon the death of John
Henry Cornell?

Issue 1.

7.

The above list of issues is not exhaustive and the Estate may assert other

issues on appeal thereafter discovered by the Estate.

- ~
DATED this L_ day of July 2014.
CREASON, MOORE , DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

uel T. Creason , IS
Attorney for Personal Representative of
Estate of John Henry Cornell

NOTICE OF APPEAL- 2

PLLC
Creason , Moore, Dokken & Geidl, 696
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231

j

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this r:-day of July, 2014, a copy of the foregoing
NOTICE OF APPEAL was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C.
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

NOTICE OF APPEAL- 3

X

FIRST-CLA SS MAIL
HAND DELIVERE D
OVERNIGH T MAIL
FAX TRANSMIS SION (208) 746-9553
EMAIL krseubert@lewiston.com
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_________ _____
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)
)
)
)
)
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)

Case No. CV 2012-00277

APPELLANT'S BRJEF
Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court
of the Second Judicial District for Clearwater County
Honorable Randall W. Robinson, Magistrate Judge Presiding

I)
L__i
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Counsel for Appellant
Theodore 0. Creason, ISBN: 1563
Samuel T. Creason, ISBN: 8183
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT1

This case is about the actions of Toni C. Johnson while she served as the successor
trustee of The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell ("Trust").
Ms. Johnson concedes that during the over two and a half years that she served as successor
trustee, she repeatedly made improper use of the Trust res for her own benefit.

She also

concedes that during that time she engaged in inequitable conduct in order to deprive her brother,
John Cornell-a co-beneficiary-o f his interest in the Trust res. Now, she argues that because
John Cornell died before he could stop her from continuing in this line of conduct, any claims he
held abated and there exists no judicial recourse for the heirs of John Cornell. Tue question
before the Court is whether the Estate of John Cornell may pursue recovery of John Cornell's
interest in the Trust res.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case

The Estate of John Henry Cornell comes before this Court on appeal from dismissal of its
petition for supervised administration and court ordered distribution of The Revocable Family

I

l

Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M Cornell: The magistrate court dismissed the Petition on

the grounds that the Estate's claims did not survive the death of John Henry Cornell. Petitioner
appeals.
B. Course of Proceedings

This matter comes before the Court after the conclusion of a highly irregular course of
proceedings before the magistrate court. The case identified by case number CV 2012-277 was
initiated through a Petition filed by John Henry Cornell on July 11, 2012. John Cornell died
\_
[_
1

Petitioner sets forth a verbatim copy of her brief filed in the previous appeal of this matter, any
substantive change in text has been underlined.
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from an apparent suicide on August 20, 2012.

[-

Ms. Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss on

September 17, 2012, arguing that the claims in John Cornell's petition abated upon his death.
Ms. Johnson also argued that because John died, there existed no legitimate party in interest
unless and until the Estate was substituted into the action pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil

I

Procedure 25(a)(l).
\

For reasons beyond Kareen Cornell's control, John Cornell's attorney continued to
prosecute the petition in John Cornell's name, personally. In late November 2012, Ms. Cornell
appeared before the Court and notified the Court that she objected to any other person acting on
behalf of her late husband. While the magistrate court invited Ms. Cornell to submit briefing on
pending action, it did not bring her or the Estate into the litigation. Thus, Ms. Cornell's briefing

I

was, in effect, amid briefing. On February 15, 2013, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion.
In that opinion, the Court dismissed the petition filed by John Cornell, personally. However, the
Court expressly invited Ms. Cornell to file claims on behalf of the Estate.
Ms. Cornell responded to the Court's invitation by filing the Estate's Petition on February
28, 2013. While many of the Estate's claims were identical to those raised by John Cornell in his
August 2012 petition, the Estate also raised additional claims. The Estate's Petition alleged that
Ms. Johnson (1) failed to act in conformity with the terms of the Trust; (2) breached her fiduciary
duties when acting in her capacity as Trustee; (3) engaged in equitable conversion of the
property belonging to John Cornell by refusing to distribute the property; and (4) was unjustly
enriched by (a) misusing Trust assets for personal desires, and (b) refusing to comply with the
terms of the Trust and her fiduciary duties in order to effect a distribution in her favor. The
Estate sought supervised administration, court ordered distribution of the Trust, and a judgment

I_

against Ms. Johnson for injuries caused to the Trust. The Petition set forth the following legal
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and equitable causes of action: (A) breach of fiduciary duty; (B) constructive trust; (C) breach of
contract; (D) conversion; and (E) unjust enrichment.
No Answer has ever been filed to those allegations. Instead, Ms. Johnson filed a Motion

r-1

to Dismiss the Estate's Petition on March 1, 2013. Ms. Johnson argued that the petition should
be dismissed because (1) the Estate was bound by the Court's February 15, 2013, memorandum
opinion, and (2) the Estate's Petition either failed to state a cause of action or stated causes of
action which abated upon the death of John Cornell.

Ms. Johnson based her abatement

arguments on the same theory that the magistrate court adopted in dismissing Mr. Cornell's
claims.
The magistrate court granted Ms. Johnson's motion on June 21, 2013.

In its

memorandum opinion, the court concluded that (A) all claims for breach of fiduciary duty
abated, at common law and under Idaho statute, upon death; (B) the doctrine of constructive trust
was inapplicable and an action under that doctrine was in tort, which abated upon death; (C) the
claims for breach of contract were co-extensive with the statutory duties of a trustee and,
therefore, were breach of fiduciary duty claims which abated upon death; (D) claims for
equitable conversion sounded in tort and, therefore, abated upon death; and (E) claims for unjust

l_

enrichment sounded in tort and, therefore, abated upon death. The magistrate court based its
ruling upon the following conclusions of law: (1) the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion of Bishop v.
Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 619 (2012) stands for the proposition that all claims sounding in tort

abate at common law upon the death of the claimant; and (2) the Idaho legislature did not
abrogate that rule with the amendment of Idaho Code § 5-327, except for claims for recovery of
medical expenses, out of pocket expenses, and lost wages.
\_
L
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The Estate filed an Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District court on
October 13, 2013. The Estate's Appeal alleged that both the common law and Idaho Code§ 5327 supported a ruling that the causes of action set forth in the Estate's Petition survived the
death of John Cornell. On April 8, 2014, the District Court remanded the case back to the
Magistrate Court. The District Court instructed the Magistrate Court to first determine whether
Toni Johnson ought to be removed as trustee.
On May 13, 2014, Ms. Cornell filed a Motion to Remove Trustee and an Application for
Appointment of Trustee seeking appointment to herself to serve as trustee. Oral arguments were
heard on May 27, 2014, with regards to the remand order and Ms. Cornell's motion. In its
memorandum opinion the court concluded that (A) because a request for removal was not made
I

I

within the Estate's Petitioner, there existed no party with standing to request removal of Toni
Johnson; (B) the Estate's claims abated upon the death of John Cornell, and (C) therefore, she
did not have standing to request removal of Toni Johnson under Idaho Code § 15-7-308; and
(D) it was nonsensical for the Court to order removal of Toni Johnson once the Court has found
that no other beneficiaries exist.
The magistrate court based its ruling upon the following conclusions of law: (1) the Idaho
Supreme Court Opinion of Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 619 (2012) stands for the
proposition that all claims sounding in tort abate at common law upon the death of the claimant;
and (2) the Idaho legislature did not abrogate that rule with the amendment of Idaho Code § 5327, except for claims for recovery of medical expenses, out of pocket expenses, and lost wages.
As set forth herein, the court's conclusions are erroneous.

l
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IC. Statement of Facts
Michael and Arlie Cornell established The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell
and Arlie M. Cornell ("Trust") on November 1, 1996. The Trust was established to provide for
Michael and Arlie during their lifetimes, with the remainder to be distributed to their two
children: Toni Johnson and John Cornell. Arlie Cornell died on November 9, 2008. Michael
Cornell died on December 15, 2009. Ms. Johnson has been the sole Trustee since that time.
As a successor trustee, Ms. Johnson was to have a very limited role. Ms. Johnson's sole
duty as trustee was to distribute the trust assets. Over the months and years following Michael
Cornell's death, Ms. Johnson failed to distribute the Trust. Instead, she "egregiously wronged
her brother during his lifetime. Mem. Op. re Attorney Fees and Costs 3. "Ms. Johnson acted

r...

inappropriately in bestowing the proceeds of the trust upon herself and not shar[ing] one cent

I

with her brother." Id.

She refused to distribute the Trust, despite John Cornell's repeated

objections and pleas that she do so, in part, so that he could "pay for necessary medical care that
he could not obtain without money from the trust." Id. at 2. John Cornell was never able to
compel distribution before his death on August 20, 2012.
Ms. Johnson's discovery responses in this case substantiate the concerns and frustrations
I

l

that Mr. Cornell raised in the over two and one-half years between the surviving truster's death
and Mr. Cornell's death. At her deposition, Ms. Johnson admitted that she routinely makes
personal use of the real and personal property of the Trust. She lives rent-free in the home that is
included in the Trust. She has commingled cash assets of the Trust with her own cash assets.
She has depleted the cash assets of the Trust, with not only expenses of the Trust but also her

I

L

personal expenses. To date, the only distributions that Ms. Johnson has made are the unreported
distributions made through her personal use of the Trust res.
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ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

I

The issue before the Court is the survival of causes of actions regarding (a) proper
1.
administration of the Trust, and (b) proper distribution of assets to which the Trust is title owner.
Under its terms, the Trust was to terminate upon the death of the surviving trustor-in this case,
December 15, 2009. As successor Trustee, Toni Johnson was to distribute the Trust res "as soon
as reasonably possible." Ms. Johnson concedes that she acted inequitably: she mismanaged the
Trust, she commingled assets, she used Trust funds for personal use, and she refused to distribute
the Trust res, despite John Cornell's demands. John Cornell died in August 2012. May the
Estate of John Cornell pursue not only his interests in the remaining Trust property, but also
claims for the diminution of that property through mismanagement by Toni Johnson?
ARGUMENT
The Estate's Petition raises claims against Ms. Johnson based upon conduct occurring
since December 15, 2009, the date she accepted appointment as successor trustee of the Trust.
The law governing survival of actions upon the death of the injured party was changed on July 1,
2010, when the amended Idaho Code § 5-327 became effective. Prior to that point in time,

I

issues of survival upon the death of the injured party were governed by the common law. Thus,
this case requires the Court to determine whether the Estate's claims survive at common law and
under section 5-327.

The magistrate court granted Ms. Johnson's motion to dismiss on the

grounds that (1) under the common law, all causes of action sounding in tort abate upon the
death of the injured party; and (2) under Idaho Code§ 5-327(2), all causes of action sounding in
tort are limited, upon the death of the injured party, to recovery for damages not sought in the
Estate's petition.

A.

Standard of Review

The magistrate court dismissed this action on a summary judgment standard, because it
considered affidavits filed by the parties.

See Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). An appellate Court

exercises de novo review over a grant of summary judgment.
I

l__

Constr. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v.

Assurance Co. ofAm., 135 Idaho 680,682, 23 P.3d 142, 144 (2001).
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Summary judgment is only appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material

I

fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. P.
56(c). When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court "liberally

I'

construes the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all
reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor." Constr. Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 135 Idaho
at 682, 23 P.3d at 144. If, as the result of such a liberal construction, the Court finds that
reasonable persons could reach different findings or draw conflicting inferences from the
evidence, the Court must deny the motion. Thus, Ms. Johnson carries the burden of proving that
reasonable persons could not draw conflicting inference from the evidence, when the record is
construed in a light most favorable to the Estate.
B.

The Estate's Causes of Action Did Not Abate at Common Law.
1. The Estate's Tort Claims Did Not Abate

The Estate's tort claims did not abate at common law, because the claims seek damages
for the deprivation and diminution of a property interest. The magistrate court ruled that, at
common law, every cause of action sounding in tort abates upon the death of the injured party.
The court based its ruling entirely on the Idaho Supreme Court case of Bishop v. Owens, 152

l

Idaho 616, 272 P.3d 1247 (2012). The magistrate court found the following language from
Bishop dispositive in this case:

"Under the common law, claims arising out of contracts

generally survive the death of the claimant, while those sounding in pure tort abate." Id. at 619,
272 P.3d at 1250. The magistrate court's broad application of Bishop is in error. The Bishop
Court identified the general rule regarding abatement of tort claims at common law. Id. While
that general rule is certainly applicable to this case, it is not dispositive. The Bishop Court was

L

not presented with facts that required it to analyze some of the more nuanced applications of the
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abatement doctrine. The magistrate court erred in applying the general rule of Bishop to this
case because (a) the Estate's tort claims seek redress for injury done to the decedent's property
interests; (b) the Estate's tort claims are founded upon a remedial statute; and (c) the Estate's tort
claims are not legal claims but rather claims in equity.

As set forth below, each of these

distinctions dictates a finding that the Estate's tort claims survived the death of John Cornell.
The Bishop Opinion does not-either by its facts or by its language- set precedent
regarding abatement of causes of action Estate's claims. The Bishop Court was presented with
facts far different from this case. First, the decedent in Bishop brought a legal malpractice claim,
alleging that her former attorney injured her by failing to properly advise her about the
consequences of a negotiated settlement with respect to subrogated interests. Id. at 618, 272
P.3d at 1249. Here, the Estate claims that the defendant injured John Cornell by depriving him
his property (which she still retains) and, at the same time, diminishing the value of that
property. Second, the decedent in Bishop did not rely upon a statute or equitable doctrine to

I

identify a unique duty or standard of care; she relied upon a legal representation agreement
which applied the same standard to which all Idaho attorneys are held, the Idaho Rules of

I

Professional Responsibility. Id. at 620, 272 P.3d at 1251. Here, the Estate has raised tort claims

l_

based upon the remedial statutes set forth in the Idaho Code which govern the conduct of
trustees, and based upon equitable doctrines. Third, the decedent in Bishop sought an award of
money damages, not relief in the form of restoration and distribution of certain identified assets
to which she believed she was entitled. Id. at 619, 272 P.3d at 1250. Here, the Estate seeks
restoration and distribution of certain assets-the Trust res. These three factual distinctions

I

L

explain why the Bishop Court had no need to proceed beyond a recitation of the general rule and
evidence why the magistrate court erred in giving Bishop such a broad interpretation.
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The language of the Bishop Opinion does not support the magistrate court's interpretation

I

of the Bishop language as universal. The Bishop Opinion cites Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415,
184 P. 477 (1919) as support for its general rule. Kloepfer makes express that which Bishop
assumes: "As a general rule, in the absence of a statute providing otherwise, causes of action ex
contractu survive, while causes ex delicto do not.

However, there are well-recognized

exceptions to both branches of the rule." Id. (emphasis added).

These well-recognized

exceptions mandate survival of the Estate's claims.
Subsequent Supreme Court case law also conflicts with the magistrate court's
interpretation. Based on Bishop, the magistrate court ruled that "in order for John's claims to
survive his death, his claims must sound in contract, and not in tort." Memorandum Op. re:
Kareen Cornell 10. In the January 2013 case of St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'! Med. Ctr. v.
Luciani, the Supreme Court considered whether a given tort claim could be assigned after the

II

death of the injured party, particularly in light of its opinion in Bishop. 154 Idaho 37,293 P.3d

i

661, 667 (2013). The Court affirmed the rule from MacLoed v. Stelle, where it held that "'if [a

I

tort claim] survives, it may be assigned; if not, it may not,' [the Court] also held that an 'injury
[that] lessens the estate of the injured party does survive, and that is assignable." Luciani, 154
Idaho at 41, 293 P.3d at 667 (quoting MacLoed, 43 Idaho 64, 75,249 P. 254,257 (1926)). Thus,
even as recent as January 2013, the Idaho Supreme Court assumed that certain tort claims
survive the death of the injured party, even after Bishop.

a.

The Estate's tort claims did not abate because the claims seek redress
for injury to property.

One of the well-recognized exceptions to the rule of abatement of tort claims is that tort

I~

claims survive where they are actions for recovery or protection of a property interest.
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I

The general rule is that, in addition to the causes of action arising out of contract
recognized at common law, causes of action arising from torts to real and personal
property survive and pass to the personal representative of the decedent, while
purely personal torts do not survive in the absence of statutory provision.
1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 51. Thus, in cases where the injured party
alleged an injury to his property-such as the existence or amount of his interest in a trust-the

I

claim survives. See Barnes v. Barnes, 135 Idaho 103, 105, 15 P.3d 816, 818 (2000) (holding that
while a divorce proceeding abates upon death, "[i]f property issues are involved, the action
continues solely to resolve those issues").
Here, there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Cornell held a vested
property interest in the Trust res at the time of his death. Upon accepting appointment as

I -

successor trustee, Ms. Johnson's obligations to the Trust and Mr. Cornell (as the beneficiary)

I

were clear.

I

On the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trust shall terminate and the
Trustee shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and
principal remaining in the Trust into two (2) equal shares and distribute
them to the following beneficiaries: TONI C. JOHNSON and JOHN H.
CORNELL.
Trust§ 4.03. However, the very next provision of the Trust gives rise to much of the confusion

in this matter. The Trust proceeds to set forth the terms for distribution in the event that one or

i

i

I-

both of the Trustors' children should die.
If any child ... should die prior to the above distribution, then the Trustee
shall distribute all of such deceased child's share to his or her surviving
issue in equal shares. . . . If there is no surviving issue, then all of the
deceased child's share of the Trust Estate shall be added to the shares set
aside for the ... other living child .... "

Trust§ 4.03(a). Ms. Johnson argued that because John Cornell died before he could compel her

to distribute the Trust res, any interest he held in the Trust died with him; thus, she should
C

receive the entirety of the Trust res. The Estate maintains that John Cornell's interest in the
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Trust res vested upon the death of Michael Cornell. The Estate also argues that even if John

1-

Cornell's interest did not vest upon the death of Michael Cornell, it vested at the point in time

I

where equity would presume proper distribution because "equity regards that as done which
ought to be done." See First Sec. Bank of Idaho, Nat. Ass 'n v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 657, 429
P.2d 386, 389 (1967).
The magistrate court ruled that because John Cornell died prior to distribution, he could
not have obtained a vested interest in the Trust res.2 See Memorandum Op. re: Kareen Cornell
12. The magistrate court did not provide any discussion or analysis regarding ambiguity within
the document or the intent of the Trustors. The magistrate court did not provide any discussion
or analysis regarding the Estate's arguments that, at the very latest, John Cornell's interest vested

1 ·

under equity. These omissions are of particular import because the magistrate court later found
that Ms. Johnson acted against the intent of the Trustors. See Memorandum Op. re: Attorney
Fees and Costs 3. Therefore, the magistrate erred when it ruled that, as a matter of law, John
Cornell did not hold a vested interest.

b.

The Estate's tort claims did not abate because the claims are founded
upon a remedial statute.

The survivability of this action is further supported by the fact that the claims arise
pursuant to a remedial statute. In Bishop, the decedent merely relied on a common law duty.
Here, the Estate seeks recovery based, in part, upon a trustee's breach of fiduciary duty, as
defined in Idaho Code§§ 15-7-101 through 15-7-601. "A cause of action that is founded on a
remedial statute ... survives the death of the party possessing the cause of action." 1 Am. Jur.

L

The magistrate court was not explicit about why it rejected the Estate's arguments regarding
continuing jurisdiction over administration of the Trust. It appears, however, that the magistrate
court rejected that argument based upon the court's finding that Toni Johnson was the only
remaining entity with an interest in the Trust.

2
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2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival§ 59. A statutory right exists to hold a trustee liable for her

I·

conduct in the same manner as a personal representative of an estate. Idaho Code § 15-7-306

I

cmt. Liability for a trustee and for a personal representative as to a beneficiary focuses upon

i

injury to the estate or the trust res, rather that the person. See id.; Idaho Code § 15-3-808.
Therefore, the Estate's breach of fiduciary duty claims did not abate.

I

c.

The Estate's tort claims did not abate because the claims are not legal
claims, but claims in equity.

Finally, the survivability of this action is further supported by the fact that it seeks
recovery through equitable causes of action. In Bishop, the only cause of action was the legal
theory of malpractice. Here, the Estate has raised several equitable doctrines entitling it to relief.
"In equity, abatement signifies a present, temporary suspension of further proceedings in a suit

because of want of proper parties. It is an interruption or suspension of a suit, the equivalent of a
stay of proceedings, and the suit may be revived and proceed to its regular determination." 1
Am. Jur. 2dAbatement, Survival, and Revival§ l (footnotes omitted).
The principle that a cause of action expires with the death or disability of a party
generally does not apply to suits in equity; equitable remedies exist to the same
extent in favor of and against executors and administrators as they do against
the decedent, as long as the court can continue to grant effective relief in spite of
the death. One of the main reasons for this stance for suits in equity is that
such suits primarily pertain to property rights.
3
1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 60 (footnotes omitted) (emphases added).

The magistrate court erred in ruling that the claims of conversion, constructive trust, and unjust
enrichment abated under Bishop. See Memorandum Op. re: Kareen Cornell 13-15.

See also Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchants Ass'n, 128 F.2d 645,649 (4th Cir. 1942);
Glojek v. Glojek, 254 Wis. 109, 115, 35 N.W.2d 203, 206 (1948); Hughey v. Mooney, 282 S.C.
597, 602, 320 S.E.2d 475, 477 (Ct. App. 1984); Miller v. Hayman, 766 So. 2d 1116, 1118 n.1
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

3

L
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Conversion. The Estate seeks recovery under the equitable doctrine of conversion. "The

r-

I
I
I

act of wrongfully and permanently depriving someone of his property establishes conversion."
In re Pangburn, 154 Idaho 233, 296 P.3d 1080, 1085 (2013). These are the exact elements

alleged by the Estate. As set forth above, a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding
whether John Cornell held a vested interest in the Trust res at the time of his death. "At common
law, the right to bring an action for the conversion of goods in the lifetime of the decedent owner
generally survived to the personal representative .... " 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and
Revival§ 76. The consequence of the magistrate's ruling evidences the reason for the equitable

exception to the rule of abatement: if the Estate's claims did not survive John Cornell's death,
then Ms. Johnson will be allowed to enjoy property which she did not own, and which she now
possess only as a result of her inequitable conduct. Such a result is patently inequitable. The
Estate's claims for redress through the doctrine of conversion did not abate.
Constructive Trust.

The Estate seeks recovery under the the equitable doctrine of

constructive trust. It is "the fundamental rule of equity that equity regards that as done which
ought to be done." See First Sec. Bank of Idaho, 91 Idaho at 657, 429 P.2d at 389 (discussing
basis of doctrine of equitable conversion). Ms. Johnson ought to have distributed the Trust res
long before the death of John Cornell. It is undisputed that Ms. Johnson engaged in inequitable
conduct by retaining legal title to the assets of the Trust in the name of the Trust. "When
property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in
good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee." TRUST,
Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), trust (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see
also Hanger v. Hess, 49 Idaho 325, 328, 288 P. 160, 161 (1930). The doctrine of constructive
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trust is a description of the nature by which a wrongdoer holds the property of another; the court
deems that property as already belonging to the injured party at some earlier point in time.
The court's ruling regarding abatement is erroneous. While the Idaho Supreme Court has

i-

not expressly addressed the issue of survival of constructive trust claims at common law, it

i

presumed their survival in Brasch v. Brasch, 55 Idaho 777, 47 P.2d 676, 678 (1935). The
Estate's claims for redress through the doctrine of constructive trust did not abate.
The magistrate court also supported its grant of summary judgment against this claim by
ruling that a constructive trust could not have arisen in this case as a matter of law: "As this case
already addresses a legal trust, there is no necessity to resort to the legal fiction of a constructive
trust." Memorandum Op. re: Kareen Cornell 13. The Estate is unaware of any authority argued
by the parties (or otherwise existing at law or in equity) supporting a finding that the doctrine of
constructive trust is unavailable in cases involving express trusts. The constructive trust in
which the Trust held John Cornell's property is distinct from the actual trust arrangement that
existed prior to the constructive trust arising. The doctrine of constructive trust is particularly
applicable to the facts of this case. Ms. Johnson ought to have distributed the Trust res as soon
as reasonably practicable when the Trust automatically terminated upon the death of Michael

l

Cornell. Ms. Johnson acted inequitably by retaining the Trust res in name of the Trust, while
using it for her own benefit.

Reasonable persons could reach different findings or draw

conflicting inferences from the evidence with respect to whether a constructive trust arose based
upon (i) the extended period of time between the death of Michael Cornell and the death of John
Cornell; and (ii) the undisputed inequitable conduct by Ms. Johnson. Therefore, the magistrate
court erred in granting summary judgment on this claim.
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Unjust Enrichment. The Estate seeks recovery under the equitable doctrine of unjust
enrichment. "Unjust enrichment occurs where [offending party] receives a benefit which would
be inequitable to retain without compensating the [injured party] to the extent that retention is
unjust." Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 557, 165 P.3d 261, 271 (2007). The
damages available to the claimant on an unjust enrichment claim is the value of the amount by
which the offending party was unjustly enriched. Barry v. Pac. W Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827,
834, 103 P.3d 440, 447 (2004).

Like constructive trust, unjust enrichment is an equitable

doctrine that seeks to return to the injured party those amounts which were due to him or her in
equity; amounts which equity deems property of the injured party. If the Estate prevails on its
unjust enrichment claim, it will have established that John Cornell held an equitable interest in
property prior to his death. The Estate has a statutory duty to recover property of the decedent
and distribute it in probate. See Idaho Code § 15-3-709. The Estate's claims for redress through
the doctrine of unjust enrichment did not abate.

2. The Estate's Breach of Contract Claims Did Not Abate
As with the tort claims, the magistrate court relied exclusively on Bishop to support its
ruling of abatement of the contract claims. The court interpreted Bishop as standing for the
proposition that where the duties placed upon the defendant could be found at law, all contract
claims should be re-characterized as tort claims. Memorandum Op. re: Kareen Cornell 13-14.
The magistrate court found that the Estate failed "to point out any way in which the Trust
instrument imposes any duties upon Toni [Johnson] that are not also imposed by the Probate
Code." Id. As a result, the magistrate court held the contract claims were actually tort claims
and,. therefore, abated upon the death of John Cornell. The court ruling was erroneous because

L
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I

(a) the analysis in Bishop was in response to a relationship that was not contractual in nature; and

\

(b) the Estate's contract claims identify contractual duties which do not exist at law.
The magistrate court's reliance upon Bishop to re-characterize the Estate's contract
claims was in error. In Bishop, the question before the court was whether the decedent could
pursue a legal malpractice action through breach of contract claims. Bishop, 152 Idaho at 620,

I·

l_.
272 P.3d at 1251.

The plaintiffs theory in Bishop was that it could either sue for legal

malpractice, which sounded in pure tort, or for breach of the legal representation agreement,
which sounded in contract. Id. The Bishop Court actually held this theory correct. See id. The
reason the contract claims failed in Bishop is that the plaintiff had not alleged breach of a
specific term within the contract, but instead alleged breach of the term referencing the common

I

law duties owed by every attorney to that attorney's clients. Id. at 621, 272 P.3d at 1252. The

Bishop Court explained that if such a provision were enough to transform the pure tort action of
legal malpractice into a breach of contract action, there would exist "a per se breach of contract
action in every legal malpractice action." Id. The relationship between attorney and client is not
contractual in nature. Id. at 620,272 P.3d at 1251. The Estate's action is far different than that
in Bishop.
The relationship between a trustee and a beneficiary is contractual in nature. "A trust is
not itself a separate legal entity that can own property; rather, it is a relationship having certain
attributes." In re Thompson, 454 B.R. 486, 492 (Banlcr. D. Idaho 2011). "A trust creates a
fiduciary relationship in which the trustee is the holder of legal title to the property subject to the
beneficial interest of the beneficiary." DBSIITRI. Vv. Bender, 130 Idaho 796,808,9 48 P.2d 151,
163 (1997). The scope and nature of that relationship is defined by the terms of the trust, i.e. the
I

L
L
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contract. A trustee's fiduciary duties and contractual duties are intertwined, yet distinguishable.
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 2 defines a trust as
... a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising from a manifestation
of intention to create that relationship and subjecting the person who holds title to
the property to duties to deal with it for the benefit of ... one or more persons, at
least one of whom is not the sole trustee.

I

The Estate has identified specific provisions within the Trust document -the trust contractwhich Ms. Johnson breached.
4.03 & 4.04:

5.01:
8.02:
r

[_

The Trust terminates automatically upon the death of the surviving Trustor
and the successor Trustee is to distribute the property "as soon as
reasonably possible."
The only property which may be retained in the Trust after the death of the
surviving Trustor is property productive of income.
The successor Trustee shall render an accounting from time to time.

The Estate alleges that Ms. Johnson breached these contractual provisions through her conduct.
These provisions set forth specific duties outside the general fiduciary duties found in the probate

rI

code. There exist clear and distinct terms in the trust contract regarding conduct after the death
of Michael Cornell.

The Estate's allegation that Ms. Johnson breached those terms is far

different that a general allegation that she did not administer the trust expeditiously in
accordance with Idaho Code§ 15-7-301. The Estate's allegation that Ms. Johnson breached the
trust contract by retaining non-income producing property in the Trust, identifies a duty that
cannot be found anywhere in statute. A breach of contract claim is distinct from a breach of
fiduciary duty claim. A breach of contract claim focuses on the trustee's failure to adhere to the
terms of the trust document; a breach of fiduciary duty claim focuses on the trustee's failure to
act in accordance with the standard of conduct required of the trustee under statutory and
common law. To argue that no contractual claim may lie against the trustee is to argue that the
terms of the trust document have no substance.
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I

C.

i

The Estate's Causes of Action Did Not Abate Under Idaho Code § 5-327(2).

The magistrate court held that the Estate's causes of action arising after July 1, 2010
abated pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-327(2).
I

It based this holding on its interpretation of

subsection 5-327(2) as allowing survival in property damage cases only for recovery for medical
expenses, other out-of-pocket expenses, and loss of earnings. The court's error was the result of

i

I

construing the language of the statute in such a rigid manner as to produce an absurd result upon
application.
While the Estate's causes of action survived John Cornell's death under the common law,
the Idaho legislature made survival explicit in its enactment ofldaho Code§ 5-327(2):
A cause of action for personal injury or property damage caused by the wrongful
act or negligence of another shall not abate upon the death of the injured person
from causes not related to the wrongful act or negligence. Provided however, that
the damages that may be recovered in such action are expressly limited to those
for: (i) medical expenses actually incurred, (ii) other out-of-pocket expenses
actually incurred, and (iii) loss of earnings actually suffered, prior to the death of
such injured person and as a result of the wrongful act or negligence. Such action
shall be commenced or, if already commenced at the time of the death of the
injured person, shall be thereafter prosecuted by the personal representative of the
estate of the deceased person or, if there be no personal representative appointed,
then by those persons who would be entitled to succeed to the property of the
deceased person according to the provisions of section 5-3 l 1(2)(a), Idaho Code.
The first sentence of subsection 327(2) states that tort causes of action for "personal injury or
property damage" do not abate upon the death of the injured party. The second sentence then
contains a proviso limiting recovery to medical expenses, other out-of-pocket expenses, and loss
of earnings. Because this proviso does not expressly limit itself to the antecedent of "personal
injury" claims, the magistrate court concluded that the proviso also applies to causes of action for
property damage.

I

t
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The proper application of Idaho Code § 5-327(2) is revealed through the syntactic and
contextual canons of statutory interpretations.

The following principles of statutory

interpretation should be employed here:

I
[

1.
2.
3.
4.

the objective is to derive the intent of the legislature;
language should be interpreted in the context of the entire document;
language should be given its plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and
language is to be interpreted in accord with common sense and reason.

See State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011) and Smith v. Dep't of
Employment, 100 Idaho 520,522,602 P.2d 18, 20 (1979). The issue before this Court is whether
the legislature intended the second-sentence proviso to apply to both personal injury actions and
property damage actions.
The subordinate clause at the end of the second sentence supports an interpretation which
limits the proviso to personal injury cases. The subordinate clause restricts recovery in the listed
areas to those damages which resulted from the wrongful act or negligence; and incurred "prior
to the death of the injured person." The limitation of damages to those incurred prior to the
death of the injured person evidences the legislature's intent to limit recovery in personal injury
actions for economic harms suffered, excluding damages such as pain and suffering. A property
damage action, by its nature, seeks only recovery economic harm suffered.
Interpreting the listed areas of recovery in accord with common sense and reason, the
listed areas for recovery support an interpretation which limits the proviso to personal injury
cases. It is the rare property damage case where "medical expenses" are incurred. It is also rare
to have a property damage case where the plaintiff seeks "loss of earnings." Those two areas
are, however, common in personal injury actions. Not only do these areas of recovery counsel
against applying the proviso to the property damage case, they support allowing full recovery in

-19-

719

~··
r·

i

property damage cases. In one sense, every property damage claim could be categorized as a
claim for recovery of out of pocket expenses.
The magistrate courts rigid interpretation of Idaho Code § 5-327(2) was in error. The
subsection, however, provides a sensible and reasonable result when interpreted through the
syntactic and contextual canons of statutory interpretations. The Estate asks this Court to reverse
the magistrate court's grant of summary judgment and rule that the second sentence proviso in
the subsection does not constitute a limitation on property damage actions.
CONCLUSION

Both the common law and Idaho Code§ 5-327 support a ruling that the causes of action
set forth in the Estate's Petition survived the death of John Cornell. The Estate has raised several
claims in law and equity seeking recovery of that property in which John Cornell held an interest
I

l
I

I

at the time of his death. The property interests of a decedent do not die with that decedent.
Neither do the decedents claims for damage to his property done by others. Both the property
interests and the claims for property damage pass to his Estate, where the interests may be
pursued on behalf of the beneficiaries of the Estate. Ms. Johnson has conceded that she acted
inequitably. Neither law nor equity allows her to continue her inequitable conduct by now

L

depriving John Cornell's heirs of his property.

The Estate asks this Court to reverse the

magistrate court's ruling and remand the case for further proceedings.
DATED this9"-day of July, 2014.
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

I
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
In the Matter of:

)
)

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST
OF MICHA ELS. CORNELL AND
ARLIE M. CORNELL

CASE NO. CV 2012-277

)
)

SCHEDULING
ORDER

)
)

Based upon an appropriate showing that a transcript was not requested
and is not necessary in the appeal of the above entitled case,
AND that appellant filed the appellant's brief on July 10, 2014,
IT IS ORDERED that the respondent's brief shall be filed by August 7,
2014, and,
The appellant shall file a reply brief by August 28, 2014 .
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that oral argument on appeal shall be held
on the
of
2014 at the hour of

ft't..day

/0 (CJV

~W rv-:

,

@

IJ}m-in the District Courtroom of the Clearwater County
Courthouse, Orofino, Idaho.
DATED this 2 4\day of July, 2014.

Michael J. Gri!fin
District Judge
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Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court
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I.
A.

STATEMENTO FCASE1

NATURE OF THE CASE

This action involves a dispute over the administration of a trust.

One of the trust

beneficiaries, John Cornell, filed a petition seeking relief against his sister in her capacity as
trustee of the subject trust. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Cornell died. His Petition was dismissed after
Mr. Cornell's death. Subsequently, his estate filed a separate petition raising claims related to

the trust administration.

The Magistrate Court dismissed the Estate's petition.

The Estate

appealed the original dismissal of the Estate's petition, which the District Court remanded on
issues umelated to the abatement claim. On remand, the Magistrate Court addressed the District
Court's concerns and affirmed its prior dismissal based upon abatement.

The Estate now

appeals. The question before the Court is whether Mr. Cornell's death abates the Estate's claims
related to the trust.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Given the highly unusual posture of this proceeding, the factual background and course
of the proceedings overlap to such a degree that it is appropriate to discuss both together.
Background

Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell established the Revocable Family Trust of
Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell on November 1, 1996.

Petition for Supervised

Administration and Court Ordered Distribution of Trust at,-[,-[ 3.1, 3.4, Exh. A (said Exhibit
hereinafter referred to as "Trust"). Through said Trust, Mr. and Mrs. Cornell named their two
children, Toni C. Johnson and John H. Cornell, as the beneficiaries of the trust upon Mr. and

1

Toni Johnson has adopted the same approach as the Estate in its Appellant's Brief of submitting a nearly verbatim
copy of her brief filed in the previous appeal with any substantive additions in text underlined. Portions not relevant
to the current appeal have been stricken.
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Mrs. Cornell's deaths. Id. at § 4.03 of Exh. A. On August 6, 2009, Michael S. Cornell as
surviving grantor and trustee named Toni C. Johnson as sole trustee/successor trustee. Id. at
Exh.B.
Arlie M. Cornell died on November 9, 2008 and Michael S. Cornell died on December
15, 2009. Id. at ,r,r 3.4, 3.6.

Litigation Concerning Cornell Revocable Living Trust
On July 11, 2012, John H. Cornell filed a Petition for Supervised Administration and

Removal a/Trustee, which originally initiated this proceeding. Id. at ,r,r 2.3, 3.9.
John H. Cornell died on or around August 20, 2011 leaving no issue. Id. at ,r 3.10.
Respondent Toni C. Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 17, 2012 seeking to
dismiss the Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee on the basis that the
claims of John H. Cornell were extinguished by his death. Said Motion was granted on February
15, 2013.
Margaret Watkins, the former temporary personal representative then as a self-identified
"interested person," appealed.

The District Court subsequently determined that Margaret

Watkins lacked standing to pursue claims of John Cornell against Toni Johnson or the Cornell
Family Trust. She has not participated in the proceedings since that time.
On February 26, 2013, Kareen Cornell as then personal representative of the Estate of
John H. Cornell and as his surviving spouse, filed a Petition for Supervised Administration and

Court Ordered Distribution. On March 4, 2013, Respondent filed a second Motion to Dismiss.
On July 21, 2013, the Magistrate Court dismissed the Estate's Petition on the basis of abatement.
The Estate then appealed said decision to the District Court.

The District Court

considered said appeal concurrent to the appeal pursued by Margaret Watkins. The District

2
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Court issued its Order Remanding Case and Order RE: Appeal on April 8, 2014, which
remanded the case to Magistrate Court for further ruling on the request to remove Toni Johnson
as trustee. Id. On remand, the Magistrate Court denied the request to remove Toni Johnson as
trustee and reaffirmed its prior dismissal on grounds of abatement. Memorandum Opinion re:

Remand Order entered June 16, 2014. The Estate now appeals that decision.

II.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Estate's claims against Respondent abated upon the death of John Cornell
based upon the application ofldaho Code § 5-327(2).
·

The Estate asserts that the Magistrate Court erred in dismissal of its tort claims based on
application of Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 272 P.3d 1247 (2012), to this case. Appellant's

Brief at 6-9. The Magistrate Court relied upon the Bishop decision to conclude that the general
rule requires that claims sounding in tort do not survive the claimant's death. Memorandum

Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 9-12. The Estate contends that the Magistrate Court misapplied
the Bishop decision.

As discussed further below, the Magistrate Court did not err in its

application of the Bishop decision.
In Bishop, the Idaho Supreme Court discussed Idaho abatement law as follows:
The abatement rule holds that in the absence of a legislative enactment addressing
the survivability of a claim, the common law rules govern. Under the common
law, claims arising out of contracts generally survive the death of the claimant,
while those sounding in pure tort abate.
.. . The scope of an attorney's contractual duty to a client is defined by the
purposes for which the attorney is retained. Breach of an attorney's duty is
negligence in tort. The contract basis of legal malpractice actions is the failure to
perform obligations specified in the written contract. Thus, under the abatement
rule, breach of duty is an action in tort, not contract; that is, unless an attorney
foolhardily contracts with his client guaranteeing a specific outcome in the
litigation or provides for a higher standard of care in the contract, he is held to the
standard of care expected ofan attorney. Breach of that duty is a tort.
. . . [T]he contours of the duties owed by an attorney to his or her client are
defined by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. If an attorney and client
3
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want to provide for a higher standard of care, they may do so by express language
in the contract. Here, the standard of care in the contract is essentially the same as
in any attorney-client relationship. Because this claim sounds in tort, it abated
upon [the client's] death.

Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 620-21, 272 P.3d 1247, 1251-52 (2012) (citations omitted).
Similar to the attorney-client relationship at issue in Bishop, the contours of the duties
owed by a trustee to trust beneficiaries are defined by the Uniform Probate Code and Principal
and Income Act. Here, the Trust contains no greater requirements than are set forth in said
statutes. Therefore, the common law rule of abatement applies.
Because a breach of fiduciary duty arises in tort, it abates upon the injured person's death
under the common law. As such, the Estate's breach of fiduciary duty claim is abated unless a
statute precludes dismissal.
The statutory section that governs the survivability of negligence claims is Idaho Code
Section 5-327(2), which was amended in 2010 with the amendment taking effect on July 1, 2010.
The Magistrate Court correctly concluded that the Estate's claims are outside of the scope of
Idaho Code Section 5-327(2). See infra § ll(H).
As such, the Estate's negligence claims abated upon John H. Cornell's death and no
reversible error has been shown. The Magistrate Court's dismissal should be affirmed.
B.

There is no exception to the abatement rule for torts for injury to property.

The Estate argues that the Magistrate Court erred when it rejected its argument that an
exception to the general rule of abatement exists where damages are sought for injury to
property. Appellant's Brief at 9-11.

This issue was raised below and addressed by in the

Magistrate Court's decision as follows:
Kareen seeks to distinguish Bishop by relying on several Am. Jur. Cites. Kareen
argues that the survival of an action depends on the nature of the interest affected.
Because property of the Trust is involved, as opposed to physical injury, the claim
cannot be abated. 1 Am.Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival and Revival § 51 ....
While Kareen correctly sets forth these principles, she provides no explanation as
to how they are consistent with Bishop. The Supreme Court in Bishop did not
examine whether the claims were equitable or torts done to persons or to property
in determining whether the joint contract and tort action survives the death of the
party. . . . As Kareen's claims are in the nature of torts, Kareen's claims are
abated by John's death. Therefore, Kareen's arguments are rejected.

4
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Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 15-16.

The Estate argues that the purported exception to the general abatement rule for cases for
injury to property is "[o]ne of the well-recognized exceptions" under Idaho law. Appellant's
Brief at 9. In support of this "well-recognized exception," Mrs. Cornell cites to the Idaho cases

of Barnes v. Barnes, 135 Idaho 103, 15 P.3d 816 (2000), and First Sec. Bank of Idaho, Nat.
Assn 'n v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654,429 P.2d 386 (1967). See Appellant's Brief at 9, 10. Said cases

do not stand for the proposition that such an exception has been recognized under Idaho law.
The Barnes case was a divorce action where the husband died during the·pendency of an
appeal after entry of an interlocutory divorce.

There, the surviving wife sought to

"posthumously reunite the parties based on a procedural flaw in the motion for summary
judgment." Id. at 107, 15 P.3d at 820. The Barnes decision stands for the limited principle that
where a divorced spouse dies prior to resolution of the division of community property and
debts, the resolution of said division of property survives. Id. Said case does not discuss nor
recognize any exception to the abatement rule outside of a divorce proceeding.
The Rogers case was an interpleader action where a dispute arose between three creditors
over funds related to a contract dispute. 91 Idaho at 655, 429 P.2d at 387. The quote relied upon
by Appellant, "equity regards that as done which ought to be done," was part of a discussion of
the doctrine of equitable conversion. 91 Idaho at 657, 429 P.2d at 389; Appellant's Brief at 10.
Said case does not discuss nor recognize any exception to the abatement rule.
A review of Idaho case law finds no other cases that recognize or create an exception to
the general abatement rule discussed in Bishop v. Owens. See infra II(A).
For these reasons, no reversible error has been shown, and the Magistrate Court's
dismissal should be affirmed.

5
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C.

There is no exception to the abatement rule for claims based upon a remedial
statute.

The Estate argues that the Magistrate Court erred when it rejected its argument that an
exception to the general rule of abatement exists where damages are sought upon a remedial
statute.

Appellant's Brief at 11-12.

This issue was raised below and addressed by in the

Magistrate Court's decision as follows:
Kareen seeks to distinguish Bishop by relying on several Am. Jur. Cites. . ..
Kareen also argues that the claims under the Probate Code survive because "(a)
cause of action that is founded on a remedial statute survives the death of the
party possessing the cause of action." 1 Am.Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and
Revival§ 59.
While Kareen correctly sets forth these principles, she provides no explanation as
to how they are consistent with Bishop. The Supreme Court in Bishop did not
examine whether the claims were equitable or torts done to persons or to property
in determining whether the joint contract and tort action survives the death of the
party. Nor did the Supreme Court analyze whether the rules of professional
conduct are remedial in nature for for purposes of surviving the party's death. As
Kareen's claims are in the nature of torts, Kareen's claims are abated by John's
death. Therefore, Kareen's arguments are rejected.

Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 15-16.
Appellant relies upon a treatise, 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival and Revival§ 59, to
support the position that a cause of action founded upon a remedial statute does not abate upon
the injured party's death. The Estate cites to no Idaho authority to support said broad principle,
which is contrary to the principles established in the Bishop decision.
The Estate further relies upon Idaho Code Sections 15-7-306 and 15-3-808 in support of
its position that liability for a trustee to a beneficiary focuses upon injury to the estate or the trust
res, as opposed to the person. Appellant's Brief at 12. Said statutory provisions are essentially
identical with one another except that I.C. 15-7-306 applies to trustees and I.C. 15-3-808 applies
to personal representatives of decedent's estates.
Specifically, Idaho Code Section 15-7-306(b) provides that "[al trustee is personally
liable for obligations arising from ownership or control of property of the trust estate or for torts
6
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committed in the course of administration of the trust estate only if he is personally at fault." A
review of Idaho case law finds no cases analyzing this statutory section that support an exception
to the general rule of abatement for cases pursued under a remedial statute. Of the two found
reported decisions citing to LC. 15-7-306, the Dennett v. Kuenzli decision, 130 Idaho 21, 936
P .2d 219 (Ct.App. 1997), confirms that a trustee's assignment of an option contract from himself
personally to himself as trustee does not render the option contract inoperable, and the Ko/ouch
v. First Sec. Bank decision, 128 Idaho 186, 911 P.2d 779 (Ct.App. 1996), upholds an award of
extraordinary costs to the moving party in a removal action. Neither case is applicable here, nor
supports the conclusion that an exception to the general rule of abatement exists where damages
are sought upon a remedial statute.
For these reasons, no reversible error has been shown, and the Magistrate Court's
dismissal should be affirmed.

D.

The Magistrate Court correctly considered and applied the law in rejecting the
Estate's conversion claim.

The Estate seeks recovery under the equitable doctrine of conversion. Appellant's Brief
at 12-13.

The Magistrate Court rejected the Estate's conversion claim concluding that the

conversion claim are in the nature of torts, thus abated by Mr. Cornell's death. Memorandum

Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 15-16.
Appellant cites to no case law or statutory authority in support of her position that the
Estate now can pursue said conversation claim after John Cornell's death, but instead relies upon
a treatise, 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival and Revival § 59, without further authority or
relationship to Idaho law.
For these reasons, no reversible error has been shown, and the Magistrate Court's
dismissal should be affirmed.
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E.

The Magistrate Court correctly considered and applied the law in reiecting the
Estate's constructive trust claim.

The Estate seeks recovery under the equitable doctrine of constructive trust. Appellant's
Brief at 13-14. The Magistrate Court rejected the Estate's constructive trust claim concluding

that the Idaho Probate Code supplants equitable considerations and that th~ circumstances
necessitating creation of a constructive trust meets the definition of a tort.

Memorandum

Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 12-13.

"A constructive trust arises where legal title to property has been obtained through actual
fraud, misrepresentations, concealments, taking advantage of one's necessities, or under
circumstances otherwise rendering it unconscionable for the holder of legal title to retain
beneficial interest in the property." Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165, 168, 722 P.2d 474, 477 (1986)
(citing Davenport v. Burke, 30 Idaho 559, 167 P. 481 (1917)). A "constructive trust arises from
the legal title holder's wrongful actions and not from any intent to create a trust." Snider v.
Arnold, 153 Idaho 641, 289 P.3d 43 (2012) (citing Davenport v. Burke, 30 Idaho 599, 608, 167

P. 481,483 (1917)).
The Magistrate Court concluded that the Estate's constructive trust claim is a tort.
Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 12 (citing Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 619-20,

272 P.3d 1247, 1249-50 (2012)) ("Kareen requests a constructive trust to address the civil
wrong, the breach of duties Toni owed to John. As a cause of action sounding clearly in tort,
Kareen's request for a constructive trust must be rejected as abated.").
The Estate asserts that the Idaho decision of Brasch v. Brasch, 55 Idaho 777, 47 P.2d 676
(1935) holds that the survival of constructive trust claims is presumed.

The Brasch case

involved a dispute over whether a statute of limitations had run prior to a decedent's death. Id.
The Court concluded that the statute of limitations for the disputed claim had run during the
8
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decedent's lifetime, therefore the plantiffs demand was barred by the statute of limitations. Id.
at 780, 47 P.2d at 679. The case discussed the probate statute then in effect, which read: "If a
person entitled to bring an action die before the expiration of the term limited for the
commencement thereof, and the cause of action survive, an action may be commenced by his
representatives, after the expiration of that time, and within one year from his death[.]" Id at
679, 47 P.2d at 678 (LC. A., sec. 5-231) (emphasis added). The statute in question recognizes
the question of abatement by conditioning the tolling of a statute of limitations only where "the
cause of action survive[ s]." It does not recognize a presumption, instead a condition precedent.
The Estate argues that "Ms. Johnson ought to have distributed the Trust res as soon as
reasonably practicable when the Trust automatically terminated upon the death of Michael
Cornell. Ms. Johnson acted inequitably by retaining the Trust res in the name of the Trust, while
using it for her own benefit." As the Magistrate Court previously concluded in its Memorandum

Opinion dated February 15, 2013, "[t]he constructive trust argument is indistinguishable from
[the Estate's] arguments regarding breaches of fiduciary duties."
The Estate has provided no authority or explanation to explain the distinction it is
assep:ing, nor to show reversible error in rejecting its constructive trust claim. Therefore, the
Magistrate Court's dismissal should be affirmed.
F.

The Magistrate Court correctly considered and applied the law in reiecting the
Estate's uniust enrichment claim.

The Estate seeks recovery under the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment. Appellant's

Brief at 15. The Magistrate Court rejected the Estate's unjust enrichment claim concluding that
the unjust enrichment claim is in the nature of torts, thus abated by Mr. Cornell's death.

Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 15-16.

9
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"Unjust enrichment, as a fictional promise or obligation implied by law, allows recovery
where the defendant has received a benefit from the plaintiff that would be inequitable for the
defendant to retain without compensating the plaintiff for the value of the benefit." Great Plains

Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 123 Idaho 754, 767, 979 P.2d 627, 640 (1999)
(citing Continental Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler Supply Co., 95 Idaho 739, 743, 518 P.2d
1012, 1205 (1974)). Unjust enrichment claims involve claims based on an implicit promise to
pay. Id., 979 P.2d at 640.
As with the conversion and constructive trust claim, Appellant cites to no controlling
authority to support its assertion the Bishop abatement rule does not apply to claims arising in
equity.

Appellant's Brief at 15.

Further, Appellant provides no explanation of how the

Magistrate Court erred in its conclusion that "[a]s Kareen's claims are in the nature of torts,
Kareen's claims are abated by John's death." Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 16.
For these reasons, no reversible error has been shown, and the Magistrate Court's
dismissal should be affirmed.
G.

The Magistrate Court correctly considered and applied the law in rejecting the
Estate's breach of contract claim.

The Estate argues that the Magistrate Court erred by relying upon Bishop "to recharacterize the Estate's contract claims[.]" Appellant's Brief at 15-16.
The Magistrate Court discussed the Estate's breach of contract claim as follows:
Kareen argues that her breach of contract claim must be viewed as separate from
the breach of fiduciary claim and, as a contract claim, survives John's death. The
Supreme Court in Bishop addressed the same claim. In the absence of finding
that a higher duty of care is provided for under the Trust agreement than provided
under the statute, Bishop requires abatement of Kareen's claim. Bishop v. Owens,
152 Idaho at 620,272 P.3d at 1251. Kareen fails to point out any way in which
the Trust instrument imposes any duties upon Toni that are not also imposed by
the Probate Code. This Court stands by its more detailed analysis when
addressing John's claims that the Trust instrument gives no higher duty of care

10
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than the duty imposed by the Probate Code. Memorandum Op. Feb. 15, 2013 at
6-8.
Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 13-14. In the earlier opinion referenced therein, the

Magistrate Court discussed the Bishop decision to conclude that like Bishop, this case is a mixed
tort and contract case involving torts arising from a contractual agreement.

Memorandum

Opinion Feb. 15, 2013 at 6. The Magistrate Court further concluded that the duties owed by the

trustee to a beneficiary are defined by the Uniform Probate Code and Uniform Principal and
Income Act. Id. at 7. Violation of these fiduciary duties arising under statute is a tort, not a
contract. Id.
Specifically, the Bishop Court analyzed the interplay of tort and contract theories in the
attorney-client context as follows:
[T]he contours of the duties owed by an attorney to his or her client are defined by
the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. If an attorney and client want to
provide for a higher standard of care, they may do so by express language in the
contract. Here, the standard of care in the contract is essentially the same as in
any attorney-client relationship. Because this claim sounds in tort, it abated upon
Patricia Shelton's death.
Although the medical malpractice cases on which Owens relies are governed by
specific statute, the fact that a proponent labels his or her action as sounding in
contract as well as malpractice does not make the underlying action contract. The
"theory" of relief sought is not different. A holding to the contrary would create a
per se breach of contract action in every legal malpractice action. Legal
malpractice has traditionally been treated as the proper claim where an attorney
breaches his or her duty, which arises from the attorney-client relationship.
As noted in the previous section, because the contingent fee agreement in this
matter contained no express language providing for a higher standard of care, the
duty owed by Owens is not defined by the contingent fee agreement. The
language in the contingent fee agreement that "attorneys shall represent Client in
said manner and do all things necessary, appropriate, or advisable, in regard
thereto" is not materially different from the standard applied in the legal
malpractice claim. Thus, this action is really a malpractice claim disguised as a
contract claim. A person cannot change a tort action into a contract action simply
by labeling it as such. Hayward, 136 Idaho at 350, 33 P.3d at 824.
Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 620-21, 272 P.3d 1247, 1251-52 (2012)).
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Here, like in Bishop, Appellant's breach of contract claim is really a breach of fiduciary
duty claim disguised or labelled as a contract claim. The subject trust contained no provisions
providing for a higher standard of care than established in the Uniform Probate Code.
Appellant cites to no authority to support its assertions that "a breach of contract claim is
distinct from a breach of fiduciary duty claim." Appellant's Brief at 17. Appellant further
asserts that "[t]o argue that no contractual claim may lie against the trustee is to is to argue that
the terms of the trust document have no substance." Id. at 18. The trust document has substance,
but it is the same substance as found in statute. As such, the Estate's breach of contract claim
abates.
For these reasons, no reversible error has been shown, and the Magistrate Court's
dismissal of the Estate's breach of contract claim should be affirmed.
H.

The Magistrate Court correctly considered and applied LC. § 5-327(2)

The Estate argues that the Magistrate Court erred in its interpretation of Idaho Code
Section 5-327(2). Appellant's Brief at 18-20. The Estate contends that "the court's error was the
result of construing the language of the statute in such a rigid manner as to produce an absurd
result upon application." Id. at 18.
It is important to note that said statutory section was amended in 2010, where the Estate's
claims cover a time period relating back to December 15, 2009, which is the death of the last
grantor's death. In light of said amendment, a two-part analysis is needed to properly consider
the Estate's claims.
Prior to its amendment, which took effect on July 1, 2010, said statute read as follows:
Causes of action arising out of injury to the person or property, or death, caused
by the wrongful act or negligence of another, except actions for slander or libel,
shall not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer, and each injured person or the
personal representative of each one meeting death, as above stated, shall have a
cause of action against the personal representative of the wrongdoer; provided,
however, the punitive damages or exemplary damages shall not be awarded nor
penalties adjudged in any such action; provided, however, that the injured person
shall not recover judgment except upon some competent, satisfactory evidence
corroborating the testimony of said injured person regarding negligence and
proximate cause.
LC.§ 5-327 (through July 1, 2010) (emphasis added).

12
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In its prior form, the clear language of the statute reflects that survivability applied only
after the death of the wrongdoer, not the death of the injured party as the subsequent amendment
addressed. Because the amendment to Idaho Code Section 5-327(2) was not retroactive, said
amendment applied only to actions which arose on or after the statute's effective date. See
Bishop, 152 Idaho at 620, 272 P.3d at 1251. Therefore, the statute in its original form applies

from the death of Michael S. Cornell on December 15, 2009 until July 1, 2010. The Estate's
predecessor in interest, John Cornell, is the injured party and Toni Johnson the wrongdoer for
purposes of this appeal. Because the alleged "injured party" is the decedent as opposed to the
"wrongdoer," any claims of John Cornell that may have arisen between December 15, 2009 and
. July 1, 2010 abated upon his death. No reversible error has been shown, and the Magistrate
Court's dismissal as it relates to claims arising prior to July 1, 2010 should be affirmed.
The Estate's parsing of the current statute applies only to its claims that arose on or after
July 1, 2010. In its current form, Idaho Code§ 5-327(2) states in relevant part as follows:
A cause of action for personal injury or property damage caused by the wrongful
act or negligence of another shall not abate upon the death of the injured person
from causes not related to the wrongful act or negligence. Provided however, that
the damages that may be recovered in such action are expressly limited to those
for: (i) medical expenses actually incurred, (ii) other out-of-pocket expenses
actually incurred, and (iii) loss of earnings actually suffered, prior to the death of
such injured person as a result of the wrongful act or negligence.
The Estate argues that the limitation on recovery for medical expenses, other out-of-pocket
expenses, and loss of earnings applies only to personal injury cases, not cases involving property
damages. Appellant's Brief at 18-20. Said interpretation does not employ the well-recognized
principles of statutory interpretation cited to by Appellant. See Appellant's Brief at 19 (citing
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011); Smith v. Dept. of Employment,

100 Idaho 520, 522, 602 P.2d 18, 20 (1979)). Specifically, Appellant cites to no legislative
history that would support her conclusion. Appellant parses the second sentence of said statute
in an attempt to limit the statute's application to personal injury cases, thereby ignoring the
context of the entire document, which is clearly applicable to "a cause of action for personal
13
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mJury or property damage."

(emphasis added).

Appellant's interpretation relies upon

speculation and generalities (specifically that "medical expenses" rarely, in his opinion, are
incurred in property damage cases), in order to deviate from the plain and ordinary meaning of
"such action."

Further, said limited interpretation, which rejects its application to property

damages cases despite their specific inclusion by reference, departs from common sense and
reading. The Estate cites to no case law supporting this interpretation of the statute. For these
reasons, no reversible error has been shown and the Magistrate Court's application of Idaho
Code 5-327(2) should be affirmed.

III.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Respondent respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Judgment
for Dismissal and Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell, both entered June 21, 2013, and
the Memorandum Opinion re: Remand Order entered June 16, 2014.
DATED this

If

day of August, 2014.
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT1

This Court must determine whether, through the doctrine of abatement, Toni C. Johnson
can avoid repayment of her brother's estate, the Estate of John Cornell, for property losses from
admittedly improper conduct.
Johnson's arguments regarding common law abatement are based upon an expansive
interpretation of a single sentence in Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 619 (2012). Johnson
proposes an interpretation which would dictate that all claims which are torts-or which could be
re-characterized as torts-abate upon the death of the injured party, absent a statutory exception.
Johnson's interpretation conflicts with pre-Bishop and post-Bishop precedent, as well as the
language and facts from Bishop, itself.

The Court should reject Johnson's proposed

interpretation of Bishop. Without Johnson's proposed universal rule of abatement, the Court
must determine whether the Estate's claims fall within one of the exceptions to the general rule
that tort claims abate. The Estate's claims fall within three such exceptions: the exception for
claims seeking redress for injury to property; the exception for claims founded upon a remedial
statute; and the exception for claims that are not legal claims, but claims in equity.
Johnson's argument regarding the Estate's breach of contract claims proposes a legal
analysis whereby the court must re-characterize every breach of contract claim into a tort claim if
the contract does not provide for a higher standard of care than established at law. Johnson's

I

I
1

,--,

I

L

Petitioner sets forth a verbatim copy of her brief filed in the previous appeal of this matter, any
substantive change in text has been underlined.
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analysis should be rejected, as it would create an unsubstantiated and unworkable standard which
would, in practical effect, eliminate nearly all breach of contract claims.
Finally, Johnson's argument regarding statutory abatement under Idaho Code § 5-327(2)
sets forth a proposed interpretation which conflicts with the intent of the legislature, as
determined by the language of the statute, common sense, and reason.
The Estate requests that this honorable Court reverse the judgment of the magistrate
court.
ARGUMENT
A.

The Estate's Tort Claims Did Not Abate at Common Law.

Johnson argues that Bishop established the following universal statements as a rule of
law: All claims which can be characterized as a tort claim abate at common law unless a
statutory exception exists. See Resp. Br. 4, if2. Johnson's proposed rule of abatement would

L

prohibit the Estate from pursuing its claims against her for the property she wrongfully withheld
from her brother. Johnson's interpretation stretches Bishop far beyond the scope of its facts and
far beyond the Idaho Supreme Court's treatment of Bishop earlier this year in St. Luke's Magic
Valley Reg'! Med. Ctr. v. Luciani, 154 Idaho 37, 293 P.3d 661 (2013). In Luciani, the Court

made clear that Bishop did not establish a universal statement of law, but rather re-iterated what
had long been the rule at common law in Idaho: exceptions exist to the general rule that tort
claims abate. See id. at 42, 293 P.3d at 667.
The Bishop Opinion included a statement that "[u]nder the common law, claims arising
out of contracts generally survive the death of the claimant, while those sounding in pure tort
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abate." 152 Idaho 616, 619, 272 P.3d 1247, 1250 (2012). As set forth in the Estate's Opening
Brief, Johnson's interpretation of this sentence is erroneous. See App. Br., 7-9.

Johnson's

interpretation conflicts with (a) the language of the Bishop Opinion; (b) the Bishop Court's
citation to Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 184 P. 477 (1919) as authority; and (c) the post-

Bishop authority of Luciani.
I

The question before the Luciani Court was whether a legal malpractice claim could be

I

assigned as part of an asset and liability transfer from one entity to another. Luciani, 154 Idaho
at 39, 293 P.3d at 663. The Court's consideration of assignability included a discussion of its
precedent on survival in Bishop. Id. The issue of survival was raised by the defendants in

Luciani, likely because "[t]he assignability of a cause of action is ... intimately associated with,
and in most cases held to depend upon, the same principle as the survival of a cause of action.
Thus, if it survives, it may be assigned; if not, it may not." MacLeod v. Stelle, 43 Idaho 64, 249
P. 254, 257 (1926). The Luciani defendants argued that Bishop stood for the proposition that all
legal malpractice claims abated at common law-just as Johnson argues here-and, therefore,
that such claims are unassignable. Luciani, 54 Idaho at 43,293 P.3d at 667. The Court rejected
this reasoning.

II~

The Supreme Court first made clear that Bishop did not stand for the proposition that all
legal malpractice claims sounded in pure tort. Id. The Court then made clear that Bishop did not
stand for the proposition that every tort claim abated at common law.

[

The malpractice claim here sounds in tort and, therefore, the MacLeod case
provides some guidance. Although we stated that "if [a tort claim] survives, it
may be assigned; if not, it may not," we also held that an "injury [that] lessens the
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estate of the injured party does survive, and that it is assignable." 43 Idaho at 75,
249 P. at 257. If personal injury claims that "diminish the estate [and are] an
injury to property" may be assigned, it seems clear that personal injuries of the
type alleged here-malpractice leading to an alleged loss of millions of dollarsare precisely that. See id. The crux of St. Luke's lawsuit against Luciani is that the
alleged malpractice substantially impacted the value of the assets it acquired from
Magic Valley.

Id. (quoting MacLeod v. Stelle, 43 Idaho 64, 249 P. 254, 257 (1926)) (alterations in original).
Thus, the MacLeod Opinion is still good law in this jurisdiction with respect to the intimately
associated issues of assignability and survival.
Having established that the Bishop Opinion did not create a universal rule of abatement,
the question before this Court is whether the Estate's claims fall within any of the "wellrecognized exceptions" to the general rule that tort claims abate. See Kloepfer, 32 Idaho 415, 184
P. 477. The Estate's Opening Brief shows that its claims fall within three well-recognized
I

I_

exceptions: (1) the exception for claims seeking redress for injury to property, see App. Br. 9-11;
(2) the exception for claims founded upon a remedial statute, see App. Br. 11; and (3) the
exception for claims that are not legal claims, but claims in equity, see App. Br. 12-14.
(1) Tort claims seeking redress for injury to property are an exception to the general rule of
abatement.

I

I

The exception to abatement for claims seeking redress for injury to property is an
expressly identified exception in Luciani. 54 Idaho at 43, 293 P.3d at 667 ("[an] injury that
lessens the estate of the injured party does survive"). In her brief, Johnson does not provide

[
I_

analysis of the Luciani Opinion; instead, she argues that two other cited cases are inapposite. See
Resp. Br. 6 (disputing applicability of Barnes v. Barnes, 135 Idaho 103, 105, 15 P.3d 816,818
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(2000) & First Sec. Bank of Idaho, Nat. Ass 'n v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 657, 429 P.2d 386, 389

I

[
1-

(1967)).
The Estate directs this Court to Barnes as merely one example ofldaho courts' treatment
of a decedent's claims regarding property interests upon the decedent's death. Those claims do
not abate. The Estate directs this Court to Rogers as authority for the finding that, at the very
least, a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether John Cornell held a vested
property interest in the Trust res at the time of his death. By conceding inequitable conduct,
Johnson has conceded that John Cornell held an interest at the date of death; she merely argues
that her inequitable conduct succeeded in divesting him of that interest. Thus, Johnson has
conceded those facts necessary for the Estate to pursue its claim at trial.

I

l

The cases of Barnes and Rogers provide exemplary support for that which is explicitly
stated in Luciani, MacLeod, and Kloepfer: an estate may pursue the claims of the decedent
seeking redress for injury to property.
(2) Tort claims seeking redress based upon a remedial statute are an exception to the general
rule of abatement.

I

I~

Johnson's argument regarding this exception presumes that Bishop established a
universal rule against survivability. Johnson then proposes an analysis whereby the Court must
find abatement absent the provision of Idaho case law directly overcoming that universal rule.
As set forth in the Estate's briefing, Bishop provides no such universal rule.

Where no

controlling authority exists, Idaho courts look to other jurisdictions and sources in determining
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2
whether an exception should be recognized in Idaho.

The second edition of American

Jurisprudence sets forth the general rules of law for United States' jurisdictions based upon a
comprehensive review of case law. In fact, this same treatise was relied upon by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Luciani. 154 Idaho at 41 & 42, 293 P.3d at 665 & 666. The Estate supported
its reliance upon the second edition of American Jurisprudence by pointing out that the remedial
statutes ofldaho Code§§ 15-7-306 & 15-3-808 focus upon the injury to the Estate or trust res in
determining the liability of a personal representative or trustee. Thus, the statutory guidance on
these remedial statutes is consistent with the reasoning set forth in the Estate's Opening Brief. In
response, Johnson again argues that this Court must disregard such guidance and find abatement,
absent an express statement by the Supreme Court overturning Bishop. Johnson's argument fails

r··

because she presupposes the accuracy of her interpretation of Bishop before considering the
statutes, instead of allowing these authorities to guide the interpretation of Bishop.

l

Where

Johnson's proposed interpretation conflicts with nearly every other area of legal guidance, the
Court should find that the proposed interpretation fails, rather than finding that it somehow
constitutes a sea change to the state of the law. The Estate maintains that the magistrate court's
analysis was in error for the reasons set forth in the Estate's Opening brief.
(3) Tort claims based in equity and not in law do not abate.
2

See St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Luciani, 154 Idaho 37, 293 P.3d 661 (2013)
(looking to California, Nebraska, Indiana, Kansas, Virginia, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Michigan,
Minnesota, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Maine, ALR, and Am.Jur.2d); MacLeod v. Stelle, 43
Idaho 64, 249 P. 254, 255 (1926) (looking to California, New York, Wisconsin, Ohio, Kansas,
Montana, Connecticut, Alabama, Colorado, and multiple secondary sources); Kloepfer v. Forch,
32 Idaho 415, 184 P. 477 (1919) (looking to Virginia, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York,
Indiana, California, and Corpus Juris).
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With respect to the Estate's equitable claims, Johnson once again argues that this Court
must find that the Estate's claims abated absent controlling case law expressly providing for an
exception to the general rule in Bishop. This type of analysis runs contrary to the Idaho Supreme
Court's consideration of other jurisdictions and authorities when analyzing issues of assignment
and survival. 3 With respect to the Estate's arguments regarding the re-characterization of its
equitable claims as legal claims, Johnson provides no argument or analysis additional to that set
forth by the magistrate court. The Estate maintains that the magistrate court's analysis was in
error for the reasons set forth in the Estate's Opening brief.
B.

The Estate's Complaint States Separate Contract Claims.

Johnson proposes an interpretation of Bishop that not only created a universal rule of
abatement, but that also dictates that all other claims-whether in tort or contract, whether in law
or equity-ought to be re-characterized and held abated. The magistrate court erred in its
interpretation. In its Opening Brief, the Estate distinguished its contract claims from those found
in Bishop by setting forth the distinct factual scenarios, and identifying specific trust provisions
that required certain duties not identified in the Uniform Probate Code. Johnson argues that even
though the Estate has identified specific terms, it has still only made a tort claim because "no
3

Johnson challenges the Estate's citation to Brasch v. Brasch, 55 Idaho 777, 47 P.2d 676 (1935)
as appearing to presume survival. The Estate provided this citation as a supplement to the
general rule of survival of equitable claims, as set forth in the second edition of American
Jurisprudence. The Estate still maintains that the Brasch Court appears to presume survival. In
Brasch, the Court considered whether an estate could pursue a constructive trust claim on behalf
of a decedent. Id. The Brasch Court held that the estate could not pursue the claims because the
statute of limitations ran prior to institution of the suit. Id. The Court made no mention of
abatement.
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though the Estate has identified specific terms, it has still only made a tort claim because "no
provisions [of the trust] provid[e] for a higher standard of care than established in the Uniform
Probate Code." Resp. Br. 12, ,r1.
Johnson reasons that where (1) the law presumes a standard of care, (2) the contract does
not provide a distinct standard of care, and (3) the cause of action alleges a breach of that
standard of care, then the claim is made in tort and not contract. If Johnson's proposed reasoning
were to prevail, a contract cause of action would rarely exist. The law presumes a standard of
care in every contract, whether it be a standard of good faith and fair dealing or a higher standard
based upon the relationship of the parties. Johnson's attempt to distinguish contract claims from
tort claims based upon the document's identification of a unique standard of care is
unsubstantiated and unworkable.
C.

The Estate's Causes of Action Did Not Abate Under Idaho Code§ 5-327(2).

I

l~

The Estate was unable to identify Idaho case law addressing the application of the
language ofidaho Code§ 5-327(2) to claims of property damage. The Estate recognizes that the
legislature's choice of arrangement and wording is inarticulate. The Court is left with the task of
deriving the intent of the legislature. In accomplishing its task, the Court must determine if
common sense and reason counsel a finding that the legislature intended to limit property
damage cases to recovery for "medical expenses," "other out-of-pocket expenses" and "loss of

Il

earnings actually suffered" where those damages are incurred "prior to the death of such injured
period as a result of the wrongful act or negligence." For the reasons set forth in the Estate's
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Opening brief, the Estate maintains that the legislature did not intend the second sentence to
function as a limitation on property damage claims.
CONCLUSION
The property interests of a decedent survive the decedent, they do not die and they do not
abate.

The magistrate court erred in its expansive reading of Bishop and erred in its rigid

interpretation of Idaho Code § 5-327(2). The Estate asks this Court to reverse the grant of
summary judgment.
DATED this 11th day of August, 2014.
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

uel T. Creason, ISB #8183
ttomeys for Appellant
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IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF TIIE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF

Tiffi STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNY OF CLEARWATER

IN THE MATTER OF:

)
)
)

THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF )
:MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE
)
M.CORNELL.

CASE NO. CV 2012-277
MEMORANDUM OPINION

)
BACKGROUND

Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell, husband and wife, created a trust (Cornell
Family Trust) while living in California. They had two children, John Cornell and Toni Johnson,
both of whom survived their parents.

Arlie and Michael Cornell were originally co-trustees of their family trust. Arlie Cornell
died on November 9, 2008.

On August 6, 2009 Michael Cornell amended the trust and Toni Johnson was appointed
sole trustee.
Michael Cornell died on December 15, 2009.
The trust provided that the trustee would divide the trust property equally between Toni

Johnson and John Comell as soon as reasonably possible after the death of both trostors. Toni
Johnson did not distribute any of the trust property to John Cornell. Toni Johnson used the trust
property for her own benefit.
John Cornell filed a Petition for Supervised Administration of the Cornell family trust,
and removal of Toni Johnson as trustee on July 11 , 2012.
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John Cornell committed suicide on August 20, 2012.

The trust provided that if one of the beneficiaries died before receiving their share of the

trust assets, then their share would be distributed to the deceased beneficiaries' issue, and if there

was no issue, then to the surviving beneficiary.
Kareen Cornell, wife of John Cornell, was appointed personal representative of John
Cornell's estate on February 6, 2013Kareen Cornell also requested that Toni Johnson be removed as trustee and the
administration of the trust be supervised.
Affidavits were filed and the Magistrate treated the motion as one for summary judgment_
The Magistrate,s opinion was issued on February 15, 2013. That order dismissed John Comell,s
petition for supervised administration of the Camell family trust and petition for removal of I oni
Johnson as trustee.

Toe Magistrate issued a summary judgment dismissing Kareen Cornell's petition on June
21) 2013.
The Magistrate determined that any claims of John Cornell to the property of the trust
were abated upon his death. The Magistrate did not set forth reasons for not removing Toni
Johnson as trustee.
Toe matter was remanded for findings regarding not removing Toni Johnson as trustee.
The Magistrate used his discretion in not removing Toni Johnson as trustee, even though she
,•

breached her fiduciary duties as trustee, because under the terms of the trust she would receive
all of the property after John Cornell died.
Kareen Camell appeals the Magistrate's order.of June 16, 2014.

APPELLATE ISSUES
Did the Magistrate err is determining that .Toni Johnson's breach of fiduciary duty to
John Cornell was a tort which abated upon his death?

LEGAL STANDARD
The court defers to the trial court's findings of fact if supported by substantial competent
evidence, but exercises free review of the law and its application to the facts.

MEMORANDUM OPINION-2
763

Oct.24.2014 1:08PM

No. 6063

P. 8

DISCUSSION
Paragraph 4.03 of the Cornell Family Trust provides that upon the death of the surviving
trustor, the trustee shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net assets of the trust into two

equal shares, one for Toni Johnson, and the other for John Cornell. Toni Johnson had a fiduciary
duty established by the trust and I.C. 15-7-301 to expeditiously distribute the net assets of the
estate. Toni Johnson breached her fiduciary duty.
Paragraph 4.03(a) of the trust document provides that if a beneficiary of the trust dies
before their share is distributed, then that share would be distributed to the deceased
beneficiaries' issue, and if no issue, then to the surviving beneficiary.

Jobn Cornell had no issue.
By not distributing John Cornell's share of the trust estate to him for almost 3 years Toni

Johnson reaped the benefit of not perform.mg her fiduciary duties.
There was no evidence presented of a contract between John Cornell and Toni Johnson.
CONCLUSION
The Magistrate correctly classified John Cornell's cause of action as one in tort not
contract. The Magistrate also correctly determined that a cause of action in tort abates under
common law upon the death of the claimant. The Magistrate also correctly determined that the

legislature has not provided any statutory exception to this abatement
The Magistrate did not abuse his discretion when he did not remove Toni Johnson as
trustee for breach of her fiduciary duties.
The Magistrate's order dismissing John Cornell's, and later Kareen Cornell's, petitions to

remove Toni Johnson as trustee of the Cornell Family Trust, and petitions for supervised
administration of the trust should be affirmed.

Dated thls·2._'ftiay of October, 2014.

Griffin

Michael J.
District Judge
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The Appellant, The Estate of John Henry Cornell, acting through its personal

representative, Kareen Cornell, (hereinafter the "Estate") appeals against the above named
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Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Opinion and Order re: Appeal
entered in the above entitled action on the 24th day of October, 2014, Honorable Judge Michael
J. Griffin presiding, which affirmed the Magistrate Court's September 22, 2014, Judgment.
2.

That Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to
Idaho Appellate Rule 1 l(a)(2).
3.

The statement of issues on appeal that the Estate intends to assert is as follows:

Issue 1.

Whether the Court erred in finding that any claims to the Trust res
by, through, or on behalf of John Henry Cornell abated upon the
death of John Henry Cornell?

Issue 2.

Such other issues that may later be raised by Appellant.

4.

An Order has not been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

A reporter's transcript has not been requested.

6.

The Appellant requests no additional documents to be included in the clerk's

record in addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rule 28.
7.

The Appellant requests no additional documents, charts, or pictures offered or

admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court.
8.

I certify:
a.

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of

the trial or proceeding, though no transcript. has been requested, as named below at the address
set out as follows:
Keith Evans
K&K Reporting
P.O. Box 574
Lewiston, Idaho 83539
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b.

That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee

because no transcript was ordered.
c.

That the estimated fee for fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been

d.

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant

paid.

to Idaho Appellate Rule 20.
DATED this ~

day of December, 2014.

uel T. Creason, ISBN:
~ttomey for Personal Representative of
Estate of John Henry Cornell
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I, Barbie Deyo, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Clearwater, do hereby certify:
That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being
forwarded to the Supreme Court on Appeal.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS
to the Record:
1.

Transcript of a Motion To Dismiss Hearing held June 4, 2013, filed August 2, 2013.

IN WITNESS WHEREOf, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said
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day of February, 2015.
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Clerk of the District Court
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County of Clearwater, do hereby certify that the above foregoing
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